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

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Eyewitness in Warsaw

AUGUST 1956

by LEON Ó BROIN

OUR first view of Warsaw was not prepossessing.* We approached it from the airport along cobbled roads through which the grass was showing. We passed a large military barrack area, then into the ruined outskirts of the city where we ran into crowds of people waiting for trams and buses to take them home from work. As we later realized, there was a grave shortage of transport and at rush hours the usual thing was to see scores of people hanging dangerously from the trams in the way I had seen them at the end of the war in France and Belgium. The general picture as we came to the centre of the city was exceedingly strange. Despite ten years of reconstruction there were vast areas of ruins everywhere and standing up amongst them, visible from every angle, was the fabulous Palace of Culture and Science.

The Palace of Culture runs to thirty-eight floors, access to which is given by a huge system of lifts ; it embodies an enormous theatre, a cinema, restaurants, endless rooms and galleries ; and it has a good deal of statuary inside and out, some of it very good. My first feeling on seeing this monstrous building standing in the middle of the enormous square built over the ruins of Warsaw was that it had been put there as a rival to St Peter's in Rome, to give the minds of the Catholic people of Poland a new focus. All day long the place was being visited by swarms of people, many of them in groups organized by the Communist Party, but I gathered from conversations with some of the visitors that the building was not altogether popular. One man with whom I spoke openly criticized its erection and could not understand why 200,000 rooms had not been provided instead for the people of Warsaw, many of whom were still so badly off for accommodation. The Palace also provides office accommodation for a Marxist University. While I was there an exhibition of Roumanian achievement was opened : the usual assortment of photographs of happy workers and peasants, with statistics showing spectacular production increases.

Almost equally extraordinary and out of place was our skyscraper hotel, the Warszawa. It was rated, we gathered, as a second class hotel : I suppose that roughly it lived up to that rating. Yet everybody on the

*The author was attending a Conference of the Comité Consultatif International des Radiocommunications.

hotel staff, including the waiters and the floor managers, smoked quite openly and seemed to have little sense of discipline. Many of them were manifestly inexperienced ; this may have been due to the operations of the party system which, we were told, was prone to put square pegs in round holes. What mattered for a job was one's membership of the Party, not any particular competence for the job itself. We heard of many instances of the dire effects of this system on the efficiency of public life and on business projects.

From the film lists in the hotel (which had its own cinema) and from theatre notices on the hoardings in the streets, one got the impression of a serious mind behind the selection of plays and pictures. I had heard, of course, of the puritanical mentality of the regime in Russia and was not, therefore, surprised by the complete absence of what we recognize as " popular cinema ". The same observation applies to the highly coloured pictorial art we know in the West. There were hardly any coloured magazines on view in the shops or kiosks, and those I saw were of poor quality. In the reading room of the hotel there was an accumulation of papers and magazines from Communist countries or from Communist sources inside capitalist countries, and these uniformly lacked the stress on sex and glamour that we associate with similar productions in the West. They were all of a sober character. Some of them, particularly the magazines from Russia, contained many admirable reproductions.

Talking about papers reminds me how much the English *Daily Worker* was in evidence. It was displayed prominently in the hotel shop and elsewhere, always many days out of date and always carrying a depreciatory headline about the British Government. Nobody bought it, nor for that matter any of the various middle and high-brow magazines of Communist origin that were on sale. There was a demand for some of the local morning and evening papers but the interest in them was, I believe, in the domestic news and particularly in the sporting events. These papers were 4-page affairs, printed crudely on bad paper with little or no pictures and, of course, no advertisements, because in a Communist society advertising is superfluous. It would have been superfluous in Poland in any event for another reason, for as I saw later there did not appear to be much in the shops to buy or much money to buy with.

It was strange to be in a place where one could not get newspapers one wanted to read, nor to be able to listen to the wireless, and to be without letters from abroad. Day followed day without my receiving any of the letters I knew were being sent to me by airmail. Eight days had passed before I got the first message from home. It contained a copy of the *Irish Times* which I found interesting to scan for domestic news but the international news—it was the time of the Suez crisis— was so stale as to make the paper valueless from that point of view. It was

fascinating, nonetheless, to read of so much excitement in the outside world, of all the comings and goings of politicians, without having been aware of them as they happened. It made me realize what an Iron Curtain is. Gradually I found myself peeping into the Communist papers, even trying to pierce the hieroglyphics of *Pravda* to see what was happening in the world. This, too, was a pointer to how easy it is to come under the influence of a regime. The local papers could be relied upon to give the Party line unrelentingly. Reading them regularly through mere curiosity was bound to have its effect on one's loyalty to another cause.

I could not help feeling suspicious about the post. Six to eight days was an unconscionable length of time for airmail letters to come from Dublin to Warsaw, which an indicator outside the Palace of Culture and Science constantly reminded me was only a matter of 1,440 kilometres. Letters were taking the same time to travel in the opposite direction. What hanky panky was going on ? These delays were well understood by the population ; indeed one Pole said, not without humour, that the ordinary surface routes were faster than airmail.

There was a censorship, the full ramifications of which I could only guess at. Letter boxes went in pairs : one red, the other yellow. The red box was for foreign mail and one was required to put one's letter *open* into that box. This was said to be necessary in the interest of the national currency—as if anybody would bother about exporting zlotys. I had been specifically warned by my Dublin bank on no account to bring any back because I could get nothing for them. But the pretence saved the authorities the trouble of opening the letters and muted the whole population in the matter of communication with the outside world. I posted a couple of letters home before I became aware of this regulation ; I have reason to believe that they were opened before they left Warsaw. A letter from me to a friend in Poland produced no reply. As a result, therefore, of the belief that a censorship was being practised, we found ourselves writing the most ridiculously empty letters to our families and looking for chances to have our letters posted outside Poland. When I was leaving Warsaw I performed this service myself for some friends.

* * *

I spent as much time as I could out in the streets among the people. Warsaw probably suffered more devastation than any other European city during the war. It was destroyed to the extent of about 80 per cent, and even after ten or eleven years of rebuilding a vast amount still remains to be done. Dangerous buildings have been knocked down all over the place and as a result many open spaces have been left through which wider streets are being cut, or on which the process of rebuilding has not yet begun.

It is not easy for an outsider to appraise the rate and quality of reconstruction. From the architectural point of view the new buildings appear to suffer a great deal from lack of variety and modernity. The best job appears to have been done in the Stare Miasto or old town area where picturesque buildings, squares and archways dating back as far as the 11th century have been reconstructed in their original styles.

Here I found an attractive restaurant or coffee shop, called the Crocodile, which I imagine must be the successor of Fukien's, a famous house described in the pre-war travel books as having first opened its doors in 1610. The entrance hall, with its wrought-iron emblems, and the waitresses dressed in traditional costumes make this an outstanding place of elegance in Warsaw and one that is well adapted to the old-world atmosphere of the square outside. But even the Crocodile lacked, as did the other kawarnias (cafés), that note of cheerfulness we expect to find in such places. What this was due to I would not care to say exactly—it may be that the Poles, easygoing and lethargic, refuse to pull out an extra stop as we do when we take a meal in public. Another, and not unlikely, reason is the fact that they cannot have much to eat or drink on these occasions. If they order a cake with their tea, they get a cake, not a plateful of cakes from which to pick and choose, as is our practice. A senior engineer, doing a major job of reconstruction in the City, told me as he sat in a café with his wife that he could never afford to buy the glass of cognac I had been sipping. He could buy it only at the expense of essentials. So, no wonder that even a crowded café on a Sunday night, consisting of people leisurely sipping their unpleasant coffee or their tolerable tea, was a place of relative quiet, in which the piano could easily be heard above the conversation.

Between this part of the city and my hotel is a non-residential quarter, about a half-mile in length, abounding in Government buildings, churches, academies and palaces of one sort or another. Here the Philharmonic Hall has been rebuilt and the old Opera House and other art buildings were undergoing a leisurely reconstruction. But the reconstruction seemed only to re-create a certain out-of-date, provincial, though admittedly pleasant quality. One could not stray far away, however, without coming upon the vacant spaces again, the flattened-out rubble heaps and the skeletons of buildings awaiting the reconstruction gang. It will be many, many years before Warsaw will have shed the traces of what it endured in the terrible years of war. Never again, one ventures to suggest, will it acquire the reputation it held in the 18th century of being, next to Paris, the most brilliant city in Europe.

A very large number of such buildings as exist are used by the regime either for the work of government departments or for Party purposes. There are no less than thirty-three Ministers of State ; and as the system of government involves the regulations of the lives of the people at every

stage, this large number appears less formidable than at first sight. Governmental authority confronts the people at every hand's turn. It is most evident to the visitor in the field of housing accommodation. Primarily because of war destruction there is an accommodation crisis in Warsaw, but so far as I could judge the crisis went much deeper than that. In fact it went down to the fundamentals of Communism which insist that there should be no distinction between class and class. The immediately obvious effect of this is that there are no private houses and no incentive to individuals to build. People, regardless of their profession or vocation, are compelled to live with one another in those large unadorned blocks of rooms. They cannot be called blocks of flats, because what most people had, as far as I could see, were small single rooms and the use of a kitchen, shared by six or eight families.

I was not in any of these blocks of rooms and so cannot say what they are like on the inside. Externally they are plain, utilitarian buildings and all seem to have been built to the same design. Their appearance was terribly monotonous ; and I shudder to think what the city will be like when the huge gaps have been filled up with buildings of this kind. The effect is bound to add to the drabness and dreariness of the people's lives.

The streets of Warsaw are clean and well-kept, much beyond our standards. The people use the waste-paper receptacles, and the street cleaners do a much more thoroughgoing job than their opposite numbers in Dublin. Such cleaners as I saw were women ; they swept the streets with brooms, and at one end of the handle was a metal scraper for removing dung or for penetrating between sets. The cleaners carried a metal container into which they swept the dirt, emptying it from time to time into a bin nearby.

The clean condition of the streets reflects, I imagine, the tidy habits of the people themselves, habits that were acquired the hard way many years ago. Before the war the police had power to impose fines on the spot for breaches of traffic regulations and for throwing paper on the ground. The discipline thus learned explains also, no doubt, how naturally the Poles queue for everything. The queue begins at the meat counter, crocodiles around the shop and out into the street. They queue even for the evening newspapers. But needless to remark they do not like it a bit, and say so. It is apparently frowned on to announce by a notice in a shop window that any particular line of commodities is not available. The result of this is that often, after hours of waiting, the customer arrives at the counter only to discover that he had been completely wasting his time : not merely that supplies had run out, but that there had been no supply at all of that commodity on that day.

Reverting, however, to the tidy habits of the Poles, it is evident that they have learned to make a little go a long way. Clothing is scarce and

dear ; budgets are tight ; and personal wardrobes are rather empty. Yet one got the impression that the people were comfortably enough dressed. This must mean that a good deal of care is taken with whatever one has, and that home industry is largely relied on to keep up appearances. Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that the people of Warsaw could teach us a lesson in the economical use of God's gifts.

Warsaw is a city of unattractive, small shops, each specializing in some line or other, but they have one unusual feature in common, the failure of their occupiers to dress the windows attractively. They simply leave a wretched garment or two on view, with dust accumulating unashamedly on them. Women used lipstick, but apparently no other cosmetics. Nearly all of them went bare-legged : there are no nylons to be had outside the Black Market and the women, sensibly, were not interested in the cheap-looking alternatives. One could see that the people were on the move all the time to find something new, something they really needed and whenever a supply of these things came to a shop an immediate concentration in that direction was observable.

Wages obviously go mainly on food, and on food of the simplest kind. Meat, particularly fresh meat, was scarce : there were always queues, of men as well as of women, in the butchers' shops, but what people got mainly was sausages of some sort. They rarely seemed to be taking fresh meat away with them. With little meat in their diets, it follows that the people must live largely on bread, potatoes and vegetables. The bread is not of the white kind we insist upon having here ; it probably uses up more of the wheat than we do and is none the worse for that. In our hotel potatoes were served in quantities with every dish ; there seemed to be plenty of cauliflowers and beans. This, no doubt, reflected the condition of the outside market. But, as in the hotel, there was little or no fruit available to the people.

It was not difficult in these circumstances to believe that, despite appearances, many people were genuinely undernourished and that hunger was the real cause of the riots in Poznan. The Government admitted as much when they spoke of certain economic difficulties, but of course they put the real blame for the disorders on the capitalist agents working among the people. On all sides, among both the supporters of the regime and its critics, one heard it said that " things are already getting better ". This was meant to imply that an improvement had set in following the death of Stalin and the elimination of the personality cult. If it be true, and it probably is, how incredibly bad things must have been before.

Nothing was more noticeable in Warsaw than the absence of smiles and laughter. And it is a feature of which the regime is itself aware. That is how I explain the Picasso-like drawing to be seen high up on the side of a destroyed building in the centre of the city bearing the legend

Nous Sommes Joyeux. Nothing could be more grotesquely out of tune with reality. This is a joyless people if ever there was one. They are back in the condition in which George Brandes found them when he visited Warsaw in 1886. At that time the Russians were also in control. " Laughter indeed is not forbidden ", Brandes wrote, " but it forbids itself. It is so rare that a foreigner who late at night in the society of his acquaintances laughs aloud at some conceit, sees the police and gendarmes assemble with signs of astonishment. I never heard any laughter in the streets of Warsaw but my own. Silence and seriousness are the two traits which above all are characteristic of Poland. It is a land where no one publicly expresses mirth."

* * *

In striking contrast to all this were the entertainments and receptions provided for members of the Conference during my stay. The receptions were splendid affairs, especially that for the Conference as a whole which was held partly within the Halls of the Council of Ministers and partly in the terraced grounds outside. There was a lake and trees and an orchestra and dancing—a beautiful setting for a beautiful evening. The food and drink, the dressing of the tables and the service were of a quality wholly superior to anything I had seen elsewhere in Warsaw.

This function was largely made by the ladies, not merely the wives of the delegates—there were not many of these anyway—but the women attached to the secretariates and auxiliary services, including of course a large local element. The Polish ladies were naturally delighted to be asked but the invitation created a serious embarrassment for some of them. They had no dress clothes, indeed I imagine that they had not much more than what they stood up in. Some of them came to the women-translators and secretaries from Geneva and asked if they could spare a frock or anything that would help to make them look a little more decorative for the occasion. When I heard of this it convinced me more than anything else of the miserableness of the whole set-up. (It also made intelligible to me why Nina Ponomareva could steal five cheap hats in London. The eternal feminine will always break through.)

These little tragi-comedies did not dim the splendour of the entertainments set before us. Indeed, the splendour and elegance which we saw at the open-air performance of the " Mazowsze " song and dance ensemble in Lazienki Park and at the subsequent garden party seemed oddly out of place in a workers' republic. It was definitely *ancien régime*, something the hungry insurgents of Poznan would hardly understand. However, it would be improper of those of us who enjoyed these occasions not to applaud the Polish government for its success in this particular sphere.

DECEMBER 1956

by PATRICK O'CONNOR

SOFTLY, on a grand piano, a white-haired pianist played *Alexander's Ragtime Band, Tipperary* and *Happy Days Are Here Again.* A party of Chinese, including one girl, ate pork cutlets and ice cream at a table surmounted by a Chinese Communist flag. Another table was decorated with a small North Korean Communist flag. The large wall-mirrors showed members of the Polish United Workers' Party, Communists and fellow-travellers from other satellite countries, a Negro who carried a British passport, and half-a-dozen foreign journalists, dining at well-appointed tables.

This was the dining-room of the Hotel Bristol, number 42, Krakowskie Przedmiescie, Warsaw. Like all hotels and restaurants and most other businesses in Poland today, it is operated by the government. The Bristol—I wonder how it got its name—caters for foreign tourists, official delegations and such Poles as can pay the tariff.

The mirrors in that ornate room had reflected, in turn, the uniforms of Czarist Russia, free Poland, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, before the advent of the present Polish People's Republic. Even within the past year they have reflected changes. A Pole with whom I spoke in the dining-room said : " Do you realize that I could not have talked to you like this, one year ago ? " He certainly could not, for several reasons. First, it was too dangerous to be seen talking to any foreigner other than a recognized Communist. Secondly, he himself was in jail. Thirdly, under the pre-October Polish regime, I could not have entered the country.

Just four weeks after the dramatic events of October 1956, I went to the London embassy of the Polish People's Republic to enquire about a visa. I still remember how sharply the policeman stationed at the street-corner glanced at me as I walked up to the door. I was received with courtesy and was assured that my request would probably be granted without much delay. I stated my business clearly. I was an Irish missionary priest, foreign correspondent for the N.C.W.C. (National Catholic Welfare Conference) News Service, which has its headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Precisely three weeks after I posted my application from Ireland, I received a letter saying that my visa was ready, for a visit to begin on December 15 and to end on December 31. (I had asked for four weeks.) The earliest I could arrive was December 21. In Warsaw the foreign press section of the Foreign Ministry readily obtained an extension for me up to January 5.

No sane man would enter a Communist-ruled country without some misgivings. I had mine when at last I stood in the airport of Okecie,

outside Warsaw, in the cold, wintry dusk of the Feast of St Thomas the Apostle. Behind me, only three and one-half hours' flight away, lay Amsterdam, which I had left that forenoon, and the free world of the West. The 'plane I had arrived on was already loading for the return journey. From a small waiting-room, where a copy of *Pravda* lay on a table, I looked out at that plane as at a last link with the world outside the Iron Curtain.

I was agreeably surprised to find all the officials obliging and the formalities no more than a minimum. Neither then nor afterwards was I subjected to search or police interrogation. I could move freely, could carry a camera and could send despatches without submitting them to censorship. This was indeed different from life under the Communist regimes of the Far East. The events of October in Poland had been truly revolutionary, even though Communism had not been actually dethroned.

My first impressions of Poland were sombre. In Dublin, London, Dusseldorf and Amsterdam the December evenings had been bright with lights and Christmas decorations. As I flew in over the snow-covered fields of Poland, I was struck by the fewness of lights in the dark patches formed by villages and farm-houses. The airport had just enough lights for operations. The bus that brought me into the city was obviously inferior to the shiny vehicles that had taken me to and from the brilliantly-lit airports of the West. The streets of Warsaw were adequately lighted but no more. Neon signs were few and simple. Outside the airline office I waited a long time on the snow-wet pavement while a friendly official sought a taxi for me. In the end it was a private car, old and shabby, that brought me, for the price of a taxi, to the hotel.

Just inside the hotel door I was immediately reminded that I was in a Communist-ruled country : the news-stand offered a monotonous line of Communist publications, the *Daily Worker, Humanité, Pravda, Izvestia* and the rest. The Hotel Bristol, large and comfortable, was operated by Orbis, the government travel bureau. I had bought previously from the official agency in London Orbis coupons for second-class meals and lodgings : second-class means a room to yourself, without bath, and meals which though less than first-class were certainly ample. The main drawback in the dining room was the service, so slow that a full meal would take from two to three hours. Time was too precious to waste so I lost weight and money as there was no reimbursement for unused coupons except for a full day's set. The cost worked out at about £5 a day.

* * *

I spent hours trudging through Warsaw streets in snow and slush. Taxis were scarce. During a great part of the day the trams, trolley buses and motor buses were intolerably overcrowded. One afternoon

I found myself so tightly wedged inside a packed bus that I could not dismount at my destination. I had to ride helplessly back into the centre of the city.

As I went through the streets, nobody bothered me. I feel sure that I was not shadowed. Whenever I had to ask my way, people were very kind and helpful. Twice, on crowded trains, when I was standing in the corridor, someone insisted on finding a seat for me. In Cracow I arrived at the post-office with a press cable on a busy afternoon. A long line of men and women stretched from the telegraph window where apparently various kinds of business were transacted. I went to the end of the line to take my turn. A new-found friend, however, told the people that I was a priest from Ireland, a correspondent for the Catholic press. Thereupon they all insisted that I should go up to the top of the queue.

I spoke no more than ten words of Polish. As the Poles I had met in other lands were good linguists, I counted on finding persons in Poland with whom I could talk in English or French. I was not disappointed. With priests I could fall back on Latin. In a railway restaurant car I met a Latin-speaking layman, an ex-seminarian.

Occasionally I observed the shadow of doubt, especially among the clergy. Never have I seen my *celebret* scrutinized more closely. I realized that I was probably the first priest from outside the Iron Curtain to visit Poland in years. Any foreign priests who had come in recent times had come from other satellite countries, where governments gave travel permits to few except " progressivist " collaborators.

I was staying in a hotel, a fact that in itself warranted suspicion. Polish priests who stayed in hotels were usually the selfstyled " Patriots " or members of the government-sponsored Pax organization. Bishops, priests and people distrusted everybody and everything connected with Pax. Pax, headed by a layman, Boleslaw Piesecki, was a political and social, rather than a religious, movement. It was fostered by the government (and the U.B., secret police), however, with the evident purpose of controlling the Catholic body. Its weekly review, *Dzis i Jutro* ("Today and Tomorrow ") was condemned by the Holy See, but the government obliged the Pax group to publish it for nearly a year afterwards. With the change in Communist leadership, the organization had fallen from favour. It was being criticized in the press and had been obliged to curtail its activities. But it had not been dissolved. It still published a daily paper.

About ten priests, most of whom had been active with the partisans during the war, were closely associated with Pax. Some scores of priests were involved less deeply. The Polish hierarchy had warned priests and faithful against the Pax movement several times but had never banned it outright. No Pax priest has been excommunicated or suspended by name.

Along the streets of Warsaw I joined passers-by in window-shopping. Many of the shop windows bore a sort of shield with letters such as M.H.D. These were the initials of the government branch operating that line of business. Except for a small number of privately owned shops, most of which sell luxury goods, all retail business has been taken over by the State. (Already in December the government was talking of allowing more private ownership in both industry and commerce.)

To me, having just changed money at the official rate of 11 zlotys to the £, the prices marked on merchandise were staggering. A pair of boots for a twelve-year-old boy cost 300 zlotys or £27. A ball-point pencil was marked 54 zlotys or £4 18s. 0d. Of course the only way to judge prices as they affect the people is to compare them with earnings. An unskilled labourer or a beginner in a government office receives from 600 to 700 zlotys a month. A doctor's wage is from 1,200 to 1,600 zlotys a month. An average monthly wage would be about 1,000. From such earnings a Pole must pay from 500 to 750 zlotys for a fair pair of boots or shoes. A pull-over sweater will cost him from 350 to 500 zlotys. A moderately good meal in a restaurant will cost about 30 zlotys. Rents are low, but housing is dreadfully inadequate.

In down-town Warsaw two elaborate structures, built since the war, stand out, for several reasons. One is the vast, cream-coloured *Palac Kultury i Nauki imienia Josefa Stalina,* the " Palace of Culture and Science in the Name of Joseph Stalin." This monstrous edifice is a gift from the Soviet Union, imposed on Warsaw during Stalin's heyday. Its 30-odd floors include a theatre, restaurant, museums, assembly rooms and offices. On the fourth floor there is a sketchy but well-planned museum of plaster models, purporting to prove the evolutionary theory that is one of the basic dogmas of Marxism. The eleventh floor boasts a museum of Marxism-Leninism.

A massive seven-storey building, erected since the war and occupying a city block, stands in the centre of Warsaw. This is the Party headquarters. In Warsaw you do not ask " What party ? " One is supreme : the PZPR, the Polish United Workers' Party, that is, the Communist Party. One sees many buildings that house government ministries and commissions in Warsaw. There is a parliament, the Sejm. But it is from the Party headquarters that Poland has been governed. Parliament, ministries and all have had to take their orders from the Party.

Mr Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Party, is the acknowledged ruler of the Polish People's Republic. So was his predecessor in office. The Premier, Mr Joseph Cyrankiewicz, is subordinate to Mr Gomulka both in power and in the Party. Mr Gomulka holds no government office. He was not even a member of the parliament until the elections of 20 January 1957.

The strengthening of the parliament is one of the changes promised

by Mr Gomulka. It is not yet clear how far he may go in this reform. In his epoch-making speech before the Central Committee of the Party on 20 October he said : " The principle that the Party and its organization do not govern but serve only as guide, that government belongs to the State . . . must be expressed concretely and in practice. . . . The parliament has for its prime task the exercise of supreme legislative and controlling power."

A commonly heard complaint is that Russia forced Poland to go too fast and too far into heavy industry : the ambitious six-year plan launched in 1949 is now known to have failed in many respects ; with the exception of a still large proportion of farms privately owned, all Polish industry, new and old, is socialized. How productive has this Communist system proved to be ?

We can go to Mr Gomulka's speech of 20 October for a partial answer.[1]

He noted that, in 1955, 20½ million more tons of coal had been mined than in 1949. But 15.5 per cent of the miners' work hours in 1955 had been overtime. Soldiers and prisoners had been sent into the mining industry. Each year the turn-over in the mining personnel has been " enormous ". " The system of Sunday work was introduced, which was to ruin the health and strength of the miners and at the same time to prevent the proper maintenance of mining installations."

Was more coal produced per individual worker during the six years ? Per worker engaged in actual mining the daily output was 7.7 per cent less in 1955 than in 1949. Per person employed in the mining industry, including surface staffs, the daily output was 12.4 per cent less. It was 36 per cent less in 1955 than in 1938, the last year before the pre-war Polish Republic was overwhelmed.

Mr Gomulka also gave interesting figures on agricultural production. Privately-operated farms occupy 78.8 per cent of the arable land. State-sponsored cooperatives occupy 8.6 per cent and State farms 12.6 per cent. In 1955 the privately-operated farms produced 83.9 per cent of the country's agricultural yield. The cooperatives produced 7.7 per cent. The State farms produced 8.4 per cent. The value per hectare of the yield from privately-operated farms was 621.10 zlotys ; from the co-operatives, 517.30 zlotys ; from the State farms, 393.70 zlotys. Some of the cooperatives were unable to pay the minimum daily wage from their intake. They solved their problem by postponing repayment of money due to the State for credits, fertilizers and the use of machines, substantial advantages that should have enabled them to prosper. " It is a sad picture", Mr Gomulka commented. " With considerable resources, they had produced less at a higher cost."

[1]This and subsequent quotations from Mr Gomulka's speech are from the official French translation issued by PAP, the Polish Press Agency.

The large number of privately owned and operated farms have not escaped the Socialist stranglehold. For them it has taken the form of compulsory delivery of produce to the government at fixed prices, heavy taxation and restrictions on the transfer of property. Mr Gomulka recognized that the compulsory deliveries were odious to the peasants but he could not promise immediate relief. " I am thinking of doing away with the compulsory deliveries which cannot be an economic feature of our regime. . . . They are rather a phenomenon proper only to time of war. . . . The compulsory deliveries are still today one of the forms of State taxation and this tax must be paid in full."

In rural housing Mr Gomulka admitted that conditions are " simply alarming":

> During the six-year plan about 370,000 rooms were built in rural areas. Of these, about 260,000 were built by private expenditure and about 110,000 by socialized construction. . . . To maintain the number of dwelling rooms that we had in 1950, we should have built 150,000 rooms a year in the rural districts, that is 900,000 in the six years . . . . Only 370,000 have been built, and we must keep in mind that in the period of the six-year plan about 600,000 rooms have fallen into ruin or are now in a miserable condition.

It is not surprising that Mr Gomulka went on to comment :

> The whole nation has to pay for a bad economic policy and the cost falls, first of all, on the working class. . . . The causes of the Poznan tragedy and of the deep discontent of the whole working class lie in us, in the Party leadership, in the government. . . . We must tell the working class a bitter truth : at the present time we have no means of giving a considerable salary increase, for the line has been stretched so far that it is in danger of breaking. . . . The Party leadership has been afraid of it (the truth). Certain persons were afraid of being held responsible for the effects of their policy. Others felt more strongly attached to their comfortable armchair than to the working class, thanks to which they occupy the armchair. Others, finally, and they were the most numerous, feared that the working class would not understand. . . .

In these economic findings or in the police cruelties that he denounced in the same speech, Mr Gomulka apparently saw no practical refutation of Communism. " It is a matter of improving our brand of Socialism", he said. The Poles I met, having lived under the system for some eleven years, seemed to want no more of it, improved or otherwise.

The elections were drawing near when I was in Poland. Where formerly the voters were confronted with lists containing only as many names as there were seats in the parliament, this time they could choose from 721 names to fill 459 seats. All the candidates necessarily belonged to the " National Front", which therefore could not fail to win. All

were named by electoral commissions controlled by the government. Previously the Front comprised the Communist Party and what were called the Peasants' and the Democratic Parties. These were separate parties only in name. They had no real independence. For the January elections some independents, including prominent Catholics, were included. But Communist candidates were most numerous. Their names came first and a Communist majority was assured.

One heard of some murmuring and even threats to abstain en masse from voting. But the general feeling, confirmed by Mr Gomulka's outspoken warnings and the hierarchy's appeal, was that abstention would only play into the hands of the Soviet Union. The example of Hungary was before the people. If the Communists were rejected entirely, Soviet tanks would roll into Warsaw as they had rolled into Budapest last November. The rest of the world would sympathize with Poland and do nothing. (Some Soviet troops are stationed " temporarily " in Poland; nobody, outside high government circles, can say how many. It is useless and unwise to ask. The Russian soldiers do not move among the people at large. I saw no Russian uniforms during my stay.)

* * *

You cannot go far without being reminded that Poland, though ruled by a Communist party, is a Catholic nation. There are two well-attended churches within a radius of 200 yards from the Bristol. There are eight within a radius of about half a mile. One of these is the Cathedral of St John the Baptist. A stone set in the pavement outside it bears the dates : " 1370–1956". In 1370 the first church was built on this site. Last year the Cathedral, which had been destroyed during the uprising of 1944, was rebuilt. It is still unfinished inside. Part of the old walls have been carefully built into the new, for Poland holds firmly to her past. One can still see the ruins and gashes left by the battles of 1944, when the bitter fighting must have reached a climax around the Cathedral. Behind the church flows the wide, grey Vistula. On the other side of the river, a Soviet army waited, inactive, while the insurgent Poles fought heroically and in vain against the Nazis for some sixty days.

All the churches I visited in Warsaw have been repaired, at least to the extent of having roofs and walls. The heavy costs have been met almost entirely by the voluntary offerings of the people. The former government gave some grants towards the reconstruction of churches that it regarded as historic monuments. At the same time it refused to permit the erection of new churches to serve the workers housed in new settlements.

Gomulka is popular, not because he is a Communist but because he is a Pole who has stood up for Poland against the Soviet Russians. Nobody, however, appears to be esteemed and venerated as much as His Eminence Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland.

I saw him several times. His face is furrowed now, his quick eyes are often tired, but his features are always composed. He speaks with a quiet warmth, sometimes fatherly, sometimes firmly emphatic. I was presented to him during a clergy reception in his house in Miodowa Street, from which he was taken away, a prisoner, on 26 September, 1953. He greeted me with kindness, but neither then nor at any other time would he give an interview, on or off the record. I made no attempt to extract a statement from him. I am quite sure that any attempt would have been futile. His attitude of extreme caution is in itself significant.

One of the noteworthy events of last Christmas was the Cardinal's broadcast over the government radio on Christmas Eve. As I walked through the icy streets at the time, 8 p.m., I could hear the wireless sets from behind the lighted windows and could recognize the low-pitched, earnest voice. All Poland was listening to the Cardinal Primate. He, whose influence with the people was to safeguard Mr Gomulka's election (as the lesser of two evils), boldly stated ten Catholic objectives for Poland.

Addressing Poles at home and abroad, the Cardinal said : " We pledge ourselves to you that we have laboured and shall labour for these aims :

1. That Poland may live in sanctifying grace, faithful to the Church, the Gospel and the Cross, on the lands given to us by the Father of Nations.

2. That Poland may be a true Motherland to all her children at home and dispersed over all continents.

3. That Poland may become a protector of the sanctity of the family and of faithful and unbroken marriage.

4. That Poland may defend the new generation awakening to life and its right to existence. . . .

5. That Poland may educate her youth in the spirit of the nation's venerable traditions of Christian culture one thousand years old.

6. That Poland may be just and full of love for all her children. . . .

7. That Poland may be capable of sustaining all her children, so that none may be hungry or shelterless within her frontiers.

8. That Poland may become an example of fidelity to her own soil and of the spirit of peace towards all peoples.

9. That Poland may take the road of social progress, always in accord with the Christian spirit of justice and social love.

10. That Poland may keep among the family of nations the place and the rights due to her."

Polish listeners could not fail to recognize specific implications in

these general terms. For instance, numbers 3 and 4 meant that the Church in Poland was still opposing, and would work actively against, laws permitting abortion and loosening of marriage ties.

The Cardinal expressed his hope that the ten objectives would be respected as " our common desire, the programme of the nation".

Christmas was an ideal time to see evidence of Polish religious spirit, still strong after years of anti-religious pressure. Even in Warsaw, capital city with more than one million inhabitants, Christmas was an entirely religious and domestic feast. From the afternoon of Christmas Eve all shops, offices and restaurants were closed. By 6 p.m. you could not buy a meal or even a box of matches anywhere. Even the hotel kitchen and restaurant were closed. The streets were practically deserted. I saw no buses or trams running. Every Polish family was indoors, gathered for the holy night.

The traditional Christmas meal for a Polish family is not dinner on Christmas Day but supper on Christmas Eve. Since the day is one of fast and abstinence, the principal dish is fish.

Soon after 11 p.m. I saw dark figures appearing on the frozen streets. They were men, women and children, bent against the bitter wind, battling the swirling snow on their way to midnight Mass.

I went to the Cathedral, where a large congregation had assembled well before midnight. The choir of priests and seminarians had been chanting Matins since 10.30. Cardinal Wyszynski was presiding at the throne. For the first time since 1952 he stood, a free man, in his own cathedral on a Christmas night.

He preached from a temporary pulpit erected outside the sanctuary. The people crowded around the pulpit, standing tightly packed, with uplifted faces, intent on every word and gesture of their Cardinal. The church was cold—all the clergy wore overcoats under their surplices, over their soutanes—but scarcely a cough was heard during the 35-minute sermon. Men, serious, almost stern of face, formed a large proportion of the congregation. None of the worshippers was more serious than the young soldiers in uniform. A year ago they were not allowed to come to Mass.

Again during Christmas forenoon the people flocked to Masses in Warsaw's many churches. Even during the afternoon of Christmas Day they came in little family groups to visit the churches and see the cribs. The parents and children going through the streets on the feastdays looked happy and peaceful. The Christmas carols of Poland, some lively with the glad haste of the shepherds, some soft with the cadence of lullabies, seemed to linger on the air. Everybody was making Christmas visits to relatives and friends. For many thousands of Poles, released in

the past twelve months from prisons in Poland and Siberia, it was the first Christmas at home in years.

Outside these festive days, the faces I saw along the streets of Warsaw showed no gaiety. Perhaps it was too cold for sunny smiles. Laughter I did not hear. People seemed preoccupied, perhaps with national problems, perhaps with the simple personal problems of getting on a bus or stretching the meagre zlotys to pay for another kilo of sausage.

* * *

From Warsaw I travelled to the beautiful, historic city of Cracow and to Czestochowa. The journeys demonstrated again the shortage of transportation. On nearly every train, people had to stand. I went to Cracow on an evening train. I had a second-class ticket but found myself in a first-class carriage by mistake. That, too, was crowded, with passengers standing in the corridor. For the entire six hours the carriage was unlighted. In a station en route I saw another train, in which the platform lights showed people standing. The whole train was without lights.

Going to Czestochowa, I had to change trains at Katowice, a mining town. In the railway time-tables and tourist folders it had another name, Stalinogrod. But that had been dropped last autumn. It was nowhere to be seen in the station. It had been cut from the top of labels and the old name, Katowice, over-printed in the middle.

On the hill called Jasna Goro, " Bright Mountain", in the outskirts of Czestochowa, I found the spiritual capital of Poland. Here, in a chapel dating from the fourteenth century, a dark, ancient picture of the Blessed Mother with the Divine Child is enshrined. The chapel is now part of a basilica in the care of a monastic order, the Brethren of St Paul the First Hermit. They have been guardians of the shrine since its inception, nearly seven centuries ago.

Snow lay on Czestochowa under the wintry sun. It was not the season for pilgrimages but I saw pilgrims coming and going incessantly. Last year, the monks told me, more pilgrims had come than ever before. The climax was on August 26, when an innumerable multitude gathered to renew Poland's dedication to Mary. In 1656 King John Casimir had proclaimed Our Lady " Queen of the Crown of Poland". Never has Poland revoked that act. Through the past 300 years, and never more fervently than today, Poland's Catholics have venerated the Blessed Virgin as " Krolowa Polski", Queen of Poland.

From last May to May 1957 is a Marian Year in Poland, commemorating the three hundredth anniversary of King John Casimir's proclamation.

I was given the privilege of celebrating the first Mass of the day at the ancient altar beneath the richly adorned picture. It was six o'clock on a cold winter morning, but hundreds of pilgrims, men and women, were present. Just before I began the Mass the silver screen in front of the picture was raised, while trumpets and kettle-drums sounded the traditional salute. Around me were votive offerings and memorials of generations of faithful Poles, while scores of their descendants prayed with intense devotion on the stone floor.

Going out from the church where I said Mass and around Czestochowa I wore my soutane in the street, as do the local priests. Sometimes passers-by would murmur a few words of salutation. I asked what they were. I will remember them, as an echo from the Poland I had come to know so briefly and admire so much.

They were : " Praised be Jesus Christ."

Ireland and the Free Trade Area

by GARRET FITZGERALD

A NOTABLE feature of Irish life in the last few years has been the growth of public interest in the nation's economic welfare. The recession of 1952, and the politico-economic controversies of the following two years, aroused a hitherto dormant interest in economic affairs ; and the events of last year have turned this interest into a deepening concern at the weakness and instability of the Irish economy after a generation of self-government. In the face of the evident failure of traditional policies to achieve their declared objectives, many people have been led to question the validity of these policies, and to seek some effective alternative. The emergence of the European Free Trade Area Plan, and its presentation to the Irish public, could scarcely have been more opportune, therefore, and the interest, even excitement, which this proposal has aroused throughout the country, provides remarkable evidence of the existence of this new and receptive climate of opinion.

The Free Trade Area project has emerged with rather bewildering suddenness from the obscurity of various international Committees, but its history is straightforward enough. When it became evident last year that success might attend the efforts of the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (Italy, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands) to create a Common Market for the remainder of their products, the British Government became concerned at this threat to its European markets, which absorb one-fifth of all British exports. At the same time it felt precluded from joining the Common Market, because participation in this market would entail the maintenance of common tariffs against imports from outside the area —and this would preclude the retention by Britain of Commonwealth Preference.

Accordingly the British Government proposed the creation of a wider European Free Trade Area, to include the Common Market States, Great Britain, and any other OEEC countries that might care to join. Tariff and quota restrictions, in respect of industrial products at least, would be abolished as between members of the Free Trade Area—but each member would be free to maintain its own tariff and quota system vis à vis the rest of the world. Such a system obviously involves certain technical difficulties, for, unless control of goods within the Free Trade Area is continued, importers in countries maintaining high tariffs against the rest of the world could evade these tariffs by importing goods through

a member State whose tariffs are lower. To consider this and other difficulties a special working party was set up by the Council of OEEC in July last year. Before the end of the year this group reported that the proposed scheme would be practicable, although their Report was not actually published until 5 February, a week before the OEEC Council Meeting called to consider the proposal.

At this Council Meeting it was unanimously decided to initiate negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a Free Trade Area Convention ; and as a first step towards the preparation of a Draft Convention three committees were set up to consider different aspects of the problem. The first of these committees (which are to report back to the OEEC Council by July next) is to study general problems of a Free Trade Area ; the second, proposed by the Irish delegate, is to study the possibility of making special provision for agriculture with a view to getting around the rigid British objection to its inclusion ; while the third, in which Ireland has also a vital interest, is to deal with the difficulties of the less-developed countries in Europe—viz. Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Iceland, Ireland and possibly Austria. (Austria has already decided to join a Free Trade Area ; Greece has indicated that she would not do so, while refraining from vetoing the proposal ; while the other states involved have taken up intermediate positions, with the Irish delegation adopting, perhaps, the most positive attitude.)

Meanwhile the six " Coal and Steel " nations have been proceeding with their negotiations for a Common Market. At a meeting in Brussels shortly before the February OEEC Council Meeting, representatives of these six States reached tentative agreement on many outstanding issues, although the Dutch Government was dissatisfied with the outcome of these negotiations and with the many compromises introduced to meet difficulties raised by the French delegation. One important question remained unsolved in Brussels : the problem of investment by France's partners in her overseas territories. France has been anxious to associate these territories with the Common Market, and has sought guarantees that her partners in the Common Market would invest capital in these areas. But she has been unwilling to relinquish control of such investment, and the other five States have found themselves unable to agree to these terms. However, at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of the Common Market States in Paris on 18-20 February, agreement was reached on this issue, and the creation of the Common Market was thus virtually assured.

* * *

Irish interest in the Free Trade Area proposal naturally stems mainly from the prospect of greatly expanded agricultural exports that might be

opened up by Irish participation in such an Area, if agriculture were included within the terms of the proposed trade liberalization. But before considering these export possibilities something should, perhaps, be said of the other side of the picture—the possible effects upon the Irish economy of the gradual withdrawal of protection against imports of manufactured goods and, of course, of agricultural produce.

In the first place the gradual nature of the proposed change should be stressed. While the exact term of years over which the withdrawal of tariffs and quotas would be spread has not been exactly determined, a period of twelve to seventeen years has been mentioned, so that there would be ample time in which to re-adjust the pattern of Irish production to meet the new situation. Moreover the problems of countries "in process of economic development" are specifically recognized, and the Working Party Report suggests two alternative ways in which these problems might be solved. The first involves no more than permitting such States to postpone their entry into the Free Trade Area until they are capable of assuming all the obligations; but the second alternative, which seems to be preferred, would be to include these countries in the Area from the start, giving them all the benefits and advantages of membership, while exempting them from all or part of their obligations to reduce tariffs etc., during a transitional period. This transitional period could vary according to the requirements of particular countries, and the only condition would be that the countries concerned should in each case indicate what obligations, if any, they could assume from the beginning, and should submit to periodic examinations to determine what obligations they might subsequently assume.

Such a solution, taken together with the long period over which tariffs and quotas are gradually to be withdrawn, offers the Irish economy a possible guarantee against any serious disruption of industry during the period of re-adjustment, when industries would be changing over from the manufacture of tariff-protected goods for the home market to the manufacture of competitive goods for export.

To assist in this re-adjustment the Report suggests that there might be international co-ordination of economic, financial and commercial policies and constructive mutual assistance, together with an Investment and Re-Adaptation Fund to finance the re-deployment of industries likely to suffer from the withdrawal of protection. Several other suggestions made by the Working Party are also relevant to possible Irish problems. In the first place there is provision for the progressive abolition of practices likely to distort competition (such as dumping, dual pricing, government subsidies, export aids, monopoly and cartel pricing and restrictive business practices), and for the establishment of a complaints procedure which would entitle countries suffering damage from any of these practices to have their cases examined and to take appropriate protective measures

if no other solution can be found. The Report also points out that such practices will in any event tend to disappear gradually as quota restrictions and tariffs wither away.

Another suggestion which might prove of assistance to the Irish economy is the proposal to introduce Escape Clauses, which would permit countries to re-impose restrictions temporarily in order to meet a balance of payments crisis, or to deal with difficulties arising in one particular sector of the economy. These Escape Clauses would necessarily be severely restricted in their operation by limiting unilateral action to a brief period, and they might also be limited to quota rather than tariff restrictions, but they would, nevertheless, provide an additional safety valve for our economy.

These many safeguards, which are designed particularly to assist the less developed countries in Europe, appear to provide a reasonable guarantee that the ill-effects of the withdrawal of industrial protection need not necessarily be on such a scale as to preclude Ireland from seeking, through participation in the Free Trade Area, to expand its exports to European markets.

The scale of unemployment that might follow the elimination of protection is difficult to calculate without access to detailed information at the disposal of the Department of Industry and Commerce. It is possible to say, however, that of a labour force of 1,225,000 in the Republic only about 100,000 are employed in industries manufacturing or processing goods that are protected. Moreover, of this figure about half were employed in these industries in 1926, before protection was introduced, and the direct influence of protection upon the level of employment cannot therefore be assessed at more than 40,000–50,000 additional jobs—even if one assumes that there would have been no increase in industrial employment during the past thirty years without protection, which is unlikely. The proportion of these 40,000–50,000 workers for whom alternative employment would have to be found is once again difficult to calculate, but it would be unwise to under-estimate the probable resilience of Irish industry in the face of competition.

In the first place the existence of a tariff protecting a particular commodity does not necessarily imply that all the manufacturers engaged in producing this item require this protection, or would be unable to operate profitably without it. In some instances tariffs may protect the less efficient producers only, and their elimination might have no effect upon their more efficient competitors—except, perhaps, to bring them more business as the weaker firms are eliminated.

Secondly, many firms are operating at less than maximum efficiency now, simply because they find they can earn a profit with their present methods, aided by tariff and quota protection. Such firms would quickly bestir themselves to improve their efficiency and so stay in business,

if tariffs and quotas were gradually to be withdrawn in accordance with a pre-arranged timetable.

Finally, there are many industries which at present require tariff protection simply because the Irish market is too small to support an undertaking operating on an economical scale. In other words they require tariff protection because their markets abroad are in turn protected by tariffs, so that if these foreign tariffs were withdrawn, and these new markets were thus opened up, the need for tariffs here in Ireland would simultaneously disappear. This might be true in particular of textile and clothing industries, which in some cases have a low margin of tariff protection at present and have much to gain from the opening up of European markets. It is even conceivable that the expansion of the textile trades to cater for European demand might absorb a high proportion of any labour rendered surplus in other industries by the withdrawal of protection.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the textile firms, almost alone of Irish manufacturing industries, seem to have weathered the 1956 recession successfully, increasing their exports month by month throughout the year, and continuing to invest in new machinery despite the credit squeeze and the fall in home demand for textile goods.

The withdrawal of tariff and quota protection might not, therefore, involve any significant volume of unemployment in this country, especially as the liberalization of trade would be spread over a long period of years, and as financial aid might be available to assist in the re-deployment of both the labour force and the factory space thus rendered surplus. Some problems would certainly arise, especially in country towns where factories have been established to manufacture goods which are subject to very high tariffs, but the proposed scheme for the removal of protection has the advantage that its development is fixed in advance, so that ample time is available to re-adjust any sector of industry likely to be affected.

There is, therefore, a reasonable prospect that the withdrawal of protection might not affect Irish industry as drastically as might at first sight be assumed. But what positive benefits can this country expect to obtain from participation in the Free Trade Area, or what evils can it hope to avoid by joining in this project?

The answers to these questions must necessarily depend very largely upon the ultimate British decision on participation in the Area and upon the terms of this British participation, because our economy, and especially our export trade, is intimately linked with that of the United Kingdom. It now seems probable that there will be a Free Trade Area and that Britain will participate in it. It also seems likely, although this is not yet certain, that agriculture will in some form be included within the scope of the project, but that Britain will seek exemption from this particular aspect of the agreement in order to protect her home agriculture and

to maintain her system of Commonwealth Preference. To what extent Britain will succeed in this natural attempt to obtain the best of both bargains must remain uncertain until the next round of negotiations in July, when the three committees present their reports to the Council of OEEC. It is quite possible that Britain will be forced to yield on one or two aspects, making some concessions to the viewpoints of the other members of OEEC, while, perhaps, still maintaining the greater part of the exemption sought.

To the extent that the British Government is forced to concede some ground in this matter, our position in the British market may, perhaps, suffer, as our present preferences in that market against European exporters would be affected. This would add to the problems that are already developing in respect of our cattle trade with Britain, problems arising from the scale of Argentine meat exports and from our failure to face up to the situation being created by the rapid extension of the area in Britain into which live cattle may be imported only if they are T.B.-attested. These growing difficulties of our cattle export trade to Britain have in recent months been partly obscured and offset by the rapid increase in cattle and meat exports from this country to the Continent, an increase which has offered a prospect of escaping at long last from our traditional dependence on the single British market.

(Cattle exports to the Continent rose from 9,000 during 1955 to 60,500 during the first eleven months of last year, in marked contrast to the slight decline in cattle exports to Britain during this period. At the same time meat exports to the Continent doubled, while exports of meat to Britain fell by more than a quarter.)

Thus, from the point of view of our cattle and meat exports, failure to join the proposed European Free Trade Area would re-inforce our already dangerous dependence on the diminishing British market for these Irish products : the new common tariff barrier to be raised around the six Common Market states which constitute our Continental market for agricultural products would then operate against us—and in favour of our competitors within the Free Trade Area, whose exports to the Common Market countries would be tariff-free. By remaining aloof from the Free Trade Area we should, in fact, be turning our backs on this vast Continental market at the very moment when it is beginning to develop and when we are likely to need it most.

It is, of course, true that the elimination of tariffs and quota restrictions on agricultural imports into European countries is likely to be a slow process, and even when they have been removed it is proposed that minimum price levels for each product should be maintained by each country—although eventually a common minimum price level might emerge, at least within the more limited Common Market Area. Nevertheless even this restricted kind of free market in agricultural products

would be of great interest to us. Indeed an ultimate common minimum price level for each product might have the advantage, from our point of view, of protecting us from under-cutting by the more efficient Danish and Dutch farmers, while still giving us free access to the high-cost French and Belgian markets.

This proposed minimum price level might be of particular importance in connection with our exports of dairy produce, notably butter. At present we cannot export our surplus butter to the British market without a heavy export subsidy, and are deprived of access to high-cost Continental markets by the high tariffs on agricultural imports into these countries. The prospects that would be opened up by the elimination of these tariffs are particularly attractive in view of the increased emphasis on industrial development in Denmark and Holland, and the long-term trend away from dairy production in these countries.

Thus, faced with an alternative between staying outside the Free Trade Area, to the detriment of our agriculture (whose dependence on the shrinking British market for our products would thus be fatally reinforced), and joining in this project with a view to expanding our agricultural export trade to the Continent, we seem to have little choice but to make the best of what may prove to be a reasonably good bargain, endeavouring as far as possible to minimize the effects of trade liberalization upon our protected industries. By active participation in the negotiations leading up to the signature of a Free Trade Area Convention we must seek to ensure that the form in which the scheme ultimately emerges is as far as possible designed to meet our somewhat specialized needs. The commitments in which we should be involved will, of course, have to be scrutinized very carefully when the time comes to take a final decision for or against participation, and the gains and losses will then have to be weighed impartially. Meanwhile there is sufficient evidence of potential benefits to warrant the decision that has been taken to adopt a positive attitude in the discussions that lie ahead.

* * *

In all that has been said above on the possible economic advantages and disadvantages of this project, no reference has been made to the other intangible non-economic considerations which any Irish Government must also bear in mind. Membership of the Free Trade Area would clearly be a first step towards ending our long isolation from Europe. It would bring with it new contacts, new friendships and, perhaps, a modification of the hitherto unchallenged anglocentricity of Irish life, whether anglophobe or anglophile.

It would bring us a step further, too, towards eliminating some of the barriers which divide North and South. By re-opening to Northern

manufacturers the Southern market from which the Border has cut them off for more than a generation, we should be offering tangible evidence both of the potential benefits of re-unification from the Northern viewpoint, and also of our willingness to make real sacrifices in the cause of re-union.

On the agricultural side the effects on North-South relations would probably be less marked, at any rate if Britain succeeds in maintaining her subsidization of agriculture within the United Kingdom. The exact nature of the repercussions of this proposal upon the agriculture of North and South must await a clarification of the British position, and of the terms upon which the United Kingdom will eventually join the Free Trade Area.

But beyond all these arguments of national interest there lies the ideal of a united Europe, in which local nationalisms might ultimately come to rest, no longer a cause of bitterness or warfare, but an inspiration to local effort and inter-regional competition. It is this ideal which to-day prompts a nation such as France, which on the face of it would appear to have much to lose by joining a common market in which its higher production costs will render it a prey to competition from its partners, to push ahead with the project almost without counting the cost.

PATTERN OF IRISH TRADE 1955 AND 1956

	Exports[1]		Imports[1]		Trade Balance[1]	
	1955 £ Million	1956[2] £ Million	1955 £ Million	1956[2] £ Million	1955 £ Million	1956[2] £ Million
United Kingdom ...	95·03	87·05	107·60	102·80	—12·57	—15·75
Common Market States :						
Belgium	1·60	1·92	3·79	2·99	—2·19	—1·07
France	0·76	3·33	3·05	2·56	—2·29	+0·77
Germany	1·41	1·99	9·56	8·27	—8·15	—6·28
Italy	0·37	0·65	1·77	1·63	—1·40	—0·98
Luxembourg ...	—	—	0·21	0·18	—0·21	—0·18
Netherlands	0·58	1·57	5·26	4·82	—4·68	—3·25
TOTAL ...	4·72	9·46	23·64	20·45	—18·92	—10·99
Other Potential Members Of The Free Trade Area:	1·29	1·72	9·34	8·44	—80·5	—6·72
TOTAL—Free Trade Area :	6·01	11·18	32·98	28·89	—26·97	—17·71
Rest of the World : ...	5·54	6·45	59·38	47·03	—53·84	—40·58
GRAND TOTAL ...	106·58	10··68	199·96	178·72	—93·38	—74·04

[1] Excluding Re-exports and Re-imports.
[2] 11 months ended November, 1956.

Russell and the Great Mystery

by E. F. O'DOHERTY

TO philosophize successfully in these days, one must learn to speak many languages. The words used by the philosophers may very well belong in one or other of the recognized living languages of educated men. But as used by the philosopher they constitute a private language to the conventions of which only the initiated are contracting parties. This makes it difficult for the general reader or intelligent layman for whom so much contemporary philosophy is allegedly written. And it means a certain breach of good faith on the part of the philosopher : for very often he does not bother to make clear to his general reader the private meanings of the language he uses. One suspects that sometimes at least the device of the private language is used as a practical joke. The reader is being gently or maliciously mocked while he thinks he is being treated seriously as a philosopher.

The techniques of salesmanship and advertising are more extensively used in philosophy than one might suppose. Automobiles are sold in the United States by a gimmick called " psychological obsolescence " : one does not need a new car, one's current car is perfectly good still, but one simply cannot go on driving it for another year ; it is psychologically obsolete. This is perhaps the most common device used in philosophy at the moment. One does not argue the merits of a case. One simply asserts that the opposite is obsolete.

As an example, consider the following well-known passage from Bertrand Russell : ". . . The Aristotelian doctrines (of logic, which he has just expounded) are wholly false, with the exception of the formal theory of the syllogism which is unimportant. Any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle or any of his disciples." (*History of Western Philosophy,* 1946) The possibility of an alternative point of view is not even suggested, and it is extremely unlikely that many of the readers of Russell's popular history will also read Sir David Ross, for example, or Lukasiewicz, or even a lesser light like Sinclair of Edinburgh. I quote from the fifth edition (1951, reprinted 1954) of Sinclair's *Traditional Formal Logic* : " What logic is, and why it is worth studying, are difficult to understand until we are reasonably familiar with the variety of it known as the traditional formal logic." Later, in the same vein, he speaks of its " unique importance ", it is " an educational essential ", it is of " surpassing importance ", and " all the other logical theories that have been and are being advanced have arisen out of the traditional doctrine, either by extension of it, or by disagreement with it,

varying from minor criticism to total rejection ". All these quotations are from the first two pages of Sinclair's work. But there is not a hint of the possibility of this point of view in Russell. I do not suggest that Sinclair is as great a logician as Russell. That is not the point at issue. The point is that the general reader is misled by his own lack of knowledge of the background of any given philosophical problem, and by the technique of some authors in presenting their own point of view as if it were the only tenable one.

The point can be made in another way. Why should it be acceptable for Russell to suggest that St Thomas is " insincere " (loc. cit., p. 484), but intolerable to suggest that perhaps this might apply to Russell too ? " The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading", says Russell, speaking of St Thomas's philosophy (p. 485). It would be interesting should this prove to be the case with Russell himself.

* * *

In his article on the possibility of survival after death (*Sunday Times*, January 6, 1957), Russell appeals to Hume. He quotes with evident approval the well-known passage in Part IV, Section VI of the Treatise of Human Nature. The passage runs : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I might call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." What Russell did not explain, and probably could not be expected to explain within the confines of Sunday journalism, was the point at issue in this passage, and the premises assumed by Hume which determined his outlook not on this problem alone but on all philosophical issues. The point at issue is given by Hume in the opening words of the section : " There are some philosphers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self* ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence ; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity." Hume had in mind the Cartesians, and particularly Descartes himself. And there is no doubt that Hume in the passage quoted is right. We do not find a direct awareness of *self* in any introspectible act of consciousness.

This sometimes strikes people as odd, because they have long thought that they had a direct awareness of themselves. St Thomas argued that a direct awareness of oneself of this kind is the prerogative of the Divine Intellect, whereas the human intellect *intelligit seipsum per speciem intelligibilem, sicut et alia.* In modern English, this is the assertion that our conscious awareness of ourselves is through conceptual constructions

formed in the same way as we form them about anything else. And this means forming them by intellectual processes whereby we use the data of sense to achieve non-sensory intellectual contents. Of what then are we directly aware? Always of some act or content of consciousness: in Hume's terminology, we are aware of some perception of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, etc. But Hume had already ruled out the possibility of there being any mental content other than sensory (and Russell knew this). Hume was well versed in the thought of Berkeley, who had recently ("of late years" is Hume's phrase) denied that there were or could be any such things as abstract ideas. Hume claims this denial of Berkeley's as "one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries . . ."

It is not difficult, in the light of the foregoing paragraph, to translate the passage quoted approvingly by Russell, from Hume's private language into contemporary English. It would then read: "My introspective knowledge of myself does not reveal anything corresponding to the Cartesian self. I cannot discover any abstract ideas as these are normally understood ("according to the common method of explaining them"—Part I, section VII. Does this mean a denial of Cartesian innate ideas? If so, Hume is right to that extent.) All I can ever discover is a sensory content."

It is unlikely that anyone would quarrel with Hume's denial of the Cartesian self or the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas", including the idea of the "self". But there are many who would question the last assertion: that all I can ever discover is a sensory content. The evidence of experiment is that there exist "contents of consciousness" which are not sensory in character. These are the *Bewusstseinslagen* of the German psychologists who laboured in the laboratory of Wurzburg for ten years to study them. Few psychologists would now make the claim of Hume, and this for two reasons. First, because of the experimental evidence in regard to consciousness; and second, because of the increased understanding of the unconscious. Hume could not introspect the unconscious, nor can anybody else, and yet it would be rash to deny its existence, its contents and its functions. But there is no reference to these matters in Russell's article. We shall return to the point in a moment in considering the notion of memory, and the sweeping assertion of Russell "that the most essential thing in the continuity of a person is memory".

Russell claims to examine the belief in survival "from a purely scientific point of view". This seems to have impressed many readers. The purely scientific point of view means, I take it, the point of view which claims (*a*) that it is going to study only observable phenomena, (*b*) by the methods of observation and experiment. From this point of view it is unscientific to ignore, as Russell does, the experimental and clinical evidence about mind. Moreover, the scientific point of view means

the adoption of a methodology which at once rules out the possibility of studying certain kinds of problems : the nature of beauty or moral goodness, for example. And if there are disembodied spirits or angels, they will be forever by definition beyond the range of study from the " purely scientific point of view " simply because, not being material in any way, they will not be " observable phenomena ". But the fact that something is unobservable does not mean that it does not exist. If one accepts the proposition " that whatever is not observable sensorially does not exist", then of course the conclusion will follow. But the proposition that " whatever is not observable sensorially does not exist " is not only not known to be true, but could not be shown to be true. In other words it is not a scientific proposition, but a dogmatic assumption. Yet it is assumed by Hume and also by Russell.

But Russell's argument depends on his doctrine about memory. " The most essential thing ", he tells us, " in the continuity of a person is memory." This has a specious plausibility. It will be true if I state it as follows : " The most essential thing in the *awareness of* continuity of a person is memory." But this is a radically different proposition. It means for example that a person suffering from total amnesia will not be aware of his continuity as a person—he will have " forgotten who he was ". This is not at all an impossibility—it happens frequently enough. Yet no one, not even Russell I think, would deny that in total amnesia the patient is still, in a perfectly intelligible sense, the same person that he was before his loss of memory. But in terms of Russell's formulation, this would not be so. The awareness of continuity as a person is not at all the same thing, logically or psychologically, as continuity as a person. Russell concludes : " We may therefore take memory as what defines the continuity of a person." The " therefore " is good, as it suggests that something has been proved.

The argument from memory, however, can be shown by a simple *tour de force* to establish a conclusion which flatly contradicts Russell's conclusion. The argument would take the following form : I can remember something which happened to me twenty years ago. (This would hardly be denied, even by Russell.) But if this be so, then I must have had a continuous existence since the event I claim to remember happened. But it cannot be the organism alone which is responsible for this continuous existence, since biologists tell me that all the cells of my organism are different from those which constituted me twenty years ago. Therefore " I " am somehow a persistent entity, even though the organism is constantly changing. But Russell rejects this persistent entity. It will be helpful to consider this a while longer.

The argument is Hume's, and runs as follows : " I venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable

rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux or movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions make their appearance ; pass, repass ; glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. . . ." But he warns us that " the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us " : there is really no stage nor any theatre at all, but only the succession of scenes. There is no " mind " or " self ", but only the succession of mental contents. Hume makes due allowance for anyone " who has a different notion ", and says : " All I can allow him is that he may be in the right as well as I " ; but Russell makes no such concession. He gives the impression *au contraire*, that what he says is scientifically established. Now with regard to Hume's argument, if we speak in terms of the *pure experience of consciousness*, he is right. That is to say, that as far as experience goes, the literal account of mind must be of a series of mental states or contents or processes. But it was long ago pointed out by Bradley that Hume's conception of mind was incomplete. It was a hank of self-supporting onions on a non-existent rope. And many philosophers pointed out the philosophical problem which this conception posed but did not answer. If the mind is simply the succession of its own states, then how can it become conscious of itself as a succession of states. For all earlier states have ceased to exist before this present state of my mind. The series does not exist, but only the momentary term in the series. And it is not profitable to appeal to memory ; since by definition mind is only the succession of its states, it must be the present state which remembers all the others. But the present state is by definition only a mental event or content. How can one mental event or content be said to " know " or " remember " another ? much less to remember a whole series ? and at the same time to account for consciousness and self-consciousness ?

Philosophers, like other men, have minds. They are subject to some at least of the defence-mechanisms revealed in analysis : repression, dissociation—perhaps more than any other, they are subject to rationalization. John Stuart Mill understood this argument of Hume's and the difficulty of a series becoming conscious of itself as a series. But at least he faced the issue squarely as a scientist should. It was self-contradictory, he thought, that a series should thus become conscious of itself, but he preferred to accept the contradiction rather than the consequence : a substantial persistent entity through time. For this would at once pose the question about the nature of this substantial persistent entity. It is unlikely that Russell is unaware of this problem. But many of his readers will not have heard of it, while scientific integrity would seem to demand that it should be made clear to them.

Russell goes on : "The question whether we survive death thus becomes the question: Are there, after a man dies, memories of what happened to him while he lived on earth ? " It is perhaps trivial to point

out the inconsequential " thus " in this sentence. But it is more to the point to examine the question itself. The question presumably does not mean : Does anybody remember what happened to so-and-so while he lived on earth ? for this question can certainly be answered in the affirmative without prejudice to any question about survival. The question therefore must mean something else. It might mean : After a man dies, does he remember what happened to him while he lived on earth ? But this is no advance over the question : does man survive death (except perhaps in this sense, that survival might be possible without self-consciousness, and therefore without memory, as would appear to be the Buddhist view : but this possibility is ruled out in advance for Russell because of his identification of personality with memory.) The question thus becomes : Do disembodied memories occur as a series through time ?

The apparent simplicity of this question is deceptive. It might mean : do disembodied memories occur through time, with nobody who *has* these memories ? Or it might mean : do disembodied memories occur through time with nobody who *is* these memories ? The first form of the question does not arise for Russell, since in any case there is nobody who *has* memories—memories *are* the person who thinks he has them. This is clear from paragraph 2 of his article : " A critical enquiry does not reveal the existence of any such persistent entity as the core of the personality", where the words " persistent entity " refer to " soul ", " mind ", " self " or " subject ". The second form of the question is more important. If disembodied memories occur through time, even though nobody *has* these memories, they would automatically constitute a person on Russell's premisses. Russell's task therefore seems a simple one. He has only to show that there are not memories in order to show that there is no survival after death. Up to this point he seems to be using the word " memories " in an ordinary " public " sense to refer to mental events and contents. In any reasonable public use of language, one would reason as follows : Memories are either composed of matter or they are not so composed. They are either self-supporting or they are not self-supporting. Russell agrees (paragraph 9) that " thoughts and feelings are evanescent", and it is precisely on this ground that philosophers argue that these are not self-supporting but demand a subject. In order to avoid this conclusion, Russell falls back on the assertion that thoughts and feelings " compose the brain ". As the brain is clearly material by any definition, it would seem to follow that thoughts and feelings (of which memories are a species) will have to be material. But at this point the argument reverts to a private language : "When I mention the brain in this connection, I shall expect to be accused of materialism. This accusation, however, would be unjust." But it is extremely difficult to see how in the usage of any public language this is not materialism. In

fact, the identification of thoughts and feelings with the brain is only a surreptitious way of re-introducing the notion of " self " or " subject ", but in materialistic terms.

* * *

Russell is one of the ablest thinkers of the century, and one of the five or six greatest logicians of all time. From the purely scientific point of view, he is open to the criticism that he has not taken account of all the evidence. From the logical point of view, he has attempted to establish an universal negative proposition—which notoriously can only be done by deduction from another universal negative. And the one universal negative on which Russell's argument depends (" whatever is not experienced by the senses does not exist ") cannot be established.

From the psychological point of view, Russell's argument amounts to saying that people believe in survival because of their fears and their wishes. Even if fears or wishes accounted for *belief in* survival, as they might very well do for many people, the question of survival itself remains to be answered. This is the fallacy of historicism : the fallacy of thinking that because we can explain historically why a particular belief is held, therefore the content of the belief is false. Freud committed this fallacy in connection with the existence of God, and there are many other examples of it, particularly in anthropology, comparative religion, the Higher Criticism and sociology.

Philosophically, Russell's article is a good example of finding reasons for a belief held independently of the reasons given for it. Psychologists call this rationalization.

The argument for survival is extremely complex, and in a summary exposition would certainly be unconvincing. Scotus in fact characterized all rational arguments for immortality as merely probable, and fell back on faith. But St Thomas thought it could be proved. The argument depends on (*a*) the relation between action and agent, (*b*) the nature of the soul, (*c*) the relation between matter and spirit, leading to the notion of *possibility* of survival. From possibility to actual survival, the argument takes two steps : one consists in showing that the soul does not by natural means cease to be ; the other, in showing that God does not annihilate it. The question of resurrection and *bodily* survival should not be confused with the question of survival. Resurrection and bodily survival are matters of revealed faith. But the possibility and fact of immortality, though difficult, are matters that reason can deal with. In a subsequent article we hope to trace the main lines of the argument. For, as Gabriel Marcel puts it, " the problem of immortality is the pivot of metaphysic ".

Survival Without Revival?

IS IRISH NECESSARY?

by Sancho Panza

A GAEILGEOIR must usually seem a fool, being most often a convert, a turned-round man. There was, then, something doubly quixotic in the spectacle of Professor R. A. Breatnach himself riding out from the psychological home of the orthodox Irish Revival by delivering his thesis in this review last summer. Judging by the hullabaloo it started in the world of Gaelic journaldom the Don Quixote who had set himself to tilt at windmills had ended up jousting with real giants instead.

The orthodox soon captured the heretic and tried him. He was dubbed a dweller in an Ivory Tower, he who had ridden forth alone to battle[1] : the knight-errant who had wished to pluck victory from defeat was himself condemned as a defeatist[2] ; and the visionary, having uttered his portentous tidings, was taken up on the very minutiae of their consequences, on the merest illustrations of his axioms, and on these points refuted[3] ; as if by themselves they mattered. Nobody cared to see if they really were axioms. Nobody looked at his thesis at all. Nobody saw that it was merely a negative vindication of the Gaelic Revival.

This was largely Professor Breatnach's own fault : he had himself directed attention away from its fundamentals. Some of what he said might indeed have been regarded as far-reaching enough : that the state founded about thirty years ago in Ireland was the product of a nationalism whose liturgical language was naturally English, but ideally Gaelic ; that the imposition of Gaelic was the logical outcome of its foundation, despite the medieval nature of the language and the increased cause of estrangement of North and South which would result. Consequently (he said) those who did not know the language tried to refurbish it, and produced only a travesty in the form of an artificial written *koiné*. Encouragement was not used to enforce it, but instead there were employed the three empirical and inadequate principles of Pressure (meaning compulsion), of Preferment (meaning discrimination) and of Projection (meaning half-witting hypocrisy). The inevitable failure resulted. Now nothing is left but to pick up the scraps *ne pereant ;* to preserve the dying fire of the Gaeltacht and hope it may be gradually extended.

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[1] Comhar : Aug. 1956.

[2] Inniu, 7-9-'56.

[3] Feasta. Dónall Ó Móráin, B.L., : Forbairt na hAthbheochana, Dec. '56, Jan. '57. Cf. R. A. Breatnach *ibidem,* Feb. '57.

No doubt this was all quite serious ; but Professor Breatnach was too eager to show the proposed ideal to have been a *glac um gha gréine*, a grasping at a sunbeam, to realize that he was almost giving the definition of an ideal. He was too quick to romanticize the Gaeltacht, tucked away among hills and bogs and forgotten *sinus famae,* to realize that its people were very similar to those in the rest of Ireland. He was too preoccupied working out the implications of Projection, Preferment, Pressure to bother about the term nationalism, upon whose meaning almost the entirety of his article depended. And so, for all the intellectual courage and high moral probity he showed in following to its very end the winding road of his bitter pilgrimage, his thesis is initially unsound. For all his hard-dealt blows he is a Don Quixote after all.

The Two Nationalisms

In the Gaeltacht, we are told, nationalism made little impression. As an illustration one middle-aged man is referred to who, after ten years of native government, expressed a preference for Seán Buí's rule. Quite apart from the mental connotations of the name used, we have all heard similar grumblings. A Wexford farmer, more than twenty years after the founding of the state, repeatedly complained to me that since the British left, the price of animal fodder " had gone to blazes". Wexford is not a Gaeltacht. In Cork a poor old man told me sadly that in his young days you could get a shirt for fourpence. But once raised in the Gaeltacht this protest becomes " the voice of the prenationalist Gaelic past . . . a stage whisper of Gaelic Ireland's political immaturity ". The stage show is apparently bilingual.

The Gaeltacht may indeed be politically immature, as are we all. But, in any broad sense of the term, nationalism is deep in the Gaelic mind, even if the national consciousness of Gaelic Ireland has always been largely a race consciousness : that of belonging to a particular people with a common ancestry, real or mythical ; a consciousness which could make its own Piaras Feirtéar with his Norman lineage, could find its champions among the Anglo-Irish nobility in the aristocratic verse of Dáibhí Ó Bruadair or Aogán Ó Raithile, or lament their defeat in a poem like : " A Phádruig Sáirséal, slán go dtí tú ".

Its vigour among the common people is attested by Máire Bhuí Ní Laoghaire in the early nineteenth century, and by the following verse recorded in our own day :

> A Chlanna Gaedheal uasal, do fuaireabhair náire :
> Do chailleabhair Corcaigh agus Cionn tSáile,
> Áth an Luain agus Droichead Átha,
> Ach sé briseadh na Bóinne is mó do chráidh sibh.

(Noble sons of the Gael you were shamed :
You lost at Cork and Kinsale,
Athlone and Drogheda,
But the defeat of the Boyne was your greatest torment.)[1]

Maybe, however, Professor Breatnach was referring to the nationalism of the United Irishmen and the French Revolution, as in the following verse written at the time in the Court of Poetry held near Dundalk :

Tá na Franncaigh san am so 'cur céim ar gcúl
' S ní bhíonn prionnsa ós a gcionn acht riaghail glan úr,
Beidh Germanaidh is Flanders is an Réin sin fúthaibh,
' S tá mé 'n amhras go mbeidh Albain is Éire san dlúmh.

(The French are now abolishing rank and no prince will govern them, but a fresh, new dispensation. Germany and Flanders and the Rhine-country will be under them, and I suspect that Ireland and Scotland will be in the Confederation.)

True, this poem is little more than a re-editing of eighteenth-century commonplaces :

Ní ó dhúchas fuair Lúter nó aon neach dá phór
A bhfuil de chúirtionadh úrgheal' ó Luimneach go Bóinn;
Tuitfidh sgiuirse ar na búir seo le Gaedhealaibh i ngleo,
' S ní bhíonn dúithche nó dún aca i nÉirinn níos mó.

(Not by inheritance did Luther or any of his race get all there are of fresh bright courts from Limerick to Boyne. A scourge will fall on these boors, when in contest with the Irish, and they shall have neither estate nor fort in Ireland afterwards.)[2]

There are other songs also such as *An Bhliain Sin Ninety-Eight*, and many from Mayo[3], which might be quoted, notwithstanding the failure of Mícheál óg Ó Longáin in Munster to rouse the populace among whom the Catholic gentry were even then raising a loyalist militia.

If Munster was loyalist in '98[4] it was otherwise some sixty years later, even in its more impenetrable parts. In the words of Seán Ó Conaill of Ballinaskellig :

> Bhíos im gharsún an uair sin . . . do bhí captaon aca (.i. na Fínínig) go raibh stuidéar air anso thuaig i gCíllónchatha . . . Do bhídís i n-áite-annaibh áirithe astuíhe, cúl lé faor, ná ficfí iad, agus buachaillí na mbailthe 'n-a dteannta, agus iad a' drilláil.
>
> Do bhí an sgéal céana i nDairire . . . do bhídís anáirde i mullach Dhairireach—bhí ré shlé ann—agus do bhídís ga'h aon uíhe ghealaig a' drilláil ann—buachaillí Dhairireach ar fad.

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[1] cf. Rev Donnchadh Ó Floinn : An Béaloideas agus Saoghal an Duine ; Éire—Bliainiris Gaedheal, 1940.
[2] cf. : Éigse : Vol. vii. Pt. iii, article by Séamus P. Ó Mórdha.
[3] cf. Raiftire *passim*.
[4] but see " Ar maidin Luain Chíngcíse ".

(I was then a boy . . . they (the Fenians) had a captain staying just north of here in Cíllónchatha . . . They used to be in certain places by night, out of the way, so that they might be unseen, together with the lads of the townlands, drilling.

Things were the same in Dairire . . . they used to be on the summit of Dairire—there was level moorland there—and every moonlit night they used drill there—all the lads of Dairire, without exception.)[1]

Like the people of Ireland generally those living in the Gaeltacht were more interested in the matter of what their leaders, thinkers and poets had said or written for centuries than in the manner of its saying at any particular moment.

They were doubly insulated, though, in so far as this " manner " really was charged with nationalism, or more properly statism : the doctrine that the political community, together with its directing principle (both being confused with the nation and made co-extensive with it) is an absolute and self-sufficient entity. First, as the heirs of an aeons' old national tradition preserved in their spoken literature and song, they had no need to justify their national consciousness in terms of nineteenth century political literature. Secondly—and really a corollary of the first point—even should such nationalism ever reach them it would have to be related to their immemorial past in the living stream of their tradition, and so it could never completely dominate their mind. Whatever personal fervour it might arouse in individuals, its effects must quickly wear off their descendants.

There is thus meaning in the statement : " In the Gaeltacht nationalism made little impression " ; but— Is maith an scéal é, an té thuigfeadh.

Curiously enough those who are always telling the Irish what nationalists they are, usually mean statism, but miss its most obvious feature : because it makes the state supreme and confuses it with the nation, it postulates some universal supremacy in the nation too—or at least in the race, upon which it is mythically founded. German nationalism was never so arrogant as when the apotheosis of humanity was found in Aryan man. No Frenchman is so chauvinist as he for whom France is identified with civilization. Nor is any Spaniard so filled with *casticismo* as he in whose mind Spain and Catholicism are one and the same. These heresies are so much more powerful and vicious for being nearly true.

The Irish, not being sufficiently insular to escape the backwash of every periodic European tidalwave, naturally felt the shock of this particular European aberration. But compared to its continental prototype the peculiar Irish statist-nationalism which grew up was a rather poor and provincial imitation.

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[1] Leabhair Sheáin Í Chonaill ; Séamus Ó Duilearga, 1948, p. 289 : Aimsir na bhFíníneach.

At the level of politics it served to confuse the centuries-old issue of the escape from alien domination, and took over much of the outward trappings of the spirit with which Hyde had endowed the Gaelic League. Under its shadow the new state was born.

If, however, such a nationalism had been at the centre of the thought of the founders of the new state, then it must have become identified with the Absolute, and so possessed of a daemonic energy. It would have certainly made all the mistakes Professor Breatnach claims for it, but it would have made them with a lustier zeal. The first tentative boycott of Belfast must have developed into an invasion ; the invasion, no matter how often repelled, into an occupation ; the occupation into total suppression, until the last remaining Orangemen spoke Gaelic, or stole away to surreptitious gatherings in the Antrim hills, there to tap muffled Lambegs and to murmur softly the words of the *Old Orange Flute.*

The opposite happened. It happened— as might be expected of a people who had never really thought out the logic of their position as a divided nation— fitfully, with many backslidings and contradictions. But the general picture began to emerge : co-operation not compulsion, behind the talk agreement on electric power and on railways. But the rulers of a none too wealthy republic, beset with economic difficulties, whose nationalist varnish was beginning to wear off, had for the greater part never understood Hyde's teaching. Irish had been only a " badge of nationality ". What Professor Breatnach calls a policy of more and more Gaelicization, was in point of fact never proceeded with. Instead it became less and less.

The Recovery of Tradition

Wrong as Professor Breatnach is in many points, it is an indication of how much on the defensive the Gaelic movement still is that it should elect to treat him merely as its enemy when he is so evidently searching for the life-principle of our national recovery and is so concerned for the preservation of the Gaeltacht. It is unfortunate that he sees the Gaeltacht only in its external accidents of geographical setting and reduced circumstance and so misses its essential nature. It contains for him " a people who lived by immemorial custom rather than by taking thought, a people for whom there was no intellectual problem but yielded to the ultimate arbitrament of the gnōmē, and no doubt or fear or pain but found surcease in a simple Faith ". The picture is a delightful one : it is fully in the tradition of romantic writing in English, of James Stephens's Crock of Gold, of Honor Tracy's " primitive " and " friendly " Blasket-Islanders.

The people of the Dunquin-Ballyferriter Gaeltacht may indeed relish folk-lore, as many city folk do not ; but in their outlook they are not unaware of contemporary problems. One night last Winter, coming from

a friend's house where I had been entertained with " humorous anecdote and picturesque invective ", I saw lights out to sea. I asked a companion their meaning. He replied : " Sin árthaig na Spáine ag iasgach ar chóstaibh na hÉireann. Agus an *Macha,* cá bhfuil sí ? ". As these foreign trawlers were interfering with the fishing-boats from the English-speaking town of Dingle and elsewhere, this speech was not to be expected from one lost behind the barrier of a " language that was medieval rather than modern ".

Folk tales, *Piseogs* and a simple Faith as criteria by which to discern the Gaelic-speaking mind are remarkable for their survival outside the Gaeltacht. On the other hand Professor Breatnach's remark about a people for whom there was no intellectual problem certainly caused at least one smile, as I remembered the guileless youth who once remarked to me : " Seo rud táim ag ceapadh : an bhféadfadh an Eaglais bheith cam ? ". But perhaps this play-boy too has his counterpart elsewhere in Ireland where the gentle art of guying the visitor is not unknown.

Since, however, in the Gaeltacht more than elsewhere, the Irish nation still maintains the cultural links that bind it to its past, it is scarcely to be wondered that Professor Breatnach should experience there " a catharsis, a never-to-be-forgotten cleansing of the spirit ", as must any Irishman whose mind has found its home. But this pearl of great price must be something other than any custom in which it reveals itself, whether of rhymed prayer or song.

Often, doubtless, the two terms tradition and custom are interchangeable. A core of difference nevertheless remains. In the first place, custom is primarily what is done by a group over a period, while tradition is custom to which some significance is attached. Because it is considered meaningful, it is preserved with care and is handed on to later generations, and so gets its name. Sometimes the significance is not just attached to its growth, but is rather its cause. So we speak of the traditions of a craft : of boat-building, of the art and practice of medicine, of the making of verse. This implies creative endeavour in the light of an ideal at least dimly recognized—to make sea-mastering boats, to heal, to live as civilized persons.

Nonetheless, civilized living means more than artistic endeavour. It implies harmony in man himself : the ordered development of personality within a given situation that embraces family and social life. The individual, born into a community, is predisposed to accept the norms it has evolved; and even if he rebels, he implies the standards he rejects. But these very standards, these norms, are, in fact, the answer the community has found for its needs as it tries to perfect itself ; they are the formulation of its tradition in the light of its emerging genius.

Tradition in this sense represents everything worthwhile that a group or a people has discovered in its struggle towards a given ideal ; it is

the light discovered by a constant procession of idealists attempting to grasp a particular sunbeam, just as Prometheus eventually captured for mortal men divine knowledge filched from the sun. The fire may often burn the hand that holds it, the Promethean enlightenment portray a hybris that issues in pain of body and anguish of soul. These are its defects. Tradition is still the sweetest fruit of endeavour, the maturing in wisdom that marks off man from brute creation.

Our tradition, then, is not the sum of purely Irish customs. It is a form which produces a quality to be assessed upon the summit of its achievement and the potential of its aim. It is to be judged by its inherited capacity for discriminating in what is new, not by any tenets of sterile purism such as ban with an uncomprehending atavism whatever was unknown to former ages. Our Irish tradition is Ireland, because when a people has developed a tradition of its own, that tradition forms its later generations. The question than arises : can this tradition express itself in English ?

The fact that it can is shown, for instance, in the poetry of Patrick Kavanagh, even when he most rebels against it :

> . . . When Drake was winning seas for England
> We sailed in puddles of the past
> Pursuing the ghost of Brendan's mast.
>
> The seeds among the dust were less than dust,
> Dust we sought, decay,
> The young sprout rising smothered in it
> Cursed for being in the way—
> And the same is true today.
>
> Culture is always something that was,
> Something that pedants can measure :
> Skull of bard, thigh of chief,
> Depth of dried up river.
> Shall we be thus forever ?
> Shall we be thus forever ? [1]

Vehement and despairing as this poem is, its very reaction shows the strength of the tradition that provoked it ; and so it is not a condemnation of the tradition, but of the pedantry that attempts to stifle it, of the lifeless antiquarianism content to preserve *quae superaverunt fragmenta ne pereant.* In this category Professor Breatnach cannot be included for he wishes not only to preserve but also to " develop and, as far as is possible,

[1]Memory of Brother Michael : *Irish Times,* 14-10-1944.

extend " these *fragmenta*. But he does not see that this cannot take place in virtue of the Gaeltacht's *disiecta membra* alone but of the Irish tradition *sine addito*. Neither does Kavanagh appear to see that in regarding our tradition from the standpoint of English we are doing so from the outside and with foreign eyes ; and so can appreciate it only as antiquarians. Without the Irish language we will be thus forever. Historically the Irish language has been the primary means by which our tradition has maintained its development ; but, since we rejected our language, we have been trying to live our mental life according to the genius of another people, thus impairing the vitality of our tradition. The logical outcome of this process is that we must eventually cease to exist as a people.

Perhaps it is now permissible to summarize :

In the broader meanings of the term, nationalism has revealed itself as much in the Gaeltacht as in any other part of Ireland. In its strict philosophical sense, however, that of statism battening on nationality, nationalism made very little impact on Ireland. In so far as 19th century nationalistic theory entered Ireland it was more potent in the political sphere, and its influence was more far-reaching in the Galltacht where the older tradition of nationhood was less articulate, its natural instrument having been abandoned. However strong may have been the imprint of romantic European nationalism during the phase in which the Irish Revival began and the state was founded, as an intellectual force it has now lost its impetus. At this fact Gaeilgeoirí may rejoice because its presence served only to confuse the Revival and could never form a true basis for it. It hid the fact that the basis for our national recovery is our personal rebuilding within the Irish tradition, to reach which end the Irish language *per se* is inadequate, and may even on occasion prove unnecessary. Our language is valuable as a key by which our tradition may be discovered and as the natural vehicle to carry it forward to succeeding generations. Divorced from the tradition, to express and mirror which it was fashioned, it can only cloak our emptiness ; and so divorced the language must itself become warped and brittle.

Consequently it is of greater moment that the Irish language be used to become conscious of our tradition and to form ourselves in its dimensions than that it should itself become the language of daily life, however desirable this may ultimately be. It is more sound that its present development be conditioned by the continuity of that tradition than that the language should be fitted out to express opinions on every subject that suggests itself to our de-nationalized selves. For the re-growth of our Irish nationality the Gaeltacht is of great importance as being the only existing example of a community where our language and our tradition are harmoniously one. But to seek to preserve the language at its present stage of development there, is to maim both language and tradition by

denying their capacity for further expansion. For the Irish nation generally, the Gaeltacht is a source and exemplar where students may find the living well-springs and the linguistic norms which they need. If it is not availed of as such it will quickly die. The people there, seeing themselves regarded as of little value and as cut off from their countrymen, will not be prepared to accept the material poverty which their present possession of Irish entails. They will travel the old path, that of every area in Ireland where Irish has been flung aside, for " féach cad é an fhaid soir thar Daingean a thúrfaidh do chuid Gaelainge thu ! ".

In bringing these points forward I may, of course, be in error : I have tried to keep in mind that advice of Oliver Cromwell : " Consider in the bowels of the Lord, I beseech ye, that ye may be wrong ".

SOME IMPLICATIONS

In view of the importance of our tradition Professor Breatnach undoubtedly deserves commendation for underlining the poor standard of spoken Irish, even among Honours students, and for showing that the Gaeltacht was never really availed of that they might learn. Even in the Secondary schools there is no oral examination in Irish for the Intermediate and Leaving Certificate examinations. It is scarcely a cause for wonder then that in those odd cases where Irish does become " the normal schoolroom speech ", it should be pronounced as English.

To counter this development it is necessary to evolve a much wider scheme for sending children to the Gaeltacht, so that in learning the spoken language they may enter into communion with the tradition it embodies. Certainly if the Gaeltacht vanishes, spoken Irish can never be properly learned. However, the very reduction of the Gaeltacht to some 40,000 souls makes its preservation easier to ensure : it reduces the problem to providing its inhabitants with ordinary amenities and to finding work for some 10,000 persons at a level higher than that of unskilled labourers which is the penalty at present paid for possessing the living instance of our national tradition. The building of a virile Gaeltacht in such a manner appears hardly beyond the competence of a nation determined to endure. Since our resurgence can come only from our tradition it seems not unreasonable that it be derived from its present natural base which is the Gaeltacht.

This proposal entails the inverse of a process that is becoming steadily more apparent, and which might be termed " presenting the 20th century through Irish ". This process presumes that our Irish recovery entails nothing further than glossing over our de-nationalized social and intellectual life with a coat of green paint in the form of an artificial Gaelic jargon. For indicating the emergence of this perversion Professor Breatnach is to be thanked.

This linguistic veneer, however, is potent for destruction at a level

more intimate than that of vocabulary. By presenting a Gaelic façade, an outlook formed in our Anglicized centres of learning and based largely on a 19th century liberalistic utilitarianism can become translated to the very heart of the Revival movement, so as to corrupt from within. In this way a specious intellectualism, ranging over topics of varied interest, is enabled to achieve stature and influence. It is capable not only of producing a spurious jargon differing from traditional Irish but, should it achieve ultimate success, of completing the work of our destruction.

To this problem there is only one solution : a penetration in extension and depth within the Irish tradition. This, however, is already taking place and is well exemplified in the field of literature where the better writers are among those intimately connected with the Gaeltacht, however much some of them have transcended its limitations. Among prose writers, Máirtín Ó Cadhain alone has gained recognized stature ; of the younger generation Donnchadh Ó Céilleachair seems to show the most promise. Of the three or four writers of good verse, who all show a highly personal and even universal outlook, each is likewise permeated with the Irish tradition derived from the Gaeltacht—Máirtín Ó Direáin, Máire Mhac an tSaoi, Seán Ó Ríordáin. In drama, similarly, Seán Ó Tuama. The complement of this extension outwards from the living culture, the founding of the literary movement in the depth of our past tradition, has already begun in the work of Tomás Ó Floinn.

This two-fold trend appears in Father Benedict, O.D.C.'s *Leabhar an Aifrinn*. At first sight, perhaps, a mere translation of the Roman Missal, however splendid its theme, might seem just another instance of veneer-Irish unrelated to our tradition ; but its author had already steeped himself in the Gaelic world of Aran and in our folklore and literature. However pagan the substratum of our tradition, however decadent some of its historical phases, it has been salted through with the Catholic Faith over a period of many centuries. It is, therefore, not only our nation's life-source but at a personal level forms a valuable spiritual inheritance as well. Hence, it is of more than passing interest that three impressions of the work have been already sold out.

The proposed integral recovery of our Irish tradition, both within the Gaeltacht and beyond it, through our language, our literature and otherwise, on both the natural and spiritual planes is, I suppose, an ideal. As such it can only be approached, never ultimately realized. This is no cause for vain regret : our political freedom, long regarded as the *summum bonum* of our national endeavour, has already shown that to reach an attainable goal can bring in its train a reaction of disillusionment through the satiation of our hopes. That is why we can be thankful that our Irish recovery is merely a means towards our natural perfection, an end which on earth is impossible. But if we Irish refuse to take on ourselves the labour this ideal involves, we will not live long.

Newman's First Conversion

'A GREAT CHANGE OF THOUGHT'

August 1st till December 21st 1816

by C. STEPHEN DESSAIN

IT is just one hundred and forty years since Newman's first conversion at the age of fifteen, that pregnant event which set his course in the direction from which he never seriously turned aside, and of which his second conversion, when he knelt at the feet of Father Dominic, was simply the corollary. Newman covered more pages to explain the genesis of his second conversion, which he was called upon to justify, both publicly and in private, than he did his first, yet he always regarded his first as incomparably more important. He spoke of it in a score of places in his writings, published and unpublished, during the whole seventy years of his life that succeeded it; and his testimony never changed. Yet, not only has it been variously interpreted, but theories which directly contradict it, have gained a wide currency. The first biographers had the excuse that all the evidence was not available ; one of the latest brushes it aside with the words : " I feel that we may without impertinence, think we know more than Newman did ". The aim of these pages will be to bring together the different passages in which Newman speaks of the event which transformed his life, and to allow him to speak for and interpret himself. Newman *sui-ipsius interpres,* and let us not forget that he was a man passionately devoted to the truth.

On his fifteenth birthday, 21 February 1816, he had been for nearly seven years at Ealing School, whose headmaster was accustomed to say ' that no boy had run through the school, from the bottom to the top, so rapidly as John Newman '.[1] Newman himself insisted that he was not precocious, but he certainly made the most of the opportunities provided for his intellectual and literary development. What is true is that there was nothing particular to distinguish him from other highly intelligent and lively schoolboys. In his family too, where he was the eldest of six children and surrounded with affection, if he stood out it was as the most gifted member of a cultivated family, fond of music, literature and of playgoing and play-acting. The religion of the parents was that of moderate churchpeople, attached to no particular party in the Established

[1] John Henry Newman, *Autobiographical Writings*, edited by Henry Tristram, London, Sheed and Ward, 1956 (subsequently referred to as *Autobiographical Writings*), p. 29. See also A. Mozley, *Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman* 1, p. 27.

Church. The children were taught to hold the Bible and christian morality in high honour, and although Newman was later to say that he ' had a perfect knowledge of his Catechism', he received little definite doctrinal teaching, and ' had no formed religious convictions '.[1] From his mother and grandmother he learned to take great delight in reading Holy Scripture. From them he acquired that Bible Religion which, in spite of many deficiencies, inculcated a high moral standard and a sense of God's Providences towards mankind. In his father's outlook the religious beliefs he held played a less influential part. One of his sons was later to describe him as having been ' somewhat free-thoughted, fond of seeing what different people had to say for their opinions ',[2] and now his eldest son, at the age of 14, was to begin to feel the attractions of infidelity and scepticism.

" When I was fourteen, I read Paine's Tracts against the Old Testament, and found pleasure in thinking of the objections which were contained in them . . . Also I recollect copying out some French verses, perhaps Voltaire's, against the immortality of the soul, and saying to myself something like ' How dreadful, but how plausible '."[3] That was a public statement, in the *Apologia* in 1864, but already in a private notebook, in 1823, he had written : " I recollect (in 1815 I believe) thinking I should like to be virtuous, but not religious. There was something in the latter idea I did not like. Nor did I see the *meaning* of loving God. I recollect (in 1815) contending . . . in favour of Pope's *Essay on Man*. What, I said, can be more free from objection than it ? does it not expressly inculcate, ' Virtue alone is happiness below ' ? "[4]

Newman always confessed as most grave these toyings with irreligion, and the attitude of arrogant self-sufficiency and independence of God which they implied, or to which they might have led. In 1844 he wrote to Keble : " When I was a boy of fifteen, and living a life of sin, with a very dark conscience and a very profane spirit, [God] mercifully touched my heart ; and, with innumerable sins, yet I have not forsaken Him from that time, nor He me."[5] In his Journal, in 1859, he wrote : " Thy wonderful grace turned me right round when I was more like a devil than a wicked boy, at the age of fifteen, and gave me what by Thy continual aids I never lost. Thou didst change my heart, and in part my whole mental complexion at that time."[6] In one of the prayers in *Meditations on Christian Doctrine* he portrays his struggle against grace. He was being chosen, and he did everything to thwart God's purpose.

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[1] *Apologia*, Uniform Edition, p. 1.
[2] *Correspondence of J. H. Newman with J. Keble and Others*, ed. at the Birmingham Oratory, p. 394.
[3] *Apologia*, p. 3.
[4] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 169, and Mozley, *op. cit.* I, 22.
[5] *Corr. with Keble*, p. 314.
[6] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 250, and W. Ward, *Life of Newman* I p. 575.

He would have become worse and worse, and at length gone to hell, but for God's incomprehensible, overpowering love which took him captive. " Was any boyhood so impious as some years of mine ! Did I not in fact dare Thee to do Thy worst ? Ah, how I struggled to get free from Thee ; but Thou art stronger than I and hast prevailed."[1]

As we might be led to expect from the atmosphere of his family and his success at school, the sins of which Newman felt the attraction were those of the intellect. We may make allowances for that realization of spiritual realities and the gravity of sin which causes the saints to measure their own vileness by the standards of Infinite Holiness. Nevertheless it remains clear that Newman convicted himself of grave intellectual pride and self-sufficiency. No doubt, too, the temptation to pride and arrogance towards others came easily enough to the brilliant schoolboy, who was recognized as a leader by his fellows. Self-accusations such as this are to be found in his private journals during the ensuing years : " I am very bad-tempered, vain, proud, arrogant, prone to anger and vehement."[2]

Newman persisted to the end of his life in the view he took of himself at the age of fifteen. In 1863 he wrote to Mr Brownlow, the future bishop of Clifton : " I should be contradicting my own individuality and personality, if I was not as sure that God changed me altogether when I was a boy of fifteen, as I am of the existence of any particular creation of grace, of any actual divine working . . . in the Catholic Church. I am more sure that God gave me great opportunities to love Him then, than that St Ignatius was a true Martyr, or that St Augustine is a Doctor of the Church."[3] Then in 1885 almost at the end, when Anne Mozley was gathering the material for her two volumes, he wrote to her : " I am rather perplexed what to send you, whether to begin with my school time or with 1816. Of course I cannot myself be the judge of myself ; but, speaking with this reserve, I should say that it is difficult to realize or imagine the identity of the boy before and after August 1816, as the Memoranda, still undestroyed, describe him. I can look back at the end of seventy years as if on another person ; but even the period from 1816 to 1828 I shall not be able to send you, without a great effort . . ." However, the Memoranda that remain do at least suggest that the conversion was the revival of *dormant* religious teachings. " My feelings were . . . a returning to, a renewing of principles, under the power of the Holy Spirit, which I had *already* felt, and in a measure acted on, when young."[5] As much was implied in a letter written more than half a century later, to the effect that he had no *lasting* religious thoughts till

[1] *Meditations and Devotions*, p. 552.
[2] *Early Journals* II, init. 4 August 1821, in *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 174.
[3] W. Ward, *Life of Newman*, I, 652.
[4] Letter at Oriel College, 28 February 1885. cf. Mozley *op. cit.* I, 22.
[5] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 80, and Mozley, *op. cit.* I, 124.

1816. His conversion, however, when it came, was quite unexpected. He seemed set for infidelity. As he remarked in the letter just referred to, "I never dreamed of being converted."[1]

Newman was undoubtedly thinking of himself when he said, in the sermon on Christ Manifested in Remembrance: "Let a person . . . look back upon his past life, and he will find how critical were moments and acts, which at the time seemed the most indifferent; as for instance, the school he was sent to as a child, the occasion of his falling in with those persons who have most benefited him, the accidents which determined his calling or prospects whatever they were. God's hand is ever over His own, and He leads them forward by a way they know not of".[2] God's Providence, as so often, now came in the guise of adversity, and the great change of thought was prepared by a financial disaster. On 8 March 1816, the bank in which Mr Newman was a partner was forced to suspend payment and, although within a month all the creditors were very honourably paid in full, the Newman family found themselves in reduced circumstances. Their London house had to be given up, and their country cottage at Norwood sold. The end of the year saw Mr Newman established, rather precariously, as a brewer at Alton. John Henry, as the eldest son, had been called home at once and the news broken to him, and it was agreed that he should remain at school during the summer holidays, while the selling and moving of house were effected. All this *may* have brought home to him the vanity of earthly things, and it *must* have undermined his sense of security and have helped to check any tendencies to proud self-sufficiency. To this first blow of Divine Providence another was added, a severe illness, presumably in the early summer, to which Newman refers in his Journal in 1869. "I have had three great illnesses in my life, and how have they turned out! The first keen, terrible one, when I was a boy of fifteen, and it made me a Christian—with experience before and after, awful, and known only to God."[3]

* * *

Newman's second conversion in 1845 was the work of no human instrument. It is true that Bishop Wiseman and Dr Russell of Maynooth counted for a little, but essentially the work went on within Newman himself, under God. He knew no Catholics and felt no sympathy with them—he was his own guide. The first conversion was very different; it was due to a human agent, again under God. "The Conversations and sermons of the excellent man . . . the Rev. Walter Mayers . . . who was the

[1] Letter of 9 June 1882 to T. Mozley.
[2] *Parochial and Plain Sermons IV*, p. 261.
[3] *Journal*, 25 June 1869, in *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 268.

human means of the beginning of divine faith in me."[1] At the time when he converted Newman, Mr Mayers was a young man of 26, and he had been a master at the school at Ealing for some eighteen months. He himself had only recently been converted and become an Evangelical. He was at Pembroke College, Oxford and intended to take orders but, according to his biographer, viewed the ministry ' in no other light than that of a profession, which was to afford him a decent maintenance '.[2] A friend inspired him with higher views, and he was eventually converted as a result of an accident as he was crossing a bridge at Gloucester. His horse took fright at a steamboat and nearly precipitated him into the Severn. He learned two lessons he was to pass on, the realization of the presence and of the providence of God. In a memorandum he noted, " The shock I received produced some serious ideas on the providential interference of Him who is essentially present everywhere, though invisible to the carnal mind."[3]

As soon as he was ordained he began to teach the classics at Ealing, but was worried in conscience because this seemed to be harmful to his spiritual life, and a hindrance to his working as a minister of the Church. His poverty leaving him no alternative, he gradually accepted the position as providential, and did what he could to spread religion among the boys. He seems to have met with little response except in the Newman family, but if he could have foreseen the future, he would have understood that his work was providential indeed. He won Newman's confidence and, by his preaching, his private conversations and above all by the books he lent him, became the human instrument of Newman's change of thought. During the long summer holidays they were alone together at the school. At the beginning of the first of his Early Journals, Newman remarked as to this circumstance : " On my conversion. How the wisdom and goodness of God is discerned ! I was going from school half a year sooner than I did—my staying arose from the 8th of March", the day on which his father's bank suspended payments. " Thereby I was left at school by myself, my friends gone away." Newman commented in 1874, " That is, it was a time of reflection, and when the influence of Mr Mayers would have room to act upon me. Also I was terrified at the heavy hand of God which came down upon me."[4] This last sentence seems to refer to the family reverse and his own illness. A note made in 1822, in the second of the Early Journals, gives us the exact dates of the great change. " The first or last days of the half year of my conversion, Aug. 1. and Decr. 21, 1816."[5] Newman had

[1] *Apologia*, p. 4.
[2] Memoir prefaced to his *Sermons*, p. ii.
[3] *ib.* p. iii.
[4] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 150.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

matriculated at Oxford on December 14th, and left Ealing School at the end of the term.

He still remained, however, the friend and disciple of Mr Mayers. The Journal just quoted shows that he consulted him in 1823 as to the advisability of his own ordination. Mayers had left Ealing the previous year, and was now vicar of Over Worton near Oxford. In the village church there Newman preached his first sermon, on 24 June 1824, and at the end of that same year Mr Mayers married Sarah Giberne, whose sister was to become Newman's lifelong friend, following him into the Church and ending her days as a Visitation nun. At Over Worton too, Newman preached ' On the death of a very dear friend ' in 1828, a sermon about Mr Mayers, who had died a few weeks previously when out visiting his flock. In a letter of condolence at Mr Mayer's death, he writes : " Whatever religious feeling I have within me, to his kind instructions when I was at school I am especially indebted for it—and it may I think be safely said, that had it not been for my intimacy with him, I should not have possessed the comfort of that knowledge of God which, poor as it is, enabled me to go through the dangerous season of my undergraduate residence here without wounding my conscience by any gross or scandalous sin. And when I think of the affection he always showed me, the anxious pains he took to be of service to me, and the readyness he ever had to assist me in any object I had in view, and again his deep and spiritual views of religion . . . I feel my heart quite dark [?] within me at the loss of him."[1]

Great as was Newman's debt to Mr Mayers, he tells us he was even more influenced by the books he placed in his hands, and above all, " by the writer who made a deeper impression on my mind than any other, and to whom (humanly speaking) I almost owe my soul—Thomas Scott of Aston Sandford ".[2] Newman continues, " I so admired and delighted in his writings, that, when I was an undergraduate, I thought of making a visit to his Parsonage, in order to see a man whom I so deeply revered. I hardly think I could have given up the idea of this expedition, even after I had taken my degree ; for the news of his death in 1821 came upon me as a disappointment as well as a sorrow."

This extraordinary man, the son of a Lincolnshire grazier, was born in 1747, the tenth of thirteen children. He was the nephew by marriage of Capability Brown, the landscape gardener, and he was to be the grandfather of Sir George Gilbert Scott, the architect. After seven years of schooling, Thomas Scott was apprenticed to a surgeon, but was dismissed for some bad behaviour two months later. His master, though an irreligious man, remarked that his conduct was not only displeasing

[1] Letter to Rev. R. Greaves, 27 February 1828, at Oriel College. Cf. R. D. Middleton, *Newman at Oxford*, p. 10.

[2] *Apologia*, p. 5.

to him, the surgeon, but wicked in the sight of God. This chance phrase aroused a sense of God's presence in the boy, and was the beginning of his conversion.

Immediately, however, he returned home in disgrace to spend the next nine years doing the hardest and dirtiest work with the cattle, and subjected to his father's continual reproaches. In adversity at least he did not lose his taste for reading, and eventually left home and succeeded in becoming a clergyman. He accuses himself of doing this for ambitious reasons, and in order to avoid a laborious life. Certainly in his beliefs he was still a child of his age. He was a Unitarian and a deist, and did not believe in eternal punishment. He devoted all his time to study, and felt himself to be a hypocrite when performing the services of the church, owing to what he describes as his ' entire neglect of all secret religion '. His evangelical conversion was no sudden affair. When he found that one of his parishioners whom he had neglected to visit had died, his conscience was shaken and he began to visit regularly and also to pray. A chance opening of the *Book of Common Prayer* at the article which says that the Athanasian Creed is ' to be thoroughly received and believed ' gave him a scruple about his subscription to the XXXIX Articles. He shut himself off from preferment by making this public. He was led to make a deeper search for religious truth, but was not drawn to Christianity in its evangelical form. He read Locke and was attracted by rationalism, but realized the importance of moral dispositions in the search for truth. Law's *Serious Call*, which he had hitherto held in contempt, helped to make him give himself to prayer and spiritual reading. He was now a man of nearly thirty. He learned from the writings of Bishop Beveridge the orthodox doctrine of the redemption, and a year or two later, thanks to his earnest study of Holy Scripture, found himself able to accept the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Newman, in the *Apologia*, admires ' his bold unworldliness and vigorous independence of mind ', and adds, " he followed truth wherever it led him, beginning with Unitarianism, and ending with a zealous faith in the Holy Trinity. It was he who planted deep in my mind that fundamental truth of religion."[1]

Scott had not yet quite reached the end of his religious quest. He was an evangelical, but he could not accept the specifically calvinistic doctrines. After a struggle he did so, but he would not place them on a level with the other religious truths he believed. He held that a person could be ' a humble pious spiritual Christian ', who was ' an utter stranger ' to the calvinist doctrines. He was always alive to the danger of calvinism, and preached against antinomianism. The latest historian of the Evangelical Movement describes Scott's final position as one " which differed little from that of Evangelicalism in its mildly Calvinistic

[1] *Apologia*, p. 5.

form."[1] After the passage quoted above from the *Apologia,* Newman continues : " Besides his unworldliness, what I also admired in Scott was his resolute opposition to Antinomianism, and the minutely practical character of his writings. They show him to be a true Englishman, and I deeply felt his influence ; and for years I used almost as proverbs what I considered to be the scope and issue of his doctrine, ' Holiness before peace ', and ' Growth the only evidence of life '."

Long before the *Apologia,* in 1837, in a letter to Lord Lifford who thought he did not know the Evangelical School at first hand, Newman declared his admiration for Scott. " In Mr Scott's works I could bear to stand an examination. From the age of 15, when first I knew them, I was attracted by the earnestness and manliness and independence of his character ; he seemed to me one who was willing to stand on God's side against the world, and I never have lost this impression of him."[2] Scott wrote a history of his religious opinions, *The Force of Truth,* and there is a curious resemblance between it and the *Apologia,* just as there is between his life and that of Newman. Both men were converted to and accepted after a long struggle Christian truths which they had at first utterly rejected. Both realized the importance of moral dispositions in the search for the truth. Both put their principles before earthly success, and both were converted to a life of prayer, Newman at 15, Scott when he was nearly thirty. In another age or another country, Scott would probably have become a canonized saint.

* * *

What was the effect on Newman of the words of Mayers and the books and example of Scott ? How are we to describe the change which took place in him, between 1 August and 21 December 1816 ? Essentially it was neither more nor less than the full acceptance of the truths of the Christian Faith. There now began that whole-hearted devotion to the cause of Revealed Religion, which was to give Newman's life its unity. " I fell under the influence of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured."[3] Like Scott he accepted christianity in the purest form then available to him, the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, (the Theology), and the Redemption (the Economy), together with grace and the belief in heaven and hell. The dogmas about the Church and the Sacraments would be accepted when they were seen by one who had not sinned against light to cohere with and follow from the rest. He believed, too, specifically protestant doctrines such as the Lutheran view of Justification, but in later years, applying the teaching

[1] L. E. Elliott-Binns, *The Early Evangelicals,* p. 265.
[2] Draft copy, 12 September 1837, at Birmingham Oratory.
[3] *Apologia,* p. 4.

of the Grammar of Assent on certitude to his own case, he used to say not with a true certitude.[1]

Newman always looked back with deep gratitude on the teaching which formed the basis of his religious life. In the *Memoir* just referred to, written when he was well over 70, he says of the evangelical teaching that it

> had been a great blessing for England ; it had brought home to the hearts of thousands the cardinal and vital truths of Revelation, and to himself among others. The divine truths about Our Lord and His Person and offices, His grace, the regeneration of our nature in Him, the supreme duty of living, not only morally, but in His faith, fear and love, together with the study of Scripture in which these truths lay, had sheltered and protected him in his most dangerous years, had been his comfort and stay when he was forlorn, and had brought him on in habits of devotion till the time came when he was to dedicate himself to the Christian ministry, and he ever felt grateful to those who introduced them to him, and to the books, such as Scott's *Force of Truth*, Beveridge's *Private Thoughts* and Doddridge's *Rise and Progress* which insist upon them.[2]

At the very end, writing to an Evangelical in 1887, he pays his final tribute :

> I will not close our correspondence, without testifying my simple love and adhesion to the Catholic Roman Church . . . and did I wish to give a reason for this full and absolute devotion, what should, what can I say but that those great and burning truths which I learned when a boy from Evangelical teaching, I have found impressed upon my heart with fresh and ever increasing force by the Holy Roman Church ? That Church has added to the simple Evangelicalism of my first teachers, but it has obscured, diluted, enfeebled, nothing of it. On the contrary . . .[3]

In the *Apologia,* Newman called the event of 1816 " a change of thought " to emphasize its intellectual and doctrinal character, but elsewhere he calls it a conversion, and such it was : a putting into practice of his new faith, a thirst for holiness, the beginning of a life with God. The evangelical teaching converted him to a spiritual life, but with ' holiness before peace ' and ' growth the only evidence of life ' as his distinctly unevangelical watchwords. For a Catholic parallel we might think of a schoolboy converted to a life of dedicated fervour after a retreat or the reading of a spiritual book. The change in Newman was only abnormal in that it happened in one so talented and so generous. His differed from the case of St Augustine in that he had nothing to unlearn, and, that there was no separation between intellectual conviction and the offering of self in practice. In his memoranda Newman occasionally referred to this beginning of a spiritual life. During the retreat in

[1] *Autographical Writings,* p. 53. cf. *Grammar of Assent,* p. 243.
[2] *Autobiographical Writings,* p. 81, and Mozley, *op. cit.* I, p. 122.
[3] W. Ward. *op. cit.* II, 527.

Rome, before receiving the priesthood he wrote : " When I was growing up and as a young man, I had confidence and hope in God, i.e. I committed myself without anxiety to His Providence, I had the greatest faith in the efficacy of prayer . . ."[1] In 1859, on the first page of his Journal he wrote, " When I was young, I thought that with all my heart I gave up the world for Thee. As far as will, purpose, and intention go, I think I did. I mean, I deliberately put the world aside".[2] The Early Journals, in spite of their jarring evangelical style, give the same impression of one who had advanced a considerable way along the road to sanctity.

The change wrought in Newman by his new faith, and his new thirst for holiness, is summed up in the words that he rested " in the thought of two and two only supreme and luminously self evident beings, myself and my Creator."[3] Famous words, often misunderstood. They are quoted as a proof of Newman's introspection, a charge to which we shall return. Here it suffices to note that it is not introspective to turn to God within, to live with God. Introversion has a very different meaning according to whether it is used by the modern psychologists or the old spiritual writers. Newman had learned the lesson of God's Presence from Mr Mayers and Thomas Scott, both converted by a realization of that truth. His knowledge of Scripture soon made the Indwelling of God and the work of the Holy Spirit in the soul something very real. " I can offer up heartfelt prayers in my solitary walks", he notes later in his Journal at Oxford.[4] He had grasped the essential truth he was one day to develop in his sermons.

He was merely re-echoing the whole christian ascetical tradition, from the Fathers of the Desert downwards, which aimed at seeking and living with God alone. As St Gregory says of St Benedict, *solus in superni Spectatoris oculis habitavit secum.* If we require more recent parallels to Newman's words and practice we have St Teresa telling us " the utmost we have to do at first is to take care of our soul, and to remember that in the entire world there is only God and the soul".[5] And there is also St John of the Cross who gives the same advice, " Live in the world as though there were in it but God and thy soul".[6] In the sermon on Equanimity, Newman speaks of the Christian having " a deep, silent, hidden peace, which the world sees not . . . He is the greater part of his time by himself, and when he is in solitude, that is his real state. What he is when left to himself and to his God, that is his true life. He can bear himself ; he can (as it were) joy in himself, for it is the grace of God

[1] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 247.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 249, and W. Ward, *op. cit.*, I, p. 575.
[3] *Apologia*, p. 4.
[4] First Journal 13 May 1821, in *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 166.
[5] *Life*, XIII (Trans. A. Peers, p. 77).
[6] *Points of Love*, 61 (Trans. A. Peers, p. 150).

within him, it is the presence of the Eternal Comforter, in which he joys. He can bear, he finds it pleasant, to be with himself at all times—' never less alone than when alone '."[1] If explanation were needed of the famous words at the beginning of the *Apologia,* Newman himself provided it, later in the same volume. " From a boy I had been led to consider that my Maker and I, His creature, were the two beings certainly such, *in rerum natura.* I will not here speculate, however, about my own feelings. Only this I know full well now, and did not know then, that the Catholic Church allows no image of any sort, material or immaterial, no dogmatic symbol, no rite, no sacrament, no Saint, not even the Blessed Virgin herself, to come between the soul and its Creator. It is face to face, ' solus cum solo ', in all matters between man and his God."[2]

* * *

This beginning of a spiritual life lived in God's sight was not a matter of emotion, nor of intuition, nor of mere blind conviction. Feelings no doubt there were, but the change was essentially and basically an intellectual one—hence Newman's name for it, ' a change of thought '. There is a curious proof of this in the earliest pages of the first of the *Early Journals,* where he shows his readiness to defend his new certitudes. " The reality of conversion :—as cutting as the root of doubt, providing a chain between God and the soul, (i.e. with every link complete). I know I am right. How do you know it ? I know I know. How ? I know I know, etc. (vide *Grammar of Assent,* p. 195–197, ed. 4)"[3] The reference to the *Grammar* is Newman's own, and gives the key for understanding the passage. There he argues that a reflex conviction is to be reckoned as a certitude, and certitude he defines as " the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth . . . as expressed in the phrase, ' I know, that I know, etc.' " Later on in the *Grammar,* Newman lays it down that " religion demands more than an assent to its truth ; it requires a certitude".[4] He was of the same opinion in 1816, and used the arguments of the *Grammar of Assent* in embryonic form. The very next paragraph to that quoted above from the *Early Journal,* bears this out. " Again every action tells, has weight and meaning. No shadows—consistency. The unconverted man changes his end with his time of life, or goes on changing about—but here all is reality." This is already the argument from converging and consistent probabilities.

It is remarkable that Newman should have been so determined to justify his certainties, and that he should thus early have made consistency and stability the criteria of truth. Clearly he did not base his new faith on mere experience. He was quite conscious of this and realized that he had not been converted in the evangelical sense. In the *Autobiographical*

[1] *Parochial and Plain Sermons,* V., p. 69.
[2] *Apologia,* p. 195.
[3] *Autobiographical Writings,* p. 150.
[4] *Grammar of Assent,* p. 220.

Memoir he says, referring to his conversion, that " after all, the evangelical teaching, considered as a system and in what was peculiar to itself, had from the first failed to find a response in his own religious experience . . . He had indeed been converted by it to a spiritual life . . . but he had not been converted in that special way which it laid down as imperative, but so plainly against rule, as to make it very doubtful in the eyes of normal evangelicals whether he had really been converted at all ",[1] as numerous evangelicals did not hesitate to write and tell him, notably after the publication of the *Apologia*. He agreed with them to the extent " that he was sensible ", as he put it, " that he had ever been wanting in those special evangelical experiences, which, like a grip of a hand or other prescribed sign of a secret society, are the sure token of a member." The *Memoir* was written when Newman was old, but he was able to quote passages from the *Early Journals,* written while he was still an evangelical, in confirmation. " I speak of the process of conversion with great diffidence, being obliged to adopt the language of books. For my own feelings, as far as I can remember, were so different from any account I have ever read, that I dare not go by what *may* be an individual case." That was in 1821. In 1826 he added, " I wrote *juxta praescriptum.* I am persuaded that very many of my most positive and dogmatical notions were taken from *books*. In the matter in question, conversion, my feelings were not *violent*, but a returning to . . . principles . . . already felt . . . when young ",[2] that is to the Bible religion of his childhood.

The reading of Scott and of Law's *Serious Call* can only have confirmed Newman in his truly Catholic distrust of " religious experience ". Law, the High Churchman, was opposed to reliance being placed on it, and Scott followed him in this, quite emphatically. Newman not only inherited their teaching but confessed, in a passage he deleted from his *Memoir,* that he felt no inclination to any other. " The critical peculiarities of evangelical religion had never been congenial to him, though he had fancied he held them. Its emotional and feverish devotion and its tumultuous experiences were foreign to his nature, which indeed was ever conspicuously faulty in the opposite direction, as being in a way incapable, as if physically, of enthusiasm, however legitimate and guarded."[3]

Thus Newman was never a real evangelical, and had never been through the conventional experiences of conviction of sin, terror, despair, followed by full assurance of salvation. If a further proof is required of the intellectual and rational character of his conversion, it is provided by his reaction to the book presented to him by Mr Mayers, on 31 December 1816, just ten days after the process of conversion had been completed.

[1] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 79, and Mozley, *op. cit.* 1, p. 122.
[2] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 80, and Mozley *op. cit.* I, p. 123.
[3] At end of Ch. III of the Autobiographical Memoir in *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 82.

This was Beveridge's *Private Thoughts,* which Mr Mayers held to be entirely consonant with his own opinions. Its approach is almost aridly rational. The first sentence reminds the reader that he is a reasonable creature, and the first paragraph proves, by an argument from reason, that he has a spiritual soul. We are given the proofs of the existence of God, some apologetics and an outline of Christian Doctrine and morality. The combination of deep piety and compelling logic is reminiscent of the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius. On 14 October 1874, Newman wrote on the inside cover of this copy of *Private Thoughts* which had been presented to him on the last day of 1816 : ". . . no book was more dear to me, or exercised a more powerful influence over my devotion and my habitual thoughts. In my private memoranda I even wrote in its style."[1] In the first of the *Early Journals* he preserved a list of subjects on which he wrote reflections, in the Spring of 1817, and later (1851) he added the note, " I was very fond of Beveridge's *Private Thoughts* at this time, and the above quasi Sermons are, I think, in his style".[2]

Newman explained that he did not mention Beveridge's work in the *Apologia,* " because I am speaking there of the formation of my doctrinal opinions, and I do not think they were influenced by it ".[3] Other books he does mention, also given him by Mr Mayers, but earlier, during the fateful conversion months, and " all of the school of Calvin." Of strictly calvinistic doctrines, however, he never accepted what he calls ' the detestable doctrine ' of predestination to eternal death, although he did believe in his election to glory, and in regeneration as including the gift of perseverance. This belief in the elect as a clearly defined body gradually faded away, partly under the impact of pastoral work in the parish of St Clement's at Oxford. " Of the Calvinistic tenets", he tells us, " the only one which took root in my mind was the fact of heaven and hell."[4] Through Calvinism, too, he learned the Catholic doctrine of the warfare between the Christian and the world, and also, perhaps, that attitude of deep reverence before God, and the claims of God, which always characterized him.

Of other books which influenced him during the months of conversion, Newman mentions Newton *On the Prophecies,* from which he learned the then widely held doctrine that the pope was antichrist, and Milner's *Church History.* This latter work by introducing him to the Fathers provided the key which would ultimately unlock all the treasures of Revealed Truth. He has confessed how strong this influence was, in an autobiographical passage in *Difficulties of Anglicans* :

[1] *Correspondence of J. H. Newman with J. Keble and others,* p. 116.
[2] *Autobiographical Writings,* p. 154.
[3] *Correspondence of J. H. Newman with J. Keble and others,* p. 116.
[4] *Apologia,* p. 6.

> Even when I was a boy, my thoughts were turned to the early Church, and especially to the early Fathers, by the perusal of the Calvinist John Milner's *Church History*, and I have never lost, I have never suffered a suspension of the impression, deep and most pleasurable, which his sketches of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine left on my mind. From that time the vision of the Fathers was always, to my imagination, I may say, a paradise of delight to the contemplation of which I directed my thoughts . . .[1]

He " was nothing short of enamoured of the long extracts from St Augustine, St Ambrose, and the other Fathers which he found there."[2] Devotion to the Fathers, completing ' Bible Religion '—no mean foundation was being laid !

We may, then, define Newman's first conversion as the wholehearted acceptance of the Christian Faith in the purest form then available to him. It has often been noticed how many of the Tractarians either came from evangelical families, or passed through an evangelical phase. In the latter class were Newman himself and Hope-Scott and Manning ; in the former, the Wilberforces, Gladstone, Church, Faber, Oakeley and many others. Surely the implication of this is that Evangelicalism, in giving men fundamental christian teaching, provided the solid structure on which the complete edifice could be built.

* * *

It only remains to emphasize how little that was purely evangelical there was in Newman's conversion. It was no sudden affair, as those of Evangelicals were normally expected to be, nor was it violent. It was prepared in the Spring of 1816, by adversity, and it began in the quiet of a school, empty during the summer holidays. It lasted all during the Autumn term and the excitement of a first visit to Oxford, and it was inspired by two men, Mayers and Scott, both of whose conversions had been long drawn out. It was sober, too, in its consequences. In the *Apologia* Newman writes : " I am obliged to mention, though I do it with great reluctance, another deep imagination, which at this time, the autumn of 1816, took possession of me, viz., that it was the will of God that I should lead a single life." "This anticipation has held its ground almost continually ever since," he continues, in a passage not included in the printed text, " and it has been closely connected with that feeling of dissociation from scenes about me, of which I have already spoken. I had a strong persuasion that offences against the rule of purity were each of them visited sharply and surely from above : I have still extant prayers and memoranda of the years 1816 and 1821, showing my distress at the thought of going to dances or to the theatre." These memoranda,

[1] *Difficulties of Anglicans*, I, p. 370.
[2] *Apologia*, p. 7.

which show that Newman was not so very different from any timidly careful and high-principled Catholic boy, also show how anxious he was not to be censorious. The position was delicate because his parents were not Evangelicals, and Evangelicals held strict views about dancing and the theatre. So dances were not for him, but he would obey his parents in the matter, and absolutely refused to condemn those who approved of them. *Procul a me sit illud. Cuique suus mos.*[1] Also the idea that he was meant to lead a single life " was not founded on the Catholic belief of the moral superiority of the single life over the married . . . It arose from my feeling of separation from the visible world, and it was connected with a notion that my mission in life would require such a sacrifice as it involved".[2]

The sense of separation from the visible world dated back to long before the conversion. That the invisible world seemed the more real was not incipient idealism, but a deep *christian* way of thinking. It was enhanced by the new attention to God, the resting on the thought of himself and his Creator. As has already been suggested, this was far from making Newman into an introspective selfcentred youth. He remained very much the centre of his lively family. He devoted a great deal of his time to study, and that in the first months of 1817 immediately after his conversion, in spite of the fact that, as he tells us, ' my eyes were very bad, and I was not allowed or able to read much '. Professor Culler, in his recent book, tells us the ground he covered, and there was not much time left for introspection.

> He would begin in the mornings with perhaps a hundred verses of Sophocles, then do a page of Greek exercises and half a dozen Latin sentences, leave that for two chapters of Cicero's De Officiis, then four propositions of Euclid, and finally either some English verse translation or simply an ode of Horace. In this way, between the middle of March and the first of June he read five plays of Sophocles, some of them twice over ; Cicero's De Officiis, De Amicitia, and De Senectute ; four satires of Juvenal, about twenty selections from Horace, and fourteen chapters from the Gospel of St Matthew in Greek. In addition, he did the first book of Euclid, various Greek and Latin exercises, a theme on the subject ' non nobis solum ', and some translations of Ovid and Horace into English verse.[3]

No wonder Newman could write in a cancelled passage of his Autobiographical Memoir:

> There was another peculiarity of Mr Newman's mind, which was adverse to the chance of a system of emotion and sentiment gaining such a hold upon it, as it has before now attained in the case of better men, and this was his love of hard secular work and his literary tastes, in which an Evangelical proper has no sympathy.

[1] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 153.
[2] *Apologia*, p. 7. The rest of the passage is in Bouyer's *Newman, Sa vie, sa spiritualité*, p. 44.
[3] *The Imperial Intellect*. A. D. Culler, p. 5.

And further on:

> One additional feature of Mr Newman's mind shall be noticed, which seemed to intimate from the first that the ethical character of Evangelical Religion could not be lastingly imprinted upon it. This was his great attraction to what may be called the literature of Religion, whether the writings of the Classics, or the works of the Fathers. As to the Greek and Latin authors, poets and philosophers, Aeschylus, Pindar, Herodotus, Virgil and Horace, or again Aristotle and Cicero, he had from the first made much of them, as the Holy Fathers did, as being in a certain sense inspired moralists, and prophets of truths greater than they knew.[1]

That is Newman's testimony. His conversion had certain transitory effects, and we may agree with him that it led to "real isolation of thought and spiritual solitariness",[2] preserving him perhaps and preparing him providentially for the work he was to do. What was permanent and fundamental was the acceptance of Revealed Religion, and the giving of himself to God, in consequence. Let us keep to Newman's own words. He was made a Christian, he began a new life. That was the simple, profound, and lasting result; it was the turning point of his life, which gave the rest of his earthly course its unity. His unfolding mind was captured by the Christian Revelation, and his heart by the christian ideal of holiness.

(A Lecture delivered at the first International Newman Conference, Luxembourg, 24 July 1956)

[1] At end of Ch. III, *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 82.

[2] *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 65, and Mozley *op. cit.* I, p. 104.

Secondary Education in Ireland

by SEÁN Ó CATHÁIN

CONCLUSION*

A NEW PLAN

THE patient and persevering reader who has followed so far this analysis of our secondary education will probably have reached the conclusion that I am opposed to the existing extern examinations. And so I am—at any rate in their present form. Furthermore, I am very doubtful whether any merely modal alteration in them which would leave them substantially the same would be worth while : they are of their essence destructive of good teaching and true learning. The reader may then wonder how they are to be replaced ; what substitute can adequately supply for an institution that in the short eighty years of its existence, has acquired both within the schools, and even more outside them, a degree of prestige that is frankly lamentable. I have indeed a solution to offer, but before proposing it, and also by way of clearing the ground for it, I think it only right to consider the chief arguments that are usually advanced by those who defend the extern examination. If I can show that the alleged advantages are either largely illusory and, in fact, harmful to education or, in so far as they are real, are to be found in an alternative system, I can then the more confidently recommend my own solution.

It appears to me that the various advantages may be fairly grouped under two heads : (*a*) the extern examination provides an objective standard by which to assess the achievement of a school ; (*b*) it is a powerful incentive to both teacher and pupil in their work.

An Objective Standard

Those who make for the extern examination the claim of objective assessment make, either implicitly or explicitly, one or more of three judgements. The first is that such an assessment is factual, impartial and as accurate as it is within human nature to be ; negatively, that it is superior to teachers' estimates which, " as everyone knows", are often untrustworthy. The second judgement (or, more properly, supposition) is that what is tested is the achievement of the pupils in *education*. The third is that these tests have raised the general level of education in secondary schools.

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*For earlier sections cf *Studies*, Winter 1955, Spring 1956, Winter 1956.

With regard to the first of these, it is to be noticed that the test purports to pass judgement, by means of one single paper, on a pupil's work during two, three or four years in some one subject. Even under optimum conditions such an isolated sampling is contrary to well-established rules of testing. A beet factory that would judge the contents of a wagon by examining one single beet or even a sampling from only one point in the wagon would soon hear all about it, and rightly, from the Beet Growers' Association. An aeroplane might be given a certificate of airworthiness as the result of one test flight, but it would get no certificate of trustworthiness from the travelling public. But beet grower and air-traveller alike are satisfied to accept one paper of from two to three hours as a true test of what their children have learnt over a number of years. Some people are easily satisfied.

I used just now the phrase " under optimum conditions ". I was referring, of course, to the fact that the pupil may not be at his best when the time comes. This point has on occasion been exaggerated by those who oppose the single test. There is no need to conjure up fleets of ambulances and processions of stretcher-bearers and nurses dealing with hordes of hysterical examinees. Most children seem to be able to take the ordeal sensibly enough. But there is a minority who, as teachers and parents know, tend to disintegrate under the strain. They are not " examination subjects ", as the phrase goes. There is another group, one thinks in particular of girls, who will be troubled by minor physical ailments of one kind or another. But 10 a.m. comes and in they must go. Is it contended that the objective standard is verified in their case ? I am aware that hard cases do not make law, but the point is that the law, in this instance the once and for all examination, is here the cause of these hard cases.

But even if the objections just discussed did not exist there is still the fundamental question : is the assessment of the written answer an objective, accurate one ? I do not deny that it may be so in some subjects, Mathematics certainly, Latin and Mechanical Drawing probably, and also in those sections of the language papers where what is being examined is merely transcription of what has been learnt by heart. But a reference back to what I wrote in the preceding chapter on the inherent and apparently insuperable difficulty of assessing objectively the essay and the essay-type answer will show that far too much is claimed here. If by " objective " what is meant is " impersonal ", then the qualification may be granted, for what it is worth ; but if the word is used to mean a fair, factual judgement of a pupil's achievement, it has only a very limited validity.

TEACHERS' ESTIMATES

The general impression remains however that the extern test, for all its faults, is more trustworthy than the teacher's opinion of his pupils. Subjective elements, many of them foreign to the point in issue, are supposed to enter into his judgements : his personal feelings towards some pupils will colour his verdict on them ; his inclination to mark down the very good pupil (" Musn't let him get a swelled head.") and to mark up the hopeless case (" Musn't have him losing heart altogether.") warp the general result ; his self-esteem and possibly a concern for his position will urge him to " adjust " a generally bad result in a particular test. The impersonal extern test eliminates, it is argued, all these distorting elements (as a writer in the *Times Educational Supplement* recently wrote with more zest than tact : " The external examination calls the teacher's bluff "). Hence it is superior to any form of internal testing.

Leaving aside any discussion of the logical validity of that argument, and postponing for the moment the question of the value of the teacher's judgement, let us test the argument by the facts. It may be remembered that one of the aims of the Leaving Certificate Examination was " to testify to the fitness of a pupil to enter on a course of study at a University". It is highly doubtful whether university examiners would agree that that particular aim has been reached. Over the past five years about 4,320 day students in University College, Dublin sat for first year examinations in courses leading to degrees. Of that number about 1,930 failed, roughly 45 per cent. From what I know myself and from what others have told me, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the great majority of these students have taken their Leaving Certificate Examination. And yet nearly half of them failed their first university examination. Teachers' estimates would have to be very bad indeed if they could not do better than a test which has a prognostic value only 5 per cent better than the flip of a coin.

RAISING THE STANDARD

It is quite commonly said that since the introduction of the extern test both the efficiency of teaching methods and the general level of education in a country have been raised to a high level. The implication is that the alleged improvement is the result of the extern test. Now this is one of those *post hoc ergo propter hoc* arguments that ignore the possibility of any other cause save that which it is their purpose to advance. I do not propose to delay over this point as I am not at all convinced of the high level of advancement that is supposed to have taken place. It is enough to mention, for instance, the fact that, during the past hundred years, place and privilege have been yielding more and more to open competition as the gateways to careers. Open competition has come to mean success in public examinations, and there has been an increasing

tendency to regard the school simply as the place where preparation for these examinations should take place. Success here means prestige for the school and so no doubt there has been a steady drive to improve the efficiency of that preparation. But in so far as there is any honour to be derived from that state of affairs, it is to be attributed to the policy of competition for jobs, rather than to the examination that is only a handy means towards that policy.

The real question however has still to be answered : is that new efficiency really a raising of the level of education ? The answer must surely be that it is not. We have seen in the last chapter the effects of the extern examination on what we regard true education to be, how it depresses and drives out of the teaching precisely those parts that are of real value, and, perversely, exalts what is only of secondary importance. The pressure of the extern test and what its result means may produce a greater output of energy, more " work " may be being done, the pupils may be busier about many things. But to what purpose ? There is a great output of energy in an atomic bomb and a looting mob is busy about many things, but we do not praise the efficiency of the work done in either case. You may if you wish praise the adroitness, the cunning with which a teacher prepares his pupils to meet the examiner's questions, but do not call what goes on there " a raising of the level of education ". Words can stand a certain amount of twisting in meaning, and no more.

An Incentive to Work

The claim of objective assessment for the extern examination is heard more frequently, I think, from sources outside the school—parents, employers and some writers on education. Some teachers and headmasters, on the other hand, are apt to praise the examination as a stimulus to more intense study, as a motive for increased application to work. It is true that success in examination is a legitimate and even laudable reason for working hard. Success in a test of what one has done is a source of satisfaction and happiness. So too in schoolwork, whether the test be a question in class, or a piece of homework or a more formal examination. There is a long tradition among teachers and theorists (with the exception of the usual lunatic fringe) which has sensibly recognized the competitive spirit as one of the things that physics the pain of study.

But it is a motive that is not without its dangers. I am not now referring to that abuse of it which can give rise to jealousy and envy among the competitors, but to the ill-effects that a wrong use of it can have on the quality of the pupils' learning. The first ill-effect I have already discussed on more than one occasion in these chapters : the fact that too great an emphasis on the result of an examination can and does distort right ideas of education, that the incentive may become so potent that it changes the nature of the work done under its influence, and,

finally, that this abuse seems to be inherent in the character of the purely extern test.

The other danger that I see in this motive is what I may call the danger of wrong timing. While competition is a motive for learning it is by no means the only one. In fact I would place it lowest in the scale of educational values (though it is probably highest in the scale of that wrong efficiency that we discussed above). What I mean is that there is no necessary, intrinsic connection between it and education ; it would serve equally well as a motive for studying the calculus and for picking daisies. But there are other incentives that are founded on the pupil's belief that the subject he is studying has in itself a value for him. The values in this case may vary from the severely practical attitude towards mathematics of the future engineer up to the pleasures of mind and feelings that an understanding of great literature gives. The point is that he is, to a greater or less degree, seeing knowledge as something good in itself ; he is being drawn therefore to a love of it ; he is being educated.

But this appreciation of knowledge as a good thing is a matter of gradual growth. It comes with developing reason, with the beginnings at least of maturity in a mind that can, if I may be allowed the expression, see beyond its nose. Such a mind will judge a particular situation not by its immediate value only but by its place as a necessary means towards a further situation which is recognized as having an intrinsic value. The scientist, for example, intent on exploring a fascinating hypothesis, will cheerfully persist in a series of monotonous experiments or calculations ; the pupil who has already experienced something of the beauty of literature will not rebel against the study of syntax and accidence if he is convinced that only so can he grasp more of that beauty. In these cases that which of its own nature was dull and uninteresting is transformed, is in fact made intelligible, because it is seen for what it is, a necessary step towards the attainment of a good. Its true value is realized and so it is at least tolerated ; it may even be liked ; at any rate it will not be positively disliked nor lead the pupil to a dislike of learning in general.

Younger pupils, however, find this realization of deferred values a hard thing to grasp and so, to help them with those beginnings of a subject—what we may call the grammar of learning—which are dull enough in themselves, good teachers have used the spur of competition in the form of frequent small tests, or class contests, or more formal examinations. But these things are only a temporary inducement to study ; they do nothing to make clear the real purpose of what is being learnt. They are useful at a particular stage, but if persisted with they will do great harm. When a pupil learns solely in order to pass an examination, when the chief good he sees in a subject is something entirely extrinsic to it, then the whole aim of learning is lost sight of. He will never value knowledge as a good in itself ; he will in fact regard it as

something essentially dull and dry, valuable only in so far as it helps him in his examination, and when that is done with he will feel no desire to read or study any more. Why should he? He never liked the stuff, and he has no more examinations to pass.

That is the real danger of the Department's examinations as an incentive to work. What was useful and timely at the elementary stage has been carried too far and has distorted the natural sequence of learning, has repressed the spontaneous growth of appreciation and has put in its place a purely adventitious motive of study. As I said above, it is a matter of wrong timing. The Department may legitimately protest that its examinations were never meant as the sole motive of study. The trouble is that, like any extern test common to a whole country, they have acquired in the eyes of teachers and parents and the general public a degree of importance that is almost irresistible in its pressure on teaching methods. It may be noted, in conclusion, that there would be less talk about incentives to work if more care were taken to adopt the curriculum to the pupil. When he sees neither rhyme nor reason in what he is studying then he must be given some external inducement to go on with it; the carrot must be dangled before the donkey.

A SOLUTION

Having discussed as objectively as I could the alleged merits of the external examination in the light of the principles I have been developing in earlier chapters, and having concluded that the merits are to a large degree without substance, the way is now open for proposals for its replacement. It should be understood that what is put forward here in this concluding section of these chapters is based on the conclusions that have been already worked out in them. In defending the solution, therefore, I shall employ those conclusions as principles already established and show how what I propose follows deductively from them.

I used, a moment ago, the word "replacement". The first thing to do therefore is to make clear what it is that the extern test was supposed (even incorrectly) to supply and which any new system must provide for. And this, I think, is some guarantee, some assessment of the work which the school professes to do. Parents send their child to a secondary school with at least the general idea that he is being prepared for life, they pay to have him there, and so they have a right to know whether they are getting value for their money. Employers also and university authorities need some assurance about at least the intellectual qualities of those who apply to them. This then is what any alternative to the present system must supply. It must find a way of inspiring confidence in itself. The existing examinations do indeed, by and large, satisfy that

condition, but they do it at the expense of good education. The new proposals must envisage both a freedom from such harmful influences and a guarantee that the school is doing a good job of work.

The only solution that I can see is to abolish the present examinations and to substitute for them a certificate issued by the school testifying to the intellectual attainments of the pupil. If my readers will suppress their smiles of derision or their sighs of pity, I propose first, to explain exactly what I mean ; second, to put forward the advantages of such a scheme, and, third, to answer the apparent objections to it.

The Record Card

At present when a pupil acquires either the Intermediate or the Leaving Certificate what he has is a record of his performance in a series of tests extending over a week or so of his life. I have already discussed the defects, leading to unobjectivity, of such a certificate. Instead of it I propose a certificate based on the work done by the pupil during the years he has been at a particular school. The idea of a cumulative record card is, of course, not new. It is implied in a number of prescriptions in the Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum,* and is referred to explicitly in many of the rules of the Prefect of Studies. St John Baptist de la Salle ordained that a detailed record was to be kept of each pupil by his form-master, logging both his intellectual and moral progress. At the present day the custom is at least not so uncommon that its general recommendation should cause any surprise. The idea is to supply data which will give as far as possible a history of the pupil's achievements over a considerable period of time. This would include not only his marks at the more formal examinations but also how he did at homework and in the daily classwork. In addition it would report on his attitude of industry or otherwise towards his work. (For obvious reasons, serious moral faults would not appear on this card.) Other headings such as health, general social behaviour and so on might be added in order to give as broad as possible a view of him.

What is therefore envisaged is the coordination of the data provided by all the masters who, either in class or outside it, would have learnt to know the boy over the years. For the reports on home and classwork obviously the boy's teacher in any particular year would be responsible, but the formal examination might be a different matter. Here I borrow from a practice of the *Ratio Studiorum.* The paper would be set by the class master on the work he had done and checked by the Prefect of Studies to ensure that the standard was correct, but the answer books would be examined by another master of the same subject in the school—where possible by the master of the class above who might be presumed to have a special interest in these pupils. In addition to the written paper there was an oral examination before a board of three—the

Prefect of Studies and two masters of the subject. I mention this feature not necessarily to recommend it (for it would seem, in our modern system, to involve many difficulties), but because of the practice in Holland today to which I shall refer later. Whether these formal examinations should take place in the shape in which we now know them, i.e., a general examination of all the subjects, or in the form of one subject each week is not of the substance of what I am proposing. I will only say that the second form seems to me the better of the two. The general examination, as we all know too well, can hardly resist becoming a *tour de force* of sheer memory.

The final report, the certificate, would show only the pupil's scholastic career—what subjects he had studied and for how long, his rank in his final class (including the number in the class) and his teacher's estimate of his absolute standing in each subject. The headmaster would communicate the more personal data to those who might have a right to know.

Advantages

If, as I hope to do in the next section, the objections to such a scheme can be reasonably countered, its advantages should be clear in the light of what has already been laid down in these chapters. In the first place the distorting effect on education of the extern test has been removed or rather, to be realistic, the opportunity to remove it has been provided. No longer obliged to concentrate only on those parts of the course which admit of assessment by a general, nation-wide test, the teacher will be free so to present his subject as to provide the favourable conditions for that right kind of education that we considered in the first of these chapters : learning to use one's mind as it was meant to be used, as a means of arriving by active participation at a personal grasp of a truth, and moving naturally from that to an appreciation of the good of that truth and to a delight in its beauty.

As for assessing progress in that gradual unfolding of the mind, it is difficult to construct any written test that will do so adequately ; it seems to me that only the experienced teacher can form conclusions about it. He will judge it from his pupils' answers in class, from their questions too, from their free choices in reading " around " the subject and, to a limited extent, from the quality of their writing. The important thing is that he is gradually forming a judgement that is (1) based on personal intercourse between teacher and pupil ; (2) over a considerable period of time, and (3) in normal conditions. An analysis of how we form reasonable judgements about other people in daily life will show that the three factors I have listed contribute to it. I have never been able to understand why it should apparently be taken for granted by certain writers that teachers should be considered incapable of forming reasonable

judgements. But more of that later ; for the moment I wish to stress the fact that the teacher, and only the teacher, has the opportunity of observing his pupils under conditions of normal life. He is not deciding their fate on the result of an isolated two hours' work under abnormal conditions of stress. He is giving them what every man is entitled to be given, a chance to correct their mistakes and to profit from their mistakes.

And that brings me to the last advantage that I would list under this scheme : the fact that the teacher can make his examining an integral part of his teaching. I have already dealt with this point when I was discussing the proper function of examinations. In this system of internal assessment when the teacher does his own testing, formal or informal, the situation is clear. Even if it is a matter of the examining being done by a colleague, the answer books will still be available and the colleague's report can be discussed with him with the prospect of at least more profit than will come from the study of a list of anonymously awarded marks.

The Scheme in Operation

Before answering the two or three main objections to the practicability of the School Certificate plan, let us first clear out of the way one misconception. It may be put in the form of a question : " If the plan is such a good one, why do we not hear of its being put into operation ? " The implication is that the extern test—either nation-wide, as in our own country or in France, or more or less localized as in England—is the normal state of things and that I am suggesting that we get out of step with the rest of the civilized world. It should be noted in passing that even in those countries where the extern test is " in possession ", it is by no means in undisputed possession. Recent years have shown us an increasing volume of criticism of it, not just of the details of its running but of the very idea of it. So we are not completely out of step. But in fact the plan has been tried over a long time and is in operation at the present moment in at least two countries.

Up to the establishment of the extern system of examinations in secondary schools at the close of the last century (and I think Ireland has the doubtful privilege of being the first country where the plan was imposed), it was accepted as the normal thing that the school was the best judge of the quality of the work it was doing. For over two hundred years, for example, the schools of the Society of Jesus issued their own certificates which were accepted with confidence by parents and by university authorities. Up to the year 1878 the secondary schools in Ireland did the same. I am not saying that these latter were perfect ; they got no State grants, many of them were still in their early years, and famine and oppression lessened appreciably from time to time the numbers attending them. The point I am making is that it was the normal thing in Europe at that time to let the school be the judge. The

new idea of competitive entry into public life and the professions brought with it the extern test, but note that the change came about not for the sake of the school, not primarily to improve the quality of education but to serve an outside purpose : the convenience of professional and other corporate bodies.

However, even today when that external pressure is so strong, there are two countries where internal assessment is, in whole or in part, recognized. In Belgium the Jesuit schools have refused to join the State system. In consequence they receive no grants but also they take no part in the State examinations. Each college does its own examining and its certificates are accepted as on a par with the public ones, even by the Universities. I shall discuss the question of a State grant later. In Holland all school examinations are oral. An examining board is made up of the pupil's own master, another master of the school in the subject being examined and an official, usually an inspector, from the Department of Education. The last-named normally takes no part in the questioning, his function is to see to the general standard. I am not concerned here to defend the fact that the tests are all oral (though the fact is not without interest in view of the oft-repeated statement in this country that an oral even in one subject, Irish, would be impossible), but with the fact that the master examines his own pupil on what he has taught him and that, presumably, his colleague too knows what has been done during the year.

The idea therefore is not a new one and is in operation at the present with, apparently, sufficient satisfaction to all concerned to allow of its continuance.

A General Standard

From what I have heard and read, the objection which is most strongly and most frequently urged is that under such a system there would be no check at all on what was going on in the school ; there would be no way of judging what any particular school certificate really was worth. Every school would be a law to itself, and so high honours on one certificate could conceivably be worth no more than a pass on another where the general school standard was much higher. It is argued too that since teachers are human they share in the common human tendency to do only what is absolutely necessary, to grow lazy, unless there is some check on them. We must not, it is said, base a system on the supposition that every teacher is a perfect teacher. Finally, it is objected, whatever the possibility of success if the plan were applied in a system of big schools with large staffs, a strong tradition and an already assured reputation, its chances of success must inevitably be very much less in a

system like the Irish one where, according to the 1953-54 Report, out of a total of 447 schools, 233 had less than 100 pupils and only 20 had over 300.

I have tried to put this objection in as strong a form as possible because I regard it as the fundamental one, and so if a reasonable answer can be found to it the other, less serious objections need not worry us too much.

It would be wrong to regard the system as being without check of any kind. The curriculum would still have to be one which would be agreed to by the Department ; a curriculum modified on the lines suggested in a previous chapter so as to leave a good deal of freedom of choice in courses suited to the pupils' abilities, but which would have to conform in general with a recognized standard. In order to ensure that the curriculum was being followed and that the teaching reached at least some minimum standard, I suggest that the inspectorate be much increased. In the 1953-54 Report we find that over £30,000 was spent on the examinations. This sum might be employed both to increase the present number of inspectors, and also to increase their salaries to make the profession more attractive than it is at the moment. In this way visits of inspection could be much more frequent and more thoroughgoing than they can be at present, and provided that the Department made it quite clear that it was ready to act on the inspectors' reports I feel that their visits would be a good check on what was being done. In this way the Department could ensure that the grants it was distributing to the schools were not being wasted on indifferent or sub-standard work.

But, it may be said, inspection can guarantee only that a minimum standard has been attained. It does not solve the difficulty of an honours certificate in school A being objectively no better than a pass in school B. I agree that the inspector should be asked only to answer the question whether the school is satisfactory or not. Any suggestion of grading would probably lead to the grievances that existed when inspectors in primary schools decided on the teacher's efficiency ratings. In so far, therefore, as it is necessary to differentiate between school and school (and, as I shall say in a moment, the necessity is too often exaggerated), some other way must be found.

There is no need to go looking for out-of-the-way solutions. There is a natural one, the one which every school followed before the coming of the public examination, and one for which we have scriptural authority: " By their fruits you shall know them." The school guarantees by its certificate that a pupil has reached a certain academic standard. He now moves to a position where the validity of that judgement may be tested : a business position, further professional training (either in a university or training college or specialized corporate institute), agriculture or the

civil service. Those who are concerned with the quality of entrants in these various occupations will be assured that at least the minimum standard acceptable to the Department of Education has been achieved. For the rest they will have ample opportunity of seeing how the ex-pupils fulfil the claims made for them by their schools. They will be able to compare the products of different schools and so gradually come to form a fair general judgement of what the respective certificates are worth. Such a judgement, based on general results and not necessarily invalidated by the rare exception, will need time before it can take a clear shape, say three or four years ; and so these external bodies would have to be asked to exercise understanding and suspension of judgement before coming to their final decision. What I am asking for is a limited period of trial and error before coming to a conclusion about any particular school.

The fact that the trustworthiness of a school's certificate, and with it the name and even the continued existence of the school, is to depend so much on the decision of outside bodies, should act as a powerful check on the natural enough inclination to see all one's chickens as swans, or even to over-estimate the merits of one's own school. Anything in the nature of cheating would eventually bring with it its own punishment, and a very severe punishment too for it would take a long time to restore a confidence that had been once abused. A school might succeed in deceiving for two or three years only to find itself in the wilderness for the next ten—and that in spite of desperate attempts to put its house in order. In fact it is more probable that the overall effect of such a scheme would be to raise the standard on which certificates would be based rather than to lower it. I should imagine, however, that the external bodies would regard that as an error on the right side. Very few people are annoyed at making a good bargain.

Professional Preparation

However, when people talk in this way about the uncertainty of internal or domestic certificates they are arguing from an assumption, either implied or clearly expressed, which must be strongly opposed. Early on in these chapters the idea of " education for the job " was examined and rejected. It was rejected because once you assume that the chief function of a school is to be a sort of selecting machine for future employment you expose real education to the danger of destruction. This danger is all the greater when the entry conditions of that future employment demand specialized knowledge and skills. The school becomes a direct preparation for that entry with consequent warping both of the curriculum and of teaching methods. The authorities who control entry to employment or further study are no doubt within their

rights in establishing conditions of entry, but there are two points to be stressed there.

The first is that they ought to take more thought about what conditions are really necessary. There is a feeling, for example, that universities both in this country and in Great Britain are asking the schools to do work which is properly the function of the university ; that is to say that they are demanding too high a degree of factual knowledge in certain subjects at any rate, or that if they do not explicitly demand it, the first year's teaching implicitly supposes it. If they were more concerned to get candidates who had learned to study, to use their minds, rather than candidates who had learned masses of facts, the results would be better for themselves and for the schools.

The second point is that where such special conditions of entry do apply, the schools should not allow their whole course of studies to be influenced by them, should not allow themselves to be used as a convenient sieve to do other people's screening for them. I would be willing to make a compromise here. Provided that a reasonable amount of time had been spent on a course which would be free from the pressure of external requirements—a minimum of four years, say—I would not be opposed to a certain amount of specialization in a pupil's last year in school. If, for example, a pupil needed a higher standard in mathematics for entry to his future profession than the normal school curriculum provided, he might be allowed to drop some subjects or to change from what I called the major course to the minor in them so as to give more time to mathematics—always provided that such a change did not lead to the sort of lop-sided situation that one reads of as growing in the sixth form in schools in Britain. But it must be emphasized that what has been conceded here is only a concession to the present specialized demands of outside bodies. It is my belief that the policy of expecting a high standard at entry in various subjects is a short-sighted one, one which needs a much more intelligent approach than it receives at the moment.

BIG SCHOOL AND SMALL

Then there is the objection that the scheme would be impractical for the small school. If the objection is grounded on the difficulty of providing an examiner from the school itself other than the subject master I see no reason why there could not be a local confederation of such schools, so that the English master in one school could act as "extern" in a second school and vice versa. But these are details. It is more likely that what is suggested is that a pupil from a small, local school would have very little chance, when it is a matter of an appointment, against the pupil from one of the big, well-known schools. Under the present system he could at least point to high results in the examinations and so compete on his merits. It would be pleasant to believe that as things are,

those who are trying to get their names on the short list may have full confidence in their personal, that is, intellectual qualifications ; that appointment committees take nothing into consideration but academic distinction. This is a matter for which, in the nature of the case, there can be no clear evidence ; but one would have to close one's ears very tightly not to be aware that the candidate's school is only one (and by no means the least reputable) of many factors that go to the final decision. What is forgotten when this objection is made is that the reputation a big school has at present will not necessarily endure under a system which measures the success of the school not by the results of one single examination but by the after-career of its pupils. Both the big and small school will have to start afresh under the new scheme, and I see nothing in it which would seriously damage the small school. It should be admitted, I think, that under any scheme, old or new, the big school will of its nature have advantages (of staffing, equipment, amenities, etc.) which the small school cannot hope to have. So until I am convinced that what I am proposing contains factors that will add substantially to the difficulties which the small school already experiences I cannot regard this objection as a weighty one.

Teachers' Estimates

The other main argument that is likely to be advanced against the plan is based on the idea that a teacher's estimates of his pupils is unreliable. I have already discussed some aspects of this supposition. I have suggested that, judged by one criterion at any rate—that of the results of university examining—the present examination does not help very much in estimating a pupil's future chances, and that a study of the conditions under which a teacher forms his judgement shows that of themselves they lead to the making of a true estimate. Why then does the doubt arise ?

It would appear that it arises mainly in connection with the problem of selection for promotion from primary to secondary education in Britain. It is claimed that a comparison of the teacher's estimate with the subsequent performance of the pupil in the secondary school shows an appreciable difference between the two. But even a short analysis of the probable causes for the divergence will show that they are causes which do not apply to our present discussion. First, the child at eleven years of age is very immature, his character is largely unformed, and so any prediction of his future conduct must be uncertain. Now learning is not just simply a matter of intellect, it is a matter of how a pupil of a certain character uses his intellect. Moral factors therefore play a large part in it : steadiness of purpose, seriousness of disposition and what I may call in general a docility of mind. It follows therefore that there must always be an element of error in any forecast that is made of a young

pupil's future. There is in addition the phenomenon of precocity. A child may show abnormal intelligence at an early age and fail to live up to his early promise. We do not know a great deal about this fading away except that it does happen. It is not a very common occurrence but it shows up often enough to swell the number of miscalculations.

By the time however that the secondary teacher comes to make his decisions these factors will have largely disappeared as a moment's consideration will show. A period of relative stability has set in by the age of seventeen or eighteen and prediction should not be such a chancy affair.

But, it is further argued, the secondary teacher does make mistakes. The case will be brought against him of the dull, grade C pupil who was the despair of his teachers, who scraped entry into a university by making up enough subjects between Leaving Certificate and Matriculation and who then confounded the prophets by doing remarkably well in the studies for his chosen profession. I have mentioned this case before and, beyond calling attention in passing to the fact that the results of the extern tests did very little if anything to improve on his teacher's opinion, I shall only repeat what I said then : the pupil's apparent dullness was very probably due to his being forced to follow a curriculum that took little account of his abilities. I regard his refusal to take the situation seriously as an instinctive natural reaction protecting him against an environment that, had he allowed himself to be fully exposed to it, would have side-tracked or warped his true powers. Possibly his teachers should have taken greater pains to discover those powers, but even if they had done so, what could they then have done ? The curriculum is still there.

Finally, we may grant that teachers are not pure spirits. They have emotions and prejudices like the rest of us, and it is probable that an individual teacher will in certain cases let his heart influence his head. But the final result is not the judgement of that one man alone, it is what at least four or five people think about the pupil after watching him working and playing for the same number of years. Is it not reasonable to expect that individual likes or dislikes will cancel one another out, that the majority of the teaching staff will not be unfair in their judgements and that the headmaster will know his staff at least as well as he knows his pupils ?

Conclusion

I have tried to present as objectively as possible the more serious objections to the scheme I have proposed, and to answer them as best I could. But when all is said and done, the scheme is still a defective one that contains within itself the possibility of abuse. Teachers are human

beings like the rest of us, and so, like the rest of us, are inclined to laziness and to wasting time if there is no immediate check on them. It is harder too to teach well than to cram mechanically for an examination ; good teaching demands a greater use of intelligence and imagination and insight into the pupil's mind. A parallel case is that it is easier to punish automatically for a fault than to take the pains to help the pupil correct his own faults. No system will be perfect ; but when we are confronted with two systems of education we must ask ourselves which of the two has the fewer inherent defects, which of them will in the long run better lead towards the true end of education.

We should have more confidence in our teachers. How can we have good ones, enthusiastic about the subjects they teach and eager to communicate some of that enthusiasm to their pupils, if they are being frustrated by the consciousness that the name of the school or even the security of their own position depends on success in a test that so many of them recognize as being destructive of the ideals of good education ? If they were given the opportunity, as the scheme I have been explaining would give, of doing work that they regarded as good and valuable, and if they were trusted to do it, I am certain that they would rise to the occasion.

Joyce's Landscapes

by DENIS DONOGHUE

HERBERT MARSHALL McLUHAN has described the characteristic technique of post-symbolist literature as 'psychological landscape' :

> Whereas in external landscape diverse things lie side by side, so in psychological landscape the juxtaposition of various things and experiences becomes a precise musical means of orchestrating that which could never be rendered by systematic discourse. Landscape is the means of presenting, without the copula of logical enunciation, experiences which are united in existence but not in conceptual thought.[1]

Juxtaposition without the copula of logical enunciation. The procedure is being impugned these days, but no one has yet shown how we are to free ourselves from the ethos from which it derives. So far as I can judge, the times we live in tend still to frustrate this copula : these are hard days for the grammarian in each of us.

When Eliot juxtaposes, the words simultaneously render and evaluate :

> Well, that Sunday Albert was home, they had a hot gammon,
> And they asked me in to dinner, to get the beauty of it hot
> HURRY UP PLEASE IT'S TIME
> HURRY UP PLEASE IT'S TIME
> Goonight Bill. Goonight Lou. Goonight May. Goonight.
> Ta ta. Goonight, Goonight.
> Good night, ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good night, good night.

Joyce, in the early prose, often fends off the act of judgment, even where the situation cries out for ironical contemplation. In the *Portrait,* when Stephen in a Shelleyan context of " wild air and brackish waters " is stirred by the sight of a young girl, the chapter ends :

> He climbed to the crest of the sandhill and gazed about him. Evening had fallen. A rim of the young moon cleft the pale waste of skyline, the rim of a silver hoop embedded in grey sand ; and the tide was flowing in fast to the land with a low whisper of her waves, islanding a few last figures in distant pools.[2]

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[1] 'Tennyson and Picturesque Poetry': *Essays in Criticism,* I, 3, July 1951.

[2] *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (Cape, 1954 reprint, p. 197).

The next chapter begins :

> He drained his third cup of watery tea to the dregs and set to chewing the crusts of fried bread that were scattered near him, staring into the dark pool of the jar.

This is not (though it may look like it) an instance of quotidian actuality pricking a lyric bubble. One situation is just as ' romantic ' as the other, because in each the tender hero is enthroned in his own isolation. The lyric situation is insulated from probes. We need not cavil ; but there is far too much insulation in the *Portrait,* and the book would have freed itself from a pervading softness of focus if Joyce had caused his juxtapositions to evoke as much judgment as apprehension. Only a perverse reader will be content to reject whole chapters of the *Portrait* as Pater-pastiche, but dilemmas remain. Hugh Kenner (whose recent study of Joyce offers an occasion for these observations) is keenly aware of the problem :

> . . . . there remains a moral ambiguity (how seriously are we to take Stephen ?) which makes the last forty pages painful reading.[1]

Or, otherwise put : the landscape of the *Portrait* is distorted by Joyce's refusal to make his objects fully impinge on one another. When Stephen swings into his largest gestures with " Welcome, O Life ! " on his lips, even the dim light of Cranly's scrutiny is withdrawn. The loss is considerable. One of the differences between the *Portrait* and a major novel can be seen by comparing the treatment of Stephen in this regard with the presentation of Hans Castorp in *The Magic Mountain.* Mann is unwilling to have his hero's evasion of the human commitment slip from the judging grasp : in confronting Hans with Settembrini and Naphta (both ' wrong ', both sick, but nevertheless articulate) he forces him to define his values, to reveal the death in them, and to yield up the lyric privilege. The bias of the *Portrait* is narrowly protective ; that of *The Magic Mountain* is therapeutic. Rhetoric or drama should have warned Joyce that Stephen the aesthetic *alazon* needed nothing so urgently as a correspondingly deft *eiron* : lacking this, the book is blind in one eye.

* * *

Mr Kenner's book, *Dublin's Joyce,* is difficult to review. Its faults are serious, but not serious enough to conceal some of the most acute and constructive elucidation of Joyce ever written. A list is perhaps the easiest way out.

(A) The book makes hard reading. Mr Kenner offers a lumpy, indigestible prose which I cannot accept as necessary even in a para-

[1] *Dublin's Joyce* (Chatto and Windus, 1956, 25s. net.), p. 121.

phrase of Maritain on Formal Logic. This defect is surprising, too, because Mr Kenner has shown in his books on Pound and on Wyndham Lewis and in his essays (notably on Empson and on *Four Quartets*) that he can compose brilliant critical prose without lumps. The style of the new book suggests that he is perhaps not as sure of his case with Joyce as he was with Pound. I make this point tentatively, there may be nothing in it, but I am disturbed to find Mr Kenner so often brow-beating me in the new book with phrases such as " the nineteenth-century night-world ", and calling out his pet words (" letch ", " leverage ", " avatar ", " *idée reçue* ", " *point d'appui* ", and one or two others) as if he felt at a loss without them.

(B) The book is radically devoted to elucidation, but there is practically no evaluation. Indeed, the critical instinct in Mr Kenner seems often to act without any real evaluative check : during the periods of his engagement with an author whom he reads with enthusiasm (Pound, Lewis, now Joyce) he seems to absolve himself from the chore of keeping other writers, other skills, other achievements, in mind. In discreet practice this does not, of course, mean hitting Brendan Behan over the head with Shakespeare. On Joyce Mr Kenner writes as if the quite different achievements of Henry James or of Lawrence are irrelevant. Which is not so. It is no longer necessary to sign manifestos for Joyce : certain things have been established ; but this does not mean that we are to cleave to everything, every procedure, we find in him.

(C) Mr Kenner, who has knifed Mr Blackmur and the New Critics for overreading their texts, has sinned in this respect more grievously than anything I recall in *Language as Gesture*. His show-piece is a gloss on the first five or six lines of *Ulysses* : the Sunday reviewers (e.g. Mr Denis Johnston) have fastened on this exhibit with characteristic derision, and it is quite impossible, I am afraid, to condone Mr Kenner's interpretative spree. The parody-Mass in this first chapter of *Ulysses* is obvious and important. Right. But we need not keep twitching until we have managed to see Buck Mulligan's mirror as narcissist, his dressing-gown as a gold chasuble, or his razor as the instrument of the priest-as-butcher.

(D) There is something frenetic, strident, in the chapters on *Chamber Music* and on *Exiles* : genuine insights crop up on every page, but there is a serious disproportion between the highly-charged interpretation and the basic fact that these are not, after all, very good works. Surely the essential critical fact, that *Dubliners* is " the one artistic success of the first cycle " (p. 98), should largely determine the mode of approach to *Chamber Music* and *Exiles* : Mr Kenner discusses the latter works as if the question of their intrinsic merit could be postponed indefinitely.

When the question clamours, however, he becomes (I grant) surgically precise :

> What is wrong with *Exiles* is that by 1914 Joyce could neither take the emotions of *Chamber Music* seriously nor frame a drama that could get outside them. (p. 96)

Apart from a few issues which will appear presently, I have no further large quarrel with Mr Kenner. It may be possible to indicate the scope of his book by noting a few of its dominant ideas : for convenience and on my own responsibility I shall paraphrase.

(1) Joyce's Dublin was an eighteenth-century parody. The technique he developed, the technique which underlies everything from *Dubliners* to *Finnegans Wake,* came out of the subject : double writing ; "parody of the once vital to enact a null apprehension of the null. "

(2) Trivium and Quadrivium. Bloom is the Ciceronian *doctus orator* in final decay (p. 214). Stephen is a comic grammarian. Mulligan is " a dialectician enjoying rhetorical functions " as stage Irishman. (Mr Kenner does not follow up the *quad*rivial clues quite as energetically : perhaps he feels, reasonably enough, that they have already yielded most of their insights to Mr McLuhan).[1]

I have a feeling that this invocation of the Trivium does not illumine quite as much in *Ulysses* as we had hoped. It imposes itself on the book neatly enough, but it remains a superimposition : I find difficulty in seeing that its pattern is latent in the text. On the whole it strikes me as an intriguing interim idea : we shall have to work with it for some time before its validity can be firmly established. To see its operation in the *Dunciad* is one thing ; in *Ulysses,* another ; what we need, of course, is a searching study of the impact of Aquinas on Joyce.

(3) The proper reading of the later Joyce involves our alertness to the many shifts of tone and gesture into which we are forced by the jabberwocked materials of the prose and by our effort to keep the feeling and the syntax simultaneously clear. This is a truism, of course, but a necessary one for the occasion.

* * *

Ulysses is full of invitations to judgment : the landscape of the writing is metaphysical and moral rather than picturesque. At its most pithy it frequently exploits the familiar comic deflation of pretence :

> You make good use of the name, John Eglinton allowed. Your own name is strange enough. I suppose it explains your fantastical humour.

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1 'James Joyce : Trivial and Quadrivial ': *Thought,* Spring 1953.

> Me, Magee and Mulligan.
> Fabulous artificer, the hawklike man. You flew. Whereto?
> Newhaven—Dieppe, steerage passenger. Paris and back.
> Lapwing. Icarus. *Pater, ait.*[1]

Aereal diction and jaunty rhyme ("You flew. Whereto?") take a heavy fall: Joyce knew his Pope. It is possible, of course, to argue about the kind and the degree of judgment involved here. "Lapwing" complicates the issue, since recourse to *The White Goddess* prompts one to wonder about fitting in various modifying ideas about the lapwing's deceitful acumen, his knack of self-disguise (involving self-possession) and many other odds and ends.[2] The overall effect, however, still seems that of the reduction of romantic afflatus, the kind of reduction which prompts Eliot to rhyme "trumpets" and "crumpets" in *A Cooking Egg*:

> Where are the eagles and the trumpets?
> Buried beneath some snow-deep Alps.
> Over buttered scones and crumpets
> Weeping, weeping multitudes
> Droop in a hundred A.B.C's.

Later, when Leopold Bloom and Gerty MacDowell are juxtaposed in the landscape of Sandymount Strand, a much more complex kind of judgment emerges. First, Gerty:

> And yet and yet! That strained look on her face! A gnawing sorrow is there all the time. Her very soul is in her eyes and she would give worlds to be in the privacy of her own familiar chamber where, giving way to tears, she could have a good cry and relieve her pentup feelings. Though not too much because she knew how to cry nicely before the mirror. You are lovely, Gerty, it said. The paly light of evening falls upon a face infinitely sad and wistful. Gerty MacDowell yearns in vain. Yes, she had known from the first that her daydream of a marriage has been arranged and the weddingbells ringing for Mrs Reggy Wylie T.C.D. (because the one who married the elder brother would be Mrs Wylie) and in the fashionable intelligence Mrs Gertrude Wylie was wearing a sumptuous confection of grey trimmed with expensive blue fox was not to be. He was too young to understand . . . . . No prince charming is her beau ideal to lay a rare and wondrous love at her feet but rather a manly man with a strong quiet face who had not found his ideal, perhaps his hair slightly flecked with grey, and who would understand, take her in his sheltering arms, strain her to him in all the strength of his deep passionate nature and comfort her with a long long kiss. (pp. 334–5)

[1] *Ulysses* (Bodley Head edition), p. 199.

[2] Maurice Beebe: 'James Joyce: Barnacle Goose and Lapwing': P.M.L.A. June 1956.

This is the language of the *Lady's Pictorial* : Gerty cleaves to the cliché and is judged by it. In the same landscape we find Bloom relaxing into a corresponding spuriousness :

> See her as she is spoil all. Must have the stage setting, the rouge, costume, position, music. The name too. *Amours* of actresses. Nell Gwynn, Mrs Bracegirdle, Maud Branscombe. Curtain up. Moonlight silver effulgence. Maiden discovered with pensive bosom. Little sweetheart come and kiss me. (p. 353)

Bloom and Gerty are judged by the faded eroticism to which they adhere : " Maiden discovered with pensive bosom ". Gerty thinks the thoughts of Madame Vera Verity ; Bloom's erotic musings take to themselves the novelettish diction of Gene Stratton-Porter :

> On a morning like this, with a world full of flowers and singing birds, and a heart full of love (and yet, by a unique paradox hungry as ever for the love of a slip of a boy with big black eyes and crow-black blackness of hair and skilful hands and a heart overflowing with tenderness, a heart that had given love lavishly as it had received it) Amaryllis . . . . .[1]

The passages I have cited from *Ulysses* are those in which Bloom and Gerty are most strikingly shown to inhabit a single fatigued world. There is more to Bloom than this, and perhaps more to Gerty, there are other factors which modify and refine the judgment evoked by these passages ; but that the juxtaposition calls out judgment of this kind there can be no doubt. Bloom and Gerty are inadequate even to the relative valuations to which they have adhered. In both cases Joyce penetrates the reality of his characters by way of those conventions by which they protect themselves from the terror of knowing that reality. At this point he is closely in touch with the traditions of the English novel as seen in George Eliot and in Henry James. There are differences, of course. In *The Wings of the Dove* James shows Milly Theale penetrating the evil in the social forms around her, cutting through those forms to reveal their nature and thence to offer a paradigm of the Way, the Truth and the Life. Similarly Maggie Verver in *The Golden Bowl*. The main difference between the procedures of *The Wings of the Dove* and of *Ulysses* is that in James's world the protective conventions are *social* postures, in Joyce's they are *verbal* formulae : both modes of protection are rotten. It follows, appropriately, that while the penetrating agent in *The Wings of the Dove* is a person of outstanding spiritual force, the agent in *Ulysses* is language itself. In Joyce's Dublin the characters need only *speak* to reveal the half-dead forms they inhabit ; though we must bear in mind and be ready to appreciate afresh that half-dead is also half-alive.

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[1] *The Magic Garden* (*passim*).

The question of the overall perspective of *Ulysses* is a fairly delicate matter. In a recent issue of *Studies* Dr Vivian Mercier wrote of " the possibility that the past as well as the present is being held up to ridicule in *Ulysses* ",[1] but he was surely much too diffident. I may be wrong, but my impression is that something like this view has been generally held by students of Joyce for some time past. I seldom hear anybody nowadays arguing simply that the Homeric situations and characters provide lofty standards by which Joyce's Dubliners are revealed in all their shabbiness. Indeed, current orthodoxy seems to be very close to Dr Mercier's view, except that one often finds it stated more rigidly : I have in mind interpretations like that of Mr Philip Edwards :

> By using parallels from the history, beliefs and legends of the past, Joyce goes some of the way towards debunking the past by identifying its supposed grandeur with cheaper things : but the identification must also in some measure attach garlands of antique glory to those cheaper things. The value of Christ and Ulysses and what they stood for is to be lessened : the value of unworthier things is to be heightened. As we value them, Ulysses weighs 10, Bloom 0 : down comes Homer's Ulysses to 5, up goes Joyce's Bloom to 5.[2]

Mr Edwards does not, of course, read *Ulysses* as mechanically as this suggests : he oversimplifies for a purpose. Leaving the mathematics aside I would prefer to say something like this : in *Ulysses* we are confronted, not with an heroic past by which a dingy present is measured, but with a continuously changing direction of relationships between people, things (better still, *situations*) and values which modify and illumine one another. The reader must be prepared to hold these relationships in tension : relevant ' conclusions ' will emerge only from the impact of the concrete detail of the prose, one word burrowing on another (to misquote Joyce for our purpose).

Indeed, I have a strong feeling that the soundest clues to the total perspective of *Ulysses* are to be found in the local detail of the plot. The ending of the novel presents the most delicate problem. There are snags in regarding the Penelope episode as a structural excrescence, but I am inclined to argue that the book really ends at the point in the Ithaca chapter at which Stephen leaves Bloom in 7 Eccles Street :

> Alone, what did Bloom feel ?
> The cold of interstellar space, thousands of degrees below freezing point or the absolute zero of Fahrenheit, Centigrade or Reaumur : the incipient intimations of proximate dawn. (p. 665)

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[1] ' Parody : James Joyce and an Irish Tradition ': *Studies*, Summer 1956, p. 197.

[2] ' *Ulysses* and the Legends ' : *Essays in Criticism*, April 1955.

Ulysses is, among other things, a great essay in Order ; and, as such, a gesture of faith in the act of the rational imagination. What I have been concerned to show is that the book is not content merely to render or to describe : by the selection and disposition of its objects in a verbal landscape it *judges* its material. The basic impulse of *Ulysses* (perhaps the basic impulse of all fine writing) is to compose an Order commensurate with the disintegration and formlessness of its materials. Wallace Stevens realized his idea of Order at Key West in a landscape of music and the sea by night ; the rage for Order compelled Joyce to seize and, having seized, to penetrate the spectral forms which propped up whatever remained of Dublin life. If we return to *Ulysses* again and again it is surely because the disintegration in its materials is so frightful (*literally*) and because the achieved Order is so triumphantly strong.

* * *

Mr Kenner has not convinced me about *Finnegans Wake*. I shall paraphrase his main argument while emphasizing the risk of doing him less than justice.

In the dream-world of *Finnegans Wake*, Mr Kenner argues, the mind is detached from its responsibility to things : literally nothing is left but words. Dublin's reality was in talk, and a sense of that reality comes through powerfully from page to page of Joyce's double-writing. For example, an exact sense of the interaction of Dublin religion and Dublin conviviality is conveyed by this passage, whose language hangs in space half-way between the two :

> When, pressures be to our hoary frother, the pop gave his sullen bullet-action and, bilge, sled a movement of catharic emulsipotion down the sloppery slide of a slaunty to tilted lift-ye-landsmen.[1]

Of this Mr Kenner says :

> It is worse than useless to push this toward one or the other of the meanings between which it hangs ; to paraphrase it, for instance, in terms of porter being uncorked and poured . . . . . Joyce worked seventeen years to push the work away from ' meaning ', adrift into language ; nothing is to be gained by trying to push it back. (p. 304)

We must take this slowly. The warning against the adequacy of paraphrase is valid, and I welcome the implication that the reader must attend to the concrete verbal particularity, without distortion or subtraction. But the question arises : has the reader coped with the cited passage when he has apprehended from it " a sense of the interaction of Dublin religion and Dublin conviviality " ? Is that *all* he has to do with it ? It seems to me that the reader, faced with the passage, can make his way into it only by first seizing the operation of the words

[1] *Finnegans Wake* (Faber and Faber, 1939), p. 310.

on a literal level : he cannot avoid pushing the words into one or the other of the meanings between which it hangs. The passage appears in the tavern-scene when HCE

> is in on a bout to be unbulging an o'connell's, the true one, all seethic, a luckybock, pledge of the stoup, whilom his canterberry bellseyes wink wickeding indtil the teller, oyne of an oustman in skull of skand. (p. 310)

In this context the reader, I submit, cannot avoid taking as the bones of the ' meaning ' that HCE is pouring a bottle of stout. A fuller reading, I should argue, involves ranging out from this literal level as widely and as flexibly as the words in their local detail suggest. That is, the ' meaning ' is the landscape formed on this literal base by juxtaposing, nearby, other associated words and phrases including *Holy Father, praise, the Pope, Solemn Benediction,* and *Catholic Emancipation.* To take a single example : when the reader has ' sensed ' the impact, in context, of " hoar froth " on " Holy Father " (and *vice versa*), he has done all he can. Similarly, the reader confronted with " Guilty ! but fellow-culpows " will start off by translating it to " Guilty ! but fellow-culprits ", and then ' add ' *felix culpa, Phoenix culprit,* and any further associations the phrase and its context may exact. The process, I need hardly say, is neither as schematic nor as laborious as it sounds. It seems to me to require, however, that as the first step in dealing with a passage from *Finnegans Wake* we discover in the words, or deduce from them, a situation, a context on the literal or grammatical level, which can then be enriched by further interpretative activity on other levels. Practically every page of *Finnegans Wake* is rich in connotation, but before the reader can partake of this feast he must supply himself with a corresponding denotation ; either by finding it under the surface of the prose or, on occasion, by ad libbing between associated points. " Somndoze massiness " (p. 219) will have to start out as " Sunday Matinees " before it can accommodate " Some doze at Mass ".

As it happens, the " hoary frother " passage raises a difficulty which I encounter very often in *Finnegans Wake.* I propose to have another look at it, this time concerning myself with a larger critical issue. We need the text in front of us again :

> When, pressures be to our hoary frother, the pop gave his sullen bullet-action and, bilge, sled a movement of catharic emulsipotion down the sloppery slide of a slaunty to tilted lift-ye-landsmen.

I assume agreement that the most active situations juxtaposed here are, first, HCE holding up a glass and pouring porter into it, and, second, the Pope giving Solemn Benediction. Even with Mr Kenner's gloss, however, I find this juxtaposition gratuitous : at best, the sociological point it makes is *outside the story,* the situations do not modify

or illumine each other in context. There is a world of difference between this and the juxtaposition of objects in the following passage from Gerty's musings in *Ulysses* :

> . . . Then mayhap he would embrace her gently, like a real man, crushing her soft body to him, and love her, his ownest girlie, for herself alone.
>
> Refuge of sinners. Comfortress of the afflicted. *Ora pro nobis.* Well has it been said that whosoever prays to her with faith and constancy can never be lost or cast away : and fitly is she too a haven of refuge for the afflicted because of the seven dolours which transfixed her own heart. (p. 341)

Style here is antiseptic. Joyce balances parody against parody : *both* situations, *both* languages, are spurious. The archaic sermonizing-style (still with us, unhappily, in Ireland) is just as shoddy as the erotic baby-talk. But—and this is the point—the situations genuinely impinge on each other, one kind of ' comfort ' is judged in association with another.

This is the kind of radical juxtaposition I often miss in the landscape of *Finnegans Wake,* especially where the parodied original seems to be there, not for function, nor for genuine illumination, but merely because of the sonal likeness of words and phrases. Mr Kenner comes close to admitting as much (though he draws no critical conclusions from it) in writing of the language of the *Wake* :

> It is never the exigency of a reality other than verbal, but always some verbal mechanism on the page, some chain of puns, some waft of rhythm, that produces the next word. If anything is ' swift ', that syllable will call up the ghosts of Stella and Vanessa. (p. 303)

Even if the Swift-Stella-Vanessa relationships have nothing to do with the context.

The most strenuous attempt I have found to justify the kind of ' qualitative progression ' exhibited in *Finnegans Wake* was made many years ago by Professor Ransom. He argued that a basic impulse in the book is to deflate that discourse (characteristic of the ' age of science ') whose factitious intellectual and moral purity cannot be tolerated : in this sense the book is reactionary, not revolutionary, in intent. Puncturing the scientific balloon Joyce simultaneously redeems the act, the thing, or the event by a representation which restores the diffused and somewhat disorderly sensibility which makes any experience realistic. *Finnegans Wake* " shows at most places how to escape from conceptual prose, and into the contingent world ; a difficulty that most poets seem unable to surmount ".[1]

[1]John Crowe Ransom : ' The Aesthetic of *Finnegans Wake* ' : Kenyon Review, I, iv (1939), p. 428.

I should argue, on the other hand, that writers are not so much unable as unwilling to escape from conceptual prose ; unwilling, because they value concepts just as they value solid existential *things*. It is unfair of Professor Ransom to present the issue as if the only alternative to *Finnegans Wake* were the 'aesthetic poverty' of the logical positivist. It is appropriate at this point to cite such examples of prose narrative as Ford Madox Ford's *Parade's End,* the first version of Wyndham Lewis's *Tarr,* William Carlos Williams's *In the American Grain* and Henry James's *The Spoils of Poynton.* No important novelist scants the human or contingent world : the question is one of degree, of compromise. In the following passage from *The Golden Bowl,* for instance, James sets out to render a moment of some significance in the relationship of Colonel and Mrs Assingham : the latter has just asserted that there is nothing between Charlotte Verver and the Prince :

> The Colonel took it—but took it at first in silence.
>
> 'Do you mean they've *told* you ——?'
>
> 'No—I mean nothing so absurd. For in the first place I haven't asked them, and in the second their word in such a matter wouldn't count'.
>
> 'Oh', said the Colonel with all his oddity, 'they'd tell *us*'. It made her face him an instant as with her old impatience of his short cuts, always across her finest flower-beds ; but she felt, none the less, that she kept her irony down. 'Then when they've told you, you'll be perhaps so good as to let me know'.[1]

I suppose one could argue, in Professor Ransom's terms, that the sensibilities involved here, as presented, are *ordered* to an unrealistic degree. If the later Joyce were to treat this situation he would find thoughts forming themselves along the margin of Fanny Assingham's sensibility in defiance of the controlled impatience at the centre. Internally, this control would probably be obliterated by gestures of bawdry, disgust, violence. But these, if brought to their inevitable conclusion, would culminate in the heuristic marginalia of *Finnegans Wake,* in which the primary objects and situations are destroyed. If one could imagine a treatment of *The Golden Bowl* by which the palpable situation of Colonel and Mrs Assingham would be dissolved in a liquid of reactionary marginalia, the *raison d'être* of James's intelligence would then be removed. In *Finnegans Wake* Joyce may indeed have been concerned to restore to the object a greater degree of contingency than had ever been achieved before, but in the process the object itself has been dissolved out of existence. What the book renders, therefore, is contingency itself, an abstraction ; a void, bereft of *things*. And to that extent less significant.

[1]Henry James : *The Golden Bowl* (Grove Press, 1952), I, 376.

It would be quite wrong to suggest that the verbal fusion of two or more situations in *Finnegans Wake,* the landscape-technique at its most complex, is consistently gratuitous. There are several passages in the book in which the invoked original genuinely bears on the local context. For instance, when HCE reminds his tavern-jury that " the green approve the raid ! ", he continues :

> As yose were and as yese is. Sure and you would, Mr Mac Gurk. Be sure and you would, Mr O'Duane. To be sure and you would so, Mr Mac Elligut. Wod you nods ? Mom mom. No mum has the rod to pud a stub to the lurch of amotion . . . . . (p. 365)

The testament of Parnell (surely the most momentous ' character ' in Joyce, incidentally), his achievements, his tragedy, carry as much weight here as they did in *Ivy Day in the Committee Room* or in the remarkable Christmas-dinner scene in the *Portrait* : the lurch of emotion in HCE is justified and ennobled by the memory of the " march of a nation " and of Mr Casey's great " dead king ". There is nothing gratuitous in this invocation : the Parnell situation genuinely bears on that of HCE.

What I find pervadingly in *Ulysses* and only locally and spasmodically in *Finnegans Wake* is the steady focus of operative irony : the phrase is Henry James's, and one need not be surprised to find that writer hovering about the margin of the present essay. James had in mind, on one level, that use of irony which " implies and projects the possible other case, the case rich and edifying where the actuality is pretentious and vain ".[1] Joyce employs in *Ulysses,* as we have seen, irony of much greater complexity, weighing the spurious of one kind against the spurious of another, related kind. In the Preface to *The Lesson of the Master* James explains that characters such as Hugh Vereker and Ralph Limbert are not drawn from intimate experience, and he defends his procedure :

> . . . my postulates, my animating presences, were all, to their great enrichment, their intensification, ironic ; the strength of applied irony being surely in the sincerities, the lucidities, the utilities that stand behind it.[2]

I find these sincerities, lucidities, and utilities continuously operative in *Ulysses,* missing or often lapsing in the *Portrait,* operative only locally and inharmoniously in *Finnegans Wake.* The moral ambiguity which Mr Kenner finds in the presentation of Stephen in the *Portrait* comes to the surface again in *Finnegans Wake* as a flawed analogical vision : flawed, because in the process of their formation into the literary structure many of the analogized objects have been pulped out of their

[1] *The Art of the Novel : Critical Prefaces by Henry James* (Scribners, 1935), p. 222.
[2] *Ibid.*

own solid, valued existence. Literally, there is no organic unity in *Finnegans Wake*, because many of the ' organs ' have been dissolved into a glutinous literary mass. It is a maxim of modern criticism that the objects (things, ideas) which appear in a poem or novel are not identical with their ' originals ' *outside* the context, that the context itself presses on the objects, that one situation, one word, influences another. But it is ontologically vital that the originals remain at least recognizable : the writer must grant them their existence, their nature, hence their value and their rights. In the *Wake* the originals used are often destroyed in the process : to revert to Mr Kenner, " literally nothing is left but words ". I am convinced that an enormous loss is involved, and that the loss can be described in literary terms as a weakening of the focus of irony. The *quality* of the irony is poorer (more diffuse, uneconomical, gratuitous) in *Finnegans Wake* than in *Ulysses*.

Is it enough, then, that *Finnegans Wake* is, as Mr Kenner says, " richly epiphanic of the fragmented mind of Europe " ? (p. 151) Is that all we need show to prove the book good ?

Let us try another case in point :

> Whisk ! There's me shims and here's me hams and this is me juppettes, gause be the meter ! Whisk ! What's this ? Whisk ! And that ? He never cotched finer, balay me, at Romiolo Frullini's flea pantamime out of Griddle-the-Sink or Shusies-with-her-Soles-Up or La Sauzerelly, the pucieboots, when I started so hobmop ladlelike, highty tighty, to kick the time off the cluck clock lucklock quamquam camcam potapot panapan kickakickkack. Hairhorehounds, shake up pfortner. Fuddling fun for Fullacan's sake *é*. (p. 531)

Mr Kenner's only comment on this is that it gives the reader an overwhelming sense of old Kate dancing in the pantomime. I agree ; but surely there is more to it than that ? The sense of Kate the Gaiety Girl kicking up her legs is rendered primarily by the rhythm, and the main function of the words is undoubtedly to carry the rhythm into the reader's apprehension as directly as possible. But the reader is surely encouraged to contemplate the entire verbal order, the ordering of particulars on the page. At some time he will feel bound to cope with " Hairhorehounds, shake up pfortner ", expecting that the words, examined, will add something substantial to his general sense of exhibitionist dancing. A footnote about Dublin street-games might clarify the whole passage, but one would still have to cope with the words on the page. Admittedly, Kate's " do dodo doughdy dough " should be apprehended as a fragment of dance-rhythm before one starts thinking of bread, but when Kate says " I awed to have scourched his Abarm's brack for him ", most readers will concentrate on the interaction of *barm brack, arm's*

back, and *Abram* or *Abraham* in this context, particularly since the following line reads :

> For the loaf of Obadiah, take your pastryart's noas out of me flouer bouckuet.

I cannot help feeling that pure or mere association impelled the movement from *Abram* or *Abraham* to *Obadiah,* and that it might with equal show of reason have led to *Ezekiel* or *Genesis.* We might then have had :

> For the loaf of Guinnesses, take your pastryark's noas out of me flouer bouckuet . . . .

and a footnote in PMLA might have tied *loaf* to *Guinnesses* with yeast ! To be serious, however : is it improper to enquire what Abraham and Obadiah are *doing* in this passage, or whether they are there for any more semantic function than incantation ?

The whole passage, as it happens, is fairly simple and very funny. Kate is describing " Master's gunne " (i.e. Mr Michael Gunn, manager of the Gaiety Theatre) staring at a picture of her as a refined soubrette : watching her, he " sizzles " with excitement, and the word brings to a wonderful comic climax the culinary charade in the diction (*dough, braising, toastface, steeming, loaf, roasties, pastryart, flour, strainer, skillet, cream, bust allabrooche,* etc.). But this is the point : there is more here than puns and incantation, the language genuinely discovers and renders the subject during the process of its activity. Like imaginative metaphor, the language composes a landscape of objects drawn from two worlds—culinary and erotic—impinging on each other and forming a third thing, the rendered and judged situation. Heat is, of course, the point of contact between the two worlds. A sharp distinction is therefore to be drawn between passages such as this and passages (such as those cited earlier in this essay) in which the verbal ' base ' or original does not genuinely function in the composed meaning. This involves choosing and rejecting, but I think it is high time we faced up to the necessity of doing this in *Finnegans Wake.*

* * *

The language of *Dubliners* is dramatic ; of the *Portrait,* hedonist ; of *Finnegans Wake,* narcissist. This assertion oversimplifies the case, but it points to a truth, that however epiphanic of chaos *Finnegans Wake* is, its language has a disconcerting way of delighting in its own nature. It is necessary, I think, to be quite prim about all this, and to remind ourselves that words are not autonomous. When language is used at its best it develops a kind of transparence : indeed, on those occasions the language as language tends to disappear in the urgency with which it penetrates its material. It is impossible to condone, in *Finnegans*

Wake, the wholesale transfer of energy from the human situation to a world of verbal ' essence '. There is a Manichee lurking somewhere in the later Joyce : perhaps this is what I have been, for several pages back, aiming to say.

Addendum by Hugh Kenner :

Not to cavil at a reviewer who has so manifestly read one's book without being thrown into fits by the first ten pages, but to endorse Mr Donoghue's tone of genial seriousness, let me dissent from his suggestion that my exegesis of the first paragraph of *Ulysses* has anything whatever in common with the compulsive Gongorisms of Mr Blackmur—whom, by the way, I have never accused of over-reading but of fiddling with opalescent phraseology as a substitute for reading. (I have done my best to make that sentence lumpy and indigestible, in keeping with the spirit of a solemn debut in *Studies.*)

But as to stately, plump Buck Mulligan's Mass : (1) Nothing compels a writer to mention such a detail as the ungirdled dressinggown unless he means something by it. (2) Every gesture and every detail of vestment in the Mass itself has a meaning : confronted by a theme like that, it would be most un-Joycean for Joyce (whose own note on the ' Oxen of the Sun ' episode I quote elsewhere in my book) to have passed up the chance for a parallel structure of meanings in his parody-mass. (3) It is not enough to say that Mulligan carries the mirror and razor because he is going to shave, or that his dressinggown is ungirdled becaûse he hasn't tied it and yellow because, well, because it *was.* It would be a comparable triumph of common sense to observe that the priest wears vestments to cover his nakedness. The narcissist's mirror and the barber's (hence hangman's) razor are themes reduplicated throughout the book ; it seems the reverse of casual for Joyce to have introduced them into the first sentence, and *crossed* besides. The natural word for a free-floating gown would be " untied ", whereas " ungirdled " at once suggests something more, the girdle of chastity, hence the cincture. And dressinggown colours are seldom specified in fiction, whereas those of chasubles are always laid down in liturgical calendars.

As to the other matters under discussion, let the reader, before assenting to Mr Donoghue's engaging blarney, or assuming that McLuhan's ' symbolic landscapes ' have anything to do with the panaroma of all flores of speech, first procure, digest and annotate his own copy of *Dublin's Joyce,* which he can reserve to his private use for a mere 25s.

The Growth of a Myth

FATHER ROBERT PERSONS, S.J. AND LEICESTER'S COMMONWEALTH

by LEO HICKS, S.J.

THE book that came to be known as *Leicester's Commonwealth** has often been reputed to have been the work of Father Robert Persons, and though the majority of critics have rejected this ascription of the work to the Elizabethan Jesuit, and the internal evidence of the book itself supports that opinion, it is even in our days occasionally asserted to be his.[1] Thus, Martin Hume, identifying a book mentioned in a despatch of Mendoza to Philip II, 1 June 1583, adds a note: "Doubtless Leicester's Commonwealth, by Father Persons, the Jesuit"[2] and stranger still, the book is listed among Persons's works in the Short Title Catalogue.[3] Even J. H. Pollen, S.J. though he rejected Persons's authorship, was yet of opinion that he may at least have had some part in it and was certainly responsible for transmitting copies of it to England by the Jesuit lay-brother, Ralph Emerson.[4]

The book appeared in 1584 and, so far as I have been able to discover, it was some fourteen years later that it was first definitely ascribed to Persons. In 1598 when the treaty of peace was afoot between Spain and France, and preliminary steps were suggested for ending the war also with England and for bringing about a general pacification in Europe, the Catholic exile, Charles Paget, in an endeavour to find favour with Queen Elizabeth and her ministers, sent to them certain charges against the Jesuits, and particularly against Persons, with a view to making their expulsion from the country one of the conditions of peace. The second of these charges ran: "that whilst in France also he (Persons) by no means desisted from dealing in state-matters, wrote a book concerning the life of the Earl of Leicester, and sent copies of it into England by a Jesuit lay-brother."[5] Charles Paget, it must be remembered, was one of that circle of Catholic exiles, headed by the enigmatic Thomas Morgan, who strongly opposed Allen and Persons, causing the two leaders, indeed, grave concern, and who after Allen's death in 1594 concentrated their opposition on the English Jesuits and their collaborators and in particular on Persons. It must also be remembered that the

*The title of the original edition of 1584 runs: "The Copie of A Leter wryten by a Master of Arte of Cambridge to his friend in London, concerning some talke past of late between two worshipful and grave men, about the present State, and some proceedings of the Erle of Leycester and his friends in England".

ascription of the work to the Jesuit is not to be found in governmental documents of the time. These two facts point to the conclusion that such ascription arose in the circle of Persons's opponents and was used as a weapon against him. This, too, is borne out by a statement of the priest, William Watson, in his confession to the Attorney General of April 1599. After implying that the *Book of Succession, Philopater* and *Leicester's Commonwealth* were all the work of one man, that is, Persons, he continued " whether it were of a hard conceit the Jesuits have had of me from the beginning, being ever (by good fortune) brought up under such tutors since I was 19 or 20 years of age in company of such as were wholly opposite to their designments as at Rheims, I heard the case canvassed *ad unguem* about *Leicesters Commonwealth* and adjudged of as unmeet object for a priest, much more for any religious person to handle ".[6] Two or three years later this ascription was used for the same purpose, during what is known as the Archpriest Controversy, by the opponents of Blackwell who in 1598 had been appointed by the Pope Archpriest and superior of the Secular Clergy in England.[7] When, then, in 1602 this party with the connivance of the English Government, sent four priests to present their case to the authorities in Rome, John Cecil, one of the delegates, openly accused Persons of being the author of the book.

The accusation arose in this way. The procurators of the Archpriest, who was supported by the Jesuits, presented to the Congregation of the Holy Office that was examining the case certain propositions out of the Appellants' books and petitioned for their condemnation.[8] When the Cardinals of the Congregation on 20 July 1602 finally gave their decision on the controversy, their verdict was that these Appellant books ought to be condemned and prohibited.[9] The question now was whether the Papal brief to be drawn up in accordance with the decisions arrived at by the Cardinals should contain this condemnation and prohibition. To prevent this, the Appellants had recourse to a stratagem. Acting on the principle that attack is the best defence, they suggested that if these books were to be condemned in the Papal brief, then should also be condemned two books by Jesuits, *The Humble Supplication* and *Green Coat* or *Leicester's Commonwealth* ; for these also contained scandalous statements. On 22 August, John Mush, another of the delegates, recorded in his diary :[10] " D. Cecil was with the Lord Ambassador,[11] (and) carried what he had collected out of the Supplication and Green Coate to be delivered to his Holiness." The statements taken by Cecil from the two books are really frivolous and could only impress those who were ignorant of English and unacquainted with the books themselves or the context in which the statements were made.[12] They are in striking contrast to the propositions drawn from the books of the Appellants.[13]

But there still remained for Cecil to prove to the Roman authorities

that *Leicester's Commonwealth* was the work of Persons. For this he adduced three reasons : common repute, the recognizable style very familiar to many persons and the confession of Charles Arundell that he himself had contributed the material for the book and that Persons had been responsible for the method, the style and the form in which it was written.[14] He further stated that Cardinal Allen had thought the publication of such a book dangerous, had counselled sending it privately to Leicester as a warning, but that Persons against the advice of others had published it. He added somewhat airily that he did not wish to labour the point nor to pass excessive censure on Persons for his having published heretical or temerarious propositions in his effort to cultivate an artificial and subtle style. Should, however, the Holy See wish to be informed about the authorship, if steps were taken to that end in England and France, there would be forthcoming one hundred witnesses to prove that Persons wrote and published the work.

This device of John Cecil was as cunning as it was deceitful. It certainly put Persons and the Procurators of the Archpriest in a quandary. They had little, if any, knowledge of Southwell's *Humble Supplication,* and the Jesuit's memory of *Leicester's Commonwealth,* published so long ago as 1584, beyond the fact that it was a *chronique scandaleuse,* was vague. Nor could they obtain copies of the books, even from their adversaries. As for the Roman authorities they knew even less than the Procurators of the Archpriest. It is true that when Paget in 1598 made the charge, already referred to, against Persons, the Jesuit conveyed to the Pope his denial of the authorship. Even so, it was only his word against the confident assertions of John Cecil. Moreover the Appellants' case had been dragging on for months in Rome and all parties were weary of it and desired its termination. The upshot of it was that Cecil's ruse, if indeed it was his and not that of the French Ambassador, succeeded and the condemnation of the Appellants' books, which the Cardinals had counselled the Pope in their decision of 20 July, was omitted in the Papal brief.

From this circle of Persons's opponents the ascription of the book to him appears to have passed into general currency. In 1602 Matthew Sutcliffe, Dean of Exeter, writing under the anonym of O.E. listed *Leicester's Commonwealth* among Persons's works in the prefatory epistle to his *Challenge,* and ten years later Dr James of the Bodleian Library assigned it to him without hesitation, clearly indicating his source by referring to Watson's *Quodlibets* in the margin.[15]

There were, however, two circumstances which, when known, suggested Persons's connection with the book. One was that copies of it were first brought to England in the autumn of 1584 by a Jesuit lay-brother, Ralph Emerson, who had for some years worked in close co-operation with Persons and was at the time still working under his

direction. The conclusion would naturally be drawn that Persons was responsible for transmitting the books to England, and from this there was but a step to the inference that he was responsible also for the book itself. The Queen's councillors, one might surmise, would be the first to make this inference. They knew Persons to be a writer even when he was in England in 1581. They had been informed as early as July 1583 that the Jesuits were sending books into the country.[16] They knew of Ralph Emerson and after Campion's capture in 1581 they had mentioned him by name in an order that search was to be made for him as " Campion's man ".[17] And a few days after Emerson's own capture, a young prisoner in Bridewell who had been confidently employed by Catholics at home and abroad, was examined by the same Justice Young who examined Emerson and gave information of a number of Catholics, adding in particular about the activities of the Jesuit brother : " the passage for Papists is a little from Yarmouth in Norfolk, where they pass and repass at their pleasure—There is a little fellow called Ralph who is in England for Father Persons, and is a great dealer for all the Papists : he is a very slender brown little fellow of whom Harrington (later martyred) can tell more certainly ".[18]

Yet despite all this information, the Queen's ministers, so far as the documents reveal, never once made the inference that Persons was the author of the book. Immediately on Emerson's committal to the Counter the news was reported to Walsingham and a copy of *Leicester's Commonwealth* sent to him. Realizing from its perusal the damaging criticism of the regime and the unwelcome attention directed towards their sinister schemes against Mary, Queen of Scots, he at once wrote with obvious perturbation to Leicester :[19]

My very good Lord,

Yesterday I received from the Lord Mayor, enclosed in a letter, a printed libel against your Lordship, the most malicious written thing that ever was penned sithence the beginning of the world. The author hereof is Morgan, the Queen of Scots agent in France, and as I gather by the course thereof he hath been assisted therein by the Lord Paget, Charles Arundell and Tresham. About a three years past, I had notice given unto me in secret sort of such an intent, with a meaning also to reach higher, as appeareth by the Italian plot about Crichton, the Scot Jesuit. And therefore, if her Majesty shall be drawn by some of this wicked and devilish course to allow thereof, the mischief likely to ensue thereby will in the end reach to herself, when the time serves fit for the purpose. There is no good or honest man (and though he were your Lordship's most mortal enemy) that doth not condemn this treacherous manner of dealing.

I mean with the leave of God to be at the court by to-morrow at noon. I would be glad to know your Lordship's mind, what course you could like I should hold with her Majesty as also what order you think meet to be taken with the bringer over of the said books. It shall be very meet that both honest and wise men be appointed to examine him.[20] In the mean time I have given strait charge to the Lord Mayor to see him kept from all conference, by placing some honest trusty person to attend on him, until he be thoroughly examined. I have also sent for the books that were found about him, which I will see safely kept, as they may not be dispersed. It behoveth us, considering the malice of this time to walk warily in our callings. And so I most humbly take my leave. At Barnelms the 29 September 1584.

Your Lordship's to command
Fras. Walsingham.

The secretary was quick to seize the political purpose of the book;[21] for though by its over emphasis on the infamous conduct of Leicester, it might appear but a *chronique scandaleuse,* its real aim was to support and protect the Queen of Scots and her son as heirs to the throne and to destroy the power and influence of her enemies, Leicester and his followers, especially with Queen Elizabeth herself whose own life the author represented as safe only so long as Mary and her son were alive.[22] Walsingham naturally surmised that it had emanated from the circle of Mary's supporters in France. According to a report from her ambassador in Paris, the Archbishop of Glasgow, Leicester told Stafford's chaplain, Richard Hakluyt, when in England, that he knew well that it was the Queen of Scots who had created this predicament for him or that it was at her command and that he would make her smart for it.[23] And in the following January Morgan wrote to Mary : " It was told to me that Leicester should say that the book written against him tended all to your honour and his ruin and therefore he would provide hereafter, meaning by all conjecture to extend his whole force to do your Majesty harm, which I hope in God shall not be in his power. I have no great matter to trouble your Majesty but to accompany the enclosed and to advertise your Majesty that we be informed that an Englishman is here newly arrived by the practices of Leicester to kill Charles Arundell and others."[24]

Despite their suspicions, it is clear that neither Walsingham nor Leicester really knew who had written the book. When Hakluyt returned to Paris in October, he carried a message from the Earl to the English Ambassador, bidding him to find out where the book was printed and who was the author.[25] Stafford himself was eager to make the discovery, for his own wife under her former name of Lady Sheffield was mentioned more than once in the book, but it is evident by his letters of 30 March 1585

that he had not then succeeded, nor is there any evidence that he ever did. But the point to be emphasized is that in all these documents Persons is never once mentioned. There were reasons, as stated above, which might have led the Queen's ministers to think the book was his ; they knew, too, of the invasion schemes to aid the Queen of Scots in which the Jesuit was embroiled, yet, so far as the documents reveal, never once do they make the inference that he wrote the book.

The second circumstance which may possibly have led and given some colour to the ascription of the book to Persons was the publication some eleven years later of *A Conference about the Next Succession.* As this was being printed in Antwerp in 1595 it was surreptitiously purloined and synopsized by William Gifford,[27] the friend of Charles Paget, was proclaimed to be the work of Persons, though in fact he was not the sole author, and was used by that faction in an attempt to discredit the Jesuit. The second part of this work is wholly taken up with a consideration of possible successors to the throne after the eventual death of Queen Elizabeth. As many pages of *Leicester's Commonwealth* were devoted to the same subject, it was possible for Persons's opponents without overstraining the probabilities to ascribe this earlier work also to him and for the same purpose.[27]

The extant evidence, then, as has been shown, leads to the conclusion that the ascription to Persons of the book against Leicester arose not in Government circles but in the circle of the Jesuit's Catholic opponents on the Continent, the first open assertion of this being made by Charles Paget in 1598. It then passed into some of the Appellant books and was used by their delegates in Rome to prevent the condemnation of their books in the Papal brief that decided the controversy ; and from them it passed into general currency.

* * *

It is time, now, to consider Persons's reply. When in 1598 Charles Paget transmitted to the English Government the charges against the Jesuits, two Catholic gentlemen, who must have been in high position in ruling circles, made verbatim copies of them as well as of two of Paget's letters and sent them to Persons who was then at Naples. He promptly translated the documents into Latin, wrote a reply to the charges and despatched the bundle to Cardinal Cajetan, the Protector of England.[28] To ensure the safety of the two gentlemen, he warned the Cardinal, the greatest secrecy must be observed. If His Eminence had not a very trustworthy and discreet person who would show or merely read the documents to His Holiness without letting them pass through the official secretaries, then it might suffice to write in general terms to the Pope that reliable reports had come from England that certain persons

for their own private interests were treating of the matter (of peace) in the name of Queen Elizabeth through the King of France and would like in this way to win the concurrence also of His Holiness. Meanwhile the documents might be held to be exhibited at the proper time.[29] Opposite the charge of writing *Leicester's Commonwealth,* Persons noted in the margin that it was calumnious, and referred to his fuller reply which runs as follows :

> As regards the second item viz. what he (Paget) says was done in France, this is based on the like falsehood. The book against the Earl of Leicester, a most ferocious persecutor of Catholics, is believed to have been due to a combined effort, a number of Catholics having had a part in it, but chiefly Charles Arundell, a nobleman who had recently come to Paris from England and who was extremely hostile to the Earl. But no matter who gave the book its final form—for it is known to have passed through many hands—there are no affairs of state treated in it : [30] and even on the supposition that Persons had had a hand in it, ought he to be held any more to blame than those who wrote against hostile emperors such as St Nazianzen and St Basil against Julian or St Hilary against Constantius.[31]

Such was Persons's first denial of the authorship, which has been hidden away in unpublished documents for two and a half centuries. His next denial had greater publicity. In the preface to his *Warn-Word* against Sir Francis Hastings, he takes note of eight books or treatises ascribed to him by Matthew Sutcliffe, who with his *Challenge* had also entered the controversy. *Leicester's Commonwealth* was second in the list. To this he replied :

> All which books he ascribeth resolutely neither more nor fewer to Father Persons : and albeit it were over long to examine here all particulars, yet for the first four of them I never heard any man of notice and judgment ascribe them to him before, and if I be not deceived, other particular authors are known to have written them, namely the last three of the first four ; for as for the first I hold it for a mere fiction, neither does the minister alledge any proof to show these books to be his.

He then goes on to state that Sutcliffe omitted no less than five books

> which most men lightly do account by common fame to have come from him—so as in recounting us here eight books the minister telleth nine lies, four positive and five privative, no less falsely affirming the one than fraudently suppressing the other.[32]

But there is still a third and earlier document written less than two months after *Leicester's Commonwealth* appeared which leaves no doubt about the matter. In a letter from Rouen, 13 December 1584, written to his Jesuit friend, Alfonso Agazzari, the Rector of the English College in Rome, among other items of news Persons relates a piquant story

about two books published in that year, Allen's True, Sincere and Modest Defence and the book against Leicester :

> Our adversaries have been extraordinarily disquieted by two books which have appeared in England. One was directed against a kind of justice which they call British, that is to say, against a certain notorious pamphlet, brim full of lies, published a year ago by the heretics under the title, ' Justitia Britannica '. In it they endeavoured to convince foreigners that the cruel proceedings against Catholics are and should be called justice. But to this pamphlet so effective a reply has been made that the heretics are already regretting that it was written. Some copies of the reply, translated into Latin, have been sent to your Reverence to distribute among our patrons and friends. Had the style of the Latin equalled that of the original English I have no doubt it would be read with pleasure, but the translator is not satisfied that he has achieved that level.
>
> In the book are treated with sufficient clarity, as the exigencies of the time demand, nearly all those subjects which are or are thought to be of primary importance in England, such as the excommunication of the Queen, the authority of the Roman Pontiff in such matters, the taking up arms for the Catholic cause and similar questions on which the opinion of Catholics used to be demanded under torture. Hence the persecution ; but the outcome has proved quite otherwise ; for so far they have not proceeded with greater ferociousness but affrighted rather have mitigated to some extent their usual barbarity.
>
> The Earl of Leicester is hostile to the Treasurer who is reputed to have written that Justitia Britannica. When, then, he had received and read the reply to it, he presented a copy to the Queen, asserting that Cecil had acted rashly, since by his inept and inopportune pamphlet he had given occasion for this reply which would do great harm to their cause.
>
> This action of Leicester Cecil took in very bad part but soon had opportunity of paying him back in his own coin. For a few days later there appeared a book in English, written, so it seems, by a Protestant, in which in very sober style are revealed all the vices of the Puritans, but chiefly those of Leicester : his ambition, his tyranny, his crimes and treasons against the country and the Queen, his whole manner of life and utter knavery. Five or six hundred copies of the book fell into the hands of the officials whose business it is to search out such works,[33] and in the absence of Leicester were sent to Cecil as the leading member of the Queen's Council. But far from suppressing the copies, Cecil immediately distributed them to many and handed one copy to the Queen herself. She was the last person in the world that Leicester wanted to see the book and he was nearly beside himself with vexation at it.
>
> It is extraordinary, so it is reported, how eagerly the book is thumbed in England. Some offer twenty pounds for a copy and twenty crowns for a loan of one for three or four hours, so exceedingly detested by all is the Earl. Certainly the book has remarkable things to say about him

> and his partisans. I only wish you were able to read it ; you would be astounded. Copies were very hard to come by in these parts till our friends came from England. From them I obtained a copy[34] and have wanted to send it to you, that you may present it to the Bishop of St Asaph.[35]

From this account, given spontaneously in a private letter to a friend, it is clear that Persons had but recently made acquaintance with the book against Leicester through the copy brought to him from England, was just as amazed at it as were the general public and was at that time so completely in the dark as to who was the author that he suspected him to be a Protestant. Such an account rules out the suggestion that he had any part whatever in the composition of the book, nor is it compatible with his being responsible for sending copies of it into England by Ralph Emerson. It seems, indeed, that neither Fr Weston nor the Jesuit brother knew that they were transporting such books ; and, may be, a hint of this is supplied by the author himself in his Epistle Dedicatory when he writes : " And with this I will end assuring you that within five or six days you shall receive the whole in writing by another way and secret means, *neither shall the bearer suspect what he carrieth.*"

The anecdote about Burghley and Leicester, derived no doubt from English reports, is in all probability *ben trovato,* though based on the known disagreement and unfriendly relations that existed at this time between the two councillors. Such a story may have supplied the foundation of the later myth that Burghley supplied most of the materials so that Persons might compose the book.[36] Immediate steps, in fact, were taken to suppress the libel. On 12 October was published a Proclamation which ordered all such books to be handed over to the authorities, promising that no harm would befall those who complied with the order and affixing penalties for those who did not do so.[37] As London was the most likely place in which the book would be circulated, the Queen sent letters signed by herself to the Lord Mayor, the sheriffs and the aldermen to prevent it and to testify to her knowledge of the ' innocency ' of the Earl.[38] A bill, too, against slanderous libelling was introduced in the Parliament that met on 23 November. It passed its second reading in the House of Lords on 19 December, and was then submitted to a committee of thirty. It was, however, subsequently dropped, perhaps because the matter had already been dealt with by the Proclamation or because the matter of it was sufficiently covered by the Statute of Silence about the succession.[39]

Still, the measures taken did not succeed in suppressing the book. The many extant copies in print, scattered as they are in private as well as in public libraries, point to its wide diffusion, whilst the number of manuscript copies that still survive afford some evidence of the

eagerness with which it was received in England. Within a few months of its arrival a copy was smuggled into the Tower to a Catholic prisoner there,[40] and in the following June, despite the prohibition of the Proclamation, the book was in such continual circulation in the northern counties of Lancashire and Cheshire that the Lords of the Council were constrained to send a strong letter to the authorities there with the order that " the former negligence and remisness showed in the execution of her Majesty's command be amended."[41]

Government officials themselves disobeyed the prohibition ; for when William Waad, Clerk of the Council, returned in April 1585 from his mission to France, whither he had been sent to demand the extradition of Thomas Morgan for his complicity in the so-called assassination plot,[42] he took care to bring back with him a copy of the libel ; and Stafford, the Ambassador, emboldened by this example, ventured to send Burghley a copy, which but a few days previously he had said he would not do without his express command.[43] As for the circulation in France of the French translation, Stafford advised against raising the matter with the French Government, though in his letters to Burghley and Walsingham, 30 March 1585, he was still, in June, by order of Queen Elizabeth, bringing great pressure to bear upon the King of France to prohibit the sale of it and to imprison the Englishman who had been responsible for it.[44] So much then for the diffusion of the book and the efforts of the Government to prohibit it.

* * *

One word, finally, as to the principal author of the book. In the documents already quoted the name of Sir Charles Arundell occurs more than once as closely associated with the work. Walsingham named him as connected with it in his letter to Leicester,[45] and Morgan's report to the Queen of Scots seems to suggest that the Earl had sent a man to Paris to murder Arundell on account of that connection. Later in 1598 Persons definitely declared that though the book had passed through many hands, Sir Charles was the person chiefly responsible for it.

This external testimony agrees well with the internal evidence, some points of which may be here mentioned. Clearly the author was an upholder of Mary, Queen of Scots and her son as heirs to the throne. He shows himself also to have been resolutely in favour of the projected marriage between Queen Elizabeth and Anjou, so strongly opposed by Leicester and his faction, and he emphasizes the good effects that might have followed from such a marriage. He appears, further, well acquainted with Leicester's relations with Lady Sheffield and the secret marriage that followed, though he never reveals that at the time of the publication of the book she was the wife of the Ambassador, Sir Edward Stafford ; in the French edition of the book this episode is further veiled and the name of the lady omitted, presumably so as not to disclose her identity

to the French.[46] The book, moreover, especially in the earlier manuscript recension, embodies certain Howard traditions[47]; and finally the whole contents, as Dean Mosse noted,[48] suggest that it was written by a subtle courtier.

Such details accord well with the ascription of the principal part of the book to Sir Charles Arundell.[49] He was descended from Edmund Howard, third son of the second Duke of Norfolk, and brother to that third Duke whom Leicester was reputed to have tricked and betrayed in the Ridolfi Plot and so brought to his ruin and death as a traitor. Some twenty years before this event Sir Thomas Arundell, father of Charles, had been executed by Leicester's father for his alleged complicity in the Somerset plot, and the jury on that occasion had had to be kept without meat or drink for twenty four hours before they would condemn him. The Howards, in fact, had no cause to love the upstart Dudleys. By his descent, too, from Edmund Howard he was first cousin once removed to Lady Sheffield and second cousin to the Queen herself. Until his flight from England, late in 1583, he had moved in court circles and had at times been favoured and used by the Queen. With other members of the Catholic circle at the court, such as Lord Henry Howard, he had strongly supported the Anjou match in the hope that it would bring some measure of freedom in the exercise of his religion. The dramatic accusation made by Lord Oxford, about Christmas 1580, that they had been reconciled to the Faith seems to have been a deliberate attempt to ruin their influence with the Queen; and Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador, referring to this event in a despatch of some months later, records that on that occasion they had taken refuge with him for fear of being committed to the Tower and murdered, as indeed the Earl of Northumberland was later.[50] It is hardly necessary to add that Sir Charles favoured the claims of Mary, Queen of Scots as heir to the throne.

This internal evidence, then, combined with the external testimonies make it highly probable that Sir Charles Arundell, as Persons stated, was the principal author of the book. One thing, however, is certain, the Jesuit had no part in it nor was he responsible for sending copies of it into England by Ralph Emerson.

NOTES

[1] The first use of the title, *Leicester's Commonwealth*, that I have been able to find is in a letter of the priest, William Watson, to the Attorney General, April 1599, printed in T. G. Law, *The Archpriest Controversy*, Camden Society 1896, 1. p. 213. Watson used the same title again in his *Quodlibets*, 1602, p. 11: "No more than to make Greene Coate (alias Leicesters Commonwealth) or Philopater—which are all of Parsons doing." This, too, seems the first evidence of the use of its other name, Green Coat; presumably derived from a green binding of the first edition. When the book was republished in 1641, the original title was dropped and *Leycesters Common-wealth* substituted in its stead.

[2] *Spanish Calendar*, 1580–1586, p. 539.

[3] A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave, Short Title Catalogue of Books printed in England, Scotland and Ireland and English Books printed Abroad etc., Bibliographical Society, London, 1926, p. 444.

[4] *The Venerable Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel*, ed. J. H. Pollen, S.J. Catholic Record Society, XXI, p. 58.

[5] The English version of these charges is in R.O. Dom. Eliz. 267. n. 67. The expulsion of the Jesuits is clearly expressed in the title. A Latin translation in Persons's hand is at Stonyhurst, Anglia II. n. 46 and a copy of this in Arch. Vat. Nunz. Diverse 264, f. 237. Cf. also Persons to Peña, Naples, 22 August 1598, Ibid. f. 224. It may be objected that there is an earlier ascription to Persons ; for there is an advertisement in the *English Mercurie* n. 54 for 24 November 1588 : " Father persons Green Coate well dusted of shorte and pithie animadversions on that infamous Fardle of Abuse and Falsities, entitled Leicesters Commonwealth, imprinted and to be sold by John Field and Christ. Barber", B.M. Sloane MSS 4106, n. 6, f. 34. This, if genuine, would put back the ascription of the work to Persons to 1588 : but Father Pollen considered the *English Mercurie* to be a fake of much later date, and rightly so ; for English newspapers first began to appear only towards the middle of the next century, nor in the Handlist of English and Welsh Newspapers (J. G. Muddiman, London 1920), is there any newspaper called the *English Mercurie*, though there is a *Mercurius Anglicus* of 1644 and other papers with that Latin title of later date.

[6] Watson to the Attorney General April 1599, printed in T. G. Law, *The Archpriest Controversy*, I. p. 213. I have modernized the spelling.

[7] Cf. *A Dialogue between a Secular Priest and a lay Gentleman*, 1601, p. 107 and W. Watson, *Quodlibets*, 1602, pp. 11, 193, 265 and 316 to 317.

[8] The propositions—catalogus paradoxum—are printed in T. G. Law, op. cit. II. pp. 147–151.

[9] The decision of the Cardinals is in West. Arch. VII. n. 52. Section 10 of the document runs : " Actum quoque fuit de libris nuper in Anglia seu Rhotomagae in Gallia, ut dicitur, impressis in quibus quam plurima injuriosa contra Patres Jesuitas asseruntur, multa etiam haeresim sapientia continentur. Hos autem libros Ill^mi D^mi censuerunt omnino prohibendos et damnandos." Cf. also The Last Relation about the business of the Appellant Priests in Rome. Ibid. n. 66.

[10] Printed in T. G. Law op. cit. II. p. 21.

[11] Philippe de Bethune, French Ambassador to the Holy See. He strongly and at times almost violently supported the Appellants. That the above manoeuvre was a stratagem is clearly indicated by a sentence at the end of the propositions drawn from the Appellants' books, due possibly to John Cecil himself : " Propositiones istae datae contra presbiteros Appellantes in causa fuerunt quod Excellentissimus Orator Galliae Sanctissimo exhibuerit ejusdem farinae propositiones ex quibusdam Jesuitarum libris depromptas." Law. op. cit. p. 151.

[12] It was the Appellants, it must be remembered, and not the Jesuits who had caused to be printed in 1601 *The Humble Supplication*, written (but not published) ten years or so earlier by the Martyr Bld Robert Southwell, S.J. in answer to the Proclamation of 1591. Cecil, however, boldly stated at Rome that the Jesuits were responsible for its publication. Cf. Law. op. cit. II. p. 95. In a letter of 5 May 1602, Henry Garnet, the Superior of the Jesuits in England, reported to Persons : " Father Southwell wrott a very good answer to the Proclamation, but it could never be sett-forth, and when Mr Boswill either for lucre or malice meant to print it, your friend, Henry (Garnet himself) seeing that now matters were quieted and many other answers divulged and that it might breed niew troubles, requested Customer (the Archpriest Blackwell) to forbid it—this was don, but little regarded and now they will blame journeymen (jesuits) for it. Collins was hanged for printing it, but sorry that he had not known the prohibition. James Ducket was hanged for divulging it, though he were on the malcontents side, and they in vaine sought to save them and had for that effect Sir John Stanhopes letters, but James dyed well and asked for forgivness of Customer and Journeymen for adhering to the malcontents : the book I will get, if I can, for they are all taken almost ". Stonyhurst Coll. p. 547.

[13] The statements are printed in Law, op. cit. II. pp. 95–102. Cf. the propositions ibid. pp. 147–151

[14] As Cecil well knew, Charles Arundell could not be interrogated on the point ; for he had died in Paris in 1587. Beyond Cecil's statement there is not a scrap of evidence for the the alleged confession. I am afraid it is a timely invention of Cecil himself ; for, as will be shown later, Persons had nothing whatever to do with the book.

[15] *The Jesuits Downfall*, Oxford, 1612, p. 59.

[16] " The Jesuits have sent to Rouen two ' dry fats ' of books to be dispersed in England, Scotland and Flanders, conveyed by Peter l' huillier, librarian of this town. They went to day in a boat in which is some of my stuff. The books are of their new translated testaments, catechisms and small pamphlets concerning the Jesuits' miracles, done in sundry countries." The English Ambassador, Cobham, to Walsingham, Paris, 19 July 1583, For. Cal. XVIII, p. 28.

[17] Council Register 2 and 4 August 1581, Lansdowne MSS 1162 ff. 71b and 73b. Cf. J. R. Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, XIII, p. 148.

[18] Examination of Ralph Myller before Justice Young, 9 October 1584, Dom Eliz. 173. n.64. It was on 26 September 1584 that Ralph Emerson was committed to the Counter in the Poultry by the Lord Mayor, Sir Edward Osborne, but a few days after he had landed in England. Cf. the keeper's letter 14 June 1586, C.R.S. 11 p. 249. He and Father Weston had embarked 8 September. (Persons to Agazzari, Rouen, 30 September 1584, C.R.S. XXXIX. p. 245.) In prison lists of 1586 Emerson is set down as " committed for bringing over slanderous books 1584 " and as " little Ralph, sometime servant to the Jesuits in England " and again as " having been servant to Persons or Campion " C.R.S. 11. pp. 251, 254 and 250. An examination of Ralph as late as 17 April 1593 is printed from the Harleian MS 6998. f. 65 in J Morris, *Troubles of Our Catholic Forefathers*, Second Series, London, 1875 p. 40. Emerson was never brought to trial, probably because the Government in its own interests wished to avoid making the matter more public. He passed practically the rest of his life in prison, at first in the Counter and then in the Clink. Released early in the reign of James I, crippled with paralysis, he survived but a few months, dying at St Omer's College, 2 March 1604.

[19] Walsingham to Leicester, Barnelms, 29 September 1584. B.M. Titus B. VII. f. 10. The letter has long been known but never yet printed. I have modernized the spelling.

[20] Two of the worthy men selected for the task turned out to be James Young and Richard Topcliffe. Cf. C.R.S. II. p. 249.

[21] Only a few days previously Stafford had sent to Walsingham the English translation, just published in France, of Ross's book which declared the right and title of Mary, Queen of Scots and her son. Cf. Stafford to Burghley, Paris 3 and 18 September 1584, R. O. French Corr. *Leicester's Commonwealth* coming so soon after this would naturally lead Walsingham to see its political significance. Both books should be considered in connection with the complicated intrigues of the time as regards Scotland. Since the middle of 1583 when James had freed himself from the domination of the English faction in Scotland, Elizabeth and her ministers had endeavoured by every means to restore the situation. They had supported Gowrie in his conspiracy, but James's minister, Arran, had foiled it. Gowrie was executed early in May 1584 and his fellow-conspirators, Angus Mar and Glamis fled to England. Among Elizabeth's ministers there was no agreement as to policy : Burghley and Hunsdon pursued the ' by-course ' of endeavouring to win over Arran ; Walsingham favoured procuring the re-entry into Scotland of the banished lords by conspiracy and force ; and Elizabeth cunningly re-opened negotiations with Mary for her association with her son and her eventual release ; whilst in October was drawn up the sinister ' Bond of Association ', directed undoubtedly against the Queen of Scots.

[22] When a few months later a French translation of *Leicester's Commonwealth* appeared in France ' with a very villainous addition ', Stafford wrote to Walsingham : " For no doubt of it they will be sent over and it is determined among them to have all the means that can be and the devices to bring it to the sight of her Majesty ". He gave this warning, as he remarked, that Walsingham might take measures to seize the books on their being landed. Stafford to Walsingham, Paris 30 March 1585 and to Burghley of the same date. R. O. French Corr. He mentions in these letter that he had learnt when the English book came out that Thomas Throgmorton was translating it into French, but that he had taken measures then to prevent it. From a letter of the spy Berden to Walsingham 11 August 1585, printed in C.R.S. XXI pp. 78 and 79, it would appear that Thomas Fitzherbert had something to do with the French translation. There may have been a confusion of the two Thomases.

[23] Glasgow to Mary, Queen of Scots, Paris, undated but c. January 1585. R.O.M.Q.S. XVI. 1. Cf. also Mary Queen of Scots to Glasgow, Chartley, 18 May 1586, Labanof VI. p. 300.

[24] Thomas Morgan to Mary, Queen of Scots, Paris 5/15 January 1585, Murdin, State Papers, 1. p. 456. Cf. also Paget to Mary 4/14 January 1585 ibid. p. 436.

[25] Glasgow to Mary, Queen of Scots, c. January 1585 ut supra. Stafford reported Hakluyt's return in a despatch from Paris 16 October 1584 : " On arriving here yesterday I found Hakluyt with a packet from you." For. Cal. XIX. p. 106. Leicester's nephew, Sir Philip Sydney, when he wrote a reply to the libel clearly did not know who had written it. Sydney's reply is printed in A. Collins, *Letters and Memorials of State,* London 1746, 1. pp. 62—68. It does not seem to have been published till printed in Collins's collection.

[26] Cf. Gifford to the Nuncio, Malvasia, 3/13 June 1595 with the synopsis, Arch. Vat. Borghese 448ab ff 434—443v ; Malvasia to Cardinal Aldobrandino, the Spa, 7/27 June 1595, ibid. Nunz. di Fiandra VIII. f. 319 ; T. Phelippes to Burghley, 12 June 1595 and Gifford to Thomas Throgmorton, 5 June 1595 R.O. Dom. Eliz. 252 n. 66, and 66, 1 and 2.

[27] Cf. The letter of one of the Appellant priests, 15 June 1599, Cal. of Salisbury MSS, Hatfield IX. p. 202.

[28] Persons to Cajetan, Naples 22 August 1598, Arch. Vat. Nunz. Diverse 264 f. 229 : Paget's letter of 27 April and 8 May 1598, his charges and Persons's reply, ibid. ff 234–243v.

[29] For safety's sake it seems that the documents were despatched by Persons in the Spanish diplomatic bag. They were sent open to Mgr Peña, his confidential friend, to read and explain them to the Duke of Sessa, the Spanish Ambassador in Rome. That is why the copies of the documents are now found amongst the papers of Peña in whose hand they are endorsed. Ibid. f. 223. In a covering letter to the Monsignor of the same date, 22 August 1598, Persons wrote : " The two gentlemen have already sent us other documents previously of much the same import, relating to the secret negotiations with the Queen. The Archduke (Governor of Flanders) has seen some of the originals which were sent and which were afterwards returned to the Secretariate in England in order that those who sent them might not be discovered.—I am anxious that the Duke (of Sessa) should see everything and for the matter to be passed to him by your Lordship with strong recommendation for action, so that at all events his Holiness may be made aware of the kind of treaty they are aiming at with the help of the King of France, directed against the Catholics and the Fathers of the Society in particular, to the effect that the Fathers be recalled from England." ibid. f. 224.

Paget's intrigue by means of his agent, Thomas Barnes, can be followed in his correspondence in Cal. Dom. Eliz. 1598–1601 and Cal Addenda 1580–1625. According to Phelippes and Barnes the charges were shown to the Queen, but they did not know what had happened to the documents afterwards. Cf. Barnes to Paget undated 1598 Cal. Dom. p. 218 ; Phelippes to Paget 28 April 1599, Cal. Addenda. p. 393. Paget eventually thought discretion the better part of valour and retired from Flanders to Paris. Cf. his letters, 26 and 30 November 1598 and 24 April 1599, Cal. Dom. pp. 124, 128, and 187. In the Letters of Fitzherbert, C.R.S. 41. p. 93 are given some references, though by no means all that are available, to the many attempts made by the same faction to have the Jesuits expelled from England as they had been from France.

[30] This is not altogether correct if the discussion of the claims of possible successors to the throne be a matter of state. His memory of the book may have been at fault, but in any event when he first read the book in Rouen in 1584 his mind was not occupied with that question. His concern about the succession came later after the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots ; and, as will appear later, it was rather as a record of the scandalous misdeeds of Leicester that the book struck him ; he may have missed, as others have done since, its political significance.

[31] Persons's statement that the book was known to have passed through many hands supports J. Bruce's contention that it went through many stages and forms both in manuscript and print. Cf. C.R.S. XXI. pp. 57 and 58, and J. Bruce, Leicester's Correspondence 1585–1586, Camden Soc. XXVII, 1844 preface.

[32] *The Warn-Word to Sir Francis Hastings,* 1602 p. 2v.

[33] Compare Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 19/29 October 1584 : " There is a bruit that three or four hundred were taken in one port in England ". For. Cal. XIX. p. 126.

[34] Persons at Rouen may have obtained his copy from the gentleman mentioned in Stafford's despatch to Walsingham, Paris 19/29 October 1584 ut supra. " The Englishman that I desired Robert Cecil to tell you had come to the Spanish Ambassador out of England the day he left, was sent back to Rouen but is expected again within a week. He carries a false

name, I am sure, calling himself Slinter. He brought with him three or four of those books made against a great councillor in England, for before his coming by diligent search I could hear of none, but now I know where two are but very closely kept."

[35] Persons to Agazzari, Rouen, 13 December 1584, Arch. S. J. Rom. Fondo Jesuitico. The original is in Latin ; for Agazzari did not know English.

[36] Cf. Anthony A Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses,* ed P. Bliss II. col. 75. C. Grene, S.J., the seventeenth century copyist had evidently heard some such story of Burghley writing the book, for he inserts this information in the synopsis of Persons's letter of 13 December 1584 as if it was contained in that letter. Now that the full text is available this is clearly seen to be an error. J. H. Pollen, S.J., not having the full text, made the same error on the authority of Grene, though he rejected the story itself. Cf. C. R. S. XXI, p. 53.

[37] H. Dyson, *Proclamations during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth,* 1618, f. 229.

[38] Cf. Letter of the Privy Council to Lord Strange, the Bishop of Chester and the rest of the J. P.s in Lancashire and Cheshire, 20 June 1585, Bodleian, Tanner MSS 68. f. 110, printed in F. Peck, *Desiderata Curiosa,* London, 1779, p. 158.

[39] Cf. The Journal of the House of Lords, 72 and 74 and S. D'Ewes *Journals of Parliaments during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth,* London, 1682, p. 317. Cf. also An extract of the Acts to be made in this Parliament, Cal. Dom. Eliz. 1581–1590. p. 235. The tentative date January 1585, assigned by the Calendarist, seems obviously wrong. The Statute of Silence, as it is called, 23 Eliz. c. 2. was ' An Act against seditious words and rumours against the Queen's most excellent Majesty '.

[40] " Deaw sent in to Shelley the answer to the Execution of Justice and my Lord of Leicester his book and got them back." Berden to Walsingham, London, 30 April 1585, printed in C. R. S. XXI. p. 76.

[41] Lords of the Council to Lord Strange, etc., 20 June 1585 ut supra.

[42] On the so-called plot cf. The Strange Case of Dr William Parry, *Studies,* September 1949.

[43] " *Waad would* need carry with him *one of the books against my Lord Leicester,* which makes me bold to send you one packed in a box with some tokens." Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 10 April 1585, For. Cal. XIX. p. 412. Italicized words in cipher. Compare his letter to Burghley, Paris, 30 March 1585 ut supra.

[44] Mendoza to Philip II, Paris, 1 June 1585, Spanish Cal. p. 538. Leicester also through the French Ambassador in London sent a request to the French King to the same effect. Cf. Mauvissiere de Castlenau to the King, London, 11 May 1585, C.R.S. XXI. p. 112.

[45] Walsingham to Leicester, 29 September 1584 ut supra.

[46] Stafford, however, did not think the concealment sufficient. " I am not such a baby", he wrote to Walsingham, " but that I know well enough that though the names be either left out or the matter coloured in the French there be enough that have read the English and know the parties that can take pains to gloss and interpret the text." Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 30 March 1585, ut supra.

[47] Cf. *Howard Traditions in Leicester's Commonwealth,* by J. H. Pollen, S.J. C. R. S. XXI. pp. 57–66.

[48] The pertinent correspondence between Dr Ashton and Dean Mosse on the subject is printed in W. Turnbull, *Letters of Mary Stuart,* London, 1845, pp. XVII–XX.

[49] Father Pollen remarked that Persons in his Memoirs (C. R. S. 1.) often calls him *Cavalliero* or Sir, doubtless to indicate that he came of knightly family. (C. R. S. XXI. p. 28 n.) It appears, however, that Persons was using the title in the strict sense. In his *Genealogical Collections of Roman Catholic Families,* privately printed, III part, p. 23, S. R. Jackson Howard states that Charles Arundell was named in Sir Matthew Arundell's marriage settlement as his brother and that in his *Inquisitionem Post Mortem* of 30 Eliz. (30 March 1588) he is spoken of as a knight, departed out of this realm and dying without issue. I have to thank Brigadier T. Trappes-Lomax for this information which shows the accuracy with which Persons relates his facts.

[50] Mendoza to Philip II, London, 25 December 1581, printed in C.R.S. XXI. p. 30. Cf. also Mauvissiere de Castlenau to the King of France, London, 11 January 1581, ibid. p. 29.

The Secular Institutes and the Opus Dei

by JAMES CONDON

PERHAPS the most important development of the ascetical life within the Catholic Church during the past decade has been the emergence of the Secular Institutes. For some decades previously the feeling had been prevalent that the times called for a new form of the life of perfection and of the apostolate that would correspond to contemporary conditions and give direct answers to contemporary challenges. In the Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater* published by the Holy See on 2 February 1947, the Church gave its formal approval to these aspirations and laid down the general lines which corporative efforts in this direction should follow.

The secular institutes are the latest stage in a development of the Church's ascetic-apostolic history that leads from the medieval monastic orders through the mendicant orders to the various types of modern congregations. This development is at the same time one of a growing directness in the approach of the dedicated Christian life to the world and the world's redemption. The secular institutes provide a framework and direction primarily for those lay people who wish to follow the life of Christian perfection and carry on their apostolate by engaging in work or professional activity under the normal conditions of the society they live in.

Some secular institutes restrict their action to special spheres—teaching, building, the care of the sick, etc.—or to special countries. This is not essential, however, and indeed the Opus Dei, the first of the secular institutes to be approved by the Church and the most extended at the moment throughout the world, has no such limitation. It includes persons of all professions and walks of life, for the most part simply continuing in the work or profession in which they were when they found their vocation in the Opus Dei. The universal nature of the vocation offered and the absence of geographical limitations makes it possible to gain from an observation of the Opus Dei a good over-all view of what the concept of a secular institute can embrace. However, by no means all the characteristics of the Opus Dei are or need to be common to other secular institutes.

The Opus Dei was founded in Madrid in 1928. Until the end of the Spanish Civil War it was limited to a nucleus of persons gathered about the founder, Don José María Escrivá de Balaguer, an Aragonese priest.

On 19 March 1941, it was recognized as a Pious Union by the Bishop of Madrid. A few years later Fr Escrivá moved to Rome. Its Constitutions were definitively approved by the Holy See in 1950. After 1945 it began its expansion outside Spain and is to-day established in nine western European and almost all the South American countries, in Mexico and the United States. (Ireland is one of the nine European countries.) Its first foundations in each new country have usually been in the capital city or at important university centres.

The " aims " of the Opus Dei are the personal sanctification of its members and the carrying on of the apostolate. It gives its members an ascetical and doctrinal formation, and provides them with direction in their spiritual life and in their apostolate. This apostolate is usually carried on by each individual as the circumstances of his work and ordinary life suggest and allow. However, there are also corporate works of apostolate such as student hostels, educational establishments, publications, various kinds of business enterprises (including farms), etc.

The Work, as the institute is usually called in the vernacular, is divided into two separate sections for men and women. They have a common hierarchy only at the top. The President-General and some of the other top members of the Institute's internal hierarchy are priests. The local directors are lay men or women as the case may be, even when, as is usual, priests of the Opus Dei fall within the area of their jurisdiction.

Priests form a very small proportion of the members of the Opus Dei. Ordinarily, they are members who after spending some time as lay members of the institute are directed by the President-General to proceed to the priesthood. They carry out spiritual functions within the institute and contribute in their clerical and professional capacity to the work of apostolate. Strictly speaking there is nothing to prevent their continuing their professional work as before, but hitherto the pressure of directly spiritual work has generally prevented this. Secular priests can also become members of the Opus Dei. Together with the priests coming from among the ordinary members of the institute they form juridically a special body, the Sacerdotal Society of the Holy Cross. The full juridical title of the institute commonly known as the Opus Dei is the " Sacerdotal Society of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei ".

The Opus Dei offers lay people several different forms of membership. The core of the institute are the so-called "Numeraries", usually persons with a university education or some equivalent form of higher professional training. (This condition does not apply to the same extent for women members.) The institute regards the intellectual and higher professional sphere as a special object of its apostolate. The Numeraries take private vows of poverty, chastity and obedience ; their dedication is complete. They are not obliged to live together, though groups of them usually do for practical reasons connected with

their spiritual life and their apostolate and to foster the " family life " so characteristic of the institute. Numeraries of the Men's Section do complete courses in philosophy and theology, usually in centres provided by the institute.

Supernumeraries are usually persons from any walk of life whose vocation is for the married life. They can be married or intending to marry. Apart from their share in the professional apostolate, the apostolate of the family is in a special way in their hands. Their vow of poverty is a personal one (the family is not involved !), their obedience has to do only with their spiritual life and they observe chastity in accordance with their state.

A third group are the Oblates. This is intended for those who have not a higher education nor higher professional training or those who for one reason or another cannot share in the " family life " of the Numeraries. They take the three vows in the same full sense as the numeraries but usually live with their families. In particular, the Oblates represent the institute's social mission to the working classes.

There are also the Cooperators who are not bound by any special tie to the institute except that they make material contributions and pray for it and at the same time share in its graces. This group can include non-Catholics.

The priests of the institute are divided into similar groups.

Permeating all these different groups is the particular spirituality peculiar to the Opus Dei and adapted to its special mission. There is a glad acceptance of the world of men as the material out of which sanctity is to be wrung through a life of prayer and sacrifice. Daily work acquires a high supernatural significance, becomes, in fact, the central form of prayer in the spiritual life. This spiritual life rests at the same time on a thorough acquaintance with doctrine and an intimacy with the life of Christ as revealed in the Gospels. From the constant remembrance that they are God's children, the members of the Work draw much of their confidence and optimism.

Relations within the institute are maintained on informal, personal bases. The development of warm human ties and of individual responsibility are regarded as important factors for the cohesion of the institute and the efficacy of its apostolate. The spiritual life and practices of the members are of a kind suitable for a secular atmosphere and the normal circumstances of lay people.

Members are encouraged to take part in public life and hold positions of civic responsibility. It is emphasized that their way to sanctity there lies in the conscientious fulfilment of their duties to the community or to the state that employs them. Political opinions and activity are affairs of the individual members, they enjoy in this respect the same freedom as any other Catholics.

A Double Augustinian Centenary

by AUBREY GWYNN, S.J.

On 9 April 1256, Pope Alexander IV published his bull *Licet ecclesiae catholicae,* by which he united several small groups of hermits into a fully constituted Order, to be known henceforth as the Order of Hermits of St Augustine. As was fitting, the centenary of that ' Great Union ' was celebrated last year by the brethren of the Order throughout the world. But the Irish Province of those whom we know commonly as Augustinian Fathers had a further centenary of their own, which they also celebrated, more particularly in the city of Rome, last autumn. For on 2 July 1656 it was just three hundred years since Pope Alexander VII granted the Irish Fathers of the Order a house in Rome. That house is no longer occupied by the Irish Fathers ; but their connection with the city of Rome has been almost continuous since that date. It was thus natural that the community of St Patrick's, Rome—which serves the Irish national church of St Patrick on Via Piemonte—should have solemn celebrations in commemoration of that third centenary, after the greater and more solemn celebrations of the Order's seventh centenary. These celebrations have been the occasion of more than one publication that should interest Irish readers ; and I offer this brief survey of some essays and papers that were published last year as a token of esteem and admiration for work well done.

It is now almost twenty years since my own interest in the theological doctrines of Archbishop Richard FitzRalph (' Armachanus ') led me to investigate the influence of Augustinian theology on the schools of Oxford and Cambridge in the fourteenth century. At that time the Augustinian Order had been producing (since 1905) a learned periodical under the title *Analecta Augustiniana,* published in Rome. In the pages of these *Analecta* (between 1907 and 1914) a former Prior General of the Order, Father E. Esteban, had printed an important series of extracts from the registers of the early priors general, with special reference to the studies and theological teaching of the Order. To-day (since 1951) a second periodical, published at Louvain under the title *Augustiniana,* has taken the place of the former *Analecta* ; and in its pages Father Francis Roth, a former member of the German Province, now resident in New York, published in 1952-4 an important biographical study of Cardinal Richard Annibaldi, protector of the Order in its earliest days. These articles throw much light on the history of the hermits in Italy in the years immediately preceding the Great Union of 1256, and on the effects of the Union in the following years. Last year Father Eelcko Ypma, a Dutch Father who is now resident in Paris, published a fine study of the Order's early efforts to organize a school of theology, centred on the University of Paris, but training future professors for all the provinces in Europe.[1]

[1] *La formation des professeurs chez les Ermites de Saint-Augustin de 1256 a 1354* (Paris, 1956.)

The most distinguished of the professors who taught in this school was Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), himself a favourite disciple of Saint Thomas Aquinas, round whose name the Augustinian Order soon formed a whole 'schola Aegidiana' at Paris and elsewhere. The Jesuit Cardinal Ehrle, who did so much for the history of medieval theology in its last phase (during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), always held that the Augustinian school of the fourteenth century had been sorely neglected in favour of the more dramatic scholastic controversies of the thirteenth century. Even to-day, if we may judge from Father Ypma's bibliography (1956), the great names of the Order's school remain largely neglected : James of Viterbo, Augustinus Triumphus, William of Cremona, Alexander a S. Elpidio, Thomas of Strassburg and Gregory of Rimini. It is pleasant to record that a young Irish Augustinian student, Father Benedict Hackett, has recently made a fine study of the influence of Augustinian mystical theology on the spiritual doctrine of St Catherine of Siena. It is perhaps characteristic of the Order's tradition that the generation which knew Catherine of Siena and her English friend William Flete, a hermit of the Augustinian community of Lecceto near Siena, also knew humanists such as the two Italian Augustinian scholars, Bartholomew of Urbino and Bonaventura of Padua, who won the friendship of Petrach ; whilst yet another humanist friar, Luigi Marsigli, soothed the last years of the great Florentine humanist Boccaccio.

These are ancient memories ; but it is good to recall them in this centenary year. It is pleasant also to be able to report that another young Augustinian scholar from Ireland, Father F. X. Martin, has chosen as the subject for his special contribution to Augustinian history the life and work of a great humanist Prior General of the Order, Aegidius of Viterbo. Aegidius ruled the Order when Martin Luther was still a friar of the Saxon province ; and the contrast between his own sane and traditional humanism and the turbulent mysticism of his more famous subject is characteristic of the great drama which was played out in Germany in that unhappy generation. The disastrous and abiding results of Luther's apostacy from the Order and the Church have inevitably left their mark on the Order's history, especially in the nations of northern Europe. None the less, it is well to remind ourselves that the generation which saw Martin Luther in open revolt from Rome in Germany saw a very different development in Catholic Spain. Here St Thomas of Villanueva, who was Archbishop of Valencia from 1544 to 1555, was famous for his spirit of Christian charity to the poor, and was also responsible for sending the first missionary preachers of the Order to the New World. Luis de Leon, one of the great Spanish mystics, entered the Order in 1543 and died in 1591. These traditions of sanctity and apostolic zeal were carried forward by successive generations of missionary friars in Mexico, South America and the Philippine Islands.

It is thus a long and varied story which the Order commemorates to-day, not without some natural pride. As a literary memorial to the centenary of the Great Union, Father Francis Roth, with the help of scholars from many provinces, has published a large commemorative volume of *Augustiniana* (New York, 1956), in which essays are printed that cover a wide range of Augustinian

history. There is one essay in this volume which is of special interest for Irish readers, and which should be read in conjunction with the most recent issue of *Archivium Hibernicum* (1956). In the essay which is printed in *Augustiniana* (pp. 346-384) Father F. X. Martin gives for the first time an accurate and critical list of the twenty-two priories of the Hermits of St Augustine which are known to have existed in pre-Reformation Ireland. The earliest in date was the Dublin priory, founded *c.* 1280 ; but there were foundations at Dungarvan and Drogheda before the end of the century, and progress was constant until the middle of the fifteenth century. Father Martin has printed a convenient summary list of these houses at the head of his essay. From this list it is plain that the Augustinian Fathers were firmly established in the principal towns of Leinster, Munster and Connacht ; but they are most notably absent from any Irish town further north than Drogheda.

For the past five or six years I have been busily engaged, in conjunction with Mr Neville Hadcock, in an effort to compile a new *Monasticon Hibernicum,* less unworthy of that ambitious title than the volume which Mervyn Archdall produced in 1786. I can only say that the fine critical work here published for the first time will be of immense assistance to us in the completion of our laborious task. Father Martin has not been content to print whatever information he has been able to find about each of the priories of medieval Ireland. He prefaces his essay with a brief, but most useful account of the surviving registers of the medieval priors general ; and in the most recent issue of *Archivium Hibernicum* he has printed (with the assistance of Father A. de Meijer) the full Latin text of all entries relating to the Irish houses in these registers. Father Roth has undertaken for some time past a similar task for the English priories of the Order. These two scholars will thus have made available, for the first time and in trustworthy critical texts, a source of authentic information concerning the history of one of the most active and influential Orders of the Church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The earliest extract printed by Father Martin in *Archivium* is dated Pentecost 1356 ; the latest is dated September 1624. There are (unfortunately) gaps in this series of official registers ; but, so far as they are extant, they are invaluable for the light they throw on the Irish medieval priories and their fortunes during the storms of the sixteenth century.

The more exclusively Irish centenary of St Patrick's, Rome, has not been without its own modest, but very effective literary commemoration. Father J. F. Madden, Prior of St Patrick's, has edited a well-illustrated brochure entitled *The Irish Augustinians in Rome, 1656-1956,* which makes all the more pleasant reading because it is so plainly the joint work of a group of young Augustinian scholars. Father Martin plays the principal part, having written a most interesting and vivid account of the successive Irish foundations in Rome during these three centuries. He begins with the grant of the church of San Matteo in Merulana by Alexander VII in 1656, a grant which the Pope expressly said was made by him to the friars ' because they were exiles for religion '. There follows the story of the complicated disputes as to ownership in the next fifty years and more. There is an attractive memory of a saintly lay-brother, by name Donogh, who kept Irish traditions alive at San Matteo at a time when the Fathers had lost their case and had been compelled to leave the priory to their Tuscan brethren. James III, the Old Pretender,

proved himself a useful friend in the early eighteenth century, and helped the Irish Fathers to return to San Matteo, which was now formally organized as a house of studies for the Irish Mission. The ' Free Republic of Rome ' put an end to this chapter of history in 1798, when the church of San Matteo was razed to the ground. The Irish Fathers were back again in 1819, this time at Santa Maria in Posterula, where they remained until 1888. Father Patrick Glynn, their able and zealous Prior, saved the small community in that year, when the church of Santa Maria was ordered to be demolished by the Roman municipality. Father Glynn was equal to the occasion, and knew how to turn defeat into victory. It was he who organized a nation-wide appeal which had as its permanent result the building of an Irish national church on Via Piemonte, with a modern priory of St Patrick's, where the various contributors to this brochure have all done part of their studies. Ad multos annos !

REGISTRY OF DEEDS, DUBLIN: Abstracts of Wills. Edited by P. Beryl Eustace. Vol. I (1708–45) ; II (1746–85). Dublin : Irish Manuscripts Commission. 1954, 1956. 40s. each.

The Registry of Deeds was established in the city of Dublin by an Act of Parliament (6 Anne, cap. 2) in 1708. In the early period of the Registry's history the purpose of the Act " for the Public Registering of all Deeds Conveyances and Wills " was interpreted more widely than would now be the case ; and as a result many deeds were registered which are of great value for those interested in the family history of the eighteenth century. In 1922 the destruction of the Public Record Office carried with it the destruction of almost all the original Irish prerogative and consistorial wills. Hence the registration of wills in the Registry of Deeds means that we can, at least in great part (for not all wills were registered), supplement the few surviving original wills. Few scholars have been aware of the valuable material that is to be found in the transcripts preserved in the Registry, and the Irish Manuscripts Commission have rendered a great service to students of Irish history by inviting Miss Eustace to prepare these abstracts for publication.

In her short, but very useful Introduction she distinguishes between three types of registration, which she has described in her edition by the three terms " Full ", " Narrate " and " Précis ". " Full " abstracts refer to those wills which were registered in the testator's own words : " narrate " indicates a will recorded in the third person singular ; " précis " indicates what is usually a very short summary, as registered. In her first volume Miss Eustace has published abstracts of 738 wills, between 1708 and 1745 ; in her second 726 wills between 1746 and 1785. To make the 738 abstracts recorded in volume I she tells us that she has had to search references in the Index of Grantors to no less than 83,000 recorded deeds. She modestly adds to this brief statement of fact : " If any wills remain undetected, the laborious nature of this essential preliminary work must be my excuse ". Those who use her two volumes (each of which has a full Index of Personal Names and Place Names) will have good reason indeed to be grateful to her for her careful and no doubt very tedious work. We congratulate her on the completion of this task ; and we are glad to announce that Miss Eustace has been invited to prepare a third volume which will bring this series of abstracts down to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

AUBREY GWYNN

Reviews

WELLSPRINGS OF THE FAITH. By the Most Reverend John C. McQuaid, D.D., M.A., D.LITT., Archbishop of Dublin, Primate of Ireland. Dublin : Clonmore and Reynolds, Ltd. London : Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 1956. Pp. 233. 18s. net.

THIS VOLUME contains a selection of discourses and addresses of His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin. Most of them have already had a wide circulation as pamphlets, but in response to a demand from many quarters His Grace has acceded to the proposal of the publishers that they should be made available in book form. There are also included several unpublished addresses. The first part of the book contains the pastoral letters of His Grace to the faithful of the archdiocese of Dublin ; the second is devoted to addresses on various occasions, all dealing with some aspect of education.

The pastoral letters are grouped under four headings : Basic Christian Truths ; The Great Means of Grace; The Last Things ; Our Blessed Mother. They are models of pastoral instruction. They do not strain after novelty of presentation, but set forth the traditional teaching of the Church on great fundamental truths, drawn from Holy Scripture, the declarations of Popes and Councils and the writings of the Fathers and Saints. His Grace has the happy gift of combining conciseness with breadth of treatment. In one pastoral letter he can give a complete outline of the theology of some great subject such as the Redemption, the Mass, Prayer, the Motherhood of Our Lady, in which no line is superfluous, and which yet conveys a remarkable impression of the richness and beauty of the doctrine under consideration.

It has been said that the manner of treatment is not novel. This statement needs qualification. Whilst His Grace wisely contents himself, as the pastor of his flock, with following the well-beaten paths of traditional theology and refrains from out-of-the-way or ephemeral topics, he has the gift of being able to pause now and then on the way to stress some special aspect, point out some special beauty, or direct to some by-path worthy of exploration. He is thus able to give new meaning to old and familiar teachings. A few instances taken at random are his insistence on the point that the problem of suffering is best solved, not by theoretical discussions, but " by the loving acceptance of our pain ", his development of the theme that Confirmation is " a sacrament for suffering ", his linking of the sacraments with the Mass, his emphasis on the hope-inspiring beauty of the scenes in which Our Lord raised the dead to life, and the striking passages in which is traced the consistent emphasis on sorrow for sin in the Old and New Testaments and in the liturgy of the Church. The discourse on the Blessed Sacrament is particularly rich in such passages giving deeper insight into familiar truths. Our attention is drawn, for instance, to the fact that the very simplicity of the words in which Our Lord promised and instituted this gift are a reminder that the love He displayed in giving it is beyond human expression. And, on the other hand, the simplicity of the Eucharistic rite is an encouragement to our weakness and a stimulus to our faith. " Reverence there must be of adoration and love ; but the ceremony

is unobtrusive and very silent. His coming is as quiet as on the night when He was born, in the hiddenness of a stable in Bethlehem. We are thus instructed by the infallible Church to worship and receive Him, not with emotion but by Faith."

The five addresses with which the book ends show a penetrating insight into the principles of education and a wide grasp of its history. This is only what might be expected from His Grace, who has all his life played such a prominent and practical part in education, and who, since his elevation to the See of Dublin, has laboured with untiring energy and outstanding success to promote Catholic education of every type. Particularly worthy of note are the address given to the Catholic Truth Society Congress at Kilkenny in 1938 on *Catholic Education : Its Function and Scope* and that on *The Influence of Europe on Australia* delivered in the University of Sydney on the occasion of the Eucharistic Congress in 1953. The former develops the great theme that " Catholic education from first to last is based on Jesus Christ " and points out how this conception of education is in conformity with sound philosophy. The latter is far more than an occasional discourse. It is a really masterly sketch of the origin and development of European culture, of its disruption by the Renascence and the religious revolt of the sixteenth century, of the fruits of that disruption in modern philosophy, art, drama and pedagogy, and of the maintenance by the Church of the unbroken European and Catholic tradition.

Both clergy and laity will find in these discourses an admirable summary of the great truths of the Faith and will draw from them consolation and inspiration.

FERGAL MCGRATH

PHILOSOPHY

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. By A. J. Ayer. London : Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1956. 18s.

PROFESSOR AYER has come a very long way in philosophy in the past fifteen years or so. Now a major philosopher, cool, detached, self-assured, he is still, but with some difficulty perhaps, recognizable as the provocative, polemical, almost nose-thumbing author of *Language, Truth and Logic.* There can be little doubt that this latest volume of his (how does he turn out so much ?) is his best so far. Even stylistically it has much to commend it : clarity, readability, freshness, and a brittleness of thought and expression that reminds one of a good translation of a Platonic dialogue.

Perhaps " Propaedeutic to the Problem of Knowledge " might be a better title, since the essence of the work lies in its refutation of scepticism. A general vindication of knowledge is not attempted. Knowledge is upheld in particular instances where " evidence is found to be sufficient ". " Further than this we cannot go " says Ayer (p. 253), " it is enough if we can rebut the sceptic's arguments which are designed to show that we cannot even go so far. Neither is this a purely negative achievement ; a matter of running hard in order to stay in the same place. Our reward for taking scepticism seriously is that we are brought to distinguish the different levels at which our claims to knowledge

stand." These are almost the closing words of the volume. It takes 254 pages of close reasoning to reach this position, and hardly a page can be skipped. And yet it is really only on page 254 that the philosopher is ready to face the problem of knowledge.

For it is not enough for philosophy (though it may be enough for common sense) to refute scepticism. The refutation of scepticism does not establish the validity of knowledge, even of any single proposition, but only that the arguments for its impossibility do not establish their case. But given a refutation of scepticism, the possibility of knowledge arises and, with this, many problems. What kind of being can know? and how? and why? and what? What is truth?—all the great traditional problems, which the contemporary philosopher regards, together with religion, sin and pain, as slightly non-U. He takes care that they should not arise, and yet perhaps the best sentence in this book is the dictum (p. 107) that " Philosophical problems are not settled simply by our taking care that they should not arise ". It would be an interesting exercise for some student to go back through the literature and discover the source, or at any rate the occasion, of this dictum. For one was led to believe (by Ayer himself perhaps?) that all or nearly all the great philosophical problems could be avoided by taking care that they should not arise. Was not this at least one way of describing the application of the principle of verifiability? For any problem which an author could not solve could be called a meaningless question, or a pseudo-problem, by the application of this principle.

There are so many excellent passages in the book, and the general level is so high, that it is unnecessary to single out any one section for commendation. I would nevertheless like to draw the reader's attention especially to the treatment of induction (pp. 76 ff.) and to the section in the chapter on Perception, where Ayer deals with the popular difficulty that " physics proves that we do not perceive physical objects as they are ". Russell still scores for linguistic ability and closeness of reasoning (" Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false "—Russell, quoted by Ayer), but for philosophical ability it would appear that Ayer now has the edge on Russell.

E. F. O'Doherty

IMPRUDENCE IN ST THOMAS AQUINAS. By Charles J. O'Neil, PH.D. The Aquinas Lecture, 1955. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1955. Pp. 165. 2 dollars.

THE TRUTH THAT FREES. By Gerard Smith, S.J. The Aquinas Lecture, 1956. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1956. Pp. 79. 2 dollars.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. Vol. XXX, 1956—*THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE CATHOLIC LIBERAL COLLEGE.* Office of the Secretary of the Association, Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D.C., 1956. Pp. 247. 3.50 dollars.

THE GREATER part of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to the study of moral virtue, the fabric of the good life. The importance of prudence, or

practical wisdom, is that it directs moral virtue—it is prudence that discovers the golden mean of virtue in a particular case. Now, if prudence controls moral virtue, one might expect to find a predominance of imprudence in vice. But here is a curious matter. Aristotle does not appear to deal with imprudence at all in the *Ethics ;* and in fact it is doubtful if he even had a word for it. St Thomas, on the other hand, who lays the *Nicomachean Ethics* so heavily under contribution, " is perfectly at ease in assigning the vice of imprudence its proper place, its special sin, its various parts".

This striking contrast is Dr O'Neil's problem. He shows that the omission of imprudence in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is deliberate—Aristotle normally completes and illustrates his treatment of a virtue by considering the opposite vice ; and he could easily have defined imprudence as he defined the analogous " lack of art ". But St Thomas who, as the *Commentary on the Ethics* shows, is unlikely to have misunderstood Aristotle, as deliberately chose to include imprudence in the *Secunda-Secundae.* Dr O'Neil's handling of these matters is detailed and complete ; but it does assume in the reader a considerable acquaintance with the text of Aristotle and with some of the finer points of St Thomas's discussions of virtue. Despite an urbane style, this essay does not make easy reading. One regrets, as does the author himself, that more use could not have been made of Père Deman's fine work on *Prudence* (in the *Revue des jeunes* Commentary on the *Summa Theologica*). And it seems a pity that the format of the Aquinas Lectures series should permit neither Index nor Table of Contents to what is, in fact, an important monograph.

Fr Smith's lecture is a commentary on the text : " The truth shall make you free ". What is this " truth " ? It is clearly less ontological (" truth in things ") than logical (" truth in our knowledge of things "). The problem then becomes : What is the state of affairs the knowledge of which sets us free ?

Knowledge of the mechanics of the wheel set man free of a great deal of manual labour ; knowledge of the uses of penicillin has made us free of the fear of pneumonia ; we hope that the future holds the kind of knowledge that will free us of the fear of cancer. These " truths that make men free " are, philosophically, the appraisal of a given situation in terms of universal (mathematical or physical) predicates. The one "Truth that frees " lies deeper. The way to it is pointed by our realization that our universal predicates always leave something unexplained, the existential something in which they intersect. Aristotle's—and St Thomas's—conception of substance, as the subject of predication but never itself a predicate, is helpful here. But substance, too, points beyond itself for it demands a Creator. The search goes on and involves the ultimate issues—creation, good and evil, death and eternal life. How it does so is shown by Fr Smith in an original and suggestive marshalling of some of the greatest themes of philosophy. And if the conclusion seems obvious—what frees us is the knowledge that death is the gateway to life, together with all the implications of that knowledge—this closely reasoned and graceful exposition will still repay reading.

The subject chosen for the Thirtieth Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1956—the Role of Philosophy in the Catholic Liberal College—will not, unfortunately, awake many echoes in Ireland.

There is, however, much to interest the general reader in the shorter contributions to these Proceedings. One may mention Fr I. M. Bochenski, O.P. on " Scholastic and Aristotelian Logic " ; Fr Robert E. McCall on " The Metaphysical Analysis of the Beautiful and the Ugly " with the comments of Dr James P. Reilly ; and Journet Kahn on " The Threat to Academic Freedom ".

M. B. Crowe

FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC. By R. F. Harrod. London : Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1956. 24s.

One of the curious superstitions of the modern era in philosophy is the belief that " induction " is a modern discovery. Ever since Bacon (Francis, not Roger) it has been accepted by English-speaking philosophers that ancient and medieval philosophy and logic knew nothing about induction. There seems to be some confusion here between the theory of induction in logic and the practice of experiment in the sciences. Sir David Ross's short section on induction in the introduction to his edition of the *Analytics* (OUP, 1949) should by now have penetrated the thought of contemporary logicians, and some of Crombie's work (e.g. *Augustine to Galileo*) should have established the fact that the theory of induction and experiment was not a brand new discovery of the post-Galileo period. In fact Scotus anticipated much of Mill, and the School of Padua had a fairly clear idea of the nature of experiment. But ever since " induction " became a battle-cry rather than a technical term, the old unhistorical ideas persist.

The present work has been acclaimed as a most important contribution to the logic of induction. The author, though obviously a modest man, claims in his preface that his " conclusions are of great importance " : " If the doctrines here set out are correct, much, perhaps most, current thoughts about induction are wrong." He is probably right in the latter assertion. For most current thoughts about induction either take the line that induction has a formally valid logical justification, if only we could find it, or else assume with Whitehead, that " the theory of induction is the despair of philosophy ". And both these points of view are false. The question must be faced : is induction a part of logic at all ? Or have we all assumed it is, simply because so many logicians have said so ? It seems that induction is really a part of metaphysics and epistemology (as far as its validation is concerned), and a part of the natural history of thought as far as a description of how it works is concerned.

The claims of Mr Harrod have been anticipated, at least as to their essential nature, by Professor Williams of Harvard (1947) to whom Harrod refers with approval but naturally with some reservations. And it would appear that he shares the view of Williams as to what exactly induction is. For the problem of induction as Williams conceives it is : whether and why knowledge that, in an observed part of a class M, the property P is present in a certain proportion gives us a reason, analogous to that provided by the premisses of a syllogism though less conclusive, for believing that in the whole of the class M the property P is present in a similar proportion, or for believing that if most of the observed M's are P, any one unobserved M will have the property P. Induction in this

view is a logical credibility relation. It is concerned with reasonableness of belief in certain propositions, but it never achieves certitude. But the real difficulty is that we do in fact achieve certitude, even about some physical phenomena. Induction is in some way the establishing of genuine and true universal propositions. Everyone grants the probability of certain conclusions : the problem of induction only arises when we are concerned with certainty. The question is not : Is it reasonable to believe that the next M I meet will have the property P ? (with the implied assertion that of course it might not have it—this is the sensory empiricist standpoint), but rather : Does M always have the property P, and if so why ? and consequently the possibility of the assertion : Every M is P, and the next one I meet will certainly also be a P. But Harrod assumes with Williams (and many others, e.g. Russell) that " in induction we are only concerned with conclusions that are probable ". (p. 23) With respect, I suggest that this evades the issue. There is no doubt that Mr Harrod has done a good job on the probability-relation involved (though what can his Principle of Experience be, if it is not a disguised version of the principle of order ?). But in my opinion the real problem remains : the achieving of physical certitude.

There are a few minor points worth noting : minor, that is, from Harrod's point of view. On the first page of his introduction, he professes his allegiance to Locke. His act of homage reads as though he thinks that Locke (as against the " logical tenets of ancient and mediaeval logicians ") was the discoverer of the proposition that " everything we know about nature we have had to learn from experience ". One gets weary pointing out that this was a cardinal doctrine of Aristotle and St Thomas. It is interesting to note also that he seems to assume that " Locke's position has been accepted by many philosophers and has certainly been implicit in the researches of all the different kinds of scientists ever since ". The only philosophers I know who ever took any other line were extreme Cartesians and some Kantians. But as regards the scientists, he is not correct. Eddington and Milne are cases in point. Not that they were correct either—in fact Max Born attacked the idea that theory might yield genuine physical knowledge apart from experiment.

The second point worth noting is the last chapter. This is the weakest part of an interesting book. Called " Beyond Experience ", it leaves the field of logic for that of ethics, religion, goodness, etc. One quotation will suffice : " One must not, however, be too severe with a-moral people. Dogmatism is certainly out of place here. In the push and thrust of life it often seems that people who, to judge by their professions and many of their actions, are quite a-moral are the very ones most able to bring joy and light into our lives."

E. F. O'DOHERTY

FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS, CATHOLICISM. By Rev. Peter Dempsey, O.F.M. Cap. Mercier Press. 1956. 15s.

THE literature on problems of psychoanalysis and religion continues to grow. The Catholic authors who most readily come to mind in this connection already form a rather formidable list : Allers, Dalbiez, D'Arcy, Goldbrunner, Mailloux,

Stern, White, Zilboorg, to name only a few. The sheer increase in volume in the literature is not always paralleled by a corresponding increase in penetration or depth. The general principles are clear and have been for some time. What is needed now most of all is a study of more specialized problems : the psychological significance of many of the practices of the ritual, the application of analytic theory to sacramental theology, a study of religion and anxiety, of faith and superstition, of scrupulosity and the compulsive-obsessional disorders.

The present volume aims primarily at providing professional students of psychology with some orientation to the problem of Freud and Analysis. It is probably not sufficiently detailed for the professional student of psychology, but will certainly achieve its secondary aim : to arouse the interest of general practitioners and educated laymen. A short introductory chapter places Freud and analytic theory in perspective and is followed at once by a lengthy statement headed Freud and Religion. This is probably the best section in the book, in as much as it states clearly just what Freud's attitude to religion was, and to some extent helps us to understand why Freud's attitude was what it was. The middle section of the work is a straight account of the main ideas in depth psychology, leading to a consideration of the problem of human freedom in the light of analytic findings. The final section, an application of the psycho-analytic approach to the field of literature, will satisfy neither the literary critic nor the psychologist. But Father Dempsey can rightly claim that this section is " an effort to test results " rather than a definitive statement, and in this sense the experiment was well worth carrying out.

E. F. O'Doherty

LITERATURE

THE VANISHING HERO. Studies in novelists of the twenties. By Seán O'Faoláin. London : Eyre & Spottiswoode. 1956. Pp. 222. 21s.

This book, which began as six lectures given in Princeton University, is just what one would expect from the able author. It is the book of an intelligent, widely-read, professional man of letters with a sure instinct for good writing, full of interesting and witty comment and exasperating philosophizing.

The theme of Mr O'Faoláin's book is, obviously enough, that the hero, traditionally conceived as a socially acceptable person, has vanished from the modern novel. He is replaced by what the author calls the " anti-hero " who is by no means entirely acceptable. The anti-hero may be deplorable in a variety of ways but " his one abiding characteristic is that, like his author-creator, he is never able to see any Pattern in life and rarely its Destination". (p. 17) The hero has been vanishing for a long time now (since Cervantes, Mr O'Faoláin suggests) but in this century he has become virtually invisible. Novelists, of course, write like that because they feel like that. They write out of what they are ; out of their own bewildered and anxious uncertainty about what appears to them as the futility and fundamental amorality of life. Nobody will want to quarrel with this. It is a commonplace that, in an age of uncertainty, one finds the art of uncertainty. Every artist has the right to

project his own uncertainty into his work. He must for he can do nothing else.

Most of the novelists Mr O'Faoláin deals with are docile creators of the anti-hero. Even Miss Bowen, writing of a graceful but moribund society, hears empty and futile echoes in her stately houses. Mrs Woolf, Aldous Huxley, Joyce and, perhaps most of all, William Faulkner write out of an *existentielle Angst* as acute as anyone could desire. Mr O'Faoláin makes valiant efforts to enter into the mind of these writers and, it seems to me, fails gallantly. I think they all (he admits it of Faulkner) put him to sleep. He fails to be convincing because he is out of sympathy with any writing that has more in it of Dionysius than Apollo. He would like to like uncertain gropings in his novelists, but he cannot. His Gallic, and perhaps Gaelic, clarity of mind stand in his way. Yet, when he writes of Hemingway, for whom at least some values are certain, and, even more, when he writes of Evelyn Waugh and Graham Greene, who write, in their different ways, from a full Catholic certainty, he succeeds only a little better. The reason is that he criticizes their clarity in a way that is valid only for writers who are obscure.

Still, the chapter on Hemingway is the best in the book. One feels that Mr O'Faoláin's enthusiasm is for the positive, masculine certainty of the novelist. But Hemingway, as he says himself, is invigoratingly sure because his theme is so limited. *Pernod* takes the place of philosophy. Besides, a Hemingway hero is always socially acceptable in one respect at least : he is magnificently gallant in moments of extreme danger. In other words, Hemingway writes high-brow thrillers and is easy to praise.

The treatment of Waugh and Greene is interesting and acute. But here Mr O'Faoláin finds himself up against men whom he considers to have been ruined as writers by their attachment to Catholic dogma. Attachment to any dogmatic system, Mr O'Faoláin thinks, destroys the detachment necessary to an artist, especially if he be a satirical novelist like Waugh. I wonder if detachment of this kind is possible for human beings. One cannot live in a void, and it is possible to be just as doctrinaire and dogmatical about one's scepticism as about anything else. At any rate, if a man is allowed to write about his uncertainty, why may he not write of his certainty ? Fair is, after all, fair. Is it because belief in an after-life is a " mystical escape ", an excuse for not thinking honestly, a danger to integrity ? Mr O'Faoláin knows, as well as anyone, that it is no escape from the burden of living and only increases the need for integrity. Is it perhaps because (this is the fault he finds with Graham Greene) a theological background leads to an unjustifiable " rigging " of the plot ? But all plots are rigged. *Oedipus Rex* is scandalously rigged and so is *Hamlet*. When Mr O'Faoláin says that there is no place for loyalty in art (p. 66) or writes " Thinking is pure poison to innocence ", he seems to be either talking pure Bloomsbury or yielding to the temptation, irresistible to Irishmen, of making phrases *pour épater les Américains*.

More under the influence of Bloomsbury than he admits, Mr O'Faoláin takes literature too seriously. Mr Waugh, when interviewed by the B.B.C., was asked why he wrote his novels. After a moment's hesitation, in tones slightly tinged with surprise, he said " Do you mean—apart from making

money?" A typical snook-cocking answer, of course, but there is no real reason for supposing it was insincere. Belloc said he wrote because his large family was clamouring for pearls and caviare. Chesterton rejoiced that he had discovered journalism: the easiest known way of making money. This mercenary attitude of notoriously Catholic writers is no coincidence. They look on literature and art as intensely human occupations without which they would be less than men. But they never regard either as the only source of revelation. Many intelligent writers, with no religious faith, do so regard them. Many critics are concerned to trace the wanderings of these lost intellectuals engaged on heart-rending and hazardous journeys without maps. Such criticism is not so much literary as moral or philosophical.

Mr O'Faoláin is neither lost nor mapless. Yet, with the exception of a few interesting words about Hemingway's objectivity, sentences and dialogue, a footnote about the Joyceian rhythms and an enlightening discussion of Miss Bowen's use of passive and impersonal constructions, there is very little literary criticism in this book, and the little there is is tantalizingly excellent. There is much, too much, about the Meaning of Life. In other words, it is a book about the philosophy of amateur philosophers when it could easily be a professional study of craftsmanship in literature, written by a very skilful practitioner.

JOHN C. KELLY

FURTHER LETTERS OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS. Edited by Claude Colleer Abbott. Second edition revised and enlarged. Oxford University Press. 1956.

THIS third volume of Professor Colleer Abbott's edition of Hopkins's letters was first published in 1938; it contained the letters written to all his correspondents except Bridges and Dixon. This edition is considerably enlarged, the chief addition being a number of letters written to his family. In addition to these there are a number to different friends of Oxford days, a series written to his life-long friend A. W. M. Baillie, and a very valuable set of letters to Coventry Patmore. The appendices contain a lot of matter useful for a life of Hopkins—letters from Newman, Pusey and Liddon on religious matters, letters from various learned people on points of scholarship, some retreat notes, newspaper accounts about the loss of the *Deutschland*, etc.

This edition is marked by the same qualities of thoroughness, care and accuracy which were displayed in the other volumes. The letters are not given in chronological order but are grouped according to the different correspondents. There is, no doubt, something to be said for this arrangement—where, for example, the letters deal with a single theme, more or less; and certainly the correspondence with Patmore should be read as a whole. But the dropping of the chronological order involves a serious loss—we miss the sense of development in the mind of Hopkins, and also the sense of the breadth and variety of his interests.

The early letters to his family are full of charm, frank and spontaneous, and written with a marked distinction of style. They describe vividly his first impressions of Oxford; they show that he made friends easily and that

he enjoyed every moment of his life. But in the letters written after his conversion there is felt a certain sense of strain ; the old note of frank buoyancy is gone. We feel that he wrote them from a sense of duty. This change of attitude is quite intelligible and did not imply any lessening of love. The opposition he had met with at home when he had broken the news of his intended conversion had pained him profoundly. He told Newman that he could not bear to read a second time the letter he had received from his father. With a man of such integrity, for whom his religion was incomparably the most important thing in life, it could scarcely be otherwise ; he could not go on as if there was no chasm separating them now. But in later letters, especially those written in his last illness, we find the old note of full understanding.

His friendship with Baillie began at Oxford and lasted to the end, though there seemed to be little in common between him and this Scotsman, a barrister of independent means, and something of a classical scholar. The correspondence is not very intimate: it deals largely with points of scholarship and subjects in which Hopkins displayed a short-lived interest ; but it never touches on religion, and thus never reaches to the high seriousness of his best correspondence.

The letters to Patmore are very valuable both for their content and for what they reveal of the two men. They are, to a great extent, a running commentary on Patmore's poetry. It is remarkable how Patmore at once takes the position of pupil and submits to having his work examined by an exacting and outspoken critic, and still more to find him ready to accept most of the strictures and to embody them into his revised version. Patmore was a man of strong individuality, very independent and forthright in his views on things in general and especially poetry ; but like Bridges and Mason he submitted at once to the force of Hopkins's mind and character. The criticism of Patmore's poetry is well worth a detailed study ; it is remarkably searching and fine and yet sensible ; but it conveys no idea of the distinctive style that the critic himself was exercising at that very time. Hopkins reveals a sure, delicate sense for all the elements and constituents of poetry—for metre, style, expression, propriety of thought and mood. The most striking proof of Patmore's deference to Hopkins's judgment is the fact that on hearing his disapproval of the prose work, *Sponsa Dei,* which was the fruit of years of meditation, he burned it. Hopkins was shocked at this step, and he expressed his opinion in a passage which may be quoted as a good sample of his sincerity and of his vigorous mind :

" Your news was that you had burnt the book called *Sponsa Dei* and that on reflexion upon remarks of mine. I wish I had been more guarded in making them. When we take a step like this we are forced to condemn ourselves ; either our work shd. never have been done or never undone, and either way our time and toil are wasted—a sad thought ; though the intention may at both times have been good. My objections were not final, they were but considerations (I forget now, with one exception, what they were) ; even if they were valid, still if you had kept to yr. custom of consulting your director, as you said you should, the book might have appeared with no change or with slight ones. But now regret is useless."

Many of the letters of this volume deal with technical points of scholarship and show little of Hopkins's special gifts, though they all show his mastery of expression. But there are many more in which his rare qualities of thought and style have full play, and which, even apart from what they reveal of this great poet, are on their own merits assured of an abiding place in literature.

HUGH KELLY

HISTORY

THE WILLIAMITE CONFISCATION IN IRELAND 1690–1703. By J. G. Simms. London : Faber and Faber. Pp. 207. 25s. net.

UNLIKE the Ulster Plantation and the Cromwellian settlement, which received authoritative, if not definitive, treatment at the hands of Hill and Prendergast respectively, the third main episode in the history of Irish land during the seventeenth century, namely the Williamite Confiscation, has so far lacked its historian. Neither Bonn nor Butler, nor their predecessors, Froude and Lecky, told anything like the full story ; and it has been left to Dr J. G. Simms to cope with its complexities, a task which he has performed with remarkable success. The Williamite Confiscation began on a note of simplicity and severity with the Declaration of Finglas, made after the victory of the Boyne in 1690 ; but the straightforwardness of this policy was soon destined to be upset, and for the next thirteen years was caught up first in hard military negotiations, and then in the web of English party politics.

The first half of Dr Simms's book deals with the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Limerick and its consequences. William and his general, Ginkel, were only too anxious in 1691 to reach a settlement in Ireland which would leave their hands free for the next campaigning season in Europe, and they were forced by the determined resistance of Galway and Limerick to grant their defenders much better terms than had originally been offered at Finglas. As a result, the majority of Catholic landowners in Connacht, and it was in this province that they were concentrated in 1688, retained their estates. During the years following 1691, well over 1,000 claims were allowed to pass in accordance with the articles of Limerick and Galway, while it turned out that less than 500 proprietors forfeited their estates because they did not fall within the scope of the articles. Most historians have in fact greatly exaggerated the numbers of forfeitures which took place after 1691. Even the omission of the famous clause from the Treaty of Limerick, relating to persons under the protection of the Irish forces, did not affect the numbers one way or the other. In the counties of Mayo and Clare, which were the areas in question, there was no widespread confiscation as a result of the clause being omitted. Dr Simms shows indeed that even after the Williamite Confiscation, 14% of the land of Ireland remained in Catholic hands, compared with 20% in 1688. Thus the great watershed in Irish history before the Famine was the Cromwellian Settlement. By comparison with it, the Williamite Confiscation was a minor interlude.

Five years after the Treaty of Limerick, the Commissioners seemed to be nearing the end of their task ; in fact, however, the proceedings were to be

opened up again, and carried on until 1703. " Dutch William " made the mistake of granting most of the forfeited land in Ireland to Dutch favourites. Elizabeth Villiers who " squinted like a dragon " acquired most, but Bentinck, Ginkel and others also benefited. This was an issue from which William's critics in England could make political capital, and they were successful in forcing through Parliament an Act of Resumption in 1700. The chief sufferers, however, were not William's favourites, but those speculators in Ireland who had purchased the land almost as soon as it had been granted. The Act of Resumption was a hard blow to them, and it is not surprising that it should have met with a good deal of opposition in Ireland. Trustees were appointed to deal with the forfeitures, and did not finish their task until 1703, when, even then, they were forced to hand over the loose ends to a private company. In view of the confused international situation, there was little demand for Irish land, and the main beneficiaries belonged to the English minority in Ireland, most of whom were second-generation Cromwellians. There were few " Williamites " as such who arrived in Ireland after 1691. Here again the implicit conclusion of Dr Simms's book is to confirm the over-riding importance of the Cromwellian decade in Irish history.

Dr Simms has been most successful in bringing clarity to a confused period of Irish history. Within its field, his work is definitive and will provide a landmark of the greatest value for students of the eighteenth century as well as those of the seventeenth. He had a complex tale to unfold which would have been too much for a historian of lesser tenacity and patience. Dr Simms, however, has managed to preserve the main lines of his theme, while at the same time dealing with a mass of detail. Not the least of his achievements has been the compression of so much into two hundred pages ; hardly a word is wasted. It remains to add that Dr Simms is well aware that the religious clauses of the Treaty of Limerick were not kept. It was in fact the penal laws and the pressure to conform created by them which were responsible for the almost complete disappearance of the Catholic landowner by 1760. That is another story beyond the limits of the Williamite period. But even here Dr Simms has a number of penetrating remarks to make. This is indeed a book to be recommended and to be welcomed as an extremely able contribution to Irish history.

H. F. KEARNEY

MAZZINI AND THE SECRET SOCIETIES : The Making of a Myth. By E. E. Y. Hales. London : Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1956. Pp. 226. 30s.

THE present century, besides seeing the fulfilment of Mazzini's dream of an Italian Republic, has also seen a remarkable increase in our knowledge of this prophet of nationhood. This has been primarily due to the painstaking work of many Italian scholars and especially to the undertaking of the Italian National Commission in publishing Mazzini's collected writings, which run to a vast and still unfinished library of 100 volumes. Mr Hales is to be congratulated on making the fruits of this research available for English-speaking readers in an attractive and readable form. He confines himself to the formative years from Mazzini's birth in 1805 until his arrival in London as a political refugee in 1837.

How does Mazzini emerge from the crucible of twentieth-century investigation? We can no longer credit him with the absolute purity of motive in which his Victorian admirers believed. He was ready to instruct other men to assassinate European monarchs and statesmen whom he held to be obstacles to his political plans, and to " frame " innocent people in order to arouse discontent against Italy's *ancien régime* governments. Worst of all seems Mazzini's congenital inability ever to suppose himself to be wrong. It is true too that we can see more clearly than could the nineteenth century the danger inherent in Mazzini's gospel of subordinating the individual to the collective " mission " of the nation. It was not mere perversity that made Mussolini claim Mazzini as one of the precursors of Fascism.

When all this has been said we may still feel that Mazzini has survived the ordeal of reappraisal better than have many of his contemporaries. Nothing in the new picture destroys the impression of lifelong devotion to his ideal which Mazzini gave to his own age. It was this trait which explains the formation of the " myth " to which Mr Hales refers in his sub-title, though it is possible to argue that the myth was created by the defence of the Roman Republic in 1849 rather than by the tragi-comic events described in this book, whose situations and characters might well have come straight from Joseph Conrad.

The closing chapter is devoted to Mazzini's theology. We are able to see here how much Mazzini's doctrine of God manifesting Himself in a law of progress for humanity owes to Rousseau and Lamennais. Mazzini even tried to write his *Faith and the Future* in the style of Lamennais's *Paroles d'un Croyant.* One cannot help suspecting that for Mazzini, a fundamentally solitary character, faith in humanity was set in the abstract rather than in concrete reality. He himself seems to admit this half-humourously : " the company of a cat is much dearer to me than that of a man—a contradiction which may seem somewhat singular in one who professes to love Humanity and works for it " (quoted on p. 163). His attachment to Italy was equally in the abstract ; in fact he knew little of the country outside his native Piedmont. London was more familiar to him than Rome and he never went to Lombardy or the South at all. Mr Hales's vivid picture of the early career of this eccentric, dedicated man may lead the reader to hope that in another book he will resume and complete the story.

JOHN B. MORRALL

CHURCH HISTORY

IRLAND IM DEUTSCHEN UND ABENDLÄNDISCHEN SAKRALRAUM. By Georg Schreiber. Köln und Opladen : Westdeutcher Verlag. 1956. Pp. 120.

MONSIGNOR SCHREIBER is a welcome recruit to the small band of scholars who interest themselves in the activities of the Irish monks and teachers abroad and to the place which these should properly occupy in Church history. The chief question which he sets himself to answer is, naturally, their contribution to the spiritual elevation of his own Germanic people. As he was guided in the task by Dr Bieler in Dublin, Dr Bernhard Bischoff in Munich, Professor

Pokorny in Zürich and Professor Weisgerber in Bonn, it goes without saying that his treatise has high scientific value. The notes alone run into hundreds, and the number of tomes and articles which he has read is legion. He has no hobby to ride, no fantastic theory to impose, so that his work is not vitiated by *grandes passus extra viam* but from the first page to the last is solid and reliable. Comments on the Irish character, as history reveals it, are frank but not unkindly. The most useful section of the book is that dealing with the cult of the Irish saints on the Continent, for there he is able to add considerably to the knowledge which we have hitherto possessed.

The early chapters treat of St Patrick, St Brigid, St Columban and St Gall. An anecdote at the beginning is worth re-telling. In the crypt beneath St Peter's, close to the tomb of the Prince of the Apostles, is a chapel dedicated to St Columban. The moving spirit in its construction was the late Mr J. P. Walshe, Irish Ambassador to the Holy See. As soon as building operations were complete, it was proposed to adorn the chapel with statues representing two Irish saints. A distinguished Vatican archaeologist suggested St Columban and St Gall. Monsignor Schreiber relates how he protested against this choice on the ground that the two should be St Patrick and St Brigid, since these were earlier in time and higher in repute in Ireland. The great missionaries abroad, he said, presupposed the national apostle and the Mary of the Gael at home.

To read this book is to find ample confirmation of his preference, for the prominence given to St Patrick and St Brigid, in their preaching and teaching, by the Irish missionaries on the Continent was quite extraordinary. Wherever they went the cult of Patrick and Brigid went with them. It is curious to find in much of rural Germany St Patrick as the patron of herdsmen, obviously because of the six years of captivity which the saint spent guarding flocks on Sliabh Mis. New, too, is the record of an annual pilgrimage in his honour in Steiermark and the neighbouring province of Lower Austria, a practice that lasted into the nineteenth century. A long litany of St Patrick, with some forty invocations (published in 1766), was a favoured prayer in the same area. The invocation " St Patrick, liberator of souls from purgatory " shows that the author was acquainted with Loch Derg. No doubt the litany goes back to an early date in the Middle Ages, for the cult of St Patrick is attested in the litany of Louis the German, who died in 876. Similarly, the cult of St Brigid was widespread throughout south Germany, Switzerland and Alsace-Lorraine.

Everybody has heard of the severity of the Irish monastic rule. A partial explanation may be the country's lack of martyrs. Like the Roman emperors and their satellites, the Irish kings and princes in St Patrick's day were not enamoured of the Christian Faith, but they did not put him and his disciples to death because of it. One of the very few martyrs of the early Irish Church was St Cillian, and he suffered for the Faith, not in Ireland but abroad in Würzburg, in the seventh century. Thus the Irish at home, until the coming of the Northmen, could not shed their blood for Christ, for there were no enemies of the Christian name to enable them to do so. However, the flesh could be brought into subjection for the love of Christ, a painful process which

might loosely be regarded as a living death. In other words, mortification was recommended as a substitute for martyrdom.

This theory was a commonplace of Irish monastic life and a basic principle in deciding Irish monastic observance. It was carried by St Columban from Bangor to Luxeuil and Bobbio and by his disciples, immediate and remote, to a multitude of other foundations. To be worthy of the habit he bore and to do good to his neighbour the monk should be crucified with Christ on the Cross. It was only too evident that the neighbour was in sore need of help. St Columban was horrified by the prevalence of sin, gross and flagrant, among the host of Burgundians who called themselves Christians. In his view it was more than a degradation ; it was an absurdity, for had not Christ himself provided a remedy in the sacrament of Penance ? An overwhelming sense of the value of sanctifying grace was one of the greatest treasures that St Columban, St Gall and their fellow-monks brought to the Continent of Europe. Hence the stress which they laid on penance, both the virtue and the sacrament. If they established schools, as they did almost as a matter of course, the primary aim in these was also the life in grace, not the accumulation of knowledge, however praiseworthy.

Monsignor Schreiber, like many another, has fallen under the spell of St Brendan the Navigator. Such is the only conclusion to be drawn from his many pages on the voyages and his familiarity with the vast literature. Whether the saint reached in fact the Island of Birds, whether he spent Easter piously on a whale's back, whether he was or was not the first emigrant from Galway to land in America, he certainly stimulated the mediaeval imagination. This, in its turn, had some influence on Christopher Columbus and perhaps, what is equally important, on the noble Queen Isabella, who by her support made his expedition possible.

A feature of mediaeval piety was the placing of dangerous occupations, like mining, under the protection of heavenly powers. Thus, in German lands the mines themselves, the galleries within them and the shafts leading to them were named after the Holy Trinity, the Sacred Passion, the Annunciation, St Peter and so on. Chapels and altars were regularly erected by the miners in corridors and suitable openings. In a list of such patrons, drawn up in Switzerland in 1588, St Cillian and St Gall are prominent. Over the Swiss border in Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, St Columban appears with St Gall, St Colman of Melk, St Fridolin and St Vergil of Salzburg in the same capacity.

If Ireland, in many ways, influenced Germany, it is only natural that Germany in her turn should influence Ireland. Without such influence we might never have had Cormac's chapel on the Rock of Cashel. The Schottenklöster, a small Irish Benedictine congregation in Germany and Austria, had close contacts with home. How Irish devotion to the Apostle St James began is uncertain, but it seems to precede and, indeed, to be responsible for the popularity of the pilgrimage to St Iago de Compostela. To this shrine the Irish flocked in the late Middle Ages and with them those Germans who were under their spiritual direction. As a magnet for Irish pilgrims, Compostela was surpassed only by the graves of the Apostles in Rome and (for the very fortunate few) the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

A well-informed and judicious chapter on the modern development of Irish ecclesiastical studies and some pages on iconography bring this fine book to a close. While it would be unjust to part from it on a note of grievance, a gasp of surprise from one who appreciates German thoroughness will not be taken amiss : there is no index !

JOHN RYAN

MISSION TO PARADISE. By Kenneth M. King. London : Burns and Oates. 1956. Pp. 190. 18s.

FRAY JUNIPERO SERRA. By MacKinley Helm. California : Stanford University Press. 1956. Pp. 86.

CATHOLIC PIONEERS IN WEST AFRICA. By M. J. Bane, S.M.A. Dublin : Clonmore and Reynolds. 1956. 18s.

GOLD COAST MISSION HISTORY, 1471-1880. By Ralph M. Wiltgen, S.V.D. Illinois : Divine Word Publications. 1956. Pp. 181. 3 dollars.

WHEN Fr Junipero Serra died in 1784 he left behind him a line of mission foundations, stretching from San Diego to San Francisco, on the Pacific coast of America. This remarkable Franciscan friar had crammed more than a life's work into sixteen years. He had been a missionary for some years in Mexico prior to his pioneering in California, and did not begin his work as mission-founder until he was fifty-six. In those sixteen years he and his confrères recorded 6,000 baptisms among the Indians. In addition, wonderful progress had been made socially under the guidance of the friars : " livestock totalled nearly 30,000 ; the annual harvest amounted to about 30,000 bushels of grain and vegetables ; the workshops were furnishing the necessities for civilized living ", shortly before Fr Serra died.

The Indians of California were, for the most part, friendly. One misses, rather guiltily, the whooping savages who made life a purgatory for missionaries elsewhere—and added lurid colour to the story of their endeavours. Here the Indians were too easygoing to bother much about fighting. When fight they did, under provocation, " the tribe spread out in a long single line facing the enemy and pierced the air with demoniac yells until they had sufficiently frightened their opponents . . ." Yet there was often an undercurrent of dangerous suspicion towards the friars and the Spanish soldier-explorers who accompanied them ; and on one sad occasion four of the missionaries were massacred, with a little band of colonists, along the Colorado river. It is one measure of Fr Serra's success that his kindness and prudence and firm rule changed that distrust to esteem and love and loyalty.

The main troubles of the missionary came from shortage of supplies and from officials and soldiers who moved north with the friars. There was constant friction on matters of policy ; soldiers roused the Indians by acts of cruelty and by abducting their women. Always, it seems, a crisis had just passed or was looming up. There is something more than inspiring about the figure of Fr Serra moving ceaselessly from mission to mission, soothing, arguing, planning and bringing to fruition his designs for the spread of God's kingdom. Incredibly, too, he walked almost always and that despite

a painful lameness in one foot. In seven years alone he walked more than 2,000 miles.

Mr Kenneth King has told this story well. He is never less than interesting on the contemporary history of exploration and discovery. Maps of Fr Serra's mission-trail, placed in the body of the book, might more profitably be moved to the front ; and an adjoining map of the same coast with modern place-names would have been useful for reference. As it is, I, at least, lost my geographical bearings among San Juan Capistrano, Santa Clara, San Gabriel and the remainder of the score of missions.

MacKinley Helm's book, beautifully produced, offers Fr Serra's story in the form of a poetic drama. With five main characters, a commentator, soloists and chorus it should be an impressive stage presentation. Throughout there is an intriguing if anachronistic mixture of old-world setting and modern jargon : for example, Orlando, an Indian youth of Fr Serra's time (and the most interesting character), talks of " fancy psychological terms ", of " jerked beef and hardtack " and the like ; he goes too far, however, when he says " Speaking as a true native son—an original American grape, if you get me—I want to tell you . . ." The mixture is clever but somehow it does not quite " come off " ; and a few lines of dialogue are in doubtful taste.

Fr Bane of the Society of African Missions sweeps his readers through 500 years and 200 pages of mission history in West Africa. Of necessity, then, there is a constant spate of names and dates, but the book is a fine example of tight writing, of packing information into line after line. Yet the narrative does not weary. That is a notable achievement. Part II, which deals with the work of Bishop Bresillac, founder of the S.M.A., and his sons in the Lord, is particularly interesting. The story of the yellow fever epidemic in Sierra Leone which, in 1859, carried off the great bishop and his companions is movingly told. Their death ended " 400 years of sad but glorious failures ". But it was failure that presaged well-merited success. With the arrival in Dahomey (1861) of Fr Francis Borghero a new and happier era came into being. This is a fine book ; and it is strengthened by Fr Bane's genius in selecting quotable passages from the documents.

As Fr Bane notes, " The full story of all Catholic pioneers in West Africa can be told only in several volumes ". Happily, one such volume, on Gold Coast Mission History, is to hand. This book, by Dr Wiltgen, S.V.D., is a painstaking, scholarly piece of work with footnotes on every page but one (and that is all but filled by a map). Like Fr Bane, Dr Wiltgen presents his story attractively. In keeping with the narrower confines of his subject he is more expansive and can give more details. There is an orderly treatment of the work of Augustinians, Capuchins, Dominicans, Holy Ghost Fathers and of the S.M.A. Chapter V, unexpectedly but agreeably, is devoted to Protestant missionaries : " A brief glimpse at the work they accomplished shows that heroism and failure were earmarks of Protestant as well as Catholic missionaries." A valuable chapter shows how indebted West Africans are to the Catholic missionaries (and to successive Holy Fathers) for the abolition of slavery. It is good news that Dr Wiltgen is collecting material for a similar book—on New Guinea.

DESMOND REID

I

SCRIPTURE AND RELIGION

ATLAS OF THE BIBLE. By L. H. Grollenberg, O.P. Translated (from the Dutch) and edited by Joyce M. H. Reid and H. H. Rowley, Professor of Hebrew Language and Literature, University of Manchester ; foreword by W. F. Albright, Professor of Semitic Languages, Johns Hopkins University, and H. H. Rowley ; preface by R. de Vaux, O.P., Director, French School of Biblical and Archaeological Studies at Jerusalem. London and Edinburgh : Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1956. 165 pp. 70s.

WHEN three of the most distinguished names of modern biblical scholarship present an atlas of historical geography, one can be sure that a work of remarkably high quality has been published, such as we are justified in expecting from the great firm of Nelson. Fr Grollenberg's Atlas, as sumptuous and elegant as the best of the *National Geographical Magazine*, scholarly as the *Revue Biblique*, is in fact a masterpiece of book production and one of the most helpful instruments for the study of bible history which has yet appeared. No one interested in the bible, or indeed in general history, can afford to neglect this sound and informative work.

" Atlas of the Bible " is a very modest title for an almost encyclopaedic volume, which consists of 37 maps, over 400 illustrations, mostly photographs, and a long commentary which traces the history of Israel and the surrounding nations from the earliest times to the New Testament. The maps, which cover the ancient east at various stages of its history, show not only political frontiers, relief and sites : by a lavish use of colour, signs and over-printed blocks of text, they give a succinct commentary on the chief actors and events, so that they are almost a history in themselves. The illustrations range far and wide over landscape and monument, and are so well chosen that they are always eloquent. Old favourites from the Assyrian bas-reliefs vie with less well-known but equally evocative pictures, such as that of a group of realistic toy soldiers from ancient Egypt. A happy feature is the explanatory legend added to many of the photographs, which will enhance their interest immensely for the general reader. The long commentary in the text gives a critical but circumspect account of the history of the chosen people, where respect for the biblical traditions is combined with an alert ear for the most modern research. Sections on the identification of place-names, on the technique of archaeological excavations and the mental attitudes of ancient historians cover difficult but invaluable matter in a manner that scholars cannot quarrel with and the non-specialist reader will find attractive. The style of the commentary could do with tightening up and pruning ; and the translation is too close to the Germanic structure, with detriment at times to English idiom and clarity. But these are minor imperfections, not faults.

A special word of praise is due to the section on the famous Dead Sea Scrolls. It originated in the great Ecole Biblique of the Dominicans at Jerusalem and was supervised for the English editions by non-Catholic scholars of unquestionable integrity and competence. The result is a comprehensive and balanced account of the discoveries which give them their due weight, while eliminating by studied silence the unworthy fantasies of the " Christianity

before Christ " school. A final word of praise is due to the index : it not only gives references to the text and plates, but very often adds a summary comment on a word, such as ' Philistine ' or ' Hittite ', and thus becomes a biblical dictionary on a small scale. Fr Grollenberg's Atlas is a great success, and must be especially recommended to all who teach religion and bible history.

KEVIN SMYTH

PROVIDENCE AND SUFFERING IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. By Edmund F. Sutcliffe, S.J. Thomas Nelson and Sons. Pp. viii and 175. 15s. IN 1946 Fr Sutcliffe published a most interesting book* in which he presented the evidence which supports the conclusion that, for the greater part of their history, the Israelites of the Old Law were not aware that the good or bad actions we perform in this life are rewarded or punished in the next. This conclusion has long been accepted by nearly all scholars, Catholic and non-catholic alike. It should not be understood as though the Jews denied the immortality of the soul. On the contrary they very frequently referred to She'ol or the Abode of the Dead ; but they had only very vague notions of what life in She'ol was like, and they certainly did not clearly realize that it included rewards and punishments due to life on earth. The earliest texts in which it is clearly taught that rewards and punishments await us in the next life seem to date from the second century B.C.

The Jews concluded that our good or bad actions are rewarded or punished in this life : either by prosperity and happiness or by disaster and suffering. This may often be the case, but a more accurate observation of life and its vicissitudes must bring the conclusion that this general rule admits of many exceptions. No one can deny that in many cases the good suffer and the wicked prosper. This caused considerable perplexity to the thoughtful Israelite who knew that the events of this world were governed by God's providence. Fr Sutcliffe's present book deals with the former problem : why is it that God permits suffering to be endured by innocent victims who have done no wrong ?

The Christian answer is clear enough in the abstract, whatever difficulties it may create in individual applications ; and Fr Sutcliffe summarizes it in his final chapter. The main interest of his book is in the picture he gives us of the manner in which the people of the Old Law groped their way towards this solution in the days when God's revelation on this point was incomplete and still growing.

After introductory chapters on the religion of the Romans, Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonians we have a collection of the sections of the Old Testament which are relevant to our theme. Fr Sutcliffe's comments and theological exposition of these passages are clearly the product of keen insight and great but selective erudition. On a first reading it might not be completely obvious how the various chapters of this work contribute to the final result, but Chapter XI, " Recapitulation ", shows how the parts fit together to form a harmonious whole. A second reading of this thoughtful book conveys far more illumination than the first.

*The Old Testament and the Future Life. By Edmund F. Sutcliffe, S.J. Burns and Oates. 1946.

It is perhaps surprising that Ps. 21 (22) is not discussed. It would seem to be relevant to the theme " The Suffering of the Innocent " which is the heading of Chapters VII and VIII. Fr Sutcliffe doubtless had good reasons for this omission but some readers will have a quite legitimate curiosity as to what precisely these reasons might be.

The paper, printing and binding of this book are exceptionally good, far better than is usual in the case of books of this kind and at this price. Messrs Nelson are to be congratulated.

PATRICK SIMPSON

THE NEW TESTAMENT BACKGROUND : SELECTED DOCUMENTS. By C. K. Barrett. S.P.C.K., 1956. Pp. xxiv. and 276. 21s.

IT MUST never be forgotten that, although the New Testament is part of the inspired word of God, the various books of which it consists were written by definite men living, in particular countries, at fairly well defined dates. To discover the finer shades of the meaning of what they wrote it is naturally of immense help to be acquainted with the books which they may be assumed to have known, with other works composed under the same circumstances and with contemporary sources which refer to the same events. The first and most important document of all is, naturally, the Old Testament, the text of which is easily available to all. But there are many other documents which are not so easily available and which in their own way are also of very great importance. Dr Barrett has collected into a single volume over 200 of these documents from a great variety of sources : inscriptions, Roman historians, Egyptian papyri, Josephus, Philo, the Mishneh, the Corpus Hermeticum, the Dead Sea Scrolls, etc., etc. ; all in an excellent English translation and with concise but sufficient notes. This book will be of the greatest interest and utility to all students and teachers of the New Testament.

Some Catholic readers may perhaps be surprised to find that Dr Barrett has included some texts which they are accustomed to find in the Bible itself, e.g. quotations from the books of Wisdom, Tobias and I and II Maccabees. This is due to the fact that the Protestant Churches and all other Christian groups which subscribe to, or are influenced by, the XXXIX Articles do not admit that these books form part of inspired scripture and consequently do not print them in their Bibles.

Dr Barrett has undertaken to illustrate the general background of the New Testament, not to provide all the documents necessary for the complete discussion of all the problems that arise. Thus, for example, the full treatment of the famous census of Quirinius, which decides the precise date of Our Lord's birth at Bethlehem, would require in addition to Dr Barrett's material, the Papyri Oxy. 288, Lond. 904, Monumentum Ancyranum II 2-11 and the texts of Josephus and other sources which establish the series of governors of Syria for the period 12-3 B.C. It would not be fair to criticize Dr Barrett for not doing what he did not set out to do ; and although we should have been glad to have more we have every reason to be grateful for what we have.

PATRICK SIMPSON

PROBLEMS IN THEOLOGY: *vol. I*: *The Sacraments*. By John Canon McCarthy, D.D., D.C.L. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, Ltd. 1956. Pp. 433. 40s.

PROBLEMS IN CANON LAW. By William Conway, D.D., D.C.L. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, Ltd. 1956. Pp. 345. 30s.

Both these books consist of a selection from the replies to questions published in the "Notes and Queries" section of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* during the last fifteen years or so, and that fact alone should be sufficient recommendation for them. Every regular reader of the *Record* will be aware of the very high standard always maintained by Canon McCarthy and Dr Conway in the difficult task of solving the posers in Moral Theology and Canon Law put to them by correspondents. And a difficult task it truly is. The moral manuals and the commentaries on the Code of Canon Law do, indeed, provide a great deal of guidance for priests engaged in the active ministry. Nevertheless, in practice, all sorts of nasty problems, big and little, can turn up, about which the standard text-books at the ordinary priest's disposal have only a few words or are discreetly silent. Many such problems find their way to the question-box of some clerical periodical and whoever presides over it has to provide a solution, not in a secret and confidential reply, but set out in cold print for all to see and, perhaps, for some to criticize. The treatment of such questions by Canon McCarthy and Dr Conway has been one of the most highly esteemed features of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* in recent years. In their respective departments of Moral Theology and Canon Law they have dealt with innumerable queries of great practical interest, never evading the difficulties, always providing solutions based on sound theological and canonical principles and giving the necessary references for further consultation. We are very glad to see a representative selection from this work now made available in handy form to a wider public.

Canon McCarthy's book deals with problems—mainly moral but some also dogmatic—that arise in connection with the Sacraments. (A second volume is to follow dealing with the general principles of Moral Theology and with the Commandments and Precepts.) Its contents—in all, 127 replies—are classified under the headings usual in manuals of Moral Theology: the Sacraments in general, Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Indulgences, Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, Matrimony. For each reply the question is first reproduced, more or less in its original form, and then the solution is given. In the case of a book with such varied and interesting contents it is not easy to pick out particular things for mention in a review and only a few can be noted. Under Baptism, for instance, besides replies to a number of more practical pastoral questions, there is a fine and lengthy discussion regarding the fate of infants who die unbaptized, a problem much discussed by theologians in recent years. In the section on the Eucharist many practical points regarding Mass stipends and the application of Masses are treated: and the last two replies are of considerable general interest: offering Holy Communion for others and Spiritual Communion. Finally, in the section on Matrimony, various problems about impediments are dealt with, as also are onanism and the "safe period"; and there is an excellent brief commentary on the *monitum* of the Holy Office regarding the *amplexus reservatus* (issued in 1952).

Dr Conway in dividing up his material—151 items—follows the order of the Code of Canon Law. The first section, headed "General Principles", deals with queries on matters treated in Book I of the Code (*Normae Generales*) : general problems about the interpretation of ecclesiastical laws, the reckoning of time, rescripts and dispensations. Then come sections dealing with Domicile, Clerics in general, Parishes and Parochial Clergy, Religious : corresponding to Book II *(De Personis)*. These are followed by sections on the Sacraments, "Sacred Things", "Judicial Proceedings" and "Canonical Penalties" : corresponding to the remaining three Books of the Code.

In Canon Law, perhaps more than in any other branch of ecclesiastical studies, it is vital to be up-to-date and especially to be *au courant* with the latest decrees and other pronouncements of the Holy See. Among the many valuable things in Dr Conway's book are the fine and clear commentaries he provides on recent documents : e.g. the 1941 Instruction *Sacrosanctum* on the pre-nuptial enquiry, the 1947 Apostolic Constitution *Sponsa Christi* regarding enclosed nuns, the 1949 replies of the Holy Office on Communism, the 1950 decree on *negotiatio* (business and trade dealings by clerics and religious), to mention just a few. (Indeed, it might be a good idea in a later edition to provide a special index of all the documents and replies of the Holy See commented on or explained.) Besides these more general matters, innumerable practical problems of all kinds are dealt with. In all cases, except where there is question of a straight commentary on a document, the query is put first and then Dr Conway deals with it in his eminently clear, methodical and concise way, never wasting words or beating about the bush and yet always supplying a full, well-reasoned and well-documented answer.

We can very sincerely recommend these two books, characterized as they are by sound theological and canonical knowledge, by the prudent application of principles to practice and by fairness and tolerance for the views of others.

P. C. BARRY

LIFE IN CHRIST. Religious Doctrine for Secondary Schools. By Fergal McGrath, S.J. Dublin : M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd. 1956-57. Part I, pp. 200. 4s. 6d.; Part II, pp. 94, 2s. 6d.; Part III printing.

FR MCGRATH'S *Life in Christ* is a welcome sight to all those who have been brought up on, or have had to teach from, the older primers of religious doctrine. This first impression is not dulled by a closer examination. Even the title is cheering, summing up, as it does in three words, what religion should mean even to the thirteen year old child. It was expedient that Part II, dealing with the matter to be taught this year, should be published first. Now that Parts I and III are ready, it is clear that the three small books will make an admirable, positive presentation of the truths of religion. Although it cannot be hoped that they will please everyone, they could be the instrument, if they are intelligently used, of a revolution in religious teaching in this country. There is enough here, I think, to cheer anyone up.

Starting with the general notion of Life, Part I deals with Grace : the Divine Life we live as adopted sons of God. Part II treats of the Commandments : rules of the life that is lived in Christ. The last part explains prayer

and the sacraments : the channels by which the Divine Life reaches our souls. Within this simple scheme all the necessary matter is covered in a way that brings out the coherence of each truth with all the rest. I notice too, with delight, that (along with the ordinary apologetic treatment) the Church is dealt with as the Mystical Body of Christ. The Mass and the cycle of the Liturgical Year are clearly explained in a practical way that must help everyone to enter more deeply into the public prayer of the Church.

Above all, Fr McGrath must be congratulated on doing a very mortified thing. He has written a *text-book*. That is to say, he has wisely abstained from being either over personal or over exhaustive in his presentation of the doctrine. By suppressing much unnecessary matter, that used to appear in the manuals, he has given the pupil a more succinct and yet sufficient guide and mnemonic. But, more important still, he has left room for the teacher to teach.

The commandments are approached in the only right way : as positive God-revealed rules for living aright, explicit statements of the duties and obligations implicit in elevated human nature. Thus, before any discussion of the sins against any commandment, the positive attitude towards God or man which is commanded is dealt with. In the light of this prior treatment of a positive attitude, it is easy for the pupil to be brought to see why the sins are irrational and forbidden. It is important that the child should see that Christianity is profoundly positive and no mere matter of commands and prohibitions, with a predominance of prohibitions. Thus, in dealing with the first commandment, Fr McGrath demonstrates neatly how right it is, and how natural—almost inevitable, to adore God. Before speaking of the sins of dishonesty, he has a brief treatment of the rights of property. Particularly *à propos* and satisfactory is his handling of the nature of authority, on which the exposition of the fourth commandment is based. Strangely and inconsistently, the first heading in the chapter on the eighth commandment reads : *Why Lying is a Sin.* It would seem that the second heading *The Value of Truth in Speech,* if it were placed first, would be more in accord with Fr McGrath's obvious plan.

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible and undesirable, to write of the sixth commandment in a book of this kind. It is understandable that Fr McGrath should have abandoned his firm positive stand here when one considers the large circulation that the book will have. Still, when one compares the teaching on the sixth commandment with that on the fifth, it would appear that one aspect common to both might perhaps have been included with profit. I mean some elementary lessons on human psychology.

For both of these commandments, as Fr McGrath points out, have to do with our duties towards ourselves : with the control of passions and emotions, with giving back to our human nature, by our own cooperation with the grace of God, the wholeness (and wholesomeness) that was injured by original sin. A great number of young people seem to act as if they were ignorant of the role that the passions should play in their lives. They would seem to think that every merest whim or emotion must be indulged just as promptly as the most imperative direction of the will. Or, on the other hand, they may come to think that passions and emotions are wholly evil and their promptings always diabolic. They do not always seem to evaluate the different drives and urges

that spring from their humanity. Knowledge is not everything in this matter. Here training and discipline are essential. But I am sure that a real help will have been given towards self-control if the young are taught the essential goodness of the passions, once they take their proper place in the human organism, subordinate to the intellect and the will in the supernatural order. Anger, for instance, need not be sinful. There is a lawful ire. Christ was really angry with the buyers and sellers in the Temple ; and St Thomas describes anger as a strong tendency to overcome difficult obstacles. A wrong notion of the passions may lead to impossible attempts to destroy utterly an inseparable part of human nature ; and the subsequent inevitable failure and discouragement may lead to neurosis or to sin.

The books are attractively produced. There are no impenetrable slabs of print to intimidate the scholar or prevent the Spirit blowing where He wills. A slightly better quality paper (raising the price of the books by no more than a few pence) would have done better justice to the magnificent series of pictures chosen by the author as illustrations. I hope that small boys will not be allowed by their masters to draw moustaches on these splendid pictures because they can be made to serve a very real purpose. They are worlds apart from the sentimental, effeminate, commercial religious " art " of which the pupils undoubtedly see too much even still. Merely looking at these masterpieces of the great Flemish, Spanish and Italian masters will do a great deal to teach a sturdy religion. Perhaps some modern work will be introduced later: Rouault does make an impact on young people. Still the author has done more for us than we deserve even in the matter of church art. We read on p. 31, Part II : " If he ridiculed the idea of building churches for the worship of God, that would be blasphemy, but if he only said that a certain church was ugly, that would be no sin at all." Is it possible that I detect a smile ?

JOHN C. KELLY

THE NEW BEING. By Paul Tillich. London : SCM Press, 1956. Pp. 179 10s. 6d.

THIS book contains sermons to American University students. The author is the well-known Protestant theologian who came to the U.S.A. from Germany as the spokesman of Jarl Barth. The first group of sermons, " The New Being as Love ", are, within the limits set by a Protestantism without creeds or sacraments, a sincere effort to communicate some of the peace and strength of the gospel. Their main defect is the constant lapse into the obscurity and paradox of Kierkegaardian jargon : " The message of Christianity is not Christianity but a new reality ". The second group, " The New Being as Freedom", is more speculative and less exhortatory. The theme is Tennyson's : " There is more faith in honest doubt, believe me, than in all your creeds ". The " believe *me* " is outspoken : " I say this to you as somebody who all his life has worked for a true expression of the truth which is the Christ ". The third group is entitled : " The New Being as Fulfillment ". It urges joy and hope, and joy as the criterion of morality, since all definite law has been rejected. " Those pleasures are good which go together with joy ; those are bad which prevent joy ". This may be helpful and adequate for the undergraduates of America, but more " mixed-up " audiences may find difficulty in distinguishing joy from pleasure until it is too late to benefit by their experience.

KEVIN SMYTH

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Authors of articles and reviews in this issue

BEAVER : Sir Hugh Beaver, K.B.E., is Managing Director of Arthur Guinness, Son and Company, Ltd., Park Royal, London. During the war he was Director-General in the newly created Ministry of Works. He is President of the Institution of Chemical Engineers.

BELLOC : Miss Elizabeth Belloc, daughter of Hilaire, has followed her father in the craft of letters.

BRAYBROOKE : Neville Braybrooke, literary critic and author, was editor of *The Wind and the Rain*.

BUCK : Thomas Buck has made a special study of Old Icelandic in London University; he is a member of the Viking Society for Northern Research.

CARTER : Charles F. Carter left Cambridge to take up the Professorship of Economics in the Queen's University of Belfast.

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HARRISON : Mrs Miriam Harrison completed a social survey of Belfast in 1954, published that year by the Nuffield Foundation under the title *Growing Old in Common Lodgings;* in the same year she was awarded a United Nations Travelling Scholarship to Paris to study old age there.

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O'DOHERTY : Fr E. F. O'Doherty is Professor of Logic and Psychology in University College, Dublin.

PHELAN : Edward J. Phelan was a member of the staff of ILO from its beginning in 1919; he succeeded Mr Winant as Director in 1941, and subsequently became Director-General under the ILO's revised constitution.

PURCELL : Miss Mary Purcell's first book was on Joan of Arc. She has followed it up with three other biographies that have met with much success.

SHAW : Francis Shaw, S.J., is Professor of Early and Medieval Irish in University College, Dublin.

SMITH : Conn A. Smith is a Company Director; he is Chairman of the Cavan Chamber of Commerce.

SMYTH : Kevin Smyth, S.J., is Professor of Fundamental Theology at Milltown Park, Dublin.

WALSH : Peter G. Walsh lectures in Classics in University College, Dublin.

The Irish Economy Viewed from Without[1]

by C. F. CARTER

I AM, on consideration, somewhat appalled by my folly in agreeing to speak to you on this subject. The remarks of one who is not only an Englishman, but resident in Belfast, are surely liable to be treated with suspicion ; and on economic matters there is a great gulf between the hard reality and the popular fantasy, so that I have to take the unpopular position of a destroyer of illusions. My folly in doing so is excused only by the impossibility of saying 'No' to your assiduous secretary.

The Gloomy Side

Income per head in the Republic is about 55% of that in the United Kingdom ; but since the ratio is about 65% for the province of Leinster, it must be less than half for the rest of the country. The statistical evidence, as far as it can be interpreted, confirms general observation, that the Republic is falling further behind ; and it is falling behind, not only in income, but in the technical progress which creates the promise of further income.[2] Though endowed with the great natural advantages of closeness to wealthy markets, of the absence of substantial defence expenditure, and of large external assets, the Republic achieves her slow progress only by a prodigal dissipation of her external assets, occasionally restrained by emergency measures. Successive Governments have planted an immense and tangled jungle of schemes for the encouragement of industry and agriculture, for the relief of unemployment and the improvement of social facilities[3] ; but these exceed the resources of the State, even after high and burdensome taxation, and create a grave problem of finance. The help which is rightly given to agriculture does not achieve speedy technical progress or prosperous expansion ; the aid and protection given to industry cannot make it thrive in a depressed home market, and it fails to shake the obstinate preference for buying foreign goods. Such progress as has been achieved—and it is far from being insignificant, though it is inadequate—has involved the use of foreign aid, of investment by foreign companies, and of assets accumulated in the hardships and opportunities of war. Foreign aid is un-

[1] Address to the Irish Association, Dublin, 19 March 1957. For other notes, see end of article.

certain, and assets can be spent only once ; it therefore seems that the next steps of progress will be far more difficult than those which have gone before. Unique in the world, the Republic combines a large excess of births over deaths with a small and declining population. Every year there are fewer customers in the home market ; every year the young and vigorous leave to try their fortune elsewhere.

This is a situation dangerous both to the Republic and to her neighbours. Faced by it, the universal resort of politicians is to seek refuge in fantasy, and usually in the dreary fantasy that prosperity must wait on the reunion of Ireland. This has the advantage of pushing the responsibility somewhere else, usually on to the British government ; but it has no relation to economic reality. The only partition which really matters is not economic, but is a division of the mind and spirit, which grows deeper with every year of present policies. The main economic effect of the Border is that a third of the people of this island enjoy a higher standard of living and a much greater rate and promise of industrial development than the other two-thirds ; the main economic effect of moving the Border would be to impoverish the North and lay burdens now carried by Westminster on the weak economy of the South. Whatever the case for ending partition may be, it is not at present an economic one. Nor is it fair to blame the state of Ireland on the oppressive closeness of a wealthy Britain. This closeness has some disadvantages, which I shall mention later, but it also provides both a market for produce and a welcome for migrant labour. Ireland would be very poor indeed if she did not possess in Britain an outlet for migration.

No : Ireland must save herself by her own exertions, and this is a fact which seems to be recognized by most intelligent people, though I wish that more were forthright in saying so. But I find that some people who would agree with my description of the situation are disposed to say that it is hopeless ; that there is no prospect of obtaining the political or business leadership necessary for prosperity ; that the Republic must continue with unemployment and high migration, patching up a decaying economy by a succession of half-measures. If this is true, I do not believe that democratic government can survive ; but I do not think that it is true. It seems to me important that economists should say that the co-existence of unemployment and high migration with undeveloped resources is nonsense, and nonsense which can very well be put right. For the sake of all of us, I hope that you will find democratic leaders able and willing to devise and execute the necessary policies.

Effect of Public Spending

Unfortunately there is an idea about that economics teaches that a country can get itself out of depression by a sufficiently lavish spending of public money. In fact, a multiplication of schemes for Government

spending, though it may bring some immediate social benefits, is likely to aggravate the situation. This is because practically any such schemes are liable to increase imports more than, and long in advance of, any increase in exports ; there is thus a running down of assets overseas, and, although these are in total still considerable, the amount which can safely be drawn on for immediate use is now small.[4] The price of increasing State spending is a willingness to restrict imports still further by quotas or by a substantial increase in the import levies. Such action may indeed be necessary, but mere State spending does not seem to me to get at the root of the matter. Let us dig a little deeper.

Material wealth comes from the application of human skill, intelligence and hard work to the free gifts with which divine providence has endowed the world. We can do little about the natural resources of the country, except import Canadians to look for some more ; the variable factors are hard work and the skill which is embodied in technical knowledge and able management. Now it is true that improvements in technique usually require capital expenditure on machines or buildings or drainage or other such things, and that you cannot undertake such capital expenditure unless you either release the resources for it by saving more—that is, by spending less to-day so that there may be more to-morrow—*or* by first producing more, *or* by borrowing from abroad. This is the world-wide problem of underdeveloped countries ; they are poor, they save little, therefore they cannot start along the path which would give them bigger production and bigger savings, and so make development cumulative. That is why they all want Uncle Sam to give them some dollars. But it is not in fact true that saving and investment are the fundamental things ; the fundamental things are hard work, technical skill and good management, and they can often achieve a great deal without large capital expenditure.

Need for Better Management and Technical Progress

I doubt if Irish workers are naturally particularly idle ; but I think that their work is often managed so that they waste their time. Bad management and technical backwardness seem to me to be the essential troubles. The first shows itself in working time wasted because materials are not there, in failure to do market research and find out just what the customer wants, in poor costing, bad layout of plant, absence of work study and many other things. Technical backwardness is seen in agriculture in such things as the shockingly low use of fertilizers, and in industry in the absence of staff trained to appreciate new technical knowledge (which must of necessity mostly come from abroad) ; in both agriculture and industry there seems to me to be a lack of research on special Irish problems, and of liaison men with the task of taking the results of research to the small producer.

Let us therefore put down in order the basic needs of a prosperous economy :—

(*a*) Improvement of management,
(*b*) The discovery, adaptation and spreading of new technical knowledge,
(*c*) Capital investment of a productive kind to back these up.

How is the process of recovery to begin ? It is tempting to say that the answer is better education and more saving, which amounts to saying that nothing can happen for a long time. But Ireland is an exporter of brains, although she is sorely in need of them ; an improvement in education will not of itself stop this export. By far the most hopeful means of getting good management, technical knowledge and capital all at once is from subsidiaries of large foreign companies ; and it would be worth very large inducements indeed, including complete exemption from taxes for a period, to get more of them.

Unfortunately the execution of such a policy runs against a whole lot of favourite illusions. One is that a locally-owned business is better than a foreign one[5] ; the opposite is the truth, for advanced technical knowledge flows readily from a great firm to its subsidiaries, and a plant which is paid for by foreign capital is a great deal better than one which has to be paid for from the scanty savings of the Republic. Another illusion is that there is a virtue in small business ; so there is, for certain purposes, and given intelligent management, but it is quite clear that in many branches of industry (and those among the most rapidly progressive) large firms have immense advantages. They can support massive research and development programmes which benefit their subsidiaries ; they can buy the best in skill and technical knowledge and good management and diffuse its benefits throughout their empire ; they can raise money more easily and on better terms ; they can be more adventurous because they can spread their risks. The spread of good practices is much more difficult in industries, such as farming and building, which are necessarily organized in small units.

Relations with Britain

The last illusion, common to most underdeveloped countries, is that foreign enterprises link you in bondage to the foreigner ; in this case, to England. I suspect that this belief owes more to emotion than to reason, but the relations between the Republic and Britain do require a little more thought, for at present they make the worst of both worlds. The ties are very close on the monetary side, so that British credit policy greatly influences that of the Republic ; and the free migration of labour tends to mean that skilled wage rates in the Republic are around British levels, which (since production per head overall is lower) puts a great

strain on the economy. On the other hand, the Republic does not enjoy the advantages of being part of the British economy ; there is no automatic tendency for full employment to splash over into the Twenty-Six Counties, nor does agriculture (though largely serving the British market) enjoy the security of long-term guarantees. If it is thought that the two economies should be more separate, it would be possible in theory (though very difficult in practice) to separate their monetary systems and to devalue the Irish pound, which would make the direct comparison of wage-levels more difficult and give greater freedom to monetary policy, as well as having some direct effect in discouraging imports and encouraging exports. If, as seems likely, this degree of separation is impossible to achieve, then there is a great deal to be said for a greater degree of integration, and in particular for trying to persuade the next Labour Government in Britain that it is worth while offering guarantees to Irish agriculture, so that it may obtain a favoured place in the British market.[6]

Concentration of Assistance

I am not wishing to suggest that the attraction of more branches of large enterprises is the only key to success ; obviously, for instance, it has little relevance for agriculture. But I think that policy should be tested by asking whether it improves management practices and technical efficiency, and whether it contributes to the most urgently needed capital investment for productive purposes. It seems to me probable that a concentration of Government assistance on fewer schemes of high economic priority would produce better results ; in particular, I have great doubts about schemes undertaken because of their high employment content ; they may give work to ten men now at the cost of leaving undone the things which would give work to a hundred in the future. I would concentrate assistance to agriculture on such things as free fertilizers and advice and assistance on pest and weed control ; there is room for immense improvement in grassland management, and if determination to achieve a technical improvement on a narrow front were allied to a guaranteed market in Britain there might be great changes in a few years. Some of the money which could be saved from schemes of low economic priority.[7] I would use as bait to catch the unsuspecting foreigner by the offer of further concessions to new enterprises.

But such a policy needs to be run by hard-headed business men and perhaps even flinty-hearted economists ; for there is a constant temptation to spread the effort too far, ideally into every constituency. How much can the Republic afford to spend in arresting the decline of population in the West ? Something can be done, especially if there is local enterprise and initiative, but the hard fact has to be faced that there is much land which will never yield a reasonable standard of living for the

mid-20th century, and that industry is rightly and naturally drawn to the ports which face the chief markets. Millions of pounds can be spent in slowing down an inevitable decline, which would otherwise be the foundation of new and growing enterprise. I deplore the growth of Dublin and Belfast, but I would rather that men lived well in the cities than in poverty on overcrowded and over-divided farm land.

I have talked in generalities, which is inevitable on so general a subject ; but I would summarize what I have to say in this : economic prosperity is not beyond the reach of the Republic, but it is not to be found in self-satisfied isolation, nor in the narrow pride of economic nationalism. It is to be found by looking outside and taking what is best from the practice of other nations ; by seeking the co-operation of others in a development which will benefit them as well ; in fact, by using brains and ability and common sense, and (if they are in short supply) by attracting them back from overseas. This should be the first priority in State economic policy, for only ability can make up for the deficiencies of nature.

NOTES

The following notes have been added subsequent to the lecture :—

[2] The following figures show the ratio of the Republic's gross national expenditure per head to that of the United Kingdom ; this is not a fair measure of relative ' consumer satisfaction ', but it indicates a trend which is not explicable by relative changes in the cost of living.

1938	50%	1953	53%
1950	52%	1954	50%
1951	51%	1955	50%
1952	52%	1956	46%

The assertion that the Republic is falling behind in technical progress is a judgement based on observation of the great growth in research and development expenditure in other countries.

[3] There are, for instance, drainage and reclamation grants, grants for harbour construction, employment schemes, development works in bogs, rural improvement schemes, grants in relief of agricultural rates, money for cow-testing, for the improvement of livestock and poultry, for glasshouse crops, for beehives, for fruit trees, for seed, for farm buildings, for artificial insemination, for eradicating bovine tuberculosis, for pasteurizing milk, for subsidizing ground limestone, for encouraging the tweed, knitwear and embroidery industries, for supporting transport services—and so on.

[4] The question of how much overseas assets could now be run down raises difficult issues of banking policy. My own conclusion is that (unless privately-held assets were to be confiscated) no further reduction could safely be made.

[5] The preference for locally-owned business apparently arises partly from a laudable patriotism, partly from a fear of foreign domination, partly from a belief that a foreign-owned business will not be conducted in accordance

with Irish interests—for instance that it will close down first in a slump. The patriotism is ill-founded until Ireland can show that she has enough good industrial managers of her own ; the fear of foreign domination seems to me of little substance ; the third belief is contrary to common sense and experience—it is the efficiency of a business which determines whether it will continue in a slump, not the site of its head office.

[6] In the long run the present tendency to surplus in the agricultural markets is not likely to persist ; it would be to Britain's interest to develop a secure source of agricultural imports close to her shores.

[7] The question of priorities in Government expenditure is in part within the field of the Capital Investment Advisory Committee, of which I am a member ; I do not propose, therefore, to elaborate my views on priorities at this stage.

COMMENTS ON THE FOREGOING ARTICLE

1—*by* SIR HUGH BEAVER

Ireland has often been seen by her friends to be in danger of drowning in a flood of introspection. It is good to see such a friend as Professor Carter come to the rescue with economic truths linked to encouraging suggestions. I believe that some of the truths need stating more often and more starkly. I hope that some of the suggestions will be made more specifically in competent quarters.

In detail, then, I would underline Professor Carter's main points as follows, indicating those places where I would change the emphasis. Ireland's material prosperity is falling further behind that of the United Kingdom. Ireland's external assets are being used up. Foreign aid is at best uncertain. The home market is shrinking. Emigration, he indicates, creates " a situation dangerous both to the Republic and to her neighbours ". But later he says " Ireland would be very poor indeed if she did not possess in Britain an outlet for migration ". One must presume the distinction is here the not unimportant one between " emigration " and " migration ", between the New York policeman and the Achill potato picker in Scotland. I return to this point later.

Professor Carter then speaks for any economists who " should see that co-existence of unemployment and high migration with undeveloped resources is nonsense, and nonsense which can very well be put right ". One is not so clear from this article as to how. The Aunt Sally of Public Spending is rightly knocked down. But to start with, what are the undeveloped resources ? Grassland—yes, minerals—perhaps less likely

as a major contribution ; though can we be sure seeing that the last comprehensive Geological Survey of Ireland was from 1860–1880 ?

Professor Carter lists the basic needs of a prosperous economy, but I do not think enough emphasis is given to the necessity for Ireland to do supremely well what she is fitted to do supremely well, namely to produce eggs, butter, bacon, beef, mutton and sell them to Britain. New Zealand butter in Ireland is ludicrous and, therefore, not serious ; but Danish bacon, New Zealand butter and British eggs under-selling those Irish products in Britain is intolerable. What is needed is not so much discovery, adaptation and spreading of new technical knowledge, as application of existing technical knowledge and closer attention to current agricultural marketing practices elsewhere. Danish farms are no bigger than Irish.

Much is being done, sensibly and with courage and energy, in such long term investments as drainage, the dual-purpose operation of bog-mining and reclamation, and liming subsidies. These are very worth-while internal policies. Can we not hope that an outward-looking Ireland may, through the medium of a European Free Trade Area, attain a measure of economic reunion *inter alia* of two such mutually necessary partners as the United Kingdom and Ireland ? It is especially important for Ireland to note this opportunity, because the immediate advantages to the United Kingdom of such a reunion are by no means so obvious. United Kingdom agriculture to-day has worked itself into a jealously guarded and privileged position in which its own produce under-sells any Irish competition and can alarm Europe by selling there too. It is hard to follow Professor Carter's hopes that there would be votes in the United Kingdom to-day for guarantees to Irish agriculture. Ireland must compete with British agriculture ; British agriculture is subsidized by a prosperous British Industrial economy ; therefore Ireland must either accept a lower standard of living to lower her agricultural prices or increase her productivity as well as her production. This again implies less man-power on the farms. As to migration, until equilibrium is realized, where better can the able Irishman use his ability than in snatching a piece of the British industrial prosperity pie by coming over to Britain and taking it ? It must not be forgotten moreover that it is not only Ireland that is worried about emigration ; Britain is very worried too and Canada is under permanent suction of its best abilities to the United States, although in this case there is a very strong reverse tide in capital investment.

One final word : Ireland, unique among the small nations, has one priceless asset. Were the homeland to be annihilated overnight, Irishmen overseas would preserve a living Irish nationhood in a way quite impossible to conceive in the case of other small nations, however prosperous.

2—*by* PATRICK LYNCH

Professor Carter has done a useful and timely service in seeking to dispel fantasies that obscure the reality of our economic condition. The present standard of living in the Republic owes less to our current exertions than to foreign assets earned somewhat fortuitously in two world wars and since largely spent. If wealth is to be self-perpetuating it must rely for its creation primarily on current effort. External assistance can make only a marginal contribution to progress. Further drawings on sterling reserves will, in any event, be " once only " transactions, as, indeed, will foreign borrowing unless we are to incur cumulative external liabilities.

Provisional estimates of national income for the year 1956 bear out Professor Carter's contention that the rate of economic growth has been slowing down. He is certainly right in suggesting that a concentration of state assistance on fewer schemes, and these to be of high economic priority, might produce better results than a continued dispersal of effort. Economic growth alone can create opportunities for more productive employment. Wasteful employment in relief schemes cannot be justified while there is still scope for developing the unexploited resources upon which the possibility of future productive employment and higher living standards depends. To avoid leaving men in idleness, relief schemes may be better than nothing ; but prosperity will not be achieved by creating unnecessary work, or by sustaining artificially obsolete enterprises, whose operations are largely expensive subsidies for waste. A redistribution of existing resources by these means may help to salve our social conscience while we can afford it, but such activities are unrewarding economically ; they tend to demoralize those whom they employ, test the patience of the tax-payer and postpone or prevent the attainment of greater national wealth and higher living standards.

Increased productive and self-perpetuating employment is possible only through a more rapid rate of economic growth. As Professor Carter says, however, the Republic is lagging behind technically and so diminishing its prospects of economic advance. Too much, perhaps, of our capital has been invested in schemes which tend to preserve the present economic structure when changes in that structure are urgently required if the economy is to be adapted to meet contemporary conditions. Saving and capital formation are, of course, essential conditions of progress ; but, as Professor Carter reminds us, other conditions are no less essential. Technical knowledge and managerial skill must now be employed to compensate for the sterling reserves upon which we can no longer draw as freely as we did. If they are so employed, the challenge of our present economic situation may enable us to bring

about the structural changes to transform the Republic from a stagnant to a dynamic economy. What is technically possible may be financially possible, but financial possibilities are often more readily realized in Ireland than technical ones. Money is more plentiful for certain projects than the techniques and organizing skills that might guarantee their efficient operation. Lack of a sense of urgency for the real constituents of economic growth, or perhaps merely lack of common sense, has, for instance, held up the establishment of an institute for agricultural training and research, for which the United States Government gave us the funds quite a few years ago.

Not all our social objectives may be consistent with our economic potentialities. It may be easier to develop our economic resources to the full than to secure a spectacular reduction in the level of emigration. A substantial increase in agricultural output might be obtained by a labour force considerably smaller than that which is under-employed on the land at present. There is no certainty that manufacturing industry can absorb a higher proportion of the surplus labour from the land. Greater competitive efficiency in industry may, indeed, involve the use of additional machinery rather than any great increase in industrial employment. Our organizing ability in securing new markets abroad may help us out of this *impasse*. We must increase exports if we are to develop, but it would be foolish to minimize the difficulties of doing so. Countries in Europe with recurring agricultural surpluses are unlikely to provide regular and rewarding outlets for greatly increased quantities of Irish agricultural produce. It may, indeed, be easier to expand industrial exports ; but as these constitute such a small proportion of our total foreign trade there is room here for substantial expansion before dramatic results are achieved.

There is a possibility, therefore, that we may attain a reasonably high degree of economic development without being able to absorb all our people in domestic employment at the living standards they seek. We may be compelled to take a more realistic and less emotional view of emigration. National pride rejects the inevitability of emigration, but many peoples elsewhere would regard themselves well-favoured by economic fortune if they had the facilities for migration which language and geography have afforded us. The proposals for a common market and a free trade area in Europe presuppose the desirability in due course of greater mobility of labour as well as of capital, goods and services. Other European countries are making changes in structure and outlook as an alternative to economic decay. The extent and manner of our response to these forces may determine the viability of the Republic and its survival as an independent economy.

I am in general agreement with Professor Carter's refreshingly frank analysis of our economic condition and, like him, disagree with

the view that we lack the qualities of political or business leadership necessary to mobilize and give a constructive sense of direction to our efforts. There is plenty of evidence that our young people are more keenly aware than their elders admit that much of the outlook which has prevailed for the past thirty-five years must be changed if we are to make progress. It is nonsense to suggest that the young people are wholly apathetic about the future or cynical about the past. Their criticism is intelligently selective, and is directed mainly against institutions which obstinately resist change, whether these be political parties or industrial or financial organizations.

The existence of such groups as *Tuairim* reflects an encouraging recognition by some university graduates of the need for struggle against the intellectual inertia which still paralyses action in too many fields. The enthusiasm which fills *Macra na Feirme* and the *Irish Management Institute* shows that many farmers, business men and managers are being stimulated to respond to a scientific approach towards their work. On the part of industrialists there is even a willingness to admit that the restrictionist attitude embodied in the *Control of Manufactures Acts* has become a period piece no longer relevant to contemporary conditions. The success of certain firms in selling exports in highly competitive markets is more than a tribute to their own resourcefulness and to the advice and leadership of *Córas Trachtála* ; these manufacturers are acquiring greater confidence in their capacity to expand trade because they know that they can produce goods up to international standards.

Leadership of that sort will inspire and educate others to follow. But there must be a wider acceptance of the real nature of our economic problems and a more forthright expression of the attitudes which will help us to solve them.

3—*by* C. A. SMITH

Professor Carter insists that " Ireland must save herself by her own exertions ". That should be obvious, but it is a point that needs emphasizing. The current atmosphere of hopelessness and the oft-repeated statement of so many of our young men and women that " there is no future for them at home " must be refuted on all possible occasions. A vigorous campaign to raise the morale of our people and to encourage them to help themselves is badly needed.

We have a serious problem in Ireland. It is not insuperable, but to arrive at a satisfactory solution we must state that problem in terms of 1957. The fundamentals necessary for material progress are " hard work, technical skill and good management ". Again I agree with

Professor Carter. These qualities are not lacking in Ireland, but they need development. If more stress were laid on the fundamentals, which we do or can possess, and less on investment capital, which we do not possess in quantity, we might get somewhere towards achieving that air of confidence in the future of our country which alone will keep our young people at home.

Any plan for the future prosperity of Ireland must be built around our basic industry. In this field we have many advantages—good land which can be improved, a healthy, hardworking farming community, a moderate climate, so great a variety of soil types that we can grow practically any crop for which there is a market. Increased productivity per acre can be encouraged only by financial incentives to the farmer and through the widespread dissemination of our scientific knowledge. In this respect the " Pilot Farm " idea seems to be the most practical way of demonstrating what science and good management can do to increase production and, through reclamation, to extend our amount of arable land.

If the Co-operative Societies, instead of investing their tax-free earnings in retail businesses already adequately and more suitably covered by private enterprises, were to spend them on research into the farming problems of the area which they represent (with a view to increasing the productivity of that area), it would be better for them and for the state as a whole.

Serious and immediate thought should be given by the Department of Finance to the problem of inducing citizens to employ in useful productive work the vast amount of undisclosed assets which are currently " under the bed ". (Some estimates place this amount at almost £50 million.) A revenue policy of " no questions " for a limited period as to the source of money invested in new industries based on agriculture might serve a two-fold good.

One of the basic causes of the farm problem, not only in Ireland but throughout the world, is the failure of agriculture to keep abreast of industry in research and development. The object of most of our research in this field has been to obtain increased yields from a better variety of seed and from better management. We have not sufficiently regarded the other side of the picture—production costs and marketing research. The continentals, through increased efficiency and more suitable products, have almost pushed us out of our traditional markets for dairy, poultry and pig products ; and hundreds of new industrial discoveries have further limited the existing outlets for farm products. Synthetics are capturing an increasing amount of the industrial market for natural fibres and leather products, to name but two examples. A concentrated research attack on the increased industrial use of agricultural products is of vital necessity; and, through tax concessions and otherwise,

we must encourage industrialists to enter this field. There is evidence in plenty that research can solve many of the farm produce disposal problems. The American Citrus Fruit and Poultry Industries are a concrete example.

In the universities, through added Agricultural Scholarships, etc., intending students should be guided in increasing numbers towards Agricultural Science courses. These would provide the personnel for future research. There is also a very great need in Irish universities for an Agricultural Course, similar to that at Cambridge, for the farmer who wishes to return to the land. This course should combine the advantages of a university education with a sound knowledge of modern Agricultural Science practices and Estate Management. It would provide agriculture with future leaders who could intelligently apply the results of research to the hard reality of economical farming. It is not enough to learn how to grow more ; we must also know what to do with the crops thus grown.

All political parties now accept reafforestation as highly desirable and necessary from a national standpoint. To speed up the process and to complement the state's efforts some incentive should be given to private enterprise. If small business men were encouraged—through reduced rates on land under new timber, reduced taxation on profits from it and abolition of death duties on the capital so involved—our island would soon return to virgin forest. The resulting by-product industries would, over a period of from fifteen to twenty years, provide steady revenue and increasing employment.

" Ireland must save herself by her own exertions " and those exertions can best come from the youth of our country. It is a sobering thought that the same men have been at the helm in Ireland since the early 1920's ; and the qualities that make a good freedom fighter are not necessarily those that make a good administrator. It is time that the youth of to-day, who through the efforts of their forefathers have had the advantage of a good education and time to mature in a free country, should take their rightful places in the political life of Ireland.

Arab Religion as an American Ally

by J. J. W. MURPHY

THE American people, or at all events the United States government, seems to be at the start of another noble experiment. With this title somebody tried to cover the collapse of Prohibition, which had been imposed on the United States in the 1920's by one of those political pressure-groups which are a feature of the American way of life. Public opinion first acquiesced ; then gradually revolted against Prohibition. As Chesterton said : " At the beginning even those who disliked it, believed in it ; at the end even those who liked it, disbelieved in it." In 1957 a pressure-group, composed partly of admirers, male and female, of the Arab as they picture him, but mainly of business-men interested in oil, has obtained a somewhat similar uneasy acquiescence in the Eisenhower-Dulles plan to save the Middle-East from Russian Communism. This plan is certainly an experiment because its success depends on the will of some 50 million Arabs and 15 million Persians to resist Russia, and nobody knows what that is worth. It could be called a noble experiment because it is to be made regardless of financial cost. It may eventually come to be so called for the same reason as Prohibition.

Persia and the Arab countries of the Middle-East are the chief present sources of the world's oil. The religion of nearly all those people is Muslim. Islam, which is the Arab name for the Muslim religion, is divided between Sunni and Shia Muslims, corresponding to Catholic and Protestant Christians, in so far as the Sunni hold that the Koran, the Muslim equivalent to the Bible, must be interpreted by a living tradition, and the Shia hold to the Koran alone and reject the authority of tradition. Only in Persia and Iraq are the Shia a majority.

The Arab rulers in bidding for American aid made religion part of their case. They represented the Arabs as firm believers in God who would reject Communism because it is atheistic. The Americans may not have been impressed by the record of religion in Europe as an effective defence against Communism. But the Communists themselves, by their persistent attacks on religion, showed that they still considered it a force to be reckoned with, so it might be of value as an American ally in the Middle-East.

There are about 300 million Muslims in the world. Islam is almost as old as Christianity : only six centuries between their births. Its present vigour is shown by the numbers of converts it makes from paganism, even in countries where Christian missions operate. It

makes few converts from Judaism or from Christianity in any land. But neither do Jews or Christians convert many Muslims. It holds firmly to belief in one true God, supreme legislator and judge of all men. It accepts Jesus as a great prophet, but not as God in person. Its moral code has been variously represented, now as utterly different, now as very similar to the Christian moral code. This much is certain ; it was largely borrowed from Christian sources at the start. Three of the so-called Five Pillars of Islam are prayer, fasting and alms-giving. The others are the profession of faith and the pilgrimage to Mecca. After thirteen centuries all five stand firm in principle for all and in practice for many, if not for most, Muslims. Even the pilgrimage, which with the spread of Islam across India and Africa became much more difficult a journey than the Prophet Mohammed had foreseen, is now coming back within the reach of ordinary folk by reason of the cheapness and range of modern transport.

When I went to the Middle-East in April 1946, my first experience of an Arab country was in North Africa. I was an Army chaplain at Headquarters Tripolitania District from April to November. My work took me regularly on long tours through the fertile coastal plain east and west of Tripoli, and occasionally south to Garian by the desert road that leads to the depths of the Sahara. I seldom went out without seeing some Arabs at prayer. Every Muslim is taught to pray five times daily. The times are not fixed by the clock, but by the sun and by calls to prayer from the minarets of mosques in towns. In the country, when a man feels it is time to pray, he stops his work, just as a Christian might stop for a smoke, says his prayer without hurry and resumes his work. I was deeply impressed. Not by any devotional display—there was none—but by the way that these ordinary men took prayer for granted as a normal part of daily life, just like food, drink, work and play. Another thing occurred to my mind after some time, why did I never see an Arab woman at prayer ? When I got to know more about Muslim ways, I learned that prayer is considered a man's job. Every boy is taught his prayers thoroughly, but most girls learn their prayers haphazard or not at all. This of course is not right, but it surely gives a better result than what we see in Latin countries where religion is left, for the most part, to women and the clergy.

During my time in Tripoli I was in fairly close contact with the ancient Jewish community, Arab in everything except their religion. That exception made them a people apart, here as elsewhere, but there had been good relations between them and their Arab neighbours for several centuries until the recent impact of political Zionism stirred up hostility throughout the Muslim world. A few months before I came to Tripolitania there had been anti-Jewish outbreaks with looting and brutal murder. That was not only contrary to local tradition ; it was

contrary to the express teaching of the Prophet, who recognized Jews and Christians as " People of the Book ", meaning the Bible, superior to pagans in their possession of revealed knowledge of the true God, though inferior to Muslims by reason of their failure to recognize Islam as another divine revelation. One might have expected some of the preachers in the mosques on Fridays to remind their hearers of this, and some of them seem to have done so. It was not easy to know all that was preached in the mosques, but we had means of finding out the trend. It was full of menace for the Jews. Some death-sentences on Arabs, found guilty of murdering Jews, were carried out by the British Military Administration. This reassured the Jews and was a warning to the Arabs. Outwardly peace and order prevailed for the next two years, but the Jewish community in Tripolitania knew what would come when the British control would go, and they prepared for exile, or rather for a return to the home which their ancestors had left over a thousand years before, to " our Palestine " as my Jewish housekeeper said to me. I hope she got there.

I went to Palestine in November 1946. I had been there nearly twelve months before I saw a Muslim at prayer. I mentioned the fact that evening to a man who had been there very much longer. He said : " In three years I have seen two." That was typical of the state of religion in Palestine among all denominations at that time, Christian and Jewish as well as Muslim. Exaggerated nationalism seemed to have taken over men's souls. Its demands were absolute ; all means were justified by its ends ; religion was reduced to being its camp-follower on sufferance. The only native religious body that refused firmly to accept this status was a small community of Orthodox Jews. They never wavered in their faith that God would restore Jerusalem to his chosen people in his own good time, on terms not of political success but of righteousness. Political success quickly took the Zionists to the gates of Jerusalem. They are still waiting to get in. Nine years is not a long wait for a religious Jew, but it is long for a political Zionist.

Some of those Zionists are probably asking themselves now whether perhaps the orthodox Jews may not have been right, for Jews, like Christians, if they have any religious faith left, are seldom happy for long about politics in the pulpit, even when they agree with the politics. Not so the Muslim. If he does not agree with the preacher's politics, he can go to another mosque. But he cannot hope to challenge political preachers as such. Islam started as a theocracy with every department of human activity subject to the will of God as interpreted by his Prophet, Mohammed. Theocracy did not last long after the Prophet's death, but the principle survives and so does the Prophet's interpretation, the Koran. When a Muslim preacher mounts the pulpit, he is handed a sword which he holds during the sermon. In Christian political theory,

the State ought to put its power at the Church's service, including the power of the sword, but the Church must not itself wield the sword. There is no such distinction in Islam ; the State is the Church, or ought to be. Catholics may be worried over the political activities attributed to certain medieval and Renascence Popes. Muslims would not be worried by them, no more than they (or at all events most of them) were worried by the recent activities of that extraordinary prince of the Muslim church, Haj Amin el Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem in the 1930's, whose political legend could compete with that of any of the Borgias, and who to this day is probably the most feared man in the Arab world.

* * *

The failure of the Arab League in 1948 to destroy Israel at its inception has a bearing on the study of Islam as a defence against Communism. Seven Arab states, the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Egypt, declared war on Israel and all, except the Yemen, invaded Palestine in force greater than the Jews could muster. All, except Transjordan and Iraq, were defeated and driven out within a few months. The Transjordan Arab Legion managed to hold the Old City of Jerusalem and the hills south of it for about 20 miles ; the Iraqis held the hills to the north about twice as far. Later the Iraqi army withdrew, and the Jordan Army, as the Arab Legion is now called, took over all that was left of Palestine. The defeated Arabs have ever since been making excuses and seeking scapegoats. The Egyptian excuse was inadequate military supplies and their scapegoat was King Farouk and his family, who were alleged to have used for private purposes the money voted for the purchase of arms and equipment. The recent ignominious defeat inflicted by the Jews on the Egyptian government's new army, lavishly equipped by Russia, is sufficient commentary on the Egyptian story.

The real cause of the Arab failure in 1948 was disunity. Jealousy and mistrust among the heads of the Arab states prevented the effective co-ordination of military effort which could have brought overwhelming force to bear upon the Jews from all sides at once. What concerns us here is not the details of conflicts, regional, national and personal, that caused this disunity, but the fact that religion, with everything in its favour, failed to over-ride them. The Arab attack on the Jews could have been the nearest thing to a Muslim Jihad, or Holy War, that the world has seen for many centuries. Probably Jews, like Christians, are not legitimate objects of a Jihad, for they are protected by the very words of the Prophet as "People of the Book". But against this traditional protection there was the certain fact that the Zionists were, as a body, without faith in their own Bible. They were modernists, socialists, agnostics. Many of them were quite blatantly atheists of the Marxist type. The minority who believed in their religion and practised

it were Zionist mainly in the religious sense which I have already described. Even though they, or some of them, were prepared to use political means up to a certain point, they had not handed over their consciences to the nationalist heresy that the end justified any means. But as far as the Arabs could see, such Jews might as well not be there, for all the influence they had on the main body of Zionists.

I could see for myself that in Palestine nationalism was the dominant driving-force, with religion trying frantically to keep up the pace and having lost all sense of its own moderating function in doing so. There had been moderates among the Palestinian Muslims, but with a man like the Mufti of Jerusalem at the head of religious affairs, most of them had learned that this kind of moderation was not good for the health, and had decided to remain alive at all costs to their consciences. I could judge the other Arab countries only from specimens of their local newspapers which were circulated by Army Intelligence for our information. I got the impression that some of them were dragging their feet over the liberation of the sacred land of Palestine.

It was fairly clear that the Lebanon was. It has a population half-Muslim, half-Christian. One of its chief Christian prelates greatly embarrassed Palestinian Christians by a public statement in favour of the Zionists. The fact that he could make it at all showed that neither the Christians nor the Muslims in the Lebanon were greatly concerned with the fate of Palestine. King Abdullah of Transjordan, the shrewdest of all the Arab leaders, was concentrating on one objective, the capture of Jerusalem, and succeeded. The Egyptian government, who knew perfectly well that this was Abdullah's aim, manoeuvred to keep him from it and failed. Saudi Arabia's mainly illiterate population had little use for newspapers so that source of information was not available, but we had means of knowing that King Ibn Saud had not the slightest intention of picking chestnuts out of the fire for his old enemies, the Hashemite sovereigns of Transjordan and Iraq. Whatever they were in, he would be out of, Jihad or no Jihad.[1]

Only in Syria and perhaps in Iraq did one seem to find a fanatical nationalism comparable to that of the Palestinians, and it was political, not religious, in tone. The Yemen at the far end of the primitive Arab peninsula simply did not count. Yet in all the Arab newspapers the stock-phrases declaring the complete unity of the Arab states and their singleness of purpose and inflexible determination to liberate the sacred land of Palestine were repeated like an everlasting litany, as they are to-day and will be to-morrow. But there will be no Holy War, neither to-morrow nor after. There was none against godless Zionism ; there will be none against godless Communism.

[1]He did nevertheless send a token force of a few hundreds, which made no difference.

It was the combined voting-power in U.N.O. of Russia and the U.S.A. that set up Israel as an independent state in 1948. Having achieved their immediate object, getting rid of Britain in that part of the Middle-East, the Russians cleverly switched their support to the Arabs. The U.S.A. continued to support Israel until the end of President Truman's second period, and at the same time tried to conciliate Egypt and the other Arabs by supporting unofficially the attempts to undermine the British position on the Suez Canal. This seemed to the Arabs a wonderful chance of playing off one powerful foreign country against another, which is the traditional Oriental diplomatic game, and they are at it ever since. If there were no " threat " from Russia, there would be no aid from the U.S.A. The game is to keep the threat and the aid nicely balanced. So far the game has gone well. The U.S.A. has turned against Israel and has openly opposed Britain. Russia has given lavish military supplies and more are coming. Religion has very little to say to all this and can only contribute its blessing, which it does very heartily, apparently without any twinges of conscience over these openings for godless Communists which the game must provide. The Muslim is always confident in his own ability to sup safely with the devil, and he does not worry about having a long spoon or a short spoon.

If Muslims were worried about the threat of Communism to their religion, they would not have allowed the scandalous exploitation of Palestinian refugees to go on, as it went on so long since May 1948. Those unfortunate people could have been re-settled outside Palestine for less money than has been spent on their maintenance in demoralizing idleness. The refugee camps, in which some 700,000 men and women have grown to an estimated million and more by natural increase, are well known to be breeding-grounds for Communism in the Arab world. But the refugees were used as a political pawn for years by the Arab governments, who would not help to get them re-settled lest, they said, their re-settlement in other lands should prejudice their claim to restoration to their own land now unjustly occupied by Jews.

I was in Haifa where the biggest exodus of refugees took place in April 1948 after the town was captured by the Jews. I helped the refugees with the means which the Army put at my disposal. I tried to reason with some of them about the advisability of leaving home as they were doing. They would not listen. They were so sure that they would return soon to their homes in the wake of a conquering Arab Army of Liberation. We knew that the Arabs were already beaten : the battle of Haifa was decisive. We tried to assure them of protection, and I believe we could have protected them even after we had gone, because the Jews were dismayed at the disappearance from Haifa of three-fourths of its Arab population and were offering terms on which they could remain. An agreement concluded under our auspices would

probably be honoured, if only for economic reasons. I have before me the official figures for the Catholic population of Haifa in 1947 and 1950. They are 17,300 and 4,700. The Muslims and other native Christian denominations, as far as I could see, left in much the same proportions, and all were certain that the Arab governments could and would redeem their pledges for the liberation of Palestine.

Many of them were men with good education and professional qualifications. They have the intelligence to see now how they were misled, but have not the courage to say so and to face the consequences of their mistaken trust. If they had declared that the refugees ought to accept re-settlement outside of Palestine, not only would they be howled down as traitors ; they probably would feel like traitors. Such is the pressure of public opinion, inflamed by exaggerated nationalism, not only outside but in the refugee-camps themselves, that all plans for large-scale re-settlement have come to nothing. The head of the Pontifical Mission for the Relief of Palestine, Monsignor McMahon, in a statement made before the U.S.A. Congress in July 1951, urged the need to solve the problem at the roots instead of maintaining the camps hand-to-mouth and year-to-year. Other Christian organizations working in the camps have all said the same. The voice of Islam has scarcely been heard, except to repeat the slogans of that intransigent nationalism which was largely responsible for the misery of the refugees at the start, and for keeping most of them in it since.[1]

The facts which I have described may give the impression that I consider Islam as a religion to be a spent force, reduced to selling its blessings to a powerful nationalist movement in the hope of recovering its influence with the people. So might a Muslim Arab, resident in France during the same years as I lived in Arab countries, seeing that Christianity had lost its hold on the French working-class, take the view that the Church in France was finished and that the *Prêtres-ouvriers* movement was a futile attempt to climb on the Socialist band-waggon —especially when he saw that certain exaggerations of the movement brought it into conflict with the Church's supreme authority. He would be wrong about Christianity and I should be wrong about Islam, if we had drawn such conclusions.

I believe that Islam has still great latent power for good among many simple people whom Christianity does not touch. Newman believed that it would be a bad day for religion when the Protestant Church of

[1]An Egyptian newspaper, the weekly *Rose el Yussef*, of 8 April 1957, reports the Iraqi foreign minister as saying in an interview to some American journalists in Bagdad : " The problem of the refugees is a political card used by Egypt. Iraq alone could absorb all Palestinian refugees . . . Iraq will agree to make all Palestinian refugees Iraqi citizens ". The Egyptian paper printed this as an anti-Iraq item indicating how Iraq is letting the side down—or the cat out of the bag. Even if Iraq were sincere in this late offer, it is doubtful if many of the refugees would venture to accept it.

England would lose its hold on the English people : they would not, as a body, turn to Catholicism but to paganism. Something the same may be said of Islam and the Arabs.

But having said so much in the interests of truth and fairness, I want to point out that the defence of civilization against Communism may be a useful by-product, but it is not the purpose of religion as such. Considering Islam as a possible defence against Communism, not as a religion, I think that its totalitarian structure is just what Communism wants in order to get hold of the Middle-East. Its theoretical identification of Church and State leaves it wide open to totalitarian politics in the guise of religious, nationalist or humanitarian reforms. We know how well Communist propaganda has succeeded in persuading many Christians that atheism is a detachable part of Communism, and that the rest of Communist doctrine may be held by Christians as a political opinion. The sincere Christian who is thus deceived may find a second line of defence against the totalitarian state in the Christian belief that there are things which are not Caesar's. Once the sincere Muslim is allowed to worship Allah, all his religious defences against Communism are down. He may not like the Communist version of the totalitarian state, but he cannot logically object on religious grounds ; the ideal Muslim state is totalitarian. There are no things in it which are not Caesar's. If Caesar happens to be a Communist, it is all his, just as it was when Caesar was the Khalifa, the vicar of Allah on earth, provided Communism comes to some such settlement with Islam as it has made with the Orthodox Church in Russia.

* * *

The totalitarian Muslim state is the professed aim of a powerful organization called the "Muslim Brothers", sometimes referred to as IEM from the initial letters of their Arabic title "Ikhwan el Muslamun". They were founded in Egypt by a country schoolmaster, Hasan el Banna, before World War II. He seems to have been a sincerely religious man, who was distressed by the modern Egyptian's falling away from the traditions of Islam under the influence of nineteenth-century Europe, which came in with the Suez Canal in the second half of the century. Long after it was moribund in Europe that influence remained in Egypt as it had been in its European hey-day: secularist, materialist, sceptical in religious belief but credulous in its acceptance of catchwords like science and progress, and of parliamentary government as a remedy for all human ills. Hasan el Banna had good reason to doubt the value of this, as Europe has since discovered and as Egypt has yet to learn. He did not find his countrymen responding well to his appeal for " the revival of a purely Islamic government and the building-up of Muslim society according to the laws of Islam", meaning, for the average

man, no wine, no tobacco, no cards, cinemas or dances. Like Aldous Huxley's "Grey Eminence", he was too easily persuaded that compulsion was necessary, and that therefore political power was necessary, in order to build the heavenly kingdom on earth. He had more excuse than Père Joseph, but he paid for his mistake with his life in a spate of political assassination started by his followers after the Palestine war of 1948.

His movement fell into the hands of men who were shrewd enough to see that the weakness of El Banna's religious revival could be remedied by an alliance with nationalism. They worked out a simple formula, not unknown in Christian countries, on these lines. Every patriotic Egyptian should be a good Muslim. Christianity is the religion of foreign enemies. An Egyptian who is a Christian is a traitor to Egypt. Jews were later included as foreign enemies and native traitors. This crude appeal to religious bigotry and nationalist prejudice was much more effective than the call back to primitive Islam. The people of the Book were thus deprived, by modern politicians and in the name of religion and nationalism, of the Prophet's protection. This is a mild sample of the casuistry by which the Muslim Brothers find in the Koran what suits their political book. They could easily find Marxism in it by similar methods, or enough of it to justify an alliance with Russian Communists against Christians or Jews, as happened in the Cairo riots of January 1952.

The Cairo Communists foresaw in 1951 that the Egyptian government, as soon as it ran into real trouble with the British on the Canal, would take revenge on the resident British community in Cairo and Alexandria. This would take the form of riots, apparently spontaneous expressions of popular indignation and actually organized by government agents, who passed the word around to the right people that the police would be looking the other way if they wanted to loot some British shops and beat-up some foreign Christians. It was a well-established way of doing things. But it was never let go so far as might cause drastic reaction by the British government, and this point was nicely calculated and seldom passed. The Communists decided to take charge of those riots and carry them well beyond that point. The Polish diplomatic representatives in Cairo, no doubt on orders from Russia, lent a hand in organizing them. Somebody got the bright idea of getting the Muslim Brothers to join in. That invitation was accepted without scruple. While the Communists were destroying the resorts of capitalists in the shopping-centre, the Brethren could destroy bars, dance-halls and cinemas, where the native Egyptian enjoyed himself contrary to the rules of the Koran. So it was done on 26 January 1952. Between lunch and tea-time one quarter of the modern shopping-centre of Cairo was looted and burned-out. The damage was estimated at over 20 million

Egyptian pounds.[1] Most of the destruction was done to native and foreign property other than British, but eight British men and one woman were murdered.

Egyptians ought to be grateful to King Farouk who forced his prime minister, Mustapha Nahas, to declare martial law that evening and to send the army to disperse the rioters before they could do more harm to life and property. What purpose the riots were meant to achieve remains obscure. The result that they produced was to disgrace Egypt before the civilized world. Protests came in from France, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Austria, Holland, Turkey, India, Brazil, Argentine, U.S.A., Iran, Poland, all of whose nationals had suffered losses or injuries in the riots. The new Egyptian government of Ali Maher, who succeeded Nahas, in its reply spoke of a " subversive plan to sow terror and devastation in the capital of Egypt " and voted five million pounds as a first instalment towards compensation of foreigners.

The hand of the Muslim Brotherhood was evident in the destruction. Out of some 700 buildings looted and destroyed, places of amusement reprobated by them in the name of the Koran were in high proportion. The official list had ninety-two bars, seventy-two dance halls, forty cinemas. A number of cafés were also broken up, probably because they allowed gambling, for coffee-drinking is hardly a sin in Egypt even to the Brotherhood. But the excellent organization of the riots showed the Communist touch. A Polish diplomat was expelled soon after from Cairo. That would indicate one source of the expert advice behind the plan to wreck the city. A similar plan to wreck Egypt's second city, Alexandria, was frustrated by its governor who on his own responsibility declared martial law in time.

It would seem that both Communists and Muslim Brothers were prepared to throw their country into anarchy and then contend for power, regardless of consequences. As had happened in August 1939 when the totalitarian Nazis of Germany made their bargain for the ruin of Europe with the totalitarian Communists of Russia, so it happened in Egypt between the godless Communists and the worshippers of Allah who had only their totalitarianism and their anti-Christian fanaticism in common. We have not seen the last of such bargains, I fear, nor of the disasters that follow them, in the Middle-East.

* * *

One would normally assume that all these facts had been duly reported to the State Department in Washington and there duly weighed. But the American tendency to fit facts into a preconceived political framework makes one fear for the facts which do not seem to fit. When

[1]Egypt is in the dollar area and the Egyptian pound was worth more than the pound sterling. The IEM went too far when they tried to assassinate Colonel Nasser in October 1954, and were banned in Egypt. The ban has not worried them much in Egypt, and in other Arab countries not at all.

President Wilson in 1919 wanted to find out Arab feeling about his proposed mandatory system for Palestine, he sent two Americans to investigate and report. They were Mr Crane and Mr King. What their qualifications were, did not appear. In a recent book on the Middle-East, Mr White, a friend of the President, is recorded as saying : " The President felt that these two men were particularly qualified to go to Syria because they knew nothing about it."[1] This was not intended as criticism, but as praise of Wilson's care for impartiality. No doubt impartiality is important, but in Arab countries ignorance may be too high a price for it. Americans are said to be quick to learn from their mistakes. This is all right when there is a wide margin of safety in which mistakes can be corrected before they are overtaken by disaster. That margin is not wide in the Middle-East.

American policy in the Middle-East was formerly closer to realities. Given time, it will surely find its way back. Given time. The following once appeared in an English newspaper, *The Observer*, of 21 July 1805 :

> The Americans, to their infinite honour, have triumphed over that petty African tyranny to which the several states of Europe have so long submitted and supported by their inglorious and impolitic subsidies.
> Colonel Eaton, having landed with a body of Marines, etc., from the American squadron in Egypt, advanced into Tripolitan territory and after some severe contests, in which he was wounded in the arm by a musket ball and in which many of his people fell, he carried Derna and Benghasi by assault. The Tripolitans, alarmed at this success, immediately made overtures of peace, proposing to liberate Capt. Bainbridge and the people of the Philadelphia, etc.

This brave and successful operation is commemorated by the United States Marines in their famous march, " From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli ". But to-day many English and most American newspapers would probably call it gunboat-diplomacy. The " subsidies ", which were inglorious and impolitic when paid by European sovereigns to the Dey of Algiers and the Karamanli rulers of the Barbary coast in those days, would now be called generous and wise measures of financial assistance to impoverished natives who had been driven to a little piracy by foreign exploitation. Instead of " overtures of peace " and offers to set free the American sailors of the *Philadelphia,* there would be an appeal to U.N.O. against aggression by the Dey and the Karamanlis. The wheel has come round very near full circle since 1805. Perhaps we shall see an American newspaper returning to Britain the compliment paid by the 19th century *Observer,* if we are allowed to live long enough, and America is allowed to learn.

[1]Elie Kedourie : *England and The Middle-East*, p. 141.

No doubt Washington has had expert advice on the Middle-East. Thus the Visiting Professor of Arabic in the University of Princeton speaks in the latest edition of his book on Islam of the " ill-informed fear of some European writers that the Islamic peoples may become Communists", and calls it utterly unfounded. The example which he selects to demonstrate this view shows that he is not an expert in present Communist technique. It is the Bolshevik regime in Turkestan, where the Communists tried the out-of-date method of direct attack on religion, burning the Koran, pulling down mosques, executing religious leaders. He says that the liberation of Turkestan from Russian rule will without doubt lead to an Islamic revival. Quite likely, on two conditions, both unlikely : that liberation will come soon ; that the Communists have not before then succeeded with the same tactics as enslaved the Orthodox Church in Russia, after persecution had failed.

I have given a number of examples from my own experience of Islam in the Arab countries that I know. They show religion bowing in every case to the prevailing political winds, which happened to be nationalist, even to the extent of allying itself with godless Communists against Christians, in the name of Arab nationalism. I am not concerned with the extent to which the Arab nations may or may not resist Communism, but with the nature of that resistance. It will hardly be religious, whatever else it may be. It may even find religion working against it and in favour of Communism, as now in Russia. That will depend, I think, on how far the Arab Communists and fellow-travellers succeed in attaining political power and look like winning complete control. Totalitarian Islam and totalitarian Communism must compromise in order to coexist. The result will probably be a national-socialist regime with religion reduced to the status of a civil servant, such as Hitler aimed at and Stalin achieved. It will begin in Egypt or in Syria and will try, too late, to escape from Russia without giving up Communism. What will happen in the other Arab states will depend on whether the U.S.A. realizes in time that, although Communism cannot be stopped by force alone, it cannot be stopped without it.

Russell and the Great Mystery

SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH

by E. F. O'DOHERTY

IT is fairly obvious that if there is no such thing as " soul ", there can be no such thing as immortality[1]. One could still argue and reason about the " eternity " of matter[2] but the eternity of matter, either backwards or forwards in time, is irrelevant to the question : do I survive the death of the body ?

The problem of the eternity of the world, in so far as reason can cope with it, can be put very simply. Since God always is, in an eternal *nunc,* the act of creation of a finite universe (speaking anthropomorphically) could have occurred at any " point " in God's existence, or could have been " co-terminous " with the existence of God. The fact that this was not the case is not known from reason but from revelation. The possibility of eternity " forwards " in time follows from the difference between transformation and annihilation of matter. Transformations of matter are familiar. Hydrogen and oxygen " become " or are " changed into " water. There is a loss of energy ; but it is not simply reduced to nothingness. The energy is taken up by something else.

The notion of nothingness is difficult. It is not just a blank surrounded by something else, as one might think when considering the possibility of a perfect vacuum. There is no known instance of " reduction to nothingness " in the physical world, any more than there is of creation. But the loose and inaccurate use of the word " annihilation " in connection with atomic energy has led the public to think that matter is literally " annihilated " or reduced to nothingness. In fact it is converted into energy, and energy is still a phenomenon of the physical material world. The loose use of " annihilation " is parallelled by the equally loose use of the word " creation ", e.g. by Fred Hoyle, who thinks that matter is being " eternally created " when what he means apparently is that energy is constantly being transformed into " matter ".

There is no known instance of annihilation (in the literal sense) in the physical universe. Appeals to thermodynamics will not help : entropy may mean the cessation of all movement and change, but it is not the same as " ceasing to be ". Nor does it help to speculate on

[1] This article is complementary to " Russell and the Great Mystery " in *Studies,* Spring 1957.

[2] cf. Russell in *Mysticism and Logic* : " Brief and powerless is Man's life ; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way . . . ."

the possibility of a bomb superior to the H-bomb, of such power, or instigating a chain reaction of such magnitude, that our universe would be " annihilated ". For, once again, the position is that our universe would be converted into something else : energy, perhaps, but I leave that to the physicists. Such an event might be the end of " our world ", but not necessarily the end of " the world ". We must take it that, as far as human reason can penetrate the problem, matter could be eternal. Annihilation is the prerogative of divine power, the correlative of creation.

If it is assumed, as Russell seems to assume, that man is nothing but matter, then his " eternity " will follow from the eternity of matter itself. But of course Russell would agree that his continuity as a person would cease. The continuing in existence of the atoms or particles of which I am composed is not at all the same as *my* continuing in existence. It seems that if Russell wished to be completely consistent, his argument could have been stated in a few sentences : " I am nothing but a collection of elementary particles organized in a particular way. It is manifest that this organization breaks down. But the particles go on existing. This is not immortality. But there is nothing else. Therefore there is no immortality ". But the concepts of *me*, ego, self, person, are hard to get rid of. Consciousness and mental life are equally difficult to get rid of. Hence the inevitable falling back on a discussion of memory and continuity, rather than a straight statement of the materialist hypothesis.

The " reduction " of man to a group of elementary particles or, more generally, the elimination of any difference between living and non-living matter has become a habitual mode of thought with many. Sherrington (*Man on His Nature*), though he does not subscribe to this doctrine, states it very well. Referring to a well-known passage where Eddington speaks of his table and of his elbow resting on it, Sherrington says :

> True, there is between the elbow and the table the difference that the one is ' living ' and the other is dead. Chemistry and physics say nothing of this. Or rather they say a great deal about it, but do not in saying it make use of either of these words. If we tell them that the table was at one time living wood and is now dead wood, that the wood was at one time part of a living tree, they do not recognize the word as conveying any radical distinction between the two . . . Chemistry says that neither in the one case nor in the other does it find anything or any behaviour which is not chemical.

And again Pirenne (*British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 11, 8) makes an important point : " An examination of physics *qua* physics gives no indication that the new physical laws should not apply to the

components of the human body". But neither does Pirenne accept the materialist hypothesis. It would be interesting, but perhaps unprofitable, to compile a list of quotations from Eddington, Einstein, Hinshelwood, Adrian, each of whom in his own way states the problem and rejects the materialist hypothesis, very often, as with Sherrington, by doing violence to his own scientific thinking. Sherrington is prepared to accept the theoretically impossible, as he puts it: that is to say, he accepts the physico-chemical account of man, the reality of mind, the impossibility that mind and matter should affect one another, but accepts in addition that in fact they do so. This would appear to be the position of many contemporaries—a sort of reversion to an Averroist "double-truth" theory.

* * *

The way out of the apparent impasse depends on hard philosophical thinking. The impasse derives from what Ryle has called the "Official Doctrine", "Descartes' Myth", "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". This myth he derives not only from Descartes, but also from "Scholastic and Reformation theology", "Stoic-Augustinian theories of the will", "Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the intellect" (*The Concept of Mind*, 1949, page 23). Reasoning better than he realized, he reverted to what is in essence (though not in detail or in the consequences he draws from it) a good thomistic concept of man as one being. St Thomas's problem was not: how is soul as spirit related to a body existing in its own right so that the product is man? This was Plato, St Augustine, Scotus, Descartes and I fear many who would even still claim to follow St Thomas's teaching. But rather: given that this being, sitting or standing in front of me, is Socrates, how is it that the following propositions can all be true about him at the same time: he weighs 180 lbs., he is subject to the law of gravity, he grows, he sees, he feels, he thinks? In philosophical terms this is the problem: how is it that one and the same being can sustain apparently contradictory predicates—he is matter, he is spirit?

The solution of Plato and the others listed above consisted always in saying: there is no contradiction. He is really two beings, and some of these predicates are true of one of these beings and the others are true of the other. But St Thomas will have none of this. Perhaps his greatest, but certainly his most controversial, contribution to the philosophy of the middle ages was his rejection, long before Ryle, of the dogma of the ghost in the machine.

His solution is a psycho-physical composite, neither of whose components is a complete being: the same kind of composition which is found in every other creature in the physical universe, a composition between a formal and a material principle. But this must not be thought of as a simple combination of "organization" with "elementary

particles". It is a metaphysical union of principles of being. This is not an out-moded solution but a grievously misunderstood one. The theory of elementary particles in no wise upsets it. For if there really are elementary particles, they will be themselves so composed. And if there are not (Schrödinger apparently thought there were not: see "Are there Elementary Particles?", *Endeavour*, 1950; *Brit. Jour. Phil. Science*, 1952. Dingle has called them "physical symbols", and most physicists think of them apparently as conceptual constructions; but the public does not know this) they cannot upset the theory of co-principles of being.

It is not my intention to engage in a dispute with modern physics. But a word on this problem may not be out of place here since it is often contended that modern physics, and especially its applications in cybernetics, has radically altered the problems involved in a philosophy of man. It is worth noting that this has not happened through pronouncements of the great physicists, but rather through the popularized versions which the public has access to. Thus, in spite of many disclaimers on the part of all the great physicists, many still believe the billiard-ball analogy of the atom, and many who would reject this in the case of the atom appear to cling to it still in endeavouring to understand the elementary particles. It is assumed by many that these particles are durable little things with individuality, and that we are composed of such "little things". But Schrödinger laid down categorically that "(a particle) is *not* a durable little thing with individuality" (*Brit. Jour. Phil. Science*, 1952). According to Max Born, who described this view-point as "reactionary", Schrödinger has "right from the beginning", taken the view that "there are no particles, no stationary states, and no transitions" (1953). Schrödinger in fact went even further: there are not even "waves"; "The waves are not quite real waves"; "Whatever meaning we may give to the dangerous epithet 'real', all quantitative models or images conceived by the physicist are, epistemologically, only mathematical devices for computing observable events . . . . ."

The explanatory value of elementary particles is of course beyond question, and one can only admire and be grateful to the physicists for their achievements. But, in sheer logic, it should be pointed out that a concept or set of concepts which "explain" something are not thereby shown to have an ontological counterpart. "Phlogiston" and "ether" are classical examples of concepts which appeared for a time to "explain" phenomena, but which were subsequently abandoned for lack of any reality corresponding. Some "explanatory concepts" are "logical fictions". Russell instances geometrical points and instants of time, but there are others. The cycles and epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy turned out to be logical fictions, and "the unconscious" in contemporary

psychology will be seen on reflection to be a good example of an " explanatory concept " which, however convinced one might be of its reality, might turn out to be a logical fiction. For the independent demonstration of its existence turns out to be " impossible by definition ".[1]

It is true that most physicists tend to eschew the Schrödinger articles, but then it is also true that most physicists prescind from any discussion of the " real existence " of elementary particles. Their position appears to be expressible in some such form as this : " Something " exists, and these are the explanatory concepts which render it intelligible and (to some extent) controllable. This statement is in no sense intended as a reflection on physics or physicists, but only to show that, in spite of *a priori* assumptions to the contrary, the elementary particles do not raise new philosophical problems in the philosophy of man. For it was always clear (except perhaps to panpsychists) that the organism is material—so that whatever is true of matter will be true of the organism.

The fact that the organism is subject to the law of gravity but that " thought " is not so subject raises the same *philosophical* problems as are raised by cybernetics or the quantum theory. For the problem is : how can this one individual being, man, or Socrates, whose organism is material (whatever matter is), be also at one and the same time a " thinking thing " ? The term " thinking thing " is of course Descartes's term, but it is used here without prejudice to the theories of Descartes. The watershed which divides all philosophies of man is found right here. For either one assumes that " matter " can think, or that it cannot. The fact of thinking is indisputable, but the assumption that matter can think can only be made either by a purely verbal supposition or by ignoring the nature of thinking itself. One could never explain what thinking is to a being who did not already know in some way what thinking is, since the very fact of explanation involves a conscious cognitive receptive being, who already knows something and moreover knows that it knows. It is easy of course to make suppositions and to suppose that thought is something other than thought : e.g. that it is an electronic process in a complex machine. But all attempts at " reducing " thought to non-cognitive elements will prove unsatisfactory as long as the person who makes the supposition retains conscious awareness, that is as long as he " knows that he knows ". A little reflection will show that this line of speculation will lead to the conclusion that

[1] The point is that whatever can be experienced by mind must be a conscious phenomenon. It is therefore impossible to experience the unconscious, which must therefore remain a postulate. It is postulated to explain other phenomena (conscious ones). But it is always logically possible to discover other postulates which would explain the same phenomena (perhaps even better). Hence the unconscious is a logical construction, and might turn out to be a logical fiction (though of course this is unlikely).

whatever the relation of psychological functions to physiological factors, they are not the *same as* the physiological factors.

* * *

Just as there could be no immortality if there were no soul, so also there could be no immortality if the soul had not already a real existence of its own, or if it were composed of whatever matter is composed of. For the only " immortality " of matter is the tenuous possible " eternity " of its parts, and something which is dependent for its existence on a particular organization of matter or material particles cannot survive the disintegration of such organization. The fact that matter as such does not " think " but that man in fact " thinks " is the basis of the argument which establishes the required propositions about soul, viz., that it has real existence of its own and that it is not composed of matter.

With regard to the *possibility* of survival after death, there is an interesting reflection to be made. It is very often asserted in connection with the question " can matter think ? " that whereas we know a great deal about what matter can do, any assertion about what it *cannot* do must be invalid on grounds of apriorism. The assertion that the soul cannot survive the body can be countered by the same reasoning : we know a great deal about soul and what it can do, but any assertion about what it *cannot* do (e.g. that it cannot survive the body) must be invalid on grounds of apriorism. But those who put forward the former argument are not inclined to accept the latter, even though the logic of both is the same ; or they are tempted to fall back on a simple agnosticism, protesting that they do not know. I am not suggesting that either argument is valid, but only that consistency demands the acceptance or rejection of both. The latter does not establish immortality (or even the possibility of it) any more than the former establishes the fact or possibility that matter can think. But it has a specious plausibility. The assertion that matter cannot think does not depend simply on what we do not know about matter, but rather on what we do know about thought.

The *possibility* of survival can be established fairly directly. If soul is what we have been contending it is, viz., something with an existence of its own and an activity of its own (thought), and is not an organization of matter, it will be seen that it *could* continue to exist : for these three assertions add up to the notion of immaterial substance. There is no way of establishing this " scientifically " (in Russell's sense of the word). But it is worth recalling that the logic of the thinking involved is the same as that of the scientist who investigates matter. For he infers from the observable (e.g. the tracks on a photographic plate) to the unobservable (the inner constitution of matter) ; just as the philosopher infers from the observable (the behaviour of man, including thought) to the unobservable (immaterial substance).

The notion of immaterial substance is foreign both to the scientific mind and the empiricist philosopher. Yet the scientific mind (as witness : Sherrington, Adrian, Hinshelwood, Eddington, Einstein and others) finds it easier to accept (even if for the wrong reasons) than does the empiricist philosopher. Compare, for example, Hinshelwood and Ayer. In an essay entitled " Chemistry and Modern Thought " (1953) Professor Sir Cyril Hinshelwood, F.R.S., says : " It may reasonably be said that a purely materialist attitude (to ' the age-old problem of the relation of mind and matter ') seems rather more hopeless than ever . . . . " ; and in a larger work (1951) he appeals to the thomistic theory of angels to illustrate a point about the internal construction of the atom. Professor Ayer on the other hand, in his *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956), finds the notion of spiritual substance unintelligible. " A view which I have not considered is that people are differentiated from one another . . . by being different spiritual substances, or souls. And the reason why I have not considered it is that I do not find it intelligible." (page 209) But this statement of his is not really very good philosophizing, since " intelligible " has a technical meaning in Ayer (it means something like " capable of withstanding the sort of test which would apply to sensory experience "—but that is my own phrase, not Professor Ayer's). And we have already stated that by definition, as it were, this sort of test could not apply. The second reason why Ayer's statement is not very good philosophizing is that to say that one does not find something to be intelligible may very well be a statement about oneself, not about that which is said to be unintelligible.

The question, "does this immaterial (or ' spiritual ') substance actually survive the death of the body ? ", cannot be answered by experiment. And it can be answered in the negative either by a *nego suppositum* argument or by a statement of impossibility. The *nego suppositum* argument would run : " By asking the question, you are supposing that there is such a thing as a spiritual substance. But I deny your supposition. Therefore there is no actual survival." The discussion thereupon ceases to be a discussion about immortality and reverts to one about the possibility of there being spiritual substances.

The second form the answer might take is this : " It is impossible that anything should exist apart from matter. Therefore even if there is a spiritual component in man (but in fact, the argument would usually but not necessarily go on, there is not) it could not survive the death of the body." This could very well have been the thinking of the Sadducees, or the Greeks with whom St Paul contended in the Areopagus : *cum audissent autem resurrectionem mortuorum, quidam quidem irridebant* . . . (Acts. 17). This argument clearly depends on the assertion that it is impossible that anything should exist apart from matter. But there is no way in which this proposition could be shown to be true. Either it must be

assumed dogmatically (which is not good empiricism) or else some proposition which implies it must be assumed. The usual empiricist assumption which is alleged to imply the required proposition is of the form : only what is given in sensory experience exists. This in fact is the essence of empiricism. But neither can *it* be shown to be true, since there is no sensory test which could possibly be appealed to in order to establish it ; and yet a sensory test is the only sort of test allowed in empiricism.

Instead of asking the question in the form " does the soul survive the body ? " it can be asked in the form : " does the soul cease to be ? " and in this form it becomes much more manageable. For if one can state the ways in which things cease to be, and then show that these do not apply to the soul, it will follow that it does not cease to be, i.e. that it is immortal. It is important to remember, however, that there is an enormous difference between a thing's ceasing to be, on the one hand, and its ceasing to be *what it is,* on the other. Our only experience of " ceasing to be " is in fact the experience of things ceasing to be what they are. That is to say, we experience change, transformation, resolution into parts, reduction to elements, molecules, atoms or particles. The argument that the soul does not cease to be has a deductive or *a priori* appearance in the form in which it is usually presented, because it is usually presented in a truncated form. In fact it is essentially an inductive piece of reasoning on the basis of experience.

There is one further point : a thing can cease to be *red,* or *blue,* or *hot* or *cold,* or *large* or *small,* without ceasing either to be or to be what it is. This kind of ceasing-to-be certainly applies to the soul : it ceases to be *conscious,* or to be actively engaged in thinking or feeling, etc. But this is clearly not the kind of ceasing to be which is intended in the question of survival—unless one accepts the Humian doctrine examined in a former article : the doctrine which claims that the soul is nothing but a series of such experiences.[1] But this we have already, in the article referred to, found to be inadequate. On the other hand this kind of ceasing-to-be can help to clear up one difficulty. If the soul were in the same sort of category as " red ", " large " or " hot ", if it were a mere quality or quantity or in general an " accident " of the body, then it would be subject to this kind of ceasing-to-be. There were in fact some nineteenth century philosophers who took this line, and described soul (or more usually " mind ") as an epiphenomenon of the brain. This would still be the point of view, though the terminology might be different, of those who think that electronic brains can " think ". But this means in fact that there is no soul, and if there is no soul there cannot be an immortal soul. Consequently, dealing with this point

[1] Russell and the Great Mystery. *Studies,* Spring 1957.

of view one is not really dealing with immortality, but the larger issue of materialism.

There is another obvious fact about accidents : they can cease to be with the destruction of their " host ". Thus the " shape " of the statue ceases to exist with the destruction of the statue. If the soul were an accident of the body, it could cease to be in some such way as this ; but then it is not an accident of the body ; it is something which has existence and functions of its own. This is clearly not true of the shape of the statue : it has no existence in its own right, and there is nothing it can do of itself. One can of course deny the possibility of immaterial (or " spiritual ") substance as we have seen, but the assertion : " there are no spiritual substances " is incapable of proof. And the denial itself involves the denial of immortality. Consequently, the issue once again is not really the issue of immortality, but the antecedent question of the possibility of spiritual substance.

With regard to things other than accidents, the things for instance which are either red or blue or hot or cold, we have already made the assertion that such things do not *cease to be* in an absolute sense, but only by becoming something else, cease to be what they are. The difference is enormous. It is the difference between essence and existence, between infinite and finite causes, between reduction to parts and reduction to nothingness. With regard to anything which is composed of parts, reduction to its component parts is possible. If there are no parts, such reduction is impossible. The history of the atom illustrates the point clearly. As long as the atom was regarded as the " ultimate " constituent of matter, it was also regarded as irreducible. This is why the " splitting of the atom " seemed to be such an exciting achievement. For the splitting of the atom meant that it was composed of parts (however such composition is to be understood) and meant also, therefore, the abandoning of the supposition that it was an ultimate particle, with consequential recasting of our ideas about matter.

The soul is not composed of parts, has no dimensions, is not quantitative in any way, so that reduction to constituent parts does not arise. The soul has different kinds of functions and different kinds of capacity for carrying out such functions, but a capacity (e.g. intellect) is not a component part but an ability to act in a particular way. This is what is technically called the " simplicity " of the soul, a term which in English can be misleading. But *simplex* as opposed to *complex* carries no such misleading connotations. Complex means composed of parts, but *simplicitas* (from *simplex*) is the quality or property of not having parts. The *simplicitas* of the soul follows from its not being composed of whatever matter is composed of, nor is it a composition of matter and something else. For the former would mean that it was incapable of thought, while the latter simply leads to an infinite regress : if there were such

a composition, it is the " something else ", not the matter in the composition, which would be the soul ; and if this something else is so composed, then again the soul will be the non-material constituent, and so on.

The conclusion must be that the soul does not cease to be by reduction to parts. And the only alternative remaining for consideration is the possibility of ceasing to be outright ; this means annihilation, and the term is used here literally. Does the soul cease to be by its being reduced to nothingness, to non-existence, by an exercise of omnipotent power ? For there is no other way in which annihilation can be achieved. Annihilation is the correlative of creation. The latter means causing something to be where there was nothing; the former is the reverse process ; and neither is within the compass of finite beings. If God does not annihilate the soul, then it does not cease to be. Does he do so ?

There is no doubt that God could, in his omnipotent power, annihilate the soul, and one might as well face the fact. But that he does not do so and will not do so, follows from our knowledge of God, even such knowledge as can be achieved by natural reason without recourse to revelation. For (bearing in mind the difference between finite and infinite, and therefore that our terms are to some extent anthropomorphic, or more accurately are used " analogically ") it can be shown that God is intellect. He does not therefore act without a purpose. He therefore had a purpose in making the soul the kind of thing it is : a spiritual substance, not composed of parts, and therefore not subject to the kind of ceasing-to-be to which other creatures are subject. In other words, he made the soul immortal, and he had a purpose in so doing. If now he annihilates the soul, we are faced with a dilemma : either God had no purpose in creating the soul immortal, or he now defeats his own purpose. And both consequents are absurd in regard to God. Therefore the soul is not annihilated. Therefore it is immortal.

* * *

One must bear in mind the difference between proving a conclusion and winning assent to it. This was Newman's problem in his *Grammar of Assent.* It is quite clear that people assent to the immortality of the soul for reasons other than those of the above line of argument, and others reject it for reasons other than philosophical ones. But when it is contended that reason cannot establish a proposition or, as with Russell, that it establishes its contradictory, it becomes imperative to try once again to vindicate reason. The problem of immortality is the pivot of metaphysic (Marcel's words) in the sense that one's stand on this problem determines one's stand on all problems

of life. Russell in one of his rare emotional passages[1] falls back on a romantic but perhaps unconvincing Stoicism when he contemplates death :

> One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death. Very brief is the time in which we can help them, in which their happiness or misery is decided. Be it ours to shed sunshine on their path, to lighten their sorrows by the balm of sympathy, to give them the pure joy of a never-tiring affection . . . . . Let us remember that they are fellow-sufferers in the same darkness, actors in the same tragedy with ourselves . . . .

The notion that life is a tragedy is echoed in existentialist writings : life is absurd, and *angoisse* is the key to it. It does not matter what you do, since there are no values, no standards, no criteria, by which to judge the value of life or action. You create your own values, in your very strivings for purposes, and whatever purpose you choose gives value to your endeavours to attain it. In the long run, however, you are deceived. The malignant demon of death catches up with you, and destroys both your ends and the means you have taken to achieve them. What matters is neither the ends nor the means you have adopted : they are in themselves valueless anyway. What matters is that you should commit yourself wholeheartedly to your ends and means : *engagement totale* is the clue. If you are going to be a murderer, be a clever one ; a swindler, be a successful one ; a traitor, live for treason. The strength of the existentialist movement in philosophy lies in its consistent logic : in its not flinching from drawing the conclusions to which its premisses point. Sartre himself described it as an attempt to draw all the conclusions of consistent atheism. But many, like Russell, try to have it both ways : to retain atheism and materialism, and at the same time to defend traditional values, even ethical ones. It has often been pointed out that on the materialist hypothesis there can be no values, and Kant even went as far as trying to prove the immortality of the soul by a transcendental deduction from the existence of ethical values. At least this much is true : ethical values would be in the long run meaningless without the concept of immortality.

[1] " A Free Man's Worship " in *Mysticism and Logic.*

The Reluctant Revolutionary

by P. G. WALSH

PROFESSIONAL historians are rightly sceptical about dramatic ' turning-points ' in history ; the truth, they would claim, is almost invariably to be sought in the slow development of changed attitudes, religious, political, or economic. If, for example, we attribute the estrangement from Rome of Eastern Christendom to Leo IX's excommunication of the whole Eastern Church in 1054, we shall be patiently reminded of the long-developing controversies, especially on problems of jurisdiction, which were the fundamental causes of the cleavage. But at the same time we must not underestimate the impact of personality on history at critical junctures ; if at that fateful meeting Cerularius had not been so pig-headed, if the papal legates had not been so arrogant and ignorant, it is *conceivable* that the final separation might never have come to pass.

A similar view must be taken of the revolution in history encompassed by Julius Caesar. This year we commemorate the two-thousandth anniversary of his death : it was on the Ides of March 44 B.C. that Tillius Cimber found a pretext to detain Caesar as he was walking into the Senate. Casca struck first, and all the conspirators followed suit. The Senate was meeting that day in Pompey's theatre in the Campus Martius, and it was at the foot of Pompey's statue that Caesar rolled, the victim of twenty-three dagger-thrusts. So ended his brief period of autocratic rule—the thirty-two months since September 47, during which he assumed direct power over Rome and her empire.

The manner of his death has in itself no wide significance, though Goethe was right to label it the most *senseless* deed ever done, for the conspirators had laid no plans for alternative government. What is significant was his success in replacing an effete and inefficient oligarchical government, incapable of keeping order and avoiding bloodshed, with the foundations of an organization personally directed, which could effectively govern a world-empire in peace and security. This was the decision which determined to a large extent the whole pattern of our European culture, and which under Providence ensured a vehicle for the rapid extension of the Christian faith.

This momentous ' turning-point ' in history should be viewed not as an abrupt, unheralded and totally unexpected phenomenon, but as the final, almost logical outcome of senatorial misrule. For some two

hundred years, whilst the boundaries of empire had been steadily extended, the governing-class had maintained a rigidity of administration more appropriate to a city-state. The only power which the popular assemblies really exercised was in the yearly election of magistrates, and even here the aristocracy was able to arrogate to itself the highest offices. All its energies were devoted to the narrow aim of the maintenance of oligarchical power and wealth. The rapacity of senatorial governors in the provinces, which were scandalously misgoverned and mulcted of their resources, the unwillingness to inaugurate plans for the employment of the population displaced from the land by the nobility's own large-scale investments, and above all the obstinate refusal to extend the franchise were glaring examples of an administration hopelessly introverted and callously indifferent.

The great historians, Sallust and Livy, were of course only partly right when they attributed the decline of the Republic solely to moral degeneration, but this view is fundamentally sound. As Cowell puts it, the Romans " were unable to sink their selfish interests in self-effacing service to a greater cause than their private hopes and ambitions". The picture we obtain of first-century life at Rome would be hardly credible were it not soberly attested. Meetings of the Senate which begin with ribald cat-calls, adversaries spitting at each other, and bouts of physical violence ; law-courts ringed with armed thugs ; the popular assembly electing the magistrates with bribery rife and under threat of open force, so that frequently the voting is postponed ; leading citizens going about their business surrounded by armed bodyguards ; houses burnt down ; the Tiber " full of the corpses of citizens, the sewers choked, the blood streaming from the forum ", as Cicero attests—these are an adequate commentary on first-century politics. " Imagine London ", says Mommsen, " with the slave population of New Orleans, the police of Constantinople, the industrial condition of modern Rome, and the political state of Paris in 1848—then you will have some idea of Republican Rome in its last days."

Historians usually go back to the Gracchi in detecting the first signs of the anti-senatorial revolt which Caesar was finally to encompass some eighty or ninety years later. But to understand Caesar's role as he himself viewed it, we should be wise to keep in mind a much earlier figure of controversy, Scipio Africanus. Africanus, famous as the victor over Hannibal, held a unique position in the hearts of the Romans, and more than any other approximated to the status of the ideal Roman—Cicero calls him *homo prope divinus*. His successes against Hannibal engendered great hostility amongst rival Roman leaders like Fabius Cunctator, who found a convenient handle for attacking him in his alleged addiction to Greek habits. He was impeached in 184, and retired into exile. Later historians, probably at the time of the Gracchi,

depicted him as a martyr to senatorial intrigue, and though this is certainly a distorted view, it is none the less the view which many first-century Romans had of him. So Livy depicts Africanus as saying that if the Senate opposed his projected invasion of Africa, he would put the proposal directly to the people—which is what Caesar did in his consulship of 59, when the Senate rejected his *Leges Iuliae*.

We have seen, then, that the break-down of orderly government, coupled with the gradual rise of anti-senatorial sentiment, made a revolution highly probable, provided that a leader of sufficient stamina and foresight could emerge. The alternative, apart from the extinction of Rome as an imperial power, was the effective reform of Republican government—a contingency extremely remote when we consider the behaviour of the nobility in the fifties, and Cicero's scathing appraisal of their worth. This paper is an attempt to re-assess the character of that leader—a man whose catholicity of talent is surely unrivalled in the history of the West.

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The importance of the role which he has played in the political consciousness of Europe can be measured by the spate of literature which has been published about him, both at Rome in Augustan and post-Augustan times, and throughout Europe during the past seven centuries. This flood shows no sign of subsiding ; on the contrary, the events of the past twenty-five years have focussed our attention more closely on this key-figure, and even Soviet historians are now adding their contributions to the hundreds of studies written in other parts of the world. Inevitably political bias has crept into many of these assessments, as when the pro-Pompeian Livy remarked that " it was uncertain whether Caesar's birth was more beneficial than if he had never been born at all". Theodor Mommsen, writing at a time when German (and Italian) unification was the burning preoccupation of the day, goes to the opposite extreme : " The historian, when once in a thousand years he encounters the perfect, can only be silent regarding it." (How fortunate for Roman historians that this threatened reticence was a mere rhetorical extravagance !) However, whether we share Mommsen's adulation or Livy's scepticism towards Caesar's achievement, a study of his character is of engrossing interest and significance.

Unlike Napoleon, Caesar had the advantage of impressive physique and imposing presence. Suetonius tells us that he was tall and well-proportioned, with full face and dark, penetrating eyes. The well-known contemporary bust (now in the Castello Aglie) emphasizes his strength of countenance, even when allowances are made for the idealizing effect of the late Hellenistic plastic style. The broad, intellectual forehead, the firm mouth and chin make it easy to imagine this man effortlessly holding an audience and inspiring the confidence of his

troops. His strength of mind can be gauged when we remember that he was subject to epileptic fits, and was twice afflicted with them in the field ; yet he did not allow this disability to hinder his career.

Allied with this imposing presence was a friendliness of manner, a *comitas* strongly reminiscent of Polybius's portrait of Scipio Africanus. This is the outstanding impression which we form of Caesar from Cicero's letters, especially those written in the period of the Gallic War, when Caesar sought Cicero's support by the extension of every possible kindness. We find the strongest contrast between the surliness and ambiguousness of Pompey's demeanour and Caesar's open-handed generosity and benevolence. " There is no human being to whose kindness I bear greater witness ", writes Cicero in 54 ; and again, after the assassination he acidly sets the gentle attitude of the dead Caesar against the brutality of his lieutenants : " It would have been less dangerous for me to speak against the rascally crew when the tyrant was alive than it is now that he is dead . . . for me at least his tolerance was simply amazing."

This geniality and kindness is also to be observed in his affection and anxiety for the welfare of his troops. We recall how on one occasion in the Gallic War he sent a young Gaul, Procillus, to negotiate with Ariovistus, and how the German leader treacherously imprisoned him. After the final struggle, in which Ariovistus was routed, Procillus was rescued. Of this incident Caesar writes : " This lucky chance pleased Caesar as much as the victory itself, for Procillus's death, thus averted by fortune, would have marred the joy attendant on so great a victory." Another revealing feature of the *Commentaries* is the praise accorded to subordinate commanders when they are successful, and his lack of bitterness when, like Curio, they sustain a reverse. Curio's defeat in Africa in 49 meant the loss of that province to Caesar, but he is content, without vilifying Curio, to demonstrate the dangers in a commander of over-confidence and failure to confirm rumours. Again, when we read how Roucillus and Egus, the leaders of the Allobrogian contingent, deserted near Dyrrhachium and informed Pompey of the weaknesses in Caesar's lines, we perceive that Caesar is above all deeply pained by their ingratitude to him. And in his personal relationships with the Romans who had opposed or slandered him (like Cicero and Catullus) he shows a remarkable capacity for ungrudging forgiveness.

At the same time there is implicit in Caesar's personal relations with others a tacit sense of moral superiority which militated against intimate friendships. He is the prototype of the kindly headmaster, dealing tolerantly with wayward pupils. " Stop writing on your slate ", says Cicero to a friend who is privately criticizing the Caesarean regime, " the master is coming." Occasionally in the *Commentaries* we feel that Caesar regards his subordinates as errant schoolboys : " The winter

had flown, and the ships and legions from Brundisium had not yet reached Caesar. He thought that several opportunities of crossing had been neglected, so he wrote rather severely (*severius*) to his men . . ." It is amusing, too, to find Vatinius, Caesar's lieutenant, who in December 45 had abandoned a captured Dalmatian town because of inclement weather, writing to Cicero asking him to put in a good word to Caesar on his behalf. He obviously feared a dressing-down in the Head's study ! It was no doubt because of this superior attitude towards his generals, as Schmidt suggests, that so many of them joined the conspirators in 44.

But viewing his personal relationships generally, we are forced to conclude that Caesar was not a man of iron, but a person of considerable sensitivity. How then can we reconcile this humane character, who so often draws attention to his own clemency in contrast to the savagery of such opponents as Bibulus and Labienus, with the general who boasted that in his campaigns he had slaughtered 1,192,000 enemies ? Commentators have often scratched their heads in bewilderment at this paradox, this alternation between humane treatment and the most brutal savagery towards the defeated enemy. Here, as so often, the solution is to be found in ancestral custom. Though Caesar was soaked in Hellenistic culture, and in the enlightened ethos which proclaimed the doctrine of the brotherhood of man, it was a traditional Roman policy which he followed in warfare, a policy to which the benign Scipio Africanus, no less than the brutal Marcellus, had subscribed in the Hannibalic War.

That policy involved the according of mercy to those who willingly surrendered, but ruthless treatment to those who resisted (*parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*). So Caesar could be merciful to the Belgae, as they surrender their cantons one by one, but savage to the Nervii, famed as a race of non-drinkers, who resisted him. And his technique with tribes who showed treachery, or who contravened international law, is utterly cold-blooded. Of the Veneti, who had imprisoned some Roman ambassadors, he writes : " After this the Veneti surrendered to Caesar. He decided to make an example of them, to teach the natives to be more careful in future to respect the rights of ambassadors ; he had all their counsellors executed, and the rest of the population sold as slaves." After the siege of Avaricum (Bourges), we read that the Romans " spared neither old men nor women nor children ", and that at Uxellodunum all the men had their right hands cut off for resisting Caesar.

These facts, coldly stated not by a hostile witness but by Caesar himself, remain as a terrifying example of how a traditionally national attitude can mould the behaviour of the most urbane and cultured individual. We should remember these incidents when we read of Caesar's much-vaunted *clementia* in the Civil War, and realize that his

humanity is confined within well-ordered limits. He candidly writes from Brundisium to Oppius and Balbus that he is trying a new technique —mercy and generosity—*since others before him have incurred odium through cruelty*. We have therefore to reconcile the claim of the author of the *Bellum Africanum* that Caesar was merciful *pro natura et pro instituto* (Cicero himself calls Caesar *mitis clemensque natura*) with the more cynical view of Curio that Caesar was averse to cruelty not by nature or inclination, but because he thought that clemency was popular. As an individual, he was all that his apologists claim ; as the official representative of Roman policy he was a barbarian. The influences from Greece have in their civilizing mission as yet only half-tamed the traditional Roman brutality.

Yet there is no doubt that if anyone at Rome could lay claim to the title of *littérateur* it was Caesar. Gaston Boissier builds up a fascinating picture of what off-duty camp-life in Gaul must have been like. Caesar was surrounded with lieutenants of pronouncedly literary interests— rhetoricians like Cassius and Plancus, historians like Hirtius, would-be poets like Quintus Cicero and Matius, enthusiasts for philosophy like Balbus. Cicero's letters tell us a great deal of Julius's literary interests. He was a competent critic ; Cicero speaks of his *peracre iudicium*—a phrase with the force of a boomerang when we read of Caesar's lack of enthusiasm for one of Cicero's own poems. We gratefully recall, too, Caesar's devastating one-line criticism of Terence's fatal deficiency :

> lenibus atque utinam scriptis adiuncta foret vis
> cómica. . . .

But Caesar's intellectual powers were not confined to criticism. He was a consummate orator—Tacitus calls him "the peer of the greatest public speakers", and he was fluent not merely in Latin but also in Greek, for he addressed the Alexandrians in their own language. As a writer, his range included love-poetry and tragedy (though these were *juvenilia*), and also, in the earnest tradition of Roman scholarship, works on astronomy and grammar. The famous *Commentaries*, which are a model for the writing of military history, attest also to his study of the social, religious and anthropological aspects of other nations. In short he was not only a writer of extraordinary literary gifts, but also, as Warde-Fowler claims, the one man of his time really gifted with scientific intelligence.

What sort of cosmological beliefs did this unique brain entertain ? He was undoubtedly a sceptic in the vulgar sense. His tenure of the post of *pontifex maximus*, the highest priestly position, was for purely political advancement. It is doubtful whether any of the intellectuals of his time were unreservedly devotees of the state-religion ; people of a religious turn of mind tended to embrace the Stoic philosophy, which

recognized in Roman religion some symbolic truth. But the majority were mere formalists, paying lip-service to ideas of deity which they intellectually despised. Caesar is more open in his scepticism than most. Alone amongst the greater Roman historians he excludes from his pages any mention of divine interest or activity in human affairs. In his campaigns he showed a complete disregard for the scruples which play so important a role in the state-religion. " He was never deterred from or delayed in any operation ", writes Suetonius, " by religious scruple."

Because of this scepticism, Caesar sees only two motivating forces in history, human qualities and Fortune. It has for long been disputed whether Caesar regarded Fortune as mere chance or luck, or whether he thought her a supernatural power, as Rice Holmes claims. All the evidence suggests the first explanation, for at a rational level Caesar was too calculating to deify Fortune. But at the same time his instinct, perhaps conditioned by the ubiquitous evidence of temples and streets dedicated to her, seems subconsciously to belie the cold logic of his mind, for his strangely frequent references to Fortune's activities reveal a sentiment closely akin to superstition.

* * *

We are accustomed to associating Caesar with the terms " revolutionary ", " democrat ", " anti-senatorial ", and there is a corresponding danger that we may forget his aristocratic family-background. (The *gens Iulia* claimed descent from Iulus, son of Aeneas, and Caesar's forbears had a long record of tenure of public offices.) In fact, this background holds the key to much that may be superficially puzzling in his conduct.

We have already suggested that Caesar may have regarded himself as a Scipio Africanus rather than a Marius ; he wanted to appear as a disinterested noble persecuted by the Senate. We now see that his action in by-passing the Senate with the Julian laws of 59, and in appealing to the popular assembly, had a more respectable and long-standing precedent than that afforded by the Gracchi. And when we read in Appian and Dio Cassius of his studiously moderate attitude to the Senate until it refused to ratify the most important of these measures, the Agrarian Law, our impression of a highly reluctant revolutionary is strengthened. Here we find in Caesar evidence of a deeply-rooted trait in the Roman character, the attempt to justify himself on grounds of law or honoured precedent. It is worth remembering that almost all Roman politicians came to public life by way of the Bar ; Caesar himself was prosecuting Dolabella at the tender age of twenty-two. This early training in the courts was doubtless the formative cause of the legalism which we associate so closely with the Roman mind.

This inherent anxiety for self-justification according to the letter of the law is the cause of the bewildering manoeuvres and hesitations on both sides before the Civil War commenced with the invasion of Italy by Caesar in 49. In Caesar's *Commentaries* (which together with Cicero's letters are the most reliable evidence for analysis of Caesar's character) we read nothing of the halt at the Rubicon, the dramatic colloquy, and the decision to cross with the celebrated *mot, iacta alea est* ; Caesar is anxious not to raise in the reader's mind the question of whether he was guilty of *maiestas* by leading his army on to Italian soil. Throughout the *Commentaries* he consistently claims legality for his acts, particularly when describing his campaign against Pompey in Greece. Here he indulges in the peace-propaganda to which our post-war ears are well-attuned, purporting to show that he is the apostle of peace and that the Pompeians are the aggressors, that he is fighting for the legally-elected government whilst the Pompeians are the rebels.

But we are not here concerned with the legality of Caesar's position after 49, a topic hotly debated this last hundred years. This *Rechtsfrage* demands a lawyer to pronounce upon it, just as it needed a lawyer in Caesar himself to manoeuvre a position of such ambivalence. But a proper understanding of Julius's character presupposes an awareness of the intensely legalistic formalism of the Roman character.

We must now look for a moment on Caesar's private life. He was married three times—a good first-century average—but he took immense pains to ensure that his marital relations were marked with propriety and decorum. His first wife, Cornelia, died young in the year 68, and Caesar pronounced a panegyric over her grave—a most unusual gesture of affection for a matron of tender years. The world knows how he divorced his second wife, Pompeia, after the Bona Dea incident in 62, because Caesar's wife "must be above suspicion". And though Calpurnia, his third wife, bore him no son, she remained his wife until his death. The care which he exercised to ensure that his family life was circumspect leads us to infer that the gossip about his sexual irregularities has little basis in provable fact.

It is strange, therefore, that the scandal-mongers and political pamphleteers of second-century Rome should be so insistent on his alleged weakness for women. *Concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis*, says Cicero ; and there is never a lack of malevolent gossip to besmirch the characters of persons in the public eye. Caesar's latest biographer, M. Gérard Walter, in his curiously undiscriminating work, has repeated this tittle-tattle : " And everywhere he had to have women. He desired them with a frenzied passion which increased as he grew older. Wherever he went he left his traces, amongst the women of Gaul and Spain, of Greece and Syria. . . . "

To the sober student these sensational allegations seem highly improbable. Julius was no doubt the child of his age, and the first century was notably an age of farmyard morals. Perhaps then the vague accusations of Catullus with reference to Pompey's first wife, Mucia, have some foundation. But it is absurd to give credence to the hints of raffish, dissolute ways in his campaigns. Perhaps he encouraged his troops to think of him as a roguish character—hence their obscene song on their return from Gaul : *urbani, servate uxores*—Townsmen, keep your wives at home. But like Scipio Africanus, who incidentally had a similar reputation in his relations with the fair sex, he was too preoccupied with military planning and with his diverse intellectual activities to lead a life of sensuality and indulgence. It is worth remembering, too, that Caesar was forty-four years old at the outset of his general's career—an age at which Alexander was dead and Napoleon conquered ; he needed to conserve his strength for active service, without dissipating it in harlotry.

We should remember this when evaluating Plutarch's curious account of his behaviour with Cleopatra ; her arrival shrouded in a carpet, the feasts until day-break, the pleasure-cruise up the Nile. There is no doubt that Caesar was on terms of intimate friendship with Cleopatra—the fact that she visited Rome is sufficient proof of this—and that he took some relaxation when the Alexandrine War was over. But he was now over fifty, it is well-known that he was an abstemious drinker and had to watch what he ate, and the iron self-control which he continually exercised in other directions makes these reports of wild revelry highly unlikely. As for the Nile cruise, the fact that Cleopatra was eight months pregnant suggests that it was nothing more than a retreat from the rigours of the Egyptian summer of 47.

Caesar's energy of mind and body through the last fifteen years of his life—his travels from place to place at a speed which shattered his opponents, the innumerable battles fought, the unresting mind probing enemy weaknesses and exploiting them, the ambition which denied his body the rest it craved—these are the proper answer to charges of insatiable sensuality.

The weaknesses for which we must search are no longer those of the body, but those of the intellect. There are signs that towards the end of his career Caesar is beginning to regard himself as infallible. He had never been the type to admit to his failures or mistakes. For example, the military reverse he sustained near Dyrrhachium in 48 was attributable partly to faulty strategy and partly to lack of sufficient preparation and reconnoitring. Instead of admitting this, he presents a catalogue of excuses in which the malevolence of Fortune is prominent.

Besides this reluctance to admit mistakes, the careful reader of the *Commentaries* will also note how Caesar can create an atmosphere to

emphasize difficulties to be overcome, and the magnitude of his achievements. When Buchan remarks of the *Commentaries* that it is " the most unegotistic book ever written ", it is a tribute to Caesar's artistic skill rather than a statement of the truth. The self-flattery is subtle but omnipresent ; often it is to be found in the words attributed to his followers, or in the actions they perform for him. Another technique can be exemplified in his description of the panic in the Roman camp before the battle with Ariovistus :

> The soldiers began to question the Gauls and the merchants, who talked about the enormous stature, incredible courage and splendid military training of the Germans. Some affirmed that on many occasions when they had met them in battle, the very expressions on their faces and the fierce glance of their eyes were more than they could endure. All ranks were thrown into sudden panic that completely unnerved them. It began with the military tribunes, the prefects of the auxiliary troops, and the men with little experience of war. . . . Most of these alleged some urgent reason for leaving camp, and asked Caesar's permission to go. Some stayed out of shame, but they were unable to hide their feelings and at times could not help shedding tears ; skulking in their tents, they bemoaned their fate or joined their friends in lamenting their common peril. All over the camp men were signing and sealing their wills.

Thus does Caesar indirectly depict the formidable opposition he must meet, and directly paint the initial cowardliness of the force which he converted into a brave and disciplined army. The *Commentaries* contain a lot of rhetorical colouring of this kind, subtly praising his own achievements or disparaging that of his enemy. For he is never quite fair to his Roman opponents such as Scipio and Bibulus.

* * *

Caesar was in his fifty-sixth year only when he died, and all his military and political successes are crowded into the last fifteen years. Yet he had laid the foundations of his success earlier, when he showed meritorious bravery on service in the East, and was awarded the *corona civica* for saving the life of another. He showed another kind of courage in prosecuting the influential Dolabella and Gaius Antonius, and thus establishing himself as an orator ; but he revealed a more ominous trait by plunging himself into debt as aedile, to provide the Romans with the lavish spectacles which would ensure his popularity.

These " years of waiting " are a good time to measure a man's character ; and with Caesar we find, behind his courage and his affability, the ruthless dedication to self-advancement and the fundamental lack of moral principle which together constitute his greatest indictment. His ruthlessness is exemplified by the intrigue which resulted in his being appointed *pontifex maximus* to the exclusion of Catulus, who would

certainly have been chosen in the ordinary way ; or again, in the attack on the aged Rabirius by Caesar's hireling Labienus. His pliability is demonstrated by his first being implicated in the Catilinarian conspiracy, an extremist left-wing attempt to enforce an alternative regime before Pompey should arrive home with his troops, and then, when this failed, by his conciliation of Pompey by the enactment of legislation in his interest. The disinterestedness which he later affects is absent here ; his ambition for power is naked and unashamed.

In later years this ambition is more successfully masked. He poses as a second Scipio Africanus whom destiny commands to lead the Roman people, in spite of senatorial opposition, to greater victories. But whereas Scipio pretended to be a mystic, communing with Jupiter in the silence of his temple, Caesar, the child of his age, is a rationalist and a sceptic. In his campaigns, the overriding picture is of a man who in all circumstances exerts complete authority over his subordinates and over his own emotions. He has self-confidence, but also self-discipline. He conveys the impression that his ambition for power has overcome any demoralizing propensities of the flesh. He is affectionate to his loyal subordinates and clement to his fallen Roman enemies. He attempts to negotiate before employing force ; he rewards with mercifulness those who surrender, but is ruthless with those who resist.

But the access of supreme power brings with it the attendant dangers of spiritual and intellectual pride. His house becomes a court where the significant business of the state is administered ; he is contemptuous of the constitutional magistracies, and appoints Caninius consul for half-a-day. ("His consulship", writes Cicero, "was remarkably free from crime ; his vigilance was marvellous, for he never closed an eye." But the jest is close to tears.) He accepts honours "too great for mortal man", including virtual deification. He is already known as "the king" in urban gossip, but the rumour spreads that on 15 March 44 he will be proclaimed *rex*—the title for which Republican Romans had a pathological hatred. And it is this fear which finally persuades Brutus, descendant of the Brutus who expelled Tarquinius Superbus, to support Cassius in the defence of the Republic that no longer existed.

The Great Famine

LEGEND AND REALITY

by HUGH F. KEARNEY

THE course taken by Irish nationalism during the nineteenth century was largely determined by men and circumstances peculiar to Ireland ; its general direction, however, was profoundly affected by wider European influences. Like other nationalisms of the period, Irish nationalism owed to the Romantic Movement its eagerness in seeking out history as an indispensable ally ; and during the second half of the century it came to be conceived in historical terms, taking as its intellectual basis an interpretation of Irish history. Most nationalists sought, and found, in Irish history the justification and inspiration of their political opinions, Mitchel and Pearse, Davitt and Connolly being the most prominent and providing the most lasting contribution.

In doing so, they reflected a general shift of emphasis in European thought. History, which for the *philosophes* was an irrelevant absurdity, became for nineteenth century thinkers the essence of political philosophy, a change the extent of which can be measured by comparing the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 with the Proclamation of the Irish Republic in 1916. Both Americans and Irish rejected the authority of the British Crown and established a republic ; but whereas, in 1776, the appeal of the colonists was to the Rights of Man (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness), in 1916 it was the " historic rights of the Irish people, which in every generation . . . have asserted their right to national freedom " that provided much of the intellectual basis for the Rising. Thomas Jefferson assumed the self-evident truth of John Locke's political philosophy when drawing up the Declaration of American Independence ; the men of 1916 turned to history for their justification. In doing so, Pearse, no less than Connolly, was a child of the nineteenth century, during the course of which the related historicisms of Hegel and Marx had supplanted the rationalism of Locke and Bentham.

The eventual success of the Irish revolution inevitably brought with it the enshrinement of the successful interpretation of Irish history. In popular textbooks, in some newspapers and in many schools, this view of Irish history came to be accepted almost without criticism, and any departure from it seemed to betray the actions of 1916. Meanwhile, in the Six Counties of Northern Ireland, the Government was at some pains to create a history of its own. The Six Counties sought their

reflection in the past, and an historical monster called "The Province" made its appearance, not merely in the sixteenth century, but also in the second millenium B.C.[1] The results were as bizarre as those of Marxists who attempted to canonize Sir Thomas More and Sir William Petty in a calendar of Marxist forerunners. All this and similar attempts to use history for political purposes may cause alarm but certainly not surprise. What is surprising indeed is for a government to sponsor a work of free historical research, leaving the authors at liberty, if the facts warrant, to strike at the most strategic point of the " official " interpretation. When this happens, there is cause for congratulation.

It is difficult to believe that before the publication of *The Great Famine*[2], in 1957, there had been no detached treatment of this central episode in Irish history. Yet such was the case. No significant addition had been made since almost the time of the Famine itself, when circumstances did not favour detachment. The main lines which the history books were to follow for over a century were in fact laid down in 1847 by John Mitchel's friends, Father John Kenyon and Devin Reilly. It was Father Kenyon who categorically claimed that " the plentiful harvests of golden grain [were] more than sufficient—ever since the potato blight—to support, and to support well, our entire population " ; while, a month or so later, Devin Reilly's letter to the *Nation* declared that the Irish people were being " coolly and gradually murdered " by the British Government.

The definitive expression of this view was given by John Mitchel in his writings, notably *The Last Conquest of Ireland* (1860), *An Apology for the British Government in Ireland* (1860), and *History of Ireland* (1869). Arthur Griffith in his introduction to Mitchel's *Jail Journal* (1913) accepted this interpretation of the Famine, and it received its latest expression in 1952 in P. S. O'Hegarty's *History of Ireland under the Union*, from which the following quotation is taken (p. 328) :

> In the known facts of the business there is justification for the view that the Government policy under which over a million died, and over a million emigrated in five years, was a deliberate policy of extermination in pursuance of English political advantage, so as to ensure Ireland remaining indefinitely and powerlessly under England's control. . . . The whole course of Government measures right through the crisis, deliberately or automatically it matters not, was inspired and directed towards starvation.

This is almost identical with Mitchel's view, which may now be elaborated in a little more detail.

[1] *Ancient Monuments not in State Charge.* (Belfast, 1952), pp. 9 ; 41.
[2] *The Great Famine.* Edited by R. Dudley Edwards and T. Desmond Williams. Browne & Nolan. Dublin. 1956. 30*s*.

According to Mitchel, " the Almighty indeed sent the potato blight, but the English created the famine." Even before the Famine, the Devon Commission, set up by Sir Robert Peel, had recommended some measure of depopulation in the interest of the landlords. But Peel found it difficult until the Famine to carry out any large scale changes. Then came 1845, and " how the famine helped Sir Robert Peel and how Sir Robert Peel helped the famine forms the whole history of the island for the next five years ". Peel, not Russell, is the villain of the story, and in this may be detected the influence of the long feud which had gone on between Peel and O'Connell's Repeal Movement. Peel " could wait but he knew that hunger could not wait ". His policy was therefore one of complete inaction. His government did not take the obvious step of closing the ports, with the result that " abundant and magnificent " crops of grain and herds of cattle were shipped to England, while the Irish starved. But for this, Smith O'Brien pointed out, Irish resources would have been " abundantly adequate ". Indeed the 1847 census of agricultural produce showed that the harvest " would have amply sustained *double* the entire population of the island ", that is sixteen million people. It is true that Indian corn was imported by the government, but " a government ship sailing into any harbour with Indian corn, was sure to meet half a dozen sailing out with Irish wheat and cattle ". The failure to close the ports provides the explanation why, though potato crops failed elsewhere in Europe, there was no famine save in Ireland. It is thus no exaggeration to say that a " million and a half of men, women and children were carefully, prudently and peacefully slain by the English government ". The Famine was " artificial " ; it was a deliberate conspiracy of the British government in the interests of the landlords. Ireland, so far from being a poor country, was a " rich and fertile " land, which produced every year " abundance and superabundance to sustain her own people and many more ".

This was Mitchel's version of the Famine, which in its essentials became an integral part of the nationalist interpretation of Irish history. The British government became, for nationalists, the equivalent of the Papacy in Orange mythology—not an institution capable of honest mistakes, but a gigantic conspiracy against the Irish people. This view of the Famine remained unchanged between 1847 and 1957. But it was not entirely without competitors. In Father O'Rourke's *History of the Famine*, Sir Charles Trevelyan's *The Irish Crisis* and James Connolly's *Labour in Irish History*, the Famine was regarded as a social disaster, not a political conspiracy ; where Mitchel blamed the British government, Connolly blamed the social system. All these accounts, however, like Mitchel's, are open to criticism on the grounds either that their sources of evidence were insufficient or else that they had a political axe to grind.

The time was indeed ripe for a history of the Famine, which would use material and methods not available to writers of earlier generations.

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The Great Famine consists of seven chapters by different contributors, each a specialist in the aspect of the Famine with which he is concerned. The question must now be asked, how far does modern historical research confirm or modify the view of the Famine which Mitchel first popularized, and which has left such an enduring mark upon Irish nationalism?

The picture provided by the writers of this present volume is very different from Mitchel's, both in its general emphasis and in detail. Mitchel's story of the ships sailing into the harbour, for example, is exploded once and for all by Mr T. P. O'Neill. During the year 1846–7, imports of wheat and flour into Ireland were five times greater than exports. Three times as much barley entered Ireland as left it, and four times the quantity of Indian corn was imported as oats exported. Thus even though the ports were not closed, the balance of food imports over exports was substantial. Mr O'Neill has examined elsewhere the exact difference it would have made had the ports been closed, and he gives figures very different from Mitchel's. So far from there being enough to feed sixteen million people amply, the food which was exported would have provided the three million destitute of 1847 with a daily ration of 1⅓ ozs. of wheat and 9 ozs. of oats. This diet would have compared unfavourably with the contemporary workhouse diet. The English government's decision not to close the ports still remains open to criticism, but the realities of the situation were very different from what Mitchel would have his readers believe. Many more ships carrying food sailed into Irish harbours than out of them. Ireland was in fact incapable of feeding its population without imports, once the potato failed. This indeed was the fundamental difference between Ireland and other countries of western Europe.

The British government also emerges from this volume much better than might have been anticipated. It may have lacked foresight and generosity, and have been guilty of grossly underestimating the human problems involved, but it was not guilty of either criminal negligence or of deliberate heartlessness. Surprisingly, in view of Mitchel's strictures, the verdict on Peel is more favourable than that on Russell. Dr K. B. Nowlan considers that Peel showed "reasonable promptness" and some degree of foresight. Mr O'Neill believes that "if success is the yardstick of judgment in this matter, Peel's measures certainly merit praise. He showed an initiative unusual in that era of laissez-faire and undertook tasks at variance with current economic theory". Peel's policy was in fact more imaginative than Russell's. Even though he did not close the ports, he was responsible for importing Indian corn in 1845 which was sold at less than cost price to private individuals, but not to

commercial buyers. It was this action which prevented the exploitation of scarcity in the spring and summer of 1846, and even the *Nation* admitted the extent of Peel's success.

By comparison, Russell was much more the slave of current economic fashion. Yet the appointment of Russell as prime minister in mid-1846 was welcomed by O'Connell, who had predicted that a conservative government would mean famine. Russell's doctrinaire economic views committed him to a policy of non-intervention in 1846, when the potato crop suffered a complete failure. The solution for the Famine was now to be found in the inauguration of public works, by which the destitute would earn sufficient money to feed themselves. The government was not to intervene in the buying and distribution of food, and the field was to be left open to private traders. This scheme sounded well on paper, and it passed through parliament in 1846 without criticism from the Irish members. O'Connell was still too enamoured of the whig connection to sacrifice future political benefits by untimely criticism. What O'Connell gained on the political swings by Peel's fall, however, Ireland lost on the economic roundabouts, as O'Connell himself saw later in the year. In mid-1846, however, main attention was focussed upon the controversy between Old and Young Ireland, and it was not until the Famine had begun that serious attention was given to it.

Russell's miscalculation was to treat the Famine by an extension of normal methods, and his mistake was to have disastrous consequences. The price of food rose sharply and the government did nothing to keep down prices. The ports remained open. Finally, the government put as much financial responsibility as possible on the local landowners, and when things went wrong with the public works scheme it blamed the landlords. Even so, at the height of the Famine in 1847, the Repeal Party showed no united opposition to Russell. They were given the opportunity to vote with the opposition in favour of Bentinck's Railway Bill, to invest sixteen million pounds in Ireland. When they came to vote however, only seventeen Repealers favoured the bill, five abstained, and the remaining six openly supported the government.

At length even Russell was forced to give way before the realities of the Famine. In the spring of 1847, the free distribution of food began, and by the middle of the year more than three million destitute people were receiving a daily food ration. Russell's earlier policy of public works had completely failed, and he found himself committed to a policy of government assistance far more radical than that of Peel in 1845.

For all this catalogue of errors and rigidity, the tale is not one of deliberate extermination. Dr Nowlan assures us that Russell, though unimaginative and parsimonious, was moved by no hatred or even ill-will towards the Irish people. The failure to close the ports was

capable of being defended on economic grounds and even his policy of public works was not as farcical as is often made out. In insisting that public money should be devoted to public works, the government adopted a high-minded but unrealistic attitude. The Irish landlords pressed for productive works such as drainage, and had the government been as devoted to their interests as Mitchel maintained, it would have given way. There was indeed a strong party in the British cabinet which opposed Russell on this matter, but, though they won over the lord lieutenant to their views, they could make no headway in the face of the refusal of the civil service to take part in commercial activities. Though the machinery of public works broke down eventually under the strain of finding employment for the starving millions, Mr O'Neill's verdict is still comparatively favourable. " The board of works ", he writes, " deserves great credit for the manner in which it dealt with the tasks imposed upon it. These were impossible, but it is doubtful if any department of state could have done more." The daily feeding of over three million people was a remarkable achievement by the standards of any nineteenth century administration.

Finally, Sir William MacArthur disposes of Mitchel's statement that the British government deliberately concealed the number of famine deaths in the census of 1851. Mitchel's view has a superficial plausibility in that the number of deaths by starvation was recorded officially as only twenty thousand. To these, however, must be added deaths by dropsy, fever and dysentery, which bring the total to about 350,000. Sir William MacArthur regards this as a gross underestimate : the total was probably well in excess of half a million, and for the famine years as a whole may not be much less than a million. It was not conspiracy however which made the official figures so low. Sir William states categorically that his observations " are not intended as a criticism of the compilers of that great work, the census of 1851. They faced many difficulties in gathering their figures of death and disease, and sorted and analysed them with scrupulous care and infinite patience. They themselves were well aware of the unreliability of many of the returns they dealt with, and were careful to point out some of the possible sources of error ".

If this book may be said to have a lesson, it is that the Famine was a national disaster above and beyond politics. Political interests and decisions form part of the story, but, as a whole, the story is not the exclusively political one which Mitchel and others would have us accept. Against the background of starvation, fever, panic-stricken emigration and widespread eviction, the political mistakes and mismanagement fade almost into insignificance. To use Dr Oliver MacDonagh's words, " Granted the existing agrarian framework, the Ireland of the early 1840's was grossly overpopulated." The excess population was con-

centrated in the relatively infertile west. Improving agriculture was at a discount. The rapid growth of the population was encouraged by the swing towards tillage since the 1780's, and, in its turn, encouraged more and more sub-division of land. "Ireland", as Dr McDowell remarks, "was a nation of landlords." The picture often given in text books of two classes in Irish society, landlord and peasant, is misleading in this respect. In many cases the Irish Catholic tenant of a great Protestant landowner was the *de facto* landlord to a host of lesser tenants, holding their land from him on one-year leases. And it was normally the middleman who made the profit.

Pressure of population forced rents up. But the population continued to increase, albeit at a diminishing rate which was lower in the 'forties than in the earlier decades of the century. Because of high rents the ubiquitous potato provided an accepted standard of living. Potatoes could be grown on land which was too poor for grain and of little use for grazing, and it was mainly for this reason that the poor land in the west could support so many.[1] The complete dependence on the one crop of so many who farmed for subsistence and without reserves provided the elements of a most dangerous situation. The signs were there to be read in the partial famines of 1822, 1831, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1839 and 1842 (and also in the virtual absence of famine between 1741 and 1817); but even at this date it is difficult to see what could have been done to prevent disaster. Improving agriculture implied larger holdings and therefore evictions. Security of tenure in the existing situation was of little use unless production per acre rose. High rents would continue as long as the population increased. Land reclamation and drainage demanded the expenditure of capital which was not available in Ireland. The most prosperous farmers in Ireland were indeed the graziers of Limerick, Tipperary, Roscommon and Meath who, in Dr E. R. R. Green's words "would not have deigned to turn a sod with the plough". For such a problem, mass emigration was perhaps the only solution.

Only one part of the Irish economy was in a healthy state, the industrial area centred on Belfast, which had benefitted from the technological changes of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Elsewhere in Ireland, the effects on Irish industry of the industrial revolution had been disastrous, though the Union had indeed created an open market for Irish agriculture. In eastern Ulster there was no famine as such and deaths here were largely due to fever brought in by fugitives from other parts of Ireland.

The Ireland of 1845 as described in this work was a "ramshackle" and "ill-balanced" society. Mitchel's "abundance and super-abundance" simply did not exist. Humanly speaking, the Famine was

[1] Other causes must also be taken into consideration, such as fishing and seasonal migration.

inevitable. Even if the remedial measures of 1846–8 had been wholly successful, the only practical solution would have been mass emigration. The Famine did what no government could have done, to force two million people to leave Ireland during the years 1845–50 and so create conditions in which a balanced society was possible once more.

If it is naïve to blame the British government for the disaster of the Famine, nevertheless there were cases in which government action could have prevented unnecessary suffering. Many evictions were carried out in a heartless manner, and the amendment to the 1847 Poor Law, at the suggestion of William Gregory, M.P., and known as the " quarter acre clause " needlessly increased the rate of evictions. Often houses were levelled while the occupants were receiving indoor relief within the workhouse. Emigration was often forced on tenants by landlords' pressure. In this connection, Dr MacDonagh describes an estate in Roscommon where, in 1848, 2,400 people were occupying 2,100 acres which produced only one third of the food necessary to feed them. The Union workhouses of the district were full, and the total expense of subsidized emigration was considerably less than the cost of a year's food. It was thus decided to offer " emigration or eviction". One's sympathy is naturally with the tenants, but even so Dr MacDonagh's general conclusion is that " there is no general moral judgment to be passed. Landlords stand condemned for specific acts of inhumanity, dishonesty and irresponsibility ; but not, in justice, for a point of view and tangle of economic difficulty which, in nine cases out of ten, they merely had the misfortune to inherit."

Taken all in all, the general impression conveyed by this book is one of " inevitability " unless a radical change in the social system took place. The reliance upon the potato as the basic food of the population was a risk which carried the possibility of famine along with it. The wonder perhaps is not that the Famine came in 1845, but that it did not come before, and not that a million died, but that so many were saved. One thing does emerge from a reading of this volume : there was no simple solution for a problem of such complexity. " Repeal " was one answer, but there was no way out without a great deal of human suffering.

* * *

Despite its omission of a section dealing with population problems, *The Great Famine* is a striking example of social history at its best. The contributors to the volume were faced with the difficult task of analysing in a scholarly but imaginative way the life of Irish society at a critical moment in its existence. Their problems were not made easier by an immediate environment in which the Famine was still a live emotional and political issue. Nevertheless, they achieved success, and one would be hard put indeed to name a work of similar breadth

and originality in nineteenth century Irish history. In a sense, the Famine has now, thanks to their labours, become part of Irish history. Before, it was part of the present ; now, it has been laid to rest.

It remains to wonder what effect *The Great Famine* will have upon the teaching of nineteenth century Irish history. The time-lag between the publication of research and its effect upon the writers of text books can often be half a century or more. Perhaps in the case of the Famine the time lag will be shorter. So much valuable work deserves a better fate than to be ignored. Until its conclusions are incorporated into the text books, Irish history in the nineteenth century will remain present politics. If war is too important a subject to be left to generals, political history is too important to be left to the politicians.

After Pearl Harbour : ILO Problems

by EDWARD PHELAN

THE success of the ILO Conference which had so triumphantly closed its session in the White House in Washington on 7 November 1941 had exceeded all hopes. The Organization had made manifest its will to survive ; new important tasks had been allotted to it ; and the highest authority had accepted its claim to an important place in the post-war world.

My Report to the Conference, prepared some three months earlier, had contained the following words : " As this Report is being written the conflict threatens a further extension. Japanese forces have moved into Indo-China and the problem of the Pacific has become acute ".

On 7 December came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; and within hours the United States was at war with Japan, Germany and Italy.

The full extent of the naval disaster at Pearl Harbour was for long a closely guarded secret, but other disasters, the gravity of which there was no reason to conceal, followed fast. Within little more than two months the tide of Japanese victory engulfed Indo-China, Thailand, Malay and Hong Kong ; Japanese armies established themselves in the Netherlands Indies and in Burma, in New Guinea, in the Solomon Islands and in the Bay of Bengal ; and Australia and India were in peril of invasion. And as the months went by the tale of disaster continued. Tobruk fell on 21 May 1942 ; a little later Rommel crossed the frontier of Egypt. In the House of Commons on 2 July Winston Churchill, after summing up the military situation, concluded, " If there are any . . . . . who feel able to paint the picture in darker colours they are certainly at liberty to do so ".

It might have been expected that, as the conflict thus raged with increasing violence over more and more of the surface of the globe, the ILO would have ceased to attract any interest and that no attention would have been paid to its activities. What happened was exactly the contrary. Instead of encountering indifference the ILO suddenly found itself the object of a lively interest in both Washington and London.

Three factors combined to bring this about. The first was the entry of the United States into the war and the wave of confidence it produced. Victory, from being no more than a matter of hope and faith, became in the minds of the free peoples a predictable certainty. Winston

Churchill has recorded in his history how absolute was his conviction : " We had won the war . . . How long (it) would last or in what fashion it would end no man could tell, nor did I at this moment care ". To the United States, conscious of its vast resources, no other end than victory was thinkable.

The second factor was that in this mood of solid confidence problems of reconstruction took on a new and more realistic character ; they too became predictable certainties which now called for active practical consideration instead of hopeful theoretical planning. This was particularly so in the United States. Hitherto her interest in the matter, though great, had been based on benevolent sympathy and on the desire to show, in one of the few ways in her power, her sense of solidarity with the free nations who had borne the brunt of the struggle. Now that she herself must mobilize for war on a vast scale she, like her allies, would have to face at the end of hostilities the immense problem of restoring the peace-time structure of her people and of her economy ; she would be involved, therefore, in the whole process of world reconstruction, not just as one willing to lend a helping hand but as one whose interests were intimately and directly concerned with its every phase, both national and international.

The third factor in the situation was that the ILO had already been given the task of acting as a clearing-house for reconstruction planning. Its membership included the United States and, as there was no prospect of the United States becoming a member of any other existing international organization, the ILO inevitably assumed a new importance both in Washington and in London.

* * *

As I watched this situation develop I felt I could congratulate myself on the energy with which, during the spring and summer of 1941, I had continued to press for a meeting of the Conference at the earliest possible date. Had the decision been delayed by only a few weeks the disaster of Pearl Harbour would have intervened, and a meeting would have been impossible. The ILO would have had no opportunity to reveal its vitality and potentialities and it would not have become, as it now had, an important element in the thinking of Washington and London.

This of course could not be regarded as other than a highly satisfactory development, but it followed on the heels of the Conference too rapidly for comfort. The Conference had adopted a series of far-reaching decisions, the implementation of which even in peacetime would have placed a heavy burden on the Office. In war conditions, and in the state of the ILO's feeble resources, their implementation raised problems of an unprecedented character for the solution of which ingenuity,

patience and, above all, time were necessary. The sudden awakening of a new and highly active interest in the ILO in London and Washington added a further complication. Too much was likely to be expected from the ILO too quickly ; and if it failed to give an adequate response, its future, that had seemed so bright at New York, might find its promise unfulfilled.

The central problem was the problem of staff. Since the office had been reduced to little more than a symbolic reflection of the fields of expert knowledge which it was supposed to cultivate, any readjustment of its personnel to enable it to extend its operations could at the best be only a dangerous expedient which, if continued for any length of time, would weaken and indeed in the long run destroy its scientific authority. An increase of staff was therefore an obvious and pressing necessity, but this raised the question of finance which was the real crux of the problem, and which remained a continual and exhausting worry.

The main new task entrusted to the ILO by the New York Conference, to act as a clearing-house concerning the planning and application of measures of post-war reconstruction, was simple enough in theory. Each government would keep the ILO informed of its plans and the ILO would pass on this information to other member governments. All would know the plans of their fellows and might find in them matter that was suggestive or helpful. The ILO, keeping the whole picture under continuous review, could note common features or tendencies and thus be in a position to see on what subjects complementary international action would appear to be required, and to consider the form it might take. When the time came for the different plans to be carried out, it could be hoped that a large measure of co-ordination would already have been achieved and that the whole process would proceed much more smoothly and effectively, in both the national and the international sphere, than would otherwise have been the case.

The difficulties in the way of making the scheme work successfully in practice lay in the fact that it required the co-operation of government departments, with which the ILO had hitherto had little or no relations. Such departments could not be expected to respond to the ILO's requests as rapidly and completely as departments of labour with which a long tradition had been established. Effective collaboration is a slow growth and not something that can be brought immediately into effect by the passing of a resolution. For this reason there was bound to be a time-lag before appreciable results could be shown, and a danger that the ILO might be criticized for moving too slowly.

Since there was little the ILO could do to speed up its reconstruction task, the best way to minimize the danger of criticism was to press on with other activities which would hold members' attention, and for

this there were many opportunities. The Governing Body's meeting in New York had in the circumstances been of a somewhat perfunctory character ; and, although it had given me a very free hand, leaving many questions to the Office " to deal with as best it could ", there were already plenty of questions on which decisions by the Governing Body had become desirable. Moreover, now that the Organization had begun, after a long interval of quiescence, to function through its normal representative machinery, it was of the greatest importance that it should continue to do so in order to maintain its new-found vitality. I had reason to believe that a meeting in London would be welcomed, and this would have the additional advantage that it would enable me to pay my long overdue visit to that city in conditions in which it could prove particularly useful. It had been realized that a meeting of the whole Governing Body might present difficulties, and the membership of the Emergency Committee, which had full power to act in its place, had been revised so that it might be more easy to bring it together. It was this body which it was decided to convene in London.

The meeting of the Emergency Committee which began on 20 April 1942 was in every way successful. It disposed of a vast number of questions with harmony and efficiency. Only two or three of its features need be mentioned here. The first was the speech of Ernest Bevin in which he addressed a welcome to the Committee. His position as a member of the War Cabinet, his powerful personality and the vigour of his eloquence made his definition of the dimensions of the task before the ILO, his emphatic promise of the British Government's support for the Organization and his expression of his confidence in its future as inspiring as they were important.

The second was the approval given to my proposal to set up an Advisory Committee on the Economic Conditions of Post-War Reconstruction to advise the ILO on the economic provisions that should be included in the post-war settlement. The New York decisions on the ILO's rôle in reconstruction had, in effect, widened the ILO's competence in economic questions; but, as I have already indicated, time must elapse before the ILO could hope to build up a reputation such that when its voice was raised on economic issues it would receive real attention. Events might well outstrip this process and in order to be prepared for this possibility, my idea was to associate with the ILO's new activities a small committee composed of men of different nationalities, whose names were known to the world at large and whose past experience or present positions would secure for their opinions on economic questions the highest respect.

At first my proposal seemed to have no chance of success. Carter Goodrich, the American Chairman of the Governing Body,

told me that his preliminary conversations with the British had revealed their definite opposition. This I already knew, but I had come to the conclusion that their attitude was based on the difficulty they felt in naming a suitable British member, a difficulty from which I suspected certain elements of personal jealousy were not wholly absent. I did not think their opposition would be maintained if I pressed my proposal and if, as I had every reason to expect, it received warm American support. I was taken aback on discovering that Goodrich had been so impressed with the British attitude that he had cabled to his government asking for fresh instructions and that until these were received he must abstain from expressing any opinion. Gloomily he suggested that I would be well advised to drop the proposal as he saw no chance of its going through. This, it seemed to me, would be both cowardly and unwise, and I decided to put up a fight when the Emergency Committee met. I made my case as persuasively as I could. The British opposition did not come into the open, and finally it was unanimously agreed that I might approach personalities of the kind I had in mind, to see if they would consent to serve.

The second point to which I attached particular importance was to pursue still further the process of bringing back into active operation all the parts of the ILO's machinery. The Committee agreed without difficulty to authorize the convocation of the Joint Maritime Committee in London in June to consider wartime conditions of merchant seamen. How fully this decision proved to be justified is worth recording. The Committee was a small body of twenty titular members but such was the importance attached to its deliberations that, despite the exceptional conditions in which it met, no less than 64 representatives of seamen and shipowners of 15 different nationalities took part in its proceedings. All of its conclusions, which were of a strictly practical character, were adopted unanimously and those of them having a direct bearing on the dangers to which merchant seamen were exposed from attack by submarines were given immediate effect by government action.

The third decision of the Emergency Committee to which a brief reference must be made related to my budget estimates for 1943. Complicated questions were involved concerning the supplementary credit of 1 million Swiss francs which I had obtained for the current year to finance expenditure on reconstruction activities in pursuance of the decisions of the New York Conference in November 1941. For this, of course, the current budget had made no provision. I asked for a further credit of the same amount for 1943. This was authorized with the clear understanding that the figure would have to be increased should circumstances render it necessary. The Committee saw no necessity to give any detailed consideration to the normal expenditure budget since it provided only for the same amount as in the previous

year. I insisted however, for reasons that will appear later, on a careful examination of its separate items, and the Committee agreed that the sums asked for represented an indispensable minimum.

* * *

On my return to New York I was soon immersed in ILO affairs, too numerous and varied to be described here. What gave me most concern was the basic situation which made it impossible to provide more than stop-gap solutions. Briefly, it was that, while demands on the ILO were multiplying, its ordinary budget was not being increased to enable them to be met. Supplementary credits, indispensable though they were, could not provide for any real strengthening of the ILO's essential structure. With their aid, and with some ingenuity, it was possible for the time being to satisfy all urgent needs. But the small band of the ILO's experts had perforce to become quick-change artists : they were like the members of a stage army, disappearing behind the curtain at one end and emerging in a steady stream from the other, wearing different uniforms. It all made a brave show but it could not fool the audience forever ; when the trick ceased to be convincing, patronage would go elsewhere.

This was a dangerous situation but there was reason to fear that it was on the point of becoming more dangerous still. Supplementary credits were in the nature of loans for the repayment of which budgetary provision must be made at the first opportunity. When member States had to be asked for money to repay debts, they would be unlikely to approve any increase in the ordinary budget; they might on the contrary seek to reduce it. If they succeeded in doing so the ILO's situation, unsatisfactory as it was, would become disastrous. Activities would have to be abandoned, and the possibility could not be excluded that even some units of its small stage army would have to be dismissed.

It may seem that I was being over pessimistic and that a situation could not arise in which the ILO, having been asked to do more, might actually find itself provided with resources on a scale which would compel it to do less. The proceedings at the Supervisory Commission were to show that I had not been the victim of an over-active imagination.

The Commission met in the ILO's Montreal Office on 25 August 1942. After surveying the general financial background of its work it proceeded to its examination of the League's budget, and it became clear that when my turn came I would be asked to accept reductions in my estimates. It must be remembered that the Commission was a League body ; its members had taken part in many of the League's activities ; they felt a special loyalty towards it and a deep sympathy for the members of the Secretariat in their unhappy isolation in Geneva. Impartial though they might strive to be, it was not to be expected that they could do other than insist that the ILO's budget be modified

to conform to the general policy which they had felt it necessary to follow in dealing with the League.

The arguments which they advanced in explanation of their policy were certainly forcible : the collection of contributions from member States was becoming increasingly difficult ; some members had left the League and in consequence, if the budget was maintained at the figure of the preceding year, the remaining members would each have to shoulder a greater burden ; those of them who paid the heaviest contributions (which taken together made up for more than half the League's income) were precisely the States which had suffered most severely in the war and who were compelled to make every possible economy ; in these circumstances the Commission felt that it was impossible to ask them to pay more than what they were, at a great sacrifice, paying at present ; this could be done only if the budget was reduced and the Commission therefore was obliged to ask me to do my share and to reduce my estimates by the appropriate figure.

To this I replied that account must also be taken of the fact that the situation of the League and of the ILO differed greatly : the League was unable to perform any of its major functions ; not only was the whole machinery of the ILO in operation but new tasks had been remitted to it ; it had strong financial support—some League members who were not prepared to pay their full League contribution had remitted the ILO's share direct to the ILO (this was a sore point and I passed over it as briefly as possible) ; the League had received some contributions, from Australia for instance, only because this was the only channel through which the countries in question could make their payment to the ILO. I fully realized the necessity for laying the least possible burden on States at war and I had therefore refrained from asking for any increase in my budget. My estimates had been examined by the Governing Body which had considered that they represented an irreducible minimum. In these circumstances I must ask the Commission to accept them without modification.

The above summary gives only a brief notation of the principal arguments in a discussion that lasted all day, in which member after member of the Commission brought pressure on me to give way and into which, as the afternoon wore on, a note of irritation and resentment began to enter. This finally found strong expression in an intervention which brought matters to a head. It was the duty of the Director, the speaker said, to lay before them a reasoned statement of what the ILO required; and that he had done. That was one side of the operation. The other side was that it was the Commission's duty to decide what, in all the circumstances, it thought governments could fairly be asked to pay. He must protest that it was intolerable that he and some of his colleagues should have been brought all the way across

the Atlantic to examine the ILO's budget only to be told by the Director that they could not alter a single figure in his estimates. As the Director had refused to assist them in any way, there was no alternative but for the Commission to carry out its task as best it could in conditions which were regrettable and, so far as he could remember, unprecedented.

A murmur of assent ran round the table. I was angry at what I considered was an unfair description of my attitude and made a sign to the Chairman, Carl Hambro, that I wished to speak. He made a gesture asking me to wait and proceeded to pour oil on the troubled waters. I had, of course, a right, he said, to reply to the whole discussion before the Commission took its decision but he would ask me to postpone my statement until the following morning. Everyone had had a long and tiring day. The question before them was grave, and it was only fair that I should be given time to consider it in all its bearings. He hoped, therefore, that I would agree that it would be wiser to follow his proposal. I nodded my assent and he continued, giving me a benevolent smile, " Mr Phelan has collaborated with the Supervisory Commission for many years and on many occasions his ingenuity has helped us to find a solution to our problems. In thinking things over between now and to-morrow he will, I am sure, be willing to do so in that spirit, and once more be able to put before us some helpful suggestion ".

As I turned the situation over in my mind that evening, striving to do so as objectively as possible, I became more and more convinced that I must not recede from my position. The difficulties of the League might well become greater and, were the ILO to accept the Commission's policy, it would be condemning itself to financial strangulation. Could the Commission be induced to give way? I had exhausted, without success, every resource of argument and persuasion and I saw no hope that a fresh effort would produce any different result.

The deadlock seemed complete. Nevertheless, I continued to search for something which would enable me to respond to the Chairman's appeal, even if by no more than a gesture of goodwill. Suddenly I hit on an idea, vague at first, but steadily taking on real substance as I began to realize its possibilities. For a moment I thought I had the solution of the whole problem, and then my satisfaction faded for, solution though it was, I saw that there was no chance that the Commission would accept it. The conflict had gone too far and the Commission's mind was made up. Hambro's appeal to me was in effect a warning that it would be " wiser " to accept that fact, and all he had done was to give me time to prepare a graceful retreat. I was no further on than before. The Commission, so to speak, was out for blood and it would not be appeased by the small dry biscuit which

was all that I had to offer. It would reject it with scorn without even a sniff to discover whether it was, or was not, palatable.

Nevertheless, I found that I could not abandon the problem. There *was* a new element in it; I had what I believed was a solution if only the Commission could be led to examine it in a reasonable mood. After much thought I came to the conclusion that there was only one course to pursue. Instead of avoiding the conflict I must intensify it; instead of retreating I must attack, and attack if possible by surprise, and when the Commission's appetite for conflict was exhausted perhaps it would be possible to coax it with my biscuit to a saner meal.

When, the next morning, the Chairman called on me to make my statement and expressed the hope that, the night having brought counsel, I would have some helpful suggestion to make, members settled back in their chairs with an air of polite but not excited interest. I interpreted their relaxed attitude as an indication that they were taking it for granted that no other course was open to me than to retreat and that the Chairman's opening words, based no doubt on some hint of my intentions, were a confirmation of their expectation. This was something I had not foreseen but it was all to the good. It pointed to the line along which to start.

I had prepared no written statement. I had only three points to make, so simple and so clear in their sequence that they required no notes. In that sense it was the easiest speech I ever delivered and I can set down its main passages now pretty well in the words in which they were actually delivered. I began as follows:

> Yesterday evening, Mr Chairman, our meeting ended in disagreement and frustration and, may I also say, in some confusion. Let me try to eliminate those elements of confusion, for if I can do so we will surely find that we are more in agreement than we appeared to be last night.
>
> One member of the Commission protested yesterday that he has been brought across the ocean only to be told that the Commission could not make the slightest change in the figures I had laid before it. Let me say at once that no member of the Commission has been brought across the Atlantic, or from anywhere else, on a fool's errand. I am indeed sorry that any words of mine should have given the impression that I had any desire to obstruct the Commission in the performance of its duties.

The members of the Commission showed signs of satisfaction. I had come to the point at once and was making my surrender without any tiresome circumlocution.

I continued:

> The member to whom I have referred drew attention quite rightly to the fact that I had one set of responsibilities and the Commission

another. So let us be quite clear what are your responsibilities and what are mine. Let me read to you one sentence from the Financial Regulations. It is so simple and direct that it admits of no discussion. This is what it says : ' *The Supervisory Commission cannot alter the budget* '.

The shock was tremendous. Members looked at one another as though to ask if this could be true. I held up the Financial Regulations and gave them the number of the page and the paragraph. Then came an interjection, beginning in a voice that was still half strangled by surprise but that ended on a triumphant note. " You have forgotten. You have forgotten the Emergency Powers." I then continued :

I shall deal with them in a moment. First, let us be completely clear about the functions of the Supervisory Commission in relation to the budget. It cannot alter the budget : only the Assembly, in the exercise of its sovereign power, can do that. What the Supervisory Commission can do, if it has not been able to persuade the Director to make the modifications in his budget proposals which it deems necessary, is to make a report to the Assembly transmitting its own recommendations. The Director's proposals and the Commission's suggestions go forward together and, after considering them, the Assembly makes its final decision. The operation of the Emergency Powers makes no change in all this except that another authority replaces the Assembly.

Now that I have recalled the rules under which we are working, and about which there can no longer be any confusion, let us see where we stand. Yesterday I explained to you my estimates ; you examined them and you asked me, as was your right, to make certain reductions ; those reductions I felt unable to accept ; at the end of our discussion the Chairman asked me not to give my final answer until to-day. After giving long and careful consideration to all that is involved I can give you my answer now. I cannot accept your proposals and that answer is final.

I waited for a moment. There was dead silence in the room.

What then is the position ? Unless you on your side should feel that you can modify your attitude, we have come to the end of this phase of the normal budgetary procedure. What happens next ? The Assembly cannot meet to arbitrate between us. And so the Supervisory Commission meets again, not under the Financial Regulations but to exercise the infinitely greater responsibilities which fall to it under the Emergency Powers. But there again an interjection a little while ago leads me to fear that confusion exists. On whom has the Assembly devolved its powers to adopt the ILO's budget ? Not on you, Gentlemen, but on you and me acting together. Let me read you the text of the Assembly's enactment :

' *As regards the International Labour Office the Director, with the approval of a majority of the Supervisory Commission, shall have power in his discretion*

to take any decisions which appear necessary and such decisions shall have the same force and effect as if they were taken by the Assembly '.
And that, as you know, applies to the adoption of the budget.

I paused again. The Commission was as silent as before. I went on :

> We are not at this moment exercising those powers but it would be well to consider in advance what may lie before us. What will be the situation if I cannot secure the approval for which I shall ask ? I will tell you what it will be. On January next the ILO will have no income ; it will have no authority to make any expenditures ; it will be unable to pay a single salary ; all its activities will stop. That is the eventuality which we must picture if we are to be fully conscious of our responsibilities. If need be, I have resolved to face that situation.

I stopped once more. The Commission seemed stunned.

> I do not, however, anticipate that things will reach that stage. If the agreement necessary to operate the Emergency Powers cannot be reached, a last resource is open to us. We can take our dispute to the highest authority of all, an authority higher even than the Assembly itself. We can go to our ultimate lords and masters, the member States, and ask them to decide between us. That is the course which I shall follow and I have not the slightest doubt about the answer I shall receive.

This time I let the silence continue. I waited as long as I dared lest someone else should break in. Hitherto I had spoken firmly without any excitement or passion but with a cold deliberation that made every word tell. Now I addressed the Chairman directly in a different and almost conversational tone :

> I have not forgotten, Mr Chairman, the hope you expressed that I might be able to make some suggestions which would get us out of our difficulties. I have always tried to give the Commission every help in my power and I have a suggestion which you may think worthy of examination.

Hambro, who had been staring down at his papers in frowning concentration, looked up quickly and nodded his head. I went on :

> I do not think that our problem is insoluble if we look at it from a fresh point of view. Yesterday we started out from opposite poles and the result was a head-on collision. My suggestion is that we begin by looking at what we want to get before we begin to fight about how to get it.
>
> What do I want ? I want to keep my expenditure budget intact. What do you want ? You want to keep the contributions of League members at the level of last year. Does either of us *fundamentally* object

to what the other desires? Not at all. I know you would wish to maintain the ILO's activities at the highest possible level; and I, surely, do not need to assure you that I have as much sympathy as you have with the hard-pressed Members of the League. It follows that we should unite our efforts to find a solution to what is purely a financial problem and not a conflict of policy. There will have to be some give and take; some concessions will be necessary on both sides, but that is a small matter if we can both secure what we consider to be essential.

Here is my proposal in concrete terms. In another part of the budget which deals with working capital you have inserted a sum for the restoration of the ILO's working capital. That is really an ILO item although it comes under another heading. It is, of course, important that the ILO's working capital should be restored whenever it has been drawn upon. But in the present exceptional circumstance I should be willing to agree that the restoration should be made in two instalments instead of restoring the whole sum in 1943 which is what you propose to do. If you could accept this suggestion the total figure of the League budget could be reduced to the figure you desire, without making any cut in the ILO's expenditure budget.

Seymour Jacklin, the League Treasurer, began to utter a vigorous protest. "Mr Chairman, Mr Phelan is making no concession at all . . . . . " But Hambro, who had been listening to me intently, silenced him with unusual brusqueness. "No, no", he said. "I think Mr Phelan has got hold of something important", and turning to me he asked me to repeat my suggestion so that the Commission might fully grasp it.

I understood Jacklin's outburst. As Treasurer he rightly felt that he had a special responsibility to see that the fund was kept in the soundest possible condition. In his view I was making no concession, or rather I was making a concession at his expense and not at my own. At any other time I should have been eager to argue the point but the last thing I wanted at the moment was to see the Commission drawn away from the main issue into a technical discussion; and so, silently blessing Hambro, I gladly followed his lead and ignored the Treasurer's intervention.

When I had completed a more detailed exposition of my proposal, Hambro set it out for the Commission in his own words. Since he was speaking in his capacity as Chairman he did not declare himself for or against, but from the way in which he presented the proposal it was evident that it appealed to his political mind and that he favoured its acceptance.

Hambro's prestige in the Commission was great: not only was he its Chairman but he was by far its senior member in years of service; moreover, as one of the outstanding personalities in the League who had presided over the Assembly and as one of Norway's most distinguished

political leaders, he was an eminent figure in international life. It was natural that his colleagues should look to him for guidance when any specially difficult question arose and should attach great weight to his opinion. I was, therefore, satisfied that the battle was as good as won and so it proved.

* * *

There is one point in the story just related which may seem so curious, and even perhaps so improbable, that it needs a word of comment. How could the members of the Commission be so ill-acquainted with their powers that they were dumbfounded on being told that they could not alter the budget ? The explanation is historical. When the Commission was first set up its powers were, of course, perfectly well understood by all concerned. As time went on its authority steadily increased. Neither the Secretary-General of the League nor the Director of the ILO could afford to let his budget proposals go forward to the Assembly simultaneously with a report from the Commission demanding their reduction, and in consequence it became the invariable practice for agreement to be reached with the Commission beforehand. The most important financial document presented to the Assembly was the Report of the Supervisory Commission to which the budget proposals became only an appendix.

In the discussions in the Assembly the Chairman and the Reporter of the Commission took an increasingly important, and indeed the predominant, rôle in defending the budget and in securing its adoption. Meanwhile the original members of the Commission had been replaced by a succession of newcomers who had no reason to delve back into the origins of a piece of machinery which they found working with so much regularity and smoothness. If all this is borne in mind it will not appear so extraordinary that the text I quoted should have come as a surprise and that some members found it difficult to believe that such a text had ever figured in the Financial Regulations.

It is likewise not astonishing that, since all the members of the Commission were men who held high positions under their governments and had engrossing wartime responsibilities, they should have assumed that the Emergency Powers had simply delegated the Assembly's financial powers to the Supervisory Commission, and should not have realized that the legal advisers who had prepared the text of the Assembly's decision had necessarily taken as their starting point the text of the Financial Regulations.

Hambro's surprise, for surprised he had undoubtedly been, must be explained somewhat differently. His association with the Commission went back to its early days and he possessed a retentive memory. What had startled him was not my exposition of the legal position in the Supervisory Commission and under the Emergency Powers, which

he must immediately have recognized as correct, but my uncompromising declaration that I was resolved to stand firmly on that position whatever the consequences might be. That was a political bombshell for which he was totally unprepared, and to which he rightly attached more importance than to the texts which had so surprised his colleagues.

All these personal reactions, however, seemed far away as the Commission, after a short discussion from which any atmosphere of crisis had vanished, unanimously decided to follow the course I had suggested. It may seem that I had gained very little and that to have kept the ILO's budget at the same level as for the previous year was a result which scarcely justified the dangerous tactics I had employed. But the real issue was far more important than any question of figures. It was whether the financial nexus between the ILO and the League was to have for ever as its consequence that financial provision for the needs of the former must depend on the political fortunes of the latter. A policy based on this assumption had come to be regarded as almost axiomatic. But it no longer corresponded to any international reality. The time had come when the ILO, conscious of its growing responsibilities, must challenge a policy which, if continued, must paralyze its development and endanger its future. The challenge had succeeded. Henceforth provision for its financial needs would be judged in terms of the services demanded of it and not unrealistically restricted by irrelevant comparisons.

The Redeemed Pagan

by AUSTIN MAC CURTAIN

A PERMANENT danger lies hidden in the path of every man who would be the biographer of a " literary bloke ". It is this : that there is a tendency to confound the real man, who has written these or those books, with the man whom the books would cause us to suppose. If the subject of the biography be also a controversial figure, about whom a legend has grown and whose recorded conversations reveal or imply a great number of strong opinions, some of them mutually exclusive, then the dangers in the biographer's way are multiplied tenfold. There are men whom to idealize is to diminish : their lives are so full of movement, so charged with influence, that to fix them in a single ideal attitude is to impoverish them and to take from their characters the stuff and density of living. Hilaire Belloc was most certainly of this kind ; and Mr Robert Speaight has written his life admirably.[1]

Most of the book is given to the first half of Belloc's life, up to 1918. At this point Mr Speaight has abandoned chronology and devoted five chapters to Belloc's later work and to his last years. This might lead one to think the book unequal and ill-balanced ; it is not so. Biography demands selection, and this selection must be governed by what explains the subject's motives and his effect upon his time. To understand Hilaire Belloc we must go to his youth and early manhood, for in these years are found the experiences which were of capital importance in moulding his character and in determining all his future action.

Belloc's life, even in boyhood, was all movement. At 18, he founded a monthly magazine which " shall take care never to help those who are at war with the common ideas of right and wrong ", and which reviewed current events, books and politics. It had an exciting life through six issues, one of which was publicly burned in Turkey because of an article in defence of the Armenians. At 19, he was " cycling correspondent in France " for the *Pall Mall Gazette* and wrote home despatches on French politics and public opinion. Before he came to Oxford he had travelled across the American continent, gambling and selling sketches to pay his way ; and he had done that year's service with the French Guns which he was to remember with pride all his life. Mr Speaight's book is richly documented, and in his description

[1] *The Life of Hilaire Belloc.* By Robert Speaight. London : Hollis & Carter. 1957. Pp. xv and 552. 30s.

of these years Belloc comes vividly to life. Incidents and conversations remembered, Belloc's letters and those of his friends resurrect his boyhood and his splendid youth. The letters especially are of power in reflecting immediately the growth of his opinions and the influences which moved and directed him.

Of these influences, Belloc's meeting with Elodie Hogan and their subsequent marriage were by far the most important. Belloc found his soul in marriage, and the experiences of *The Path to Rome* were but the fulfilment for which his marriage had prepared him. He was at home.

> If I was thirsty, I have heard a spring.
> If I was dusty, I have found a field.

Mr Speaight is at his best in describing this richest phase of Belloc's life, with its full happiness, its immense energy of production and its sudden maturity. The letters are full of triumphant exultation and the books come pouring out, each written under the sharp compulsion of penury, and yet in a vivid, serene and flexible prose which gives not the least evidence of haste or carelessness. Rather the contrary : some of Belloc's best writing was done in these years, and if there is much rhetoric it is a rhetoric controlled and rhythmical, inspired by no false emotion : a style lifted by the greatness of the events it describes without failing in strength or clarity.

Mr Speaight is careful throughout not to be drawn from his purpose. Belloc's principal works are discussed freely, but always as a help to understanding the man and his effect upon his contemporaries. I say " discussed ", for Mr Speaight is by no means uncritical : where he disagrees with Belloc's attitudes, he says so, though Belloc is always allowed to speak for himself.

In the matter of Belloc's characteristic attitude to the Faith, however, Mr Speaight's judgment is less than just. He claims that Belloc's vision of the Church as the City of God lacked flexibility and " lacked the evangelist's audacity . . . he did not even want to imagine what Catholicism would be like when it had been preached to all peoples . . . " Yet he quotes a letter which Belloc wrote in 1936 in which he states his position quite clearly. When Belloc wrote later that " The Mass in an American small town, and a convent of American nuns all talking American is the most striking proof of the Church's universal character conceivable ", Mr Speaight calls it " a victory of observation over bias that Belloc could at last see the Catholic Church as the bridge between the Old World and the New ". At one point Mr Speaight asks rhetorically, " What would he have said to a vernacular liturgy ? " Belloc might have surprised him. In an essay *On Mumbo-Jumbo* he wrote, long before the question of a vernacular liturgy was widely raised :

> So also the authority of religion is badly wounded unless you have an archaic language ; and every religion whatsoever adopts one as soon as it can. Some say that the most powerful of these instruments is a dead language ; others say old, odd, mouldy forms of a living language, but at any rate Mumbo-Jumbo is of the essence of the contract.

Belloc's intransigence was, in greater matters, founded upon conviction, not upon bias. He may not have been alive to the "Continental" influences of which Mr Speaight speaks ; certainly he expressed none of the subtleties and *angoisses* which are so frequent a feature of French Catholic writing. But Belloc was concerned with showing the English the heritage which was theirs and from which they had been so drastically and unnaturally separated. He argued from the standpoint of history and tradition, and it may well be that English Catholicism is best expressed from this standpoint. Different nations have different approaches even to the same problems ; and discussions which have in France a peculiar bite and relevance often become, outside of France, merely academic or even esoteric. This difference between Belloc and his biographer is, however, of minor importance in a chapter which reveals the deepest springs of Belloc's complex personality.

In the life of this great and diverse man one thing stands out and presides over all his action and his influence : I mean his faith. In all his work it shines triumphant ; and it shines not as a mood or an emotion, but as a permanent and vivifying centre from which his actions proceed and which precontains his every aim and goal. In the fullest sense of the verb, it informs his whole life. Understand the nature and quality of this faith in Belloc and you find explained his other characteristics and even those bumps and quirks of personality which to some are a perpetual irritation but to others the flavour and salt of his humanity. The peculiar character of Belloc's faith and the consequences which it produced in his life explain his irony, his complaints, his riotous spirits and the steady melancholy which grew more pronounced with the years. For Belloc was no *anima naturaliter Christiana* ; on the contrary, he was essentially the redeemed pagan. The Faith imposed itself upon his intelligence ; and he accepted it almost as he might have accepted an unpalatable historical truth. He had little joy of it, and almost from the beginning he could see where it would lead him. In the height of his youth, on the path to Rome he " saw for an instant the Catholic Church quite plain " and was moved to meditate upon the nature of Belief. He concluded his musings with a premonition, vaguely felt and expressed in a rather literary way ; he remembers a relic of Balliol at home, a panel of the old door of his college with the college arms upon it :

> I remembered the Lion and the Shield, *Haec fuit, haec almae sacra janua domus*. Yes, certainly religion is as tragic as first love, and drags us out into the void away from our dear homes.

This cry was to be repeated continually, and in far more poignant terms, as his life went on. His natural bent was towards scepticism and speculation untrammelled by dogma, and he possessed all the pagan longings and desires. The Faith, which builds on nature, enriched and enhanced these qualities in him ; but there was a price to be paid in loneliness, in the separation from his beloved Oxford, in the estrangement of men who, had they not represented attitudes contrary to all that he stood for, would have been his natural companions. Further, since with him to believe was to do, his Faith demanded that he fight, and the fight was to be long and bitter. It cost him his hopes of prosperity, the full appreciation of his gifts and even the opportunity to employ them as he might have done. He had to abandon poetry, his " rightful garden " ; and necessity prevented his writing to his own satisfaction :

> I ought to have re-written the book (*Marie Antoinette*) as I could now indeed re-write it if I had any leisure, but there is the rub . . . not only leisure, but even regularity of employment has been denied me . . . having the thing out at last, and being free of the debt it involves, was like waking after a nightmare.

Sunt lacrymae rerum, but these things were consciously sacrificed to his belief that

> It is our business to give up all for whatever is truth, whether it appeals to our emotion or not ; whether we have others with us or not ; whether our mood concurs or repels. The intelligence is absolute in its own sphere. Intelligence commands us to accept the truth, and for the truth a man must lay down his life.

To these losses were added Belloc's private bereavements. Mr Speaight describes admirably the immense influence which Belloc's wife exercised on his faith, and the effect of her death upon him :

> We have seen how humbly and how fully he received it back from his wife ; how—in a manner of speaking, he had been content to fight while she prayed ; and how helpless he felt when she was taken from him. He had lost more than a comrade ; he had lost a comrade-in-arms—and in the battle he would always feel essentially alone.

It is in the light of this loneliness that the greatness of the man appears. Belloc had no atmosphere of vivid religion in which he might

move as in a congenial element. Many of his closest friends were not Catholics at all, and the most influential Catholics often distrusted him and deplored his outspoken challenge to his time. Indeed, he may often have wondered if his efforts were merely

> Strong blows, but on the void, and toil without reward.

There was his conscience to worry about too ; for the battle was hard-fought and controversy, even in defence of the Faith, carries the permanent risk of honour stained and charity imperilled. Had his wife been there, he could have relied upon her influence and found repose in his home ; as it was, he stood alone and kept his soul as best he could.

Of emotional satisfaction in his religion he had almost none. His faith was the stronger, but his sense of exile the more acute. His letters show his thirst for full confirmation :

> I am alone and unfed. The more do I affirm the Sanctity, the Unity, the Infallibility of the Catholic Church. By my very isolation do I the more affirm it as a man in a desert knows that water is right for a man : or as a wounded dog not able to walk yet knows the way home . . .

Thus he wrote to Chesterton in 1922. Earlier, in 1913, he had written to Maurice Baring :

> Those who are so blessed as to feel (and personally know) the high destiny of man I have always sought (those few whom I know well, those very few) and importuned them with questions as I have also you. I like to hear from the lips of others, as though it were a thing seen, that which I know I must defend but to which I have no access of my own.

That is humility ; that is courage and fortitude, and it should serve to instruct those who take it for granted that Belloc's writings on the Faith are mere false rhetoric or emotion. Mr Speaight provides much more evidence that Belloc had meditated his faith deeply and long. He had to : it was the only reasonable motive for his life and conduct.

I have called Belloc the redeemed pagan. This whole side of him is reflected in his verse, in many of his essays and chiefly in *The Four Men*. These and other writings betray all the pagan instincts, and there runs through them all a certain sadness which is foreign to the Faith and which derives from the pagan classics. It is the pagan grief at the transience of beauty and the impermanence of things, the irony and endless up and down of human existence ; it is men's shocked and puzzled anguish when their immense perspectives are confronted with the narrow limits of their powers. You find in the pagans all the heroism of men, the love of beauty and of life and, an inch below the bright

surface, a swift current of despair. Belloc describes the mood in one of his essays :

> It is the weeping of Achilles, it is the sleep of Charlemagne, it is the dog of Ulysses—it is that domestic lesser something in the hero which is common to us all. There are laws : especially laws divine. They permit us this and that,—the more gratitude to them. But, oh ! my friends, the things they fend away !

The enormous reality of death was constantly before him, and no writer has so powerfully expressed men's ancient fear of it. Donne's virtuosity sounds hollow and theatrical compared with Belloc's descriptions, instinct with awed perception. The brief account of the passing of Mr Burden, with its Vergilian ending, is sufficient to illustrate Belloc's strength :

> Loneliness caught him suddenly, overwhelming him ; wave upon wave of increasing vastness, the boundaries leaping, more and more remote, immeasurably outwards with every slackening pulse at the temples. Then it was dark ; and the Infinite wherein he sank was filled with that primeval Fear which has no name among men ; for the moment of his passage had come.

In such writings, the product of his small leisure, Belloc exorcised his griefs and allowed his soul to expand and recreate itself against the resumption of the struggle, as a soldier will, in an interval of combat, lay down his rifle and slacken his webbing and think of the things of home.

Mr Speaight's book will give to its readers a reverence for Belloc over and above the just tribute which we owe to the great ; for it records a life whose whole way was guided by the love of truth, the hunger and thirst after Justice and a faith unsupported by anything but its own heroic fortitude. The bitterness of such a life, its near-despair and its loneliness scarcely to be borne, Belloc met with songs, laughter, a sardonic and challenging mockery ; but underneath lay a hard and permanent belief that there is a place beyond the world's horizon where he should find unarmoured peace, an end of fighting and an ultimate repose :

> But beyond this there will come in time, if I save my soul, the flesh of these bones, which bones alone I can describe and teach. I know—without feeling (an odd thing in such a connection) the reality of Beatitude : which is the goal of Catholic living.

An Icelandic Martyr

JÓN ARASON

by THOMAS BUCK

ON 7 November 1550 Jón Arason, the last pre-Reformation bishop of Iceland, was beheaded in the south of the island. His trial was a sham, engineered by a few opportunists and a Danish petty official ; and the martyrdom which followed marked the end not only of the old faith but also of Icelandic independence for nearly four centuries. So it is not surprising that Jón is revered by Icelanders to-day as probably their greatest national hero. Two major biographies, two historical novels and two plays have been written about him in modern Icelandic, while numerous poems commemorate his heroic struggle and death.

Jón Arason's priestly office began strangely for one who was to become a champion of the Church. After ordination in 1507 at the age of 23, he began living with a woman of good family named Helga Sigurðardóttir[1] by whom he had several children and with whom he remained until his death. The failure to observe celibacy was a curious feature of the Icelandic Church in mediaeval times. Marriage by the clergy had been forbidden in the northern diocese, where Jón was born and ordained, in the second half of the fourteenth century ; but the custom among those in holy orders of contracting a civil union had been firmly established for so long that many priests and laymen seem to have seen nothing sinful or even unseemly in it.

It was certainly with full knowledge of Jón's position that his bishop, a Norwegian named Gottskálk Nikulásson, advanced him to positions of trust in the cathedral early in his career and sent him on important missions abroad. Jón was a born leader and when Gottskálk Nikulásson died in 1520 he was elected to the vacant see almost unanimously by the priests of the northern diocese.

Iceland in the middle ages was divided into two dioceses.[2] The northern one had its see at Hólar, a settlement near the north coast, and covered about one-third of the country. Skálholt, some fifty miles east of the modern capital of Reykjavík, was the southern see. Relations between Jón Arason and the Bishop of Skálholt, an Icelander named Ogmundur Pálsson, had been far from cordial at the time of Jón's election to the bishopric. As the doctrines of Luther gradually made their way

[1]The character ð (eth), now peculiar to Icelandic and occurring in a number of Icelandic proper names in this paper, is pronounced *th* as in the English word *then*.

[2]For a sketch map of the ecclesiastical organization of Iceland in the middle ages see *Island und die Färöer* by Alexander Baumgartner, S.J. Freiburg, 1902, 3rd edition, p. 295.

to Iceland, however, the two men drew closer together and stood united in their opposition to the new beliefs and to the increasing demands of the king of Denmark. These beliefs came late to Iceland and it is clear from a letter[1] written by Bishop Ogmundur on a journey abroad in the new year of 1534 that they had aroused little or no interest among the Icelanders.

In 1536 a period of turmoil in Denmark and Norway came to an end with the victory of the Lutheran Christian III. And one of the king's first moves in Iceland was to prepare a new Church ordinal based on Lutheran doctrine. Though this reached Iceland in 1538, it did not come under public discussion there until two years later. By then the lone position of the island politically and religiously was clear to the two bishops. Norway, to which Iceland nominally owed allegiance, had ceased to exist as a separate kingdom and the last Catholic archbishop, Olaf Engelbrektsson, had fled abroad from his see in 1537. With no prospect of support from Norway, the Icelandic parliament assembled at Thingvellir in the summer of 1540 to discuss the new Church ordinal, and Bishop Jón Arason first appeared as the champion of the Church and his whole nation. In polite but energetic terms he wrote to the king on behalf of the Althing, or Icelandic National Assembly, maintaining his beliefs and the rights of his country.

The letter,[2] signed by Bishop Jón and the sheriffs and judges of north and west Iceland and endorsed by the Assembly, states that the Icelanders will gladly discuss any measure which the king proposes for the good of Christendom and goes on :

> If your majesty's representatives wish to impose on us beliefs which are contrary to our understanding, then we humbly beg your royal majesty to grant us permission to leave with our movable belongings so that we may seek refuge in those lands that God may show to us.

In August of the same year Bishop Ogmundur wrote to Christian III declaring himself in complete agreement with his brother in the north. However, though the two bishops stood firmly together, the situations in the two dioceses were radically different. Bishop Jón was still in his prime, aged 56 according to his grandson,[3] and there is no recorded instance of any Lutheran activity in the northern diocese until a year before his death. Bishop Ogmundur was over 80 and almost blind. And though his own personal influence was still strong, he had renounced episcopal office in favour of a priest who had strong Lutheran sympathies.

[1] 18 January 1534. *Diplomatarium Islandicum.* Vol. IX, No. 570 (pp. 690, 691).

[2] 30 June 1540. *Dipl. Isl.*, Vol. X, No. 248 (pp. 536–540). A German translation follows on pp. 540–542.

[3] Magnus Björnsson. He records 1484 as Jón's birth-date. Some modern Icelandic historians would place it four years earlier, but 1484 is accepted in this paper as being probably correct.

Just how far this priest, Gizur Einarsson, deliberately deceived Ogmundur is in question, but there is no doubt that as soon as his election to the bishopric was confirmed by Christian III he set about establishing the new faith throughout his diocese, riding roughshod over Ogmundur. 'Nowhere have we the opportunity to visit a house', wrote the old bishop in a heart-cry to Bishop Jón,[1] 'but go rather as a poor man, for which Almighty God be praised. Silver and church property are taken from the cathedral and placed in whatever house he himself (*i.e.*, Bishop Gizur) sleeps. You will see the intention behind this.'

Bishop Ogmundur's letter added to the deep concern which Jón Arason felt at the spread of Lutheranism in the southern diocese. Yet for Christian III Iceland was still a thorn in the flesh, since his Church ordinal remained unadopted and the mass of the people were solidly against it. He determined on sterner measures and in 1541 sent a Dane named Christopher Hvítfeld to Iceland, with two warships, as governor. One object of Hvítfeld's mission was to prevail on the Icelanders to grant the king a new tax, called the 'landshjálp', to help pay for the expensive wars which he had had to wage to win his throne. And in the spring the governor sent the king's letter on the subject to Bishop Jón. It says much for the spirit of compromise allied to firmness which informed the actions of Bishop Jón at this time that he assembled the Church Council and with them promised to pay the new tax and to assist the royal officials 'if they maintain for us and the people the Norwegian and Icelandic laws, old liberties and lawful customs such as we, our Church and people should have'.

It was a forlorn hope. The Althing was held annually in the tenth week of summer on the plains of Thingvellir, about 30 miles from Reykjavík, and in willingness to discuss peacefully the many vexed questions at issue Bishop Jón decided to ride south to this assembly and meet Christopher Hvítfeld. With priests and lawyers he had reached Kalmannstunga, a point within a hundred miles of Thingvellir, when he learned of a heartless and treacherous deed and decided to proceed no further.

The story was a grim one. When Hvítfeld's mission arrived in the south of Iceland, Bishop Ogmundur's friends realized that as a champion of the old faith he stood in considerable danger from the Danes; they advised him to retire to a nearby monastery. A letter from Bishop Gizur Einarsson assured him that he had nothing to fear, however, and he broke his journey to visit his sister Ásdis. In the early morning of 2 June, while Ogmundur was still in bed, an armed band sent by Hvítfeld burst in, seized him, and led him out thinly clad to their horses. His sister's entreaties they rejected, taking the blind 80-year old bishop

[1] *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. X, No. 308 (pp. 600 and 601).

south to Bessastaðir, where he was placed on board a Danish ship and deported.[1] Bishop Gizur Einarsson, though he took no part in the operation, was certainly a party to the plot against his benefactor and former friend.

From Kalmannstunga Bishop Jón and his followers returned to the north and Jón then sent letters to the Althing and to Hvítfeld. Both are still conciliatory in tone but show that the northerners were not to be intimidated by violence into renouncing one jot of their ancient religious and political liberties. The letter to the Althing,[2] an extract of which follows, makes clear Jón's position :

> We will honour, swear allegiance to and hold the high-born Christian Fredericksson as our liege lord and king of Norway and pay him all taxes and dues which the thanes owe the rightful Norwegian king according to the sworn covenant which we and our forefathers have entered into. . . .
> . . . . it appears to us that the provisions in the royal letter which his lordship has sent this year have not been kept. And this we know in truth, that the liberties, privileges and sworn agreements have often been disregarded by the king's officials in our land. For this reason the people will by no means allow us to ride to the Althing at this time. But we will subscribe to the covenants entered into by the best men of the Althing which are not contrary to the Norwegian and Icelandic laws.

With Bishop Ogmundur a prisoner, Danish warships standing by and Bishop Jón absent from the Althing, the way was clear for Bishop Gizur to carry out the king's wishes. His counsels prevailed among the southerners, and the Assembly agreed at last to the Lutheran Church ordinal. It had no power, however, to legislate for the northern diocese since no representative from Hólar was present, and as Hvítfeld did not press the matter an interesting position arose. The southern diocese of Skálholt, having accepted the Church ordinal, became subject to King Christian III both politically and ecclesiastically. Hólar, however, remained under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Pope and the Archbishop of Trondheim or his representative in Iceland, Bishop Jón Arason. Politically the northerners recognized the joint rule of King Christian III and the Norwegian Council of State, though for all practical purposes the latter had ceased to function.

The position is made more interesting by the persistence of friendly relations between Bishop Jón and Bishop Gizur. From letters which passed between the two bishops in 1541 and 1542[3] it is evident that before

[1] Baumgartner states (op. cit.) that Ogmundur died at Sorö in Denmark in the year following his capture. But Jón Arason's Icelandic biographer, Páll Eggert Ólason, brings forward strong arguments (*Menn og Menntir Siðskiptaaldarinnar á Islandi*, Vol. II, Reykjavík, 1922, pp. 347 and 348) to support the view that he died at sea only a few days after leaving Iceland.

[2] 27 June 1541. *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. X. No. 330 (pp. 622–624).

[3] *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. X. Nos. 346 and 347 (pp. 643–645) and Vol. XI, No. 118 (pp. 121 and 122).

the arrival of Hvítfeld as royal governor they had made a covenant of friendship and mutual aid which was confirmed on both sides after the arrest of Bishop Ogmundur. In his letter Bishop Gizur maintained that what he had done had been for the general good ; and he asked Bishop Jón not to give credence to tales which evil men might carry between them. In reply Bishop Jón re-affirmed his faith in their agreement, adding, " Should any slander be carried between us we will not believe it until we have documentary proof duly certified by responsible persons ".

* * *

While Bishop Gizur lived, Jón Arason kept this agreement. Despite his concern at the growth of Lutheranism in the south, he made no attempt to interfere in the affairs of Skálholt. For this course of action there were probably several reasons. He considered Bishop Gizur rightly consecrated and so entitled to the allegiance of his flock. Moreover, for the time being at least, the king made no attempt to interfere in matters of religious belief or practice in the northern diocese. Had Jón called on the southerners to resist the extension of Lutheranism, the security and peace of the north would have been jeopardized for a cause which was almost certainly doomed to failure at that time.

On Good Friday 1548 Bishop Gizur died at his episcopal residence at Skálholt. To observers among the faithful at the time his end seemed a fitting judgment on him ; his last sickness came upon him as he was returning home from Kalðaðarnes where he had just removed the cross to which pilgrimages had formerly been made from all southern Iceland.

Bishop Jón heard the news at Hólar and immediately rode south with a band of followers into the diocese of Skálholt. The Icelandic historian Páll Eggert Ólason compares this decisive move to Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, and the comparison is a just one. From Kalmannstunga, where he arrived in April, Bishop Jón wrote to the southerners[1] offering to perform all episcopal offices in the diocese and to help them by advice and action, at the same time declaring himself unwilling to deal with any matters not connected with the Church.

His decision to intervene in the affairs of the southern diocese was not taken without careful consideration of the moral and legal aspects of the step ; and it was unquestionably the right as well as the bold thing to do. After the death of Bishop Gizur, he was left the only rightly consecrated bishop in Iceland and this gave him ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the whole country with the right to interpose in the episcopal elections in Skálholt. Moreover, from the purely practical point of view, the time must have seemed opportune for decisive action. Luther had died at Eisleben in 1546. On the continent there was war

[1] *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. XI, No. 564 (pp. 640 and 641).

between the Emperor Charles V and the Protestant League, of which Christian III was a member. And the Lutheran leaders Philip of Hesse and John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, had both been captured when the Protestant forces suffered an overwhelming defeat at Mühlberg.

It is difficult to see why one of Jón Arason's first actions after the death of Bishop Gizur was to send his choice of a successor, an abbot named Sigvarður, to Denmark to obtain confirmation of his election and to be consecrated. As was to be expected Sigvarður obtained no hearing from the king, and he apparently remained in Denmark and became a Lutheran.[1] The choice of the Lutherans in Skálholt fell on a priest called Marteinn Einarsson, who received prompt confirmation of his election from the king when he arrived in Denmark and was consecrated in the spring of 1549.

Even so, the situation in the southern diocese was by no means unfavourable to Bishop Jón. Though King Christian's Lutheran ordinal had been accepted officially, there still remained a solid core among the clergy loyal to the old faith. And while Marteinn Einarsson was abroad seeing the king, there must have seemed good hopes of restoring political and religious liberty to Iceland. That these proved ill-founded must be ascribed largely to the determined opposition of one man, an Icelander named Daði Guðmundsson, whom Marteinn Einarsson had left in part charge of the diocese in his absence. An attempt on the part of Bishop Jón's men to seize Skálholt by force was repulsed in the late summer of 1548 and after an eight days' siege they had to return disappointed to Hólar.

No travelling during the winter months was possible in Iceland. Bishop Jón was still at Hólar when Marteinn Einarsson returned as a duly consecrated Lutheran bishop in the following spring. By this time events were moving rapidly against Jón both at home and in Denmark. His avowed enemies, Daði Guðmundsson and the Danish governor, Laurentius Mule, were working to secure his open condemnation by the king. But what saddened him more than anything was the defection of a priest named Ólafur Hjaltason whom he had befriended from youth.

Just when the sky seemed to be growing most overcast there came a personal letter from Pope Paul III[2] which gave the bishop fresh heart and did much to relieve the deep grief he had felt at Ólafur Hjaltason's desertion. It was the reply to a letter that Bishop Jón had written the previous summer asking what he should do with the Peter's Pence which he had collected in Iceland. The bishop at once had the reply translated into Icelandic and distributed throughout the land. He summoned all the clergy of the diocese to the cathedral at Hólar, put on his

[1] According to a letter from the Danish Lutheran Bishop Palladius to Bishop Jón, dated 16 March 1550. *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. XI, No. 643 (pp. 754–759).
[2] *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. XI, No. 597 (pp. 695–698).

episcopal vestments and with crozier in hand before the High Altar had the Pope's letter read to the priests assembled in the choir :

> Venerable brother, greetings and apostolic benediction.
> We have received your letter of August 17th of last year, so full of piety towards God, as well as of veneration and obedience towards ourselves and the Holy See.
> We therefore pronounce on you our highest recognition in the Lord and exhort you, with the flock entrusted to you, to persevere in the same mind. For this you will receive praise from men here on earth and from God Himself eternal life in heaven.
> As regards the Peter's Pence, which according to your report you still have, it will be acceptable to us if you give them to the best of the poor who seem to you worthy of compassion. Given at Rome on 8th March, 1548, in the fifteenth year of our pontificate.

This warm-hearted letter, which was to be the farewell of the Papacy to Iceland for over three centuries, so encouraged the bishop that he intoned the Te Deum when it had been read and solemnly promised : I would rather die than be unfaithful to the Pope.

Until the return of Marteinn Einarsson to Iceland in 1549 relations between Bishop Jón and the King of Denmark, though strained, had not been broken. When Marteinn Einarsson attended the Althing that summer, however, he read letters[1] from the king proclaiming the bishop an outlaw, forbidding the people to give him their obedience and instructing Daði Guðmundsson to arrest the bishop and his sons. This declaration, which condemned Jón Arason without convicting him of any crime, was made without regard for the laws of Iceland and shows only too well the twofold nature of his struggle for Church and country. As the American historian Knut Gjerset points out,[2] " in resisting such encroachments on their constitutional liberties, the Icelanders were not only within their legal rights, but they were performing a patriotic duty".

One result of the king's letters was to spur the ageing bishop—he was now in his middle sixties—to the daring undertakings which could only end in victory or death. In the autumn of 1549 he sent his sons, Ari and Björn, south with a following of 100 armed men to arrest Bishop Marteinn while he was travelling in the western districts. There they captured him without difficulty. Their other quarry, the formidable Daði Guðmundsson, escaped only by mounting a swift horse.

There followed a succession of victories for Bishop Jón Arason which brought him to the verge of success in his aim of uniting his people in one faith and in opposition to the Danish king's encroachments on Icelandic liberties. Marteinn Einarsson, kept for a short time only at

[1] 11 February 1549, *Dipl. Isl.*, Vol. XI, No. 594 (pp. 691–693)—an open letter pronouncing outlawry on Jón. The letter to Daði is dated 2 April 1549. *Dipl. Isl*, Vol. XI, No. 600 (pp. 700–702).

[2] *History of Iceland.* Allen & Unwin, 1922, p. 296.

Hólar, was sent further north to Möðruvellir, where the Bishop's son Ari was his custodian, a kind and congenial one according to contemporary accounts.

When the Althing assembled the next summer, Bishop Jón attended with a following of 200 men, accompanied by his sons Ari, the lawyer, and Björn, the priest, each with a force of 100 men. This move to complete the work he had begun with Bishop Marteinn's capture was again bold but quite justified. The king had written a second letter to Daði Guðmundsson, urging him and the Danish governor to arrest the bishop. Had Jón not attended the Althing with sufficient force the country would once more have been split into two unnatural camps and the southerners compelled to submit to the Danes. The Danish governor, Laurentius Mule, and the few chieftains who supported him were quite unprepared for so large a force and were unable to resist. It was a moral and practical victory for Jón ; and he followed it up immediately.

From the Althing at Thingvellir he marched with his full force and Bishop Marteinn as captive to Skálholt, where the bishop's residence was surrendered to him and the bishop himself was left under guard. Turning west again he visited the island of Viðey, a few miles from Reykjavík. The Augustinian monastery there, which had been turned into a residence for the Danish governor, was re-consecrated, the former abbot again installed and Laurentius Mule and the Danes driven on board their ships. At Helgafell on the west coast the bishop re-consecrated another Augustinian monastery and again re-instated abbot and monks. Altogether it was a resoundingly victorious journey and the joy in Bishop Jón's heart burst forth in some lively and memorable verses on his return home to Hólar.

* * *

To an observer at the time it must have seemed that peace and unity had returned to Iceland. Even now, the speed with which an act of treachery turned victory into defeat seems almost unbelievable and strangely sad. Bishop Jón's old opponent, Daði Guðmundsson, had at one time thought of submitting to the Church and making amends for his evil life.[1] When he received the king's letter urging him to arrest the bishop he no longer thought of reconciliation. This was evidently unknown to Jón, for he arranged to meet Daði at Sauðafell in the west of Iceland, where various matters at dispute between them were to be submitted to the judgment of the lawyer, Ormur Sturluson. When the hay harvest was in and the summer work finished in the north,

[1]He was a notoriously profligate character, had children by many women, and pursued his own aims regardless of any considerations of morality or loyalty.

Bishop Jón set off with his sons, Ari and Björn, and a moderate following, reaching Sauðafell three days before the appointed date. Daði arrived with a large following and after the briefest of discussions suddenly attacked Jón and defeated his guard. The bishop and his two sons were seized in Sauðafell church where they had taken refuge, removed to Daði's farm at Snóksdal, some five miles distant, and imprisoned.

Meanwhile Daði reported to the residence of the royal governor. The only Danish official then present in Iceland was a clerk named Christian. Together with the liberated Bishop Marteinn Einarsson, Christian hastened to Snóksdal. There it was decided that Bishop Jón and his sons should be kept in custody and their case submitted to the judgment of the Althing the following summer.[1] By the laws of Iceland they were wrongfully imprisoned. But worse was to follow. After the Snóksdal judgment they were removed to Skálholt. Bishop Jón's opponents, who knew the popular support which their prisoners enjoyed, were eager to convict them before the Althing should assemble ; finally, after several days, it was agreed that they should be put to death.

At day-break on Friday, 7 November 1550, Ari and Björn were led out in turn and executed. When the aged bishop himself came out, cross in hand, he saluted a statue of Our Lady, jestingly motioning aside the Lutheran clergyman who remonstrated with him. As he went on his way to the execution block he caught sight of one of his men and said : " Since I am now to bid good-night to this world and enter a new one with other holy men, I ask you to take greetings to my friends and relatives in the north." Then with a joyous expression he made the sign of the cross and bowed his knee. After three strokes of the axe he still lived and was heard to murmur : " In manus tuas, Domine, commendo spiritum meum." Only after the seventh stroke was the executioner's work complete.

News of the murders was received with horror throughout the country, and by the people of his own diocese Bishop Jón was soon venerated almost as a saint. In the following spring thirty men led by three priests journeyed south from Hólar to claim the bodies.

As the procession returned to the northern cathedral the priests of the diocese and a great concourse of people went to meet it, the cathedral bells rang out and the bodies were received with great honour and veneration. They found their last resting place just in front of the choir door of the cathedral.

There was no one of sufficient stature to continue the struggle in Iceland either for the Church or for national independence. Perhaps it is fitting that Bishop Jón should have died as their last defender. His

[1] *Dipl. Isl.* Vol. XI, No 672 (pp. 800–803). 23 October 1550.

struggle was one against great odds and the miracle is that he accomplished so much. After four centuries, affection for his personality and admiration for his heroic struggle are still rooted in the hearts of the Icelandic people. On the quatercentenary of his death in 1950 a set of commemorative stamps was issued in Iceland showing the bishop in cope and mitre ; and his religious and secular poetry is still widely read and enjoyed.[1]

From Bishop Jón's devotional poetry it is very clear how deeply he drew his inspiration from Our Lord and His Blessed Mother. Despite his human failings, that inspiration and the selfless way in which he struggled to the end for his faith give him an honoured place among the martyrs.

[1] One of the best anthologies of modern Icelandic literature (*Islenzk Lestrarbók*, edited by Sigurður Nordal, Reykjavík, 1944), includes a long devotional poem ; and a popular review (*Samtíðin*, edited by Sigurur Skúlason) recently began a series of extracts from the Icelandic poets with short poems by Jón Arason.

St Joan of Arc

(1) ROUEN, TO-DAY

by ELIZABETH BELLOC

JOAN OF ARC was captured by the Burgundians in a skirmish outside Compiègne on a May evening in 1430. At the Castle of Beaurevoir, on the frontier of Picardy, she was sold to the English for a king's ransom, the equivalent in our modern money of £40,000. The English took her to their headquarters, Rouen, the ancient capital of Normandy. On a December day, in that damp, cold climate, they brought their illustrious prisoner, fettered in a cart, by the old downhill road which enters Rouen from the north and is now called by the lovely name of the Rue Champ des Oiseaux. That view which she must have seen from the high hill was the first of the only three glimpses she ever caught of the city of her martyrdom : Rouen, crowded within its encircling walls, its wooden houses and gabled roofs, the great Cathedral, more than half finished, towering up in the centre, and south-west outside the walls, the silver loops of the Seine. On the extreme north of the town, deflecting the road, lay the huge grim castle of Philippe-Auguste. By then over two hundred years old, its formidable circle of walls, crowned with seven towers, bestrode the city wall for double strength against the English, with their recurring claim on Normandy. When Joan was led in across the fosse, by the " common entry " on the western side, the English had been in possession of Rouen for ten years, and their boy king, Henry VI, aged nine years, was in residence there for Christmas.

Years later there were to be legends of this king's holiness : of his love of prayer and learning, of his fortitude under injustice, of his gift of prophecy. In a time when men in power thought of little else but war and murder, Henry VI gave time and money to found his two great centres of learning, Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. He, too, was to die a martyr's death. It is moving to think of the two, Joan and Henry, under the same grim roof and to wonder if they ever saw each other : unlikely enough, as one was still virtually in the nursery, and the other kept in the strictest possible duress. But he may have seen her led across the courtyard to the chapel, or to the great hall, the two places where the protracted sessions of her Trial were held.

The great Donjon tower, eighty feet high, with walls twelve feet thick, stood at the northernmost point of the castle enciente. It stands to this day, isolated and horrible, sunk in the ground and leaning slightly, all that survives of the castle buildings. It remains for the simple reason

that its weight and thickness made its removal virtually impossible until the invention of modern explosives. But by then it had become an interesting anachronism, a carefully preserved historical monument for Viollet-le-Duc to cap with an unnecessary pointed roof of slate, which it wears at a slightly tilted angle, giving the impression of an evil leer.

In the Donjon was the torture-room of the old castle. Up a flight of steps is the great round stone room where Joan of Arc was threatened with torture, confronted with the rack and all the other hideous instruments. Here she gave one of the most splendid of all her memorable answers. " If you torture me", she said, " I shall give way and say what you want. But as soon as you stop the torture I shall once more say what I am saying now." After this answer the torture was not applied. There was something subtle and modern about her wicked judge, Pierre Cauchon, and he wanted to extract a genuinely self-condemning confession from her in order to destroy her immense prestige with the common people. Her words recall, almost exactly, the same statement made in our time by a modern martyr, Cardinal Mindszenty, beyond the Iron Curtain.

Modern martyrdoms were not lacking, alas, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Donjon. The Gestapo had their headquarters in a house immediately beside the tower, a house where prisoners were questioned and tortured. This place of vile memory was pulled down after the war, and there is a memorial plaque to the victims. During the war, the Donjon, a considerable landmark, was camouflaged by being daubed with red paint. The passage of twelve years has failed to clear it all off, so that, from the railway station near by, the first monument the arriving visitor sees is this ancient, evil and apparently blood-stained tower.

In 1430 the next tower westward along the castle walls overlooked some narrow strips of hayfields, and was called La Tour vers les Champs. Here Joan was incarcerated in a stone-walled room, reached by a flight of eight steps. Here her noble spirit went through the seven hells which ended at the stake in the Old Market Place. From the time of her captivity the tower was always called La Tour de la Pucelle. The rest of the castle was mainly destroyed in the Wars of Religion, but the Maid's Tower remained until the early nineteenth century. It stood at the end of a convent garden, and at last the nuns had it pulled down. One can imagine the spirit of Joan, from the other world, breathing a sigh of relief when this was done ! Today it is easy to see the traces of this tower, because an office-block has been built *round* the site, leaving, as it were, the ghost of the high dark round tower in the midst of the modern building, with a damp green medieval well sunk into the stone floor. The place is full of shivers, and I would not care to work in any of those offices. The door opens into the main modern street, inevitably

called the Rue Jeanne D'Arc, and over the door is a stone relief of the castle, taken from an old picture.

All Rouen is built on a slight slope up from the river on the south-west, and is set in a semi-circle of high green hills which close it in most beautifully on the other three sides. Here and there on the hills are spires and buildings, with dark woodlands climbing up, and steep faces of white chalk cliff. As you look down the straight Rue Jeanne D'Arc running a mile downhill to the river, you see the blue plain beyond the Seine. From childhood I remember how the town used to be a forest of towers and spires. Half of these are now missing, after the fierce bombardments of 1944, which destroyed at least eight of the medieval churches. I remember the narrow streets and the packed fifteenth and sixteenth century half-timbered houses, huddled up one against another, leaning forward like gossips whispering together, conveying some message not altogether good to know.

Here and there these gossipping groups remain after the bombing, sometimes a whole street of them, sometimes an isolated ancient house, propped up by strong timbers, standing alone. Perhaps it was their own impending doom which they were discussing. There are still some high and huddled groups of them near the flamboyant Gothic church of St Maclou, and their message is of certain mortality. " Look your last upon the Middle Ages ", they seem to be whispering, " We will not be here for long." A whole district of these houses between the Cathedral and the river was disastrously swept away by the bombing, and their place is now taken by neat square adequate modern buildings, shorn of all magic and mystery, saying nothing because they have nothing to say. The beautiful and the sinister have vanished together in our time.

Or half-vanished. Because a great deal of old Rouen remains, and that of the very best. The great Cathedral, so loved by Ruskin, looms up above the new roofs and the old. Never again will we see the marvellous view of its great towers rising above the jumble of ancient houses along the river front ; but the modern architect has kept the new skyline low on purpose so that above and beyond the ugly present we can still see the beautiful past. And it is fortunate that the glorious towers are still there. As all the world knows, the famous building was badly damaged three times in 1944. Great holes were torn in the roof, and a large part of the south aisle came down in ruins. The pointed fifteenth century summit of the Tour St Romain, with its gilded image of the sun, was destroyed, and the tower now stands like someone whose hat has blown off in a gale. Inside the building the great Christus of Clodion was *mutilé de la guerre,* but is now quite perfectly restored. The thirteenth century glass in the apse was removed to safety in 1939. Some specially deputed archangel protected from all injury the second western tower,

the Tour de Beurre, perhaps the most beautiful Gothic tower in the whole world.

As a child of five I was puzzled to find it was not made of butter. It was built in the fifteenth century from the money given for dispensations by those who wanted to eat butter in Lent. In later childhood I was also puzzled by the great iron spire which the nineteenth century architect Avaloine raised up on the central tower to take the place of the sixteenth century flèche, which was struck by lightning and burnt down in 1822. Who had ever seen an iron spire? The modern critics call his effort *hardie* which indeed it is, but the parvenu spire stood the racket gallantly in 1944 and is still in place.

Beside the north door of the Cathedral, the Porte des Librairies, is the roofless Chapelle des Ordres, once attached to the Archbishop's Palace. This historic chapel is now doubly a ruin, first from the slow passage of time, then from the swift passage of bombs. Here Joan of Arc was formally condemned to death on 29 May 1431. It is thought that she was not present at this last session. Twenty-five years later the ceremony of her Rehabilitation took place in the same chapel on 7 July 1456. These two events are commemorated by two plaques on the ruined wall. Adjoining is the present Palace, which actually houses the Archbishop, a rare occurrence in modern France. It dates from the Middle Ages, with perfect eighteenth century additions, and stands in a fine paved courtyard, behind the lovely delicate fourteenth century chapel of Our Lady, the easternmost point of the Cathedral.

If you look in through the porte-cochère from the south, you see across the courtyard the beautiful enigmatic palace, with its strangely blended styles and its air of secrecy and power. You seem to be peering back across the centuries to a time when a good measure of civil authority was vested in the Church. Across the paven space its power appears before you in stone, high and withdrawn, a mighty memory, charged with the atmosphere of the past.

Along the north wall of the Palace and the Cathedral runs the Rue St Romain, an eerie survival of the Middle Ages, making its very narrow way between the high palace wall with its pointed turrets, and a packed mass of ancient timbered houses with overhanging gables, leaving only a strip of sky visible overhead. As you turn into this street you step back five hundred years. But a thread of fear runs through the enchanted atmosphere, a sense of all that was cruel and sinister in the past. There is a whispered doubt: What if I am caught here? What if I never find my way back to my own time? But such fears vanish as you emerge into the Cathedral square and see to the south the modern buildings, cheerful and stupid, standing where a little while ago all was the waste destruction and ruin of our own salubrious date!

East of the Cathedral are two famous churches: St Maclou, gorgeously flamboyant, clothed, as it were, in lace and cobwebs of stone; and the huge fourteenth century St Ouen with its exquisite sixteenth century crowned tower. St Ouen escaped all damage, but St Maclou was hit. Its outer fabric appears unscarred, but it suffered a sort of shell-shock, like a person, and is still closed to the public.

One of the few open spaces of the medieval town was the little cemetery of St Ouen, beside the great church. Here Joan of Arc was brought from the castle to sign in public a Deed of Recantation, on Cauchon's promising her that if she did so she would be removed to a Church prison and have only women guards about her. In the castle, quite illegally, she was guarded day and night by the vilest dregs of the soldiery, and she had urgent reason to fear rape. But hardly had she signed the Deed at St Ouen when Cauchon had her sent back again to her desperate situation in the castle. After this, as Cauchon well knew she would, she rescinded the Recantation and went to the stake.

Her last sad journey in a cart from the castle to the Old Market Place was not very long but must have taken time through the narrow crowded streets, with a considerable force of soldiers guarding the cart and the route. The Old Market Place lies under three quarters of a mile south-west of the castle site, and is still, to a sinister extent, its old self, though all the contemporary buildings have disappeared. The modern market-place is oblong, the old was triangular, and the stake was set up at the broad end, on the west. There Joan went to her death, her clear logical mind only too well aware of its savage cruelty and its utter injustice. Yet she was able to say: "I accept my death with a good heart", and she harboured no bitterness against her evil judges. In those days there was a thirteenth century church actually in the market place, a short distance from where the stake was set up. It was called St Sauveur, and was eventually destroyed at the Revolution. Joan asked for a cross to be held before her during her martyrdom. The processional cross was brought from St Sauveur, and one of the assessors, Martin Ladvenu, stood upon the faggots to hold it up before her. When the fire was kindled and began to mount, Joan begged Martin to get down quickly, fearing for his safety. The cross was held up before her to the end. An Englishman, one of the royal secretaries, cried out: "We are lost. We have burned a Saint".

A few yards from the spot where the stake stood there is a magnificent stone statue of Joan on the pyre, a modern masterpiece in the traditional style. It is by Maxim Real del Sarte and was set up in 1929. In the same way that Joan was able to call up the victorious fighting spirit in men long ago, so here she has been able to arouse the true sense of nobility and beauty in the artist. And it seems that she alone can do it, because

two important war memorials in Rouen by the same sculptor are as weak and banal as most traditional art is nowadays.

But the overwhelmingly impressive element in the Old Market Place is the fact that it is still the same work-a-day market place of Rouen, and that life has continued there unchanged since long before Joan of Arc. In her time it was called " Old " as in ours. There in the open air, the brisk business-like peasant atmosphere, so very French, creates a current on which comes down to us intact the setting in which that fearful and heroic martyrdom took place. I remember a day in the 1920's when there was a fair in the market place, and the merry-go-round was playing a wild lilting tune. The past seemed to draw near me and stare straight into my eyes. Because, in the Middle Ages, an execution was a public show and there was often loud music, with special tunes for the burning of witches.

There the alignment of the houses has changed but little, and the old streets are much the same. In 1431 the Rue aux Chevaux led westward from the market-place almost exactly where the Rue de Crosne runs now, and you can see the high green hills closing the vista at the end of the street. Surely the poor girl's eyes must have rested for a moment on those hills, with thoughts of Domrémy and the far-off many-coloured valley of the Meuse.

The tragic news would have taken some weeks to reach her family in Domrémy. Her father died two months later, and it may have been the news that killed him. But Isabelle D'Arc, Joan's mother, did not rest. From the moment she understood what had been done to her child, she laboured without respite to re-establish her daughter's good fame. For twenty-five years, through middle age on into old age, this unlettered woman struggled to get the sentence on Joan reversed. She was unaided by education, money or social connections, and Heaven knows what prayers she must have offered up, the powerful prayers of a mother which are always heard. At last the heavens opened, and the ungrateful, selfish king roused himself to institute the formal inquiry which ended in the solemn pronouncement of Rehabilitation in 1456. Two years after this Isabelle D'Arc died, her heroic task accomplished.

Among the famous buildings of Rouen the late Gothic Palace of Justice is still a sad sight, roofless from the bombing, its fine flowering of stone broken and pitted with holes. There are those who might be forgiven for thinking that Justice is always a casualty in this world ! The Great Clock, in its tower near by, escaped damage, as did a second clock inside the tower, made in the thirteenth century, and thought to be the oldest clock in existence. It has ticked its way serenely through the centuries and through the bombing, and still keeps perfect time. Near the market place, undamaged, is the sixteenth century house where the great Corneille was born and lived for fifty-six years. Nearer the

river the lovely Renaissance palace of Bourgtherolde was badly damaged, but is now wonderfully restored. Further west the singularly fine eighteenth century hospital, the Hôtel-Dieu, escaped damage altogether. The sight of it causes a melancholy reflection on the unnecessary violence of the French Revolution. So many of the great reforms had already gone through successfully before that destroying tempest struck at the fabric of French civilization. Apart from the new interest in hygiene and medicine, ably expressed in the noble architecture of the Hôtel-Dieu, an even better reform had been accomplished in the abolition of the use of torture in legal processes. The honours go to Normandy for this great reform, because it was brought about by a persistent Norman nobleman from near Dieppe, the Marquis de Miromesnil, who, to his eternal credit, persuaded Louis XVI to sign the Deed of Abolition.

(2) RECENT LITERATURE

by MARY PURCELL

JUDGING from the steady and undiminishing flow of publications concerning her, St Joan of Arc seems to retain a popularity that never wanes, an attraction that is evergreen. The further she recedes in time the greater, seemingly, her fascination for writers as for readers, for film audiences as for historians. In the course of five centuries, a vast literature has accumulated about her. Within the past decade quite a few major and a host of minor works have been added to the list ; it is not without significance that the book to touch off a controversy that raged up and down the columns of French journals and even crossed the Channel to fizzle out in a few English papers should have been one bearing a title which made a fetching headline : *Jeanne d'Arc a-t-elle été brulée ?* The book was, no doubt, a best-seller.

Before considering some of these books a reference to the sources may be useful. Most of the documents concerning St Joan were assembled by Jules Quicherat in his monumental *Procès de Condamnation et Réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc,* publication of which commenced in 1841.* Later

* Of these documents the most important are :
(1) The records of the Trials of Condemnation and Rehabilitation.
(2) Chronicles—Armagnac, Burgundian and foreign. Some of these have a partisan tinge ; Montstrelet, for instance, viewed the contemporary scene through Burgundy-coloured spectacles, as befitted the paid annalist of the Great Duke's fiefs, the Counts of Luxembourg—one of whom unexpectedly won fame and fortune when his archers captured the Maid in the meadows near Compiègne.
(3) Unofficial Flemish, Dutch, German, Italian and Genoese accounts, which are interesting in that they give the version of the Joan story brought to their various countries by openminded and shrewdly observant foreigners who had been in France during the 15th century.
(4) The *Journal du Siège d'Orléans,* a day to day record of the famous siege, covering the period from October 1428 to May 1429. (see overleaf).

scholars, beyond providing translations of Quicherat's texts, supplying critical notes and discussing various aspects of a problem of perennial interest, have added little to Quicherat's achievement. The most recent addition to the authoritative works on the texts has been a three-volume French translation of the Trial documents by Fr Paul Doncoeur, S.J. (Libraire d'Argences, Melun et Paris, 1952–1956). These dossiers include the French Minute of the interrogations ; the legal documents formally setting out the sentences delivered by Cauchon and Le Maître against Joan; and the complete set of documents relative to the 1450 Enquiries and the Rehabilitation Trial. The three volumes of Père Doncoeur represent the fruits of a lifetime's research and mark an advance on Quicherat in that new documents have been unearthed ; for instance, there is now conclusive proof that the *cedule d'abjuration* signed by Joan was not the document included, by Cauchon's orders, in the official report of the trial proceedings.

Régine Pernoud's stimulating study of the Rehabilitation Trial was published in an English translation a few years ago under the title *The Retrial of Joan of Arc* (London : Methuen. 1955). Madame Pernoud's book, while not exactly a biography nor yet a discussion of Joan's impact on her country and times, has features of both ; in reality it is a set of extracts from the Rehabilitation Trial documents ; these are linked by a highly intelligent and informed commentary. This is a very fine book, though it needs to be read with some reserve. All the evidence given at the 1450 Enquiry cannot be accepted, willy-nilly; some witnesses were dependent on memory, some on hearsay ; and after twenty years fact was liable to become confused with the legends already rife in France concerning the Maid of Orleans.

Perhaps the most important book on Joan since Miss Sackville-West's *Saint Joan of Arc,* published in 1936, was Lucien Fabre's Life, which won for its author the *Grand Prix d'Histoire* of the French Academy. Twenty-five years' study and work went to the making of M. Fabre's book, a model of accuracy and objectivity ; it is written with rare insight and in a prose that loses none of its distinction in translation.

(5) Letters ; these include letters written by Joan's scriveners at her dictation ; other letters concerning her, such as those signed by her defender Gélu, Archbishop of Embrun, or by her enemies, Bedford and Burgundy, or the enthusiastic effusions of the susceptible brothers, the faithful Lavals.

(6) Miscellaneous documents : under this heading come expense accounts, receipts, and less prosaic items such as the thumb-nail sketch of Joan and remarks scribbled by the bored notary of the Paris Parliament in the margins and between the records of judicial proceedings and parliamentary enactments. In this category also is the inimitable *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris,* in which that excellent fellow, prototype of all gossip columnists, registered the pulsebeat of Paris. Though the Bourgeois did not favour Joan, his diary is a valuable mirror of his times ; he himself was a fifteenth-century progressive in that he was a democrat to his fingertips ; and, in an age when his fellow-citizens seldom had the ability or the urge to record the events that made up the daily round, he was the happy exception to the general rule.

Fabre's contribution to the literature of the Maid drew from Claudel the commendation, " The finest book ever written on Jeanne d'Arc ". Like Madame Pernoud's, this work found an English publisher (London : Odhams. 1954).

Some years before these two publications there appeared Jacques Cordier's controversial *Jeanne d'Arc, sa Personnalité, son Rôle* (Paris. 1948), a book in the same tradition if not in the same literary rank as the *Vie de Jeanne d'Arc* of Anatole France which caused such a furore in 1904. In passing, an interesting point in connection with the sensational but unreliable *Vie* may be noted. Almost thirty years later, someone spotted, in M. France's brilliant patchwork of praise and ridicule, frivolity and higher criticism, a long passage cribbed wholesale from Molinier's *Sources de l'Histoire de France ;* the plagiarism had been used to decry and belittle Ayroles's dull but accurate five-volume Life which had the misfortune to precede the publication of the *Vie* by a brief period ; to castigate, with borrowed whips, another man's work as a " chaos of memoranda ", while his own work, whatever its literary merits, lacked order and accuracy, seems to show that the great Anatole could be smallminded betimes. One good result of his *Vie* was that it sent the exasperated Andrew Lang into the lists, thus providing the first—apart from the book of an American, Lowell—full-length, reliable and readable life of Joan in English.

Recently, Mr Sven Stolpe, a Swedish novelist, in a book, *The Maid of Orleans* (English translation by Eric Lewenhaupt. London : Burns and Oates. 1956), has attempted to deal with Cordier as Lang did with Anatole France. He has not been altogether successful, mainly perhaps because he chose to refute Cordier with Cordier. He by-passes an open armoury—the wealth of documentation available—for such weapons, second-hand and second-rate, as he can snatch from his opponent's grasp. The result is that while he states Cordier's conclusions clearly he does not always effectively counter them. In the Postscript to his book Stolpe tells us :

> To a great extent I have agreed with Cordier's treatment of the material for a biography of Joan, but I differ radically from Cordier concerning the basic view of Joan's person. My book may be said to be an attempt to create a picture of Joan as a mystic out of the material left by Cordier and others. Thus I use Cordier's conclusions, with certain reservations, but I use them in a manner of which he would highly disapprove.

Besides attempting to relegate a great deal of the known history of Joan to the realms of legend, Cordier also held that her revelations were a form of hysteria ; he insists that she never held any post of authority in the army and depicts her as a sort of military mascot in which the

French Marechals, Captains and men-at-arms had such faith that they tagged her along on each campaign. Sven Stolpe, travelling a good way along the debunkers' road with Cordier, dismisses too lightly as legend some facts for which there is incontrovertible evidence ; he quotes Cordier's pet psychologists in support of the hallucination thesis ; he credits Dunois, La Hire and de Rais with victories hitherto attributed to Joan, but fails to explain how it was that, prior to the Maid's arrival on the scene, the Dauphin's forces were so ineffectual.

Although Mr Stolpe mentions Quicherat in his Postscript as the most important source, reference is made to him only twice in almost three hundred pages. Lucien Fabre gets three passing nods, Madame Pernoud is ignored ; authorities on the Trial documents like Champion and Doncoeur fare worse, Champion being favoured with one mention while Fr Doncoeur is curtly dismissed with " the works of the Jesuit, P. Doncoeur, are insignificant and tendentious ". Yet Cordier is reverently referred to as " the careful Cordier " and " the sober Cordier ", though his work is unreliable and written from a rationalistic, even sectarian, viewpoint.

But, apart from his unsuccessful attempts to deflate Cordier, Sven Stolpe's book has much to recommend it. It is finely planned ; the narrative most readable, the style forceful and pungent. It is a moving tribute to Joan the Saint. Through the eyes of this Northern writer she is seen as

> . . . a type of martyr peculiarly helpful and consoling for our own times . . . she is akin to the broken, confused and half-yielding martyrs of Communist brain-washing methods.

He rightly stresses that her true greatness lay not in her patriotism, glorious though it was, but rather in her acceptance of personal eclipse ; in the greatness of soul that drew from her no complaint when abandoned by her friends, by her compatriots, by her king, that upheld her during a long and miserable imprisonment and through the culminating cruelty of an infamous and terrible death amid circumstances of the most overwhelming shame and desolation. Her inflexible resolve to " serve God first ", her innate purity and youthful ardour, her strong faith and trust in God despite an accumulation of misfortunes sufficient to swamp in despair older and more experienced souls—all this Mr Stolpe brings into high relief as he develops his thesis that Joan's sanctity was her highest glory. One could wish him to have stressed her essential simplicity and straightforwardness a little more ; there was a transparent, a translucent quality in her character which made a filter for a radiance not of this world. So far, only English and German translations of Sven Stolpe's work have been made. It will be interesting to see what

place the French critics will give this Scandinavian contribution to the Joan literature, when it finds a French publisher.

Before concluding this by no means comprehensive survey of the more recent books on Joan, mention must be made of Jean Grimod's sensational *Jeanne d'Arc, a-t-elle été brulée?* (Paris. 1952). M. Grimod's suggestion is no new one ; even before Jean Jacoby in 1932 and Grillot de Givry in 1914 there were quite a few writers ready to accept the hypothesis that Joan had escaped the flames. This theory its upholders usually support by the fact that there appeared on the scene, not many years after Joan's death, no less than five impostors, each in turn claiming to be the Maid. Of these one seems to have been more successful than the others ; she arrived in the Metz area about 1436 and found several persons ready to accept her story, among them two of Joan's brothers. She married a local landowner, Robert de Armoises ; as Dame de Armoises she continued to dress as a man and remained in the district for about sixteen years, after which she was imprisoned for impersonation. She must have been an athletic type, for the curé of Sermaise gave evidence that he had played tennis against her. (After the set she told him " that he might now tell the world that he had played against the Pucelle, the which saying pleased him greatly ".) M. Grimod is convinced—and wishes to convince his readers—that this lady and Joan were one and the same person ; he argues that Joan escaped from Rouen tower through a subterranean passage which led from her prison cell to Bedford's apartments in the tower. This is untenable ; the foundations of the tower were exposed some decades ago and French historians and archaeologists swarmed about it searching for such a passage, of which no trace could be found. Even to-day the foundations of the ancient Tour de la Pucelle may be seen through the courtesy of the owner of 102 rue Jeanne d'Arc, whose house stands on the site, and it is quite evident that there was no underground exit from the prison.

Grimod goes on to suggest that another girl was substituted for Joan at the stake, although the testimony of the executioner, the prison guards and the two Dominicans who stayed with her up to the end is available for all to read. He goes further still by resurrecting the old legend that Joan was a royal illegitimate who had powerful friends to buy her life at the last moment. He sidesteps the fact that some thirty to forty honest Domrémy folk swore to her origin in their village, to her having grown up amongst them, the daughter of the respectable Jacques d'Arc and Isabelle Romée. He asks readers to believe that the English, having paid over a King's ransom to get Joan into their hands, would then fail to put her to death.

The acceptance of the impostor, especially by Joan's brothers, has puzzled more than Jean Grimod. One is forced to conclude that the brothers were accomplices ; Pierre d'Arc was always a man to keep

his eye on the main chance. Still, it is worth remembering that impostors have been always with us, and, like the trail of a meteor, they tend to follow great characters. They did a flourishing trade during the 15th century, so it was nothing to wonder at that Joan should have been impersonated. Père Donçoeur relates that, as late as 1949, he himself received a letter from a lady with a Budapest address, announcing that she was Joan of Arc and begging him to establish her claims : " Mais, ne l'ayant pas vue, je ne la reconnus pas ", he dryly concludes.

M. Grimod's publishers served him well, launching his book with a tremendous flourish of advertising trumpets : " un livre magistral . . . . . un livre qui sera l'événement de la saison en matière d'histoire . . . l'extraordinaire révélation de documents d'archives . . . par un historien scrupuleux." When the Directors of the Archives Nationales attacked the author in the columns of *Le Monde* and *les Nouvelles littéraires* for " his pretensions " and denounced his book as " a tissue of errors, a denial of sworn and recorded evidence, a mass of audacious inventions ", the battle began. Grimod, who wields a vitriolic pen, compared all the medievalists and historians of France to a pack of ancient crabs, " allant gravement avec, incrustés dans leur carapace, des fucus qu'ils promènent comme des lauriers ". To stigmatize Academy and other literary awards as " fungi " only led to an extension of the verbal war on an ever wider front. The scarifying correspondence went on for months and even crossed the Channel to peter out in some English journals, for Joan's greatest victory would seem to be her conquest of the English mind. The final result was that M. Grimod's book enjoyed bumper sales ; the furious spate of letters deserved a book to themselves.

The research on Joan still goes on. Patient scholars, following where Quicherat led, continue to dig and delve in hitherto untilled portions of this vast field ; and, year by year, in the rich soil turned up by their labours, writers come to sow; the harvesters are the readers. And it is nothing to wonder at if among the springing wheat there appears also some cockle.

Caring for the Old

LONDON, PARIS, BELFAST

by MIRIAM HARRISON

MOST people have had some experience of old age—either indirectly through coping with an elderly relative or more directly by virtue of their own increasingly felt years. Whatever that experience, all must be aware that to-day old age is front page news. We hear from all sources of our rising elderly population and the declining numbers of wage earners to support it, and of the process known as " medicated survival " which has created such a demand for geriatric long-stay beds and which has blocked many acutely-needed ones. We hear of the trials facing elderly people with little or no domestic help ; of the worries connected with fixed pre-war incomes, dwindling capitals and unmanageable houses ; of loneliness and that bewildering isolation which stems from disinterested relatives and an outlived generation.

Gerontology, or the medical study of old age, is surely unique in the dominance of its social implications. This important fact is being increasingly recognized by the appointment of almoners to geriatric units, for there is no demarcation between the medical and social aspects of sick old age. Now that admission to hospital is no longer regarded as a step towards pauperism or the grave (and in fact is sometimes too eagerly sought), all hospitals are faced with a rising average age and subsequent social difficulties when patients are ready for discharge. It is thus essential to have an almoner attached to each geriatric unit to deal with the innumerable worries connected with pensions, rents, cats and dogs, unco-operative relatives, home helps and residential accommodation. The almoner will also work with the physician in screening patients for admission, in maintaining a link with the General Practitioner (who is sometimes not considered enough by the hospital staff and who usually has a long-standing knowledge of the family background), in keeping abreast with geriatric advances elsewhere, in serving on voluntary and statutory committees connected with old age, and in lecturing to medical students and probationers on the importance of the social aspects of old age.

As a profession almoners are not sufficiently vocal, and all too seldom do they write, in other professional journals, of surveys or experiments which have been carried out and which would well merit and benefit a wider audience. Even to-day the almoner is regarded by some consultants as an " eviction officer "—how familiar to most almoners is the cry " Why hasn't old Mrs Brown gone home ? Don't let me see her here to-morrow morning ". This usually results in Mrs

Brown either being concealed in the bathroom until the morning round is over or being rushed home to very unsuitable surroundings, with re-admission following shortly afterwards. Co-operation between physician and almoner is essential. Ideally they should both undertake domiciliary visiting, for this not only prevents the admission of cases better dealt with elsewhere, but provides both with an insight into the patient's home circumstances and enables a social and medical assessment to be made which will be of much value later on. Joint ward rounds keep the almoner up to date with the patient's medical progress and ensure that suitable plans are ready when discharge is suggested. Often, too, the physician bases his decision about the patient's future on the social data supplied by the almoner. The social and medical aspects of old age are so inextricably bound together that it is wasteful and unrewarding to contemplate a Geriatric Unit without an almoner.

* * *

It is interesting to note some of the good and bad aspects of growing old in three different cities.

In every great city isolation is a problem, and in London particularly, where everyone leads a very self-contained existence, the lot of an elderly person can be difficult and lonely. To offset this, there are the amenities which are easier to produce on a large scale. Some London boroughs provide a daily meals-on-wheels service ; a soiled linen service for incontinent patients is another practical measure designed to keep the sick old person at home for as long as possible ; night sitters-up are available in conjunction with the home help services ; domiciliary chiropody and physiotherapy services are arranged where necessary.

Recently I visited the Finsbury Employment Centre which provides work for about 120 old age pensioners on a part-time basis. The old people are paid a flat rate of ten shillings a week irrespective of capabilities or output. It is a great experience to see these old folk gathered together in an attractive building, working away busily and cheerfully. Some pack corn pads into containers or nail files into bundles ; some test ball-point pens ; others index for the local library ; eye pads for Moorfields Hospital are knitted ; and parts for electric irons are assembled. The emphasis of the scheme is on constructive diversion rather than commercial enterprise, though the project has the full blessing of the trade unions and the workshop competes on the labour market without preferential treatment. The workshop has obviously transformed the lives of the elderly workers. Absenteeism is non-existent, punctuality almost embarrassing in its exactitude, and the industry shown tremendous. The oldest worker is eighty-eight and attends each day from her one-roomed flat.

In England, as elsewhere, the trend in old people's accommodation is away from large residential homes towards compact labour-saving flatlets. I have visited the Drapers' Cottage Homes at Mill Hill in London, and was very impressed with the way in which three types of elderly people were looked after on the same estate.

There are five-roomed bungalows in which those who are married may live, with their own furniture and possessions round them. Self-contained flats are provided for single persons. Secondly, when the elderly residents become too infirm, they give up their bungalows and move into the rest home where they each have a bed-sitting-room, once again with their furniture. They have their meals provided in the communal dining room and are cared for if they need the odd day in bed. Thirdly, even when residents become bedfast, they are not sent to a hospital outside but are kept in the sick bay on the estate. The average age at death is 82 as compared with 72 in other parts of the country, and this is attributed to the sense of security which the old people experience there. It is noteworthy that no one pays any rent at Mill Hill, but the bungalow dwellers provide food, gas, clothing and so on from their pensions. Those in the Rest Home and Sick Bay pay 22s. 6d. a week and of course have their meals provided.

There are, however, still loopholes in the Health Service which affect old people greatly. In London there are not sufficient beds for the long-term patients, and there is pathetically little provision for the disorientated old person who is not sufficiently confused or noisy for a mental hospital. The decayed gentlefolk have a hard struggle to maintain their independence. I spent a period this year working with an organization which cares for this neglected and often silent group of society. I was particularly struck with their difficulties over clothing replacements and the provision of invalid foods on tiny fixed incomes barely sufficient to cover basic necessities. The dread of being unable to keep up appearances or, worse still, of having to relinquish their own corner is constantly with them. Old age is certainly no respecter of persons or income groups. The stigma of the workhouse still flourishes—one old lady in Battersea (a borough renowned for its long-lived residents) refused to visit the welfare officer because his office was situated in the former workhouse premises, even though she had agreed to enter a small local old people's home with no workhouse affiliations.

Paris may have a wonderful reputation for gaiety and romance, but it seems far from a happy experience to grow old there. Because of the appalling post-liberation housing situation, few grandparents can be accommodated with their children—and for most there is nothing to choose between a room, perhaps several storeys up, or one of the large hospices of at least a thousand beds. Pensions are inadequate to meet the high cost of living (especially of food), and an elderly

Frenchman has to manage on a contributory pension of £63 a year or a non-contributory pension of £28 a year. Old people are also entitled to a little help with coal, rent, gas bills and bread, and on festivals the local mayor presents each of his elderly charges with an offering for their stock pot. There is no home care scheme or statutory home help scheme, but religious orders nurse sick elderly people in their own homes.

The "foyers" for old people which have been established in each district must be a great boon for those sufficiently well to make the journey each day. A main meal is served at mid-day and again in the evening, and old people over the age of sixty-five are eligible. They are assessed on their incomes but many receive free meals. The foyer is open all day as a club-cum-recreation centre, and members may, if they wish, carry their meal home in a little covered pail. These foyers seemed to be one of the best schemes I saw in France, where planning for old people has had to take second place to the urgent problems of homelessness in the younger generations. Suicides amongst the elderly population of Paris are said to be relatively common. There are many calls for constructive thinking and practical action to cope with the ever-increasing number of old people. In particular it has been suggested that old people's flats be included on the ground floor of new blocks now being built.

It is undoubtedly true that religious enterprise is far ahead of statutory action in France where old age is concerned. Many readers will already be familiar with the work of M. l'Abbé Pierre, who has stirred the public conscience to the plight of the fifteen thousand homeless in Paris. He hopes eventually to provide small residential homes for the elderly. At the moment, an elderly applicant may wait upwards of ten years for admission to a hospice. The basis of admission differs greatly in Paris from the London and Belfast homes. Old people are allotted beds not on their physical capabilities or social status, but on their former occupation. Thus there are hospices for those employed in the building trade, for impecunious journalists and savants, for broken-down opera singers and many others. I visited the hospice for opera singers, which has only sixty-eight beds and is one of the smallest in Paris. It was founded by Madame Rossini, and applications from former prima donnas only are considered.

To supplement the small pocket money allowance in these hospices (five pounds a year) residents are given a little tobacco or sweets, sugar, soap, chocolate and four postage stamps a month. Once a month they are also given a return metro or autobus ticket, and once a quarter the fare to their home town is paid. I felt this was a very humane gesture. I was interested to discover that the Paris lodging-houses (amongst others I visited one in the form of a houseboat moored to the banks of the Seine) catered mainly for young men—unlike London and Belfast—

and the elderly man must turn to the hospice for shelter when his independence fails.

In France all children are obliged to contribute towards the maintenance of their elderly parents and are assessed accordingly.

Belfast too has its problems for the elderly resident. True there are few flats or single rooms where an old person may remain tucked away in obscurity or solitude, but many live alone in small kitchen houses with outside sanitation involving awkward steps. A once-weekly meals-on-wheels service is provided, but often the independent old Northerner cannot be cajoled into having it for fear of the neighbours' reactions. Even with a home help service, the bread-and-tea type of debilitated old person still arrives into the wards. Belfast—in proportion to its population—has even fewer long-stay beds for the chronic sick than London, and most of the general wards of every hospital have their quota of irremediable elderly patients who cannot be sent home because of impossible home circumstances but who are blocking the much-needed beds for younger remediable patients. In addition, no psychiatric long-stay annexes are available for confused old people.

To offset this, an excellent assessment ground for elderly patients is provided at Seapark House, Greenisland. Seapark is the first " half-way house " in Ireland and was purchased in 1952 by the Nuffield Trust. It is now administered jointly by the Hospital and Welfare Authorities. Patients from the Geriatric Units at the Braid Valley Hospital, Ballymena, and the Belfast City Hospital are transferred there direct from the wards to continue their treatment under trained supervision and away from the hospital atmosphere. This means that not only are beds in the units released sooner than they otherwise would be, but the elderly person is encouraged to get on his feet in more normal surroundings. He is groomed back to independence, either to return home (with less chance of re-admission) or to fit into a residential home. Over 200 patients from the City Hospital pass through Seapark each year. Some are sent down for a trial period only and, if unsuitable, are returned to the units again. This two-way system works well and ensures a continual bed-turnover. Hemiplegics, recovering fractured necks of femur, and debilitated frail old people thrive at Seapark, and indeed the last-mentioned are often unrecognizable after a month there.

There are various residential homes in Belfast. Darby and Joan accommodation is available in some of them, though, it is not often requested. One must presume that the Belfast Darbys and Joans prefer to carry on on their own until one or the other dies. More and more residential homes are allowing residents to bring in some of their own possessions, and this seems an excellent way of dispelling an insti-

tutional atmosphere. Housing for old people in Belfast is receiving attention and already some attractive flats and small bungalows have been built. A group of these flats has recently been established at one end of an existing new housing estate. A community room has been added where the old people can meet and enjoy various recreations, but it is hardly ever occupied. It is realized now that these old people are so segregated from the homes of the younger members of the estate that the company of only their own age group becomes irksome. A succession of prams rather than hearses passing by the elderly residents' window is greatly to be preferred.

Old people's clubs are increasing all over Northern Ireland and are helping to promote new interests and keep loneliness at bay.

For the past year a home geriatric service (sponsored by the Nuffield Foundation) has been operating from the City Hospital Unit. It is designed to keep patients at home and at the same time to provide them with treatment comparable to what they would receive in the ward. Cases are carefully selected and assessed with the co-operation of the general practitioner; the most suitable ones are remediable hemiplegics and arthritics who will benefit from home physiotherapy and whose relatives can be instructed in appropriate exercises. The scheme is designed to give patients the maximum degree of independence of which they are capable, thereby enabling relatives to nurse them with less strain and hardship. A mobile van equipped with portable machines takes the physiotherapist and consultant round Belfast, and the scheme has proved very successful, though of necessity only a limited number of cases can be tackled in this way.

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In these brief and incomplete comparisons, it is impossible to give a full account of all the facilities for the elderly in the three cities, but it is clear that the trials of old age are international. The life of the elderly vagrant seems to follow the same pattern whether it takes place under the bridges of the Seine, on the Thames Embankment or the waste ground near Belfast's Smithfield. All scorn a settled abode save for an occasional night spent in a lodging house; all suffer from chronic bronchitis and uncomfortable feet, and are a constant strain on hospital and welfare resources particularly in the winter. And yet one cannot help being glad that in these days of national spoon-feeding such sturdy and often picturesque old characters do still exist.

The fears of old age are also the same everywhere—fear of loneliness, fear of permanent illness, fear of having to give up familiar surroundings and fear of dying alone. In all three cities voluntary enterprise could

be developed much more to fill in the chinks left by official measures of relief. It seems to me that old age provides one of the best fields for worthwhile voluntary effort, particularly where regular visiting is concerned. The fact that someone takes the trouble to call can often rouse an old person from a state of solitary hopelessness to one of awakening interest. It cannot be over-emphasized that the old person must be able to rely on a regular (however distantly spaced) visit, otherwise his morale and interest will suffer. Churches of all denominations are becoming more aware of the part their members can play in dispelling loneliness, and many parishes run a car ferry service on Sundays so that infirm people can go to church. Elsewhere scouts and guides help with the week-end shopping for frail parishioners, and as the first and third generations always blend well together, this seems a very satisfactory arrangement.

The plight of the mentally confused old people who do not warrant mental home treatment is grave in all three cities, and too often they are bundled into already overcrowded mental hospitals or long-stay wards, or just left at home to the anxiety of relatives or neighbours. In Paris, particularly, there is no classification in the admissions to long-stay wards, and confused elderly patients lie beside young mentally-alert chronic cases and patients of all ages in the terminal stages of illness. To offset this sad state of affairs, I was impressed to find elderly residents in one Parisian hospice helping with the chores. The old ladies prepare vegetables, mend and sort linen, while the old gentlemen run the library and potter at gardening and carpentry. Quarrelling had been cut to a minimum and staff reduced as a result, and the small pocket money reward is welcome too. Fraternization between the old ladies and gentlemen flourished at this home—an unusual state of affairs to find anywhere, even though communal sitting rooms are provided. All the old men mostly tend to foregather in the smoke room and leave the old ladies to reign supreme elsewhere.

All almoners have come up against the "frail ambulant" category of old person, who is not ill enough to remain in hospital nor reliable enough to stay at home nor active enough for a residential home. The County Antrim Welfare Authority runs a residential home geared down to the requirements of these patients who need a minimal nursing care. Unfortunately the home is in a remote lonely place instead of a busy thoroughfare. London and Paris realize the importance of keeping elderly patients in familiar surroundings even when capabilities decrease.

The ancients may threaten to outstrip the moderns in the next generation, and certainly the prospect of coping with three grandfathers instead of one could be alarming, but so much depends on the attitude of younger relatives. Whether an old person lives in London, Paris

or Belfast—and I am sure Dublin too— whether alone, with relatives or in a residential home, family ties are all-important. Family responsibility is as strong to-day as ever it was, but our changing social structure makes it more difficult to practise. Let us beware, then, of referring to old age as a problem. It is rather a natural process which most of us, rather ruefully, will some day have to face. And it is up to us, the old people of the future, to do now what we hope will, later on, be done for ourselves.

THE LORD. By Romano Guardini. London : Longmans, Green and Co. 1956. Pp. 535 and xi. 28s.

This book was written in German and translated into English in America. For readers on this side of the Atlantic these are two potential obstacles to enjoyment. In fact both are wholly overcome, the first by the utter "spirituality" of the author which, as the spirit blows where it will, transcends all narrow boundaries ; the second by the singular excellence and dignity of the translation.

Mgr. Guardini presents some ninety studies or reflections or meditations—one does not know which word to use—on the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. These are of uniform length, are unrelated and follow only a loosely chronological order ; they have nothing in common, I hasten to add, with that dull genus, the meditation manual for every day of the year.

In the preface the author defines his task ; and immediately we taste the flavour of this rare book. On this threshold, where literally angels might fear to tread, Guardini stops, and we feel that for him the mystery of God in Christ is something very real ; and as we read his book we realize that that consciousness never leaves him. He most carefully sets his limits. He does not propose to write a life of Christ ; he is not concerned with the " evolution of character in the life of Jesus " ; this sober writer " makes no claim to completeness ", and he wishes " to point out that he offers nothing new ". So much for what is negative ; in his preface Guardini speaks mostly of the deep mystery of God as revealed in the words and works of Christ, and so he can define positively the purpose of his writing in these words : " We can only reverently pause before this or that word or fact, ready to learn, adore, obey ". How very fruitful, how rewarding these reverend pauses are the reader must taste for himself. If the ponderings sometimes seem ponderous, it will be found that they are so mainly *ratione gravitatis materiae,* as Saint Thomas Aquinas might say. In truth the style is heavy, in the German mode ; but it is neither dull nor unpleasing ; this is due in part to the excellence of the translation.

This is a wholly blessed book. It has no index, no bibliography and no footnotes, literally not a single one. It has no *apparatus criticus,* but would that the books that have were backed by a tenth of the wisdom and learning of this one. The rich originality of thought in Mgr. Guardini's book does not lie near to the surface. To the superficial reader it may seem dull, because for such it will have no sparkle. It has none of the ready glitter of the shoddy, nothing of the antics of the showman. But real treasure lies buried here ; it will be found only by those who are ready to dig.

FRANCIS SHAW

Reviews

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS

The year 1956 saw the publication of the seventh and last scroll from Qumran Cave 1, a " Genesis Apocryphon " or romantic biography of some Genesis characters. With this, the first great finds of 1947 were made completely available and were found to give a cross-section of the type of literature subsequently found in ten other caves : biblical texts, commentaries on biblical texts by the men of Qumran, rules of the sect, religious writings proper to the sect like the Hymns and the War Ritual, and apocryphal works more or less known already. Random samples of the texts from the last ten caves have been published in various periodicals. But only the contents of Cave 1 have been officially and definitively published : the main scrolls in Jerusalem and America, the fragments at Oxford. The unpublished texts and fragments are said to number 40,000, but as the fragments are from thumb-nail size to a few pages or more, the number does not tell us much, except that we must heed the repeated warning of the mainspring of the excavations and publications, Fr de Vaux, O.P., that the time for synthesis is not yet come.

In the task of presenting the scrolls to readers of English on this side of the Atlantic, the publishing firm of Secker and Warburg has played a leading role, with two books of outstanding value. The first is Millar Burrows's *The Dead Sea Scrolls,* which comprises a long introduction to the texts with a history of their discovery, a discussion of their date, contents and background, and a translation of the main parts of the scrolls available a year ago. Dr Burrows, who was in Jerusalem when the first finds were made, was one of the editors of the first three scrolls to be published: the Isaiah text belonging to Bishop Athanasius, the Habacuc Commentary and the Manual of Discipline. He pursued his studies of the scrolls and their commentators intensively for seven years before presenting his conclusions, and his book is still the best general introduction to the scrolls, though no student would be complete without Dr H. H. Rowley's *The Zadokite Documents and the Dead Sea Scrolls* (1952).

Dr Burrows's summary of the relations between the scrolls and the New Testament is as follows : " All these parallels are important for the study of the New Testament. They are no less significant because some scholars have exaggerated their importance. It is not necessary to suppose that any of the writers of the New Testament had ever heard of the particular sect that produced the scrolls and I see no definite evidence that they had. Why are the covenanters—or, for that matter, the Essenes, nowhere mentioned in the New Testament ? There is no reticence with regard to the Pharisees and Sadducees or the followers of John the Baptist. For myself I must go farther and confess that I do not find my understanding of the New Testament

substantially affected. Its Jewish background is clearer and better understood, but its meaning has neither been changed nor significantly clarified ".

This year, with the publication of the first complete translation of the main texts and fragments, by Theodor H. Gaster, Secker and Warburg have put us further in their debt.* Less space is now given to commentary, and the main part of the book is translation. Preface and general introduction occupy forty pages, then come some 200 pages of text, interspersed with introduction and notes for each document, to the extent of some 130 pages. Professor Gaster agrees with the generally accepted dating of the scrolls, between 175 B.C. and A.D. 68, and with the tendency to ascribe their provenance to the Essenes. His comments are succinct and sound : " The scrolls help us to reconstruct the spiritual climate of early Christianity, and throw light especially on the mission of John the Baptist and on the constitution of the primitive Church ". But he is careful to point out that similar light was already to be had from the Apocrypha and the rabbinical writings : " Accordingly, to draw from the New Testament parallels any inference of special relationship is misleading. The Scrolls contain no anticipation of or parallel to distinctive Christian doctrines, e.g. Incarnation, Vicarious Atonement or Communion. . . The sect did *not* believe, as has been supposed, in a martyred Messianic ' Teacher of Righteousness ' who appeared posthumously to his disciples and whose Second Coming was awaited. . . The title ' Teacher of Righteousness ' (more correctly, ' true exponent of the Law ') designates an office, not a particular person. The passage of the texts on which the sensational theory has been based has been misunderstood ". By restricting his comments to the minimum, Professor Gaster has allowed the texts to speak for themselves. His lucid, dignified and reliable rendering will be of great service to all readers.

Nonetheless, the views of the translator have to some extent coloured the translation. The Teacher becomes a minor character, which is all to the good, but he also loses any particular identity. This is hard on some of the texts, which hardly allow of his being anybody from Moses to the " superior for the time being " of the sect. One result is that the opening of the Damascus Document now reads as a general history of Israel rather than as a history of the origin of the sect. Dr Gaster is not alone in holding this view, and it is welcome at least in so far as it shows how debatable are widely-held views about the scrolls, even when supported by informed and conservative scholars. Further, Dr Gaster has succumbed to the temptation to read his own humanism into the scrolls. For instance, he makes the Manual begin with an exhortation " to respect God and man ". The ancient Hebrew had no idea of respecting man. He could respect the ties of blood or alliance, and he could, if he recalled the universalism of the Old Testament, respect man as the image of God. But respect for man *qua* man meant nothing to him. Dr Gaster also imports mysticism, and even modern mystical terminology, into his texts. However, these are very minor variations on the original theme, and do not affect the general reliability of the translation.

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* *The Scriptures of the Dead Sea Sect.* In English translation with introduction and notes by Theodor H. Gaster. London : Secker and Warburg. 1957. Pp. 359. 30s.

Along with these two informative and objective books, we must recall Fr Graystone's *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Originality of Christ* (reviewed in *Studies,* Winter, 1956) and F. F. Bruce's *Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls,* which are also sound and instructive, though lighter in weight. A more subjective work in many ways, but still very enlightening on the historical problems is Dr H. J. Schonfield's *Secrets of the Dead Sea Scrolls.* Dr Schonfield startles us with some opening chapters on cryptograms in the scrolls, but after this flight of fancy comes down hard on the wilder and less edifying fancies which are circulating in two popular books which must be noted here.

One is by a Unitarian, Mr A. P. Davies, published in a glaring orange cover with an even more lurid blurb : " The greatest challenge to Christian dogma since Darwin's theory of evolution ". This book is really more interested in attacking Christianity and its teachers than in propounding the results of the finds by the Dead Sea. The " Golden Bough " and Dr Albert Schweitzer's historical scepticism are invoked, along with some amateur criticism of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, into which bits of Greek and Hebrew printing are set, like glass eyes into a surrealist portrait. There is very little from the scrolls, apart from what has filtered in *via* Dupont-Sommer's eccentric views. The only quotation of any length (five lines in a book of 140 pages) contains a misleading ambiguity. This is the sort of talk about the scrolls which make their actual text, as presented by Dr Gaster, so valuable.

The second book is a " Pelican " in which Penguin Books give their wide public the dubious benefit of the theories of J. M. Allegro, which were broadcast by the B.B.C. in January 1956 (discussed in *Studies,* Spring, 1956). Mr Allegro had appealed to unpublished texts to back up his assertion that the Teacher of the sect was crucified as redeemer of the world, etc. In a letter to the *Times,* March 1956, the scholars working on the scrolls at Jerusalem flatly denied the existence of such texts and Mr Allegro then admitted that what he had first given out as " fact-finding " was merely " inference ". Unmoved by the same scholars' comment on his inferences, namely, that he had " either misread the texts or built up a chain of conjectures which the materials do not support ", he presented his theories in print not merely as the assured results of research but as the prolegomena to all future metaphysics. This is objectionable in a popular work, where the general reader has neither the apparatus nor the training to distinguish the value of a multitude of " probablys " and " possiblys " from the indicatives into which they suddenly turn.

It is particularly regrettable that in such a work the creations of the author's fantasy should be put forward as though they were authentic history. In a recent broadcast it was pointed out that the Teacher did not occupy the central place in the religion of the sect which the Dupont-Sommer school assigned to him. Mr Allegro admitted that he is mentioned comparatively rarely, but explained that by saying he was too well known to be much talked about. This answer assumes what Mr Allegro has to prove, that the Teacher *was* the central and dominant figure : a good example of begging the question. His further suggestion, that the Teacher *may* have been mentioned frequently in documents that have perished for ever, is another appeal to unpublished

(and unpublishable) texts. Actually, his hopeful " too well known to be talked about " is demonstrably false, because the best-known " value " of the Qumran sect was the Law of Moses, and they talked about it on every second page of their writings. The book is well produced and well written, but it is a pity that Mr Allegro's great talents are not better employed than in making skimpy and superficial comparisons sound like proofs of identity.

Much more promising comparisons are made by Dr Rowley in his new book *Jewish Apocalyptic and the Dead Sea Scrolls*. Certain issues such as idolatry, the Sabbath, the calendar, seem to be very much alive in both sets of writings, and point strongly to a background in the second century B.C. A date towards the end of that century would mark the withdrawal of the Qumran sect from Jerusalem and the main current of Jewish life. Each of Dr Rowley's contributions to the debate has been sound and scholarly, and this is no exception. Longmans now promise us a translation, from the Dutch, of *Discoveries in the Desert of Judah* by Fr van der Ploeg, O.P. The author, who is one of the most distinguished of the specialists who have devoted themselves to the scrolls, offers here the most comprehensive history and discussion of the finds in any language. The work has already enjoyed a wide success in the Netherlands, and will be a great acquisition to the English literature on the subject.

KEVIN SMYTH

BIOGRAPHY

ROSMINI—PRIEST, PHILOSOPHER AND PATRIOT. By Claude Leetham. With an Introduction by Giuseppe Bozzetti. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1957. Pp. xxiii + 508. 42s.

BY any standard Antonio Rosmini was a remarkable man. He was the friend and confidant of Gregory XVI, of Pius IX, of Carlo-Alberto of Piedmont, of Gioberti, Cavour, Lacordaire; he corresponded, amongst others, with Lamennais, Newman, Pusey, Montalambert; he was on terms of lifelong intimacy with Manzoni (and helped to decide the course of modern Italian literature when he advised the author of *I Promessi Sposi* to " rinse his clothes in the Arno " i.e. to write in Tuscan and not in the Milanese dialect); he wrote on philosophy, art, medicine, spirituality, penology, pedagogy, geology, acoustics, the foreign missions, the vernacular liturgy and a host of other subjects. It is no longer possible for one man to take all learning for his province. But in the early nineteenth century Rosmini had the encyclopaedic mind of an ancient polymath or of an Albertus Magnus, the Universal Doctor; one feels that he could, like Pico della Mirandola, have sustained a thesis *De omni re scibili!*

Fr Leetham's account of this achievement is based mainly on the voluminous correspondence of Rosmini himself. The feverish Risorgimento Lombardy and Piedmont scene comes to life—secret police, political censorship and passport difficulties on the one hand and secret plotting on the other. Against this background we follow Rosmini's early life and studies, his call to the priesthood, the foundation of the Institute of Charity and its spread, notably in England, under his guidance; we remark his increasing influence

as a public figure, in spite of his retiring disposition. The climax of this public career was Rosmini's Piedmontese embassy at Rome in 1848 when he narrowly missed playing a rôle of capital importance for the history of Europe. He was respected in Turin as a liberal and a patriot and yet his loyalty to the Holy See was undoubted. Pius IX, not yet entirely disillusioned with liberalism, listened to him and announced his intention of making him a Cardinal. At Gaeta, however, where he followed the Pope into exile, Rosmini saw himself displaced by Antonelli as Pius's confidential adviser ; and instead of the Secretaryship of State he received the notification that two of his works had been placed on the Index and that a Commission had been set up to examine his other writings. The great days of his influence had passed, although he still played some part in public life during the last years at Stresa.

Rosmini's view of the limitations of the Christian philosophy of his time was startlingly clear. The fact was that, since Descartes, a succession of exciting currents had swept through European philosophy and had made of scholasticism a stagnant and almost forgotten backwater. The discipline taught as philosophy in the seminaries had become at best a vague eclecticism of Cartesian inspiration, at worst a study of terminology propaedeutic to theology. Rosmini saw the danger. The medieval phraseology used by some of his contemporaries covered suppositions that could no longer go unexamined. A philosophy, he remarked, might be interspersed with pious sentiments and at the same time contain the germ of the destruction of Christianity. He stated, with a trenchancy that brings to mind the Mercier of more than half a century later, that truth is indivisible, that religion has nothing to fear from the full and sincere search for truth in philosophy and in the sciences. The reform was to come from the renewed study of St Thomas.

Rosmini's insistence on the value of St Thomas is often ignored. It is rightly stressed by Fr Leetham. Rosmini, at the age of eight, was discovered by his tutor in the library poring over a copy of the *Summa*—and he, very properly, had his head banged with the volume. In later life he worked systematically through the *Summa,* translated it and lectured on it. He began a book on the neglect of St Thomas by modern theologians. Significantly he pressed for a critical edition of the works of St Thomas, asking his friends at Venice and Rome for information about codices. It is a measure of Rosmini's advance on his time that another two generations of thinkers should have been needed before such ideas matured and the world was ready for Leo XIII's Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* in 1879. The most dramatic result of the Encyclical was the neo-scholasticism of Louvain. And even at the beginning of this twentieth century some of Mercier's statements regarding the aim of philosophy and the meaning of thomism, statements which can be paralleled in Rosmini, could still cause scandal in certain quarters.

If Rosmini, however, was not the inspiration of a neo-thomism it was not merely because the time was not ripe. There was something in his own highly personal—even eccentric—vision that disqualified him. He spoke of purging St Thomas of Aristotle, thinking of the stultifying physics of Aristotle. But one wonders if Rosmini gave sufficient weight to the fact that St Thomas so completely integrated the fundamental metaphysical insights

of Aristotle that without Aristotle he would be unrecognizable. Further, the corner-stone of Rosmini's own system, the notion of ideal being, is, to say the least, difficult to reconcile with St Thomas. (Of interest is the story of Rosmini's discovery of the *essere ideale* at the age of eighteen ; the occasion invites comparison with Descartes's dream at Ulm or Rousseau's inspiration on the road to Valenciennes.) Some of Rosmini's contemporaries may naïvely have thought that the notion of being could be acquired by the same kind of process of abstraction as other notions. Modern scholastics, however, do face the problem—and do not feel driven to the kind of direct communication that Rosmini postulates.

There remains the delicate question of the orthodoxy of the *essere ideale*. Fr Leetham enters a vigorous defence of Rosmini against imputations of ontologism and pantheism, a defence not made any easier by Rosmini's formal declarations that the ideal being is a " divine appurtenance " (*qualchecosa di divino*), divine not merely as coming from a divine cause, nor merely by participation or figuratively, but divine in a proper sense of the word. Fr Leetham describes in detail the controversies up to and beyond the " dismissal " of the works of Rosmini by the Holy Office in 1854. Is it unfair to find him less than candid in relegating the condemnation of forty propositions of Rosmini, by Leo XIII in 1887, to a discreet footnote in the chapter headed " Orthodoxy Vindicated " ? The propositions remain in the *Enchiridion Symbolorum*—a fact at least as important as the recent editor's modification of the biographical note on Rosmini, which Fr Leetham takes the trouble to notice.

These considerations, however, are much more than offset by the quality of this life of Rosmini. It is a worthy addition to the literature reflecting the increasing interest of contemporaries in Rosmini.

M. B. CROWE

HENRY MORSE : Priest of the Plague. By Philip Caraman. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1957. Pp. 201, xi. 18s.

MOST of us think of the Elizabethan period as the heroic age of English Catholic martyrdom ; Fr Caraman's book has the merit of illustrating, through the details of the life of one obscure but saintly priest, how the seventeenth century too had its dreams of danger, persecution and ultimate martyrdom among the faithful in Stuart England.

On the surface one might suppose that the Stuart monarchs, all of whom down to 1688 married Catholic wives, would be disposed to call a halt to the persecution. So indeed they might have done had they dared ; Fr Caraman quotes (p. 72) a passage from the memoirs of Père Cyprien de Gamaches, a French Capuchin, who describes Charles I watching from a window of his palace as Catholics streamed out of Sunday Mass in Henrietta Maria's chapel in Somerset House (the only authorized public Catholic place of worship in England), " by his silence approving of their devotion " and seeming " to condemn the unjust laws of the Parliament against the Catholics ". The fact was that, even in the days of Charles's personal rule in the 1630's, the pressure of Puritan opinion sufficed to make open toleration for Catholics a risk which no government would be prepared to take. We see this in the case of Fr

Morse's own arrest by Archbishop Laud's Court of High Commission immediately after being released by the ordinary royal magistrates in 1637. Laud adopted this cat-and-mouse procedure, not because he was particularly hostile to Catholics, but because he could not afford to give the Puritans further fuel for the accusations of secret sympathy for Popery which they were constantly levelling against him. Thus the Catholics paid the price in the tug-of-war for ecclesiastical control among the various factions of English Protestantism.

Persecution was sporadic and its relative intensity determined by the political needs of the moment ; the situation must have been rather like that during the persecutions of the early Christians under the pagan Roman Empire. The attempts to stamp out Catholicism were fitful, and dependent more on individual initiative than on a consistently carried out State policy. Fr Caraman has some interesting things to say on the " private enterprise " system of tracking down priests for profit by what were in effect private companies formed on a commercial basis. Much depended on the amiability and religious convictions (or lack of them) of the examining magistrates. The verbatim accounts, quoted by Fr Caraman, of Morse's cross-examinations reveal in several instances a commendable legal fairness on the part of the judges concerned ; indeed the debates between Morse, himself before his conversion a student of law, and his accusers sometimes read more like an exercise in the Inns of Court than the examination of a man facing the possibility of a capital sentence. One fancies that many of the Catholics tried in recent years behind the Iron Curtain might have found the legal procedure in Stuart England to be, by comparison, remarkably objective.

Against this background the figure of Henry Morse himself stands out in clear perspective. Fr Caraman traces his Catholic career from its beginning in 1614 to his execution at Tyburn in 1644. The scene shifts constantly from England to Douai and Rome, back to the English North Country and London, once more to Flanders and finally to England again. It was in Rome, at the English College, that Morse received his training for the priesthood and where he decided to join the Society of Jesus. It was there also that he first encountered the unfortunate conflict between the Jesuits and the English secular clergy, a result of the latter's feeling that the Jesuits in England, by mixing political activities with their missionary labours, were queering the pitch for any chance of toleration. As far as Morse himself was concerned, the suspicion seems to be groundless, although he served at one stage in the Thirty Years' War as chaplain to Englishmen fighting for the Spanish army in Flanders. Even at the height of persecution and plague in London the old feud between the two English Catholic groups died hard.

The central portion of the book is devoted to Morse's labours in St Giles-in-the-Fields (ironically named) and other slums of seventeenth century London during the plague of 1635–6. Fr Caraman's work here forms an important contribution to the social history of the time. Morse was working in an age which supposed (on the authority of the Royal College of Physicians) that the plague infection was carried by the atmosphere or (on rather less respectable authority) that the contracting of venereal disease was an effective preventive measure against it. The real culprit, the " English " black rat, was allowed to make its unsuspected ravages while scavenging animals were destroyed as carriers. Fr Caraman adds the interesting information that

the plague was ultimately driven from England when the black rats were eliminated by a new brown type of rat which came over in the eighteenth century, like England's new dynasty, from Hanover. A set of contemporary drawings of the plague, reproduced in this book, sheds vivid light on the events described in the text.

The closing scenes of the last of Morse's numerous arrests, his trial, confinement in Newgate and final martyrdom are well and movingly told. It is pleasant to learn that one of the last persons to speak with Morse before his death was an Irish Franciscan, a fellow-prisoner in Newgate, who later put on record the abiding impression made on him by the English Jesuit martyr. The straightforward account, drawn from the primary sources, of Morse's last hours, makes a stronger impression than a more highly coloured hagiographical account would have done. Throughout the book Fr Caraman sets an example to many other biographers by telling us no more than his sources actually warrant ; the sources themselves are fully listed in notes at the end of the volume. Taken as a whole, this scholarly and well-written book seems likely to gain for itself a permanent place in the historiography of recusant England and of the Society of Jesus in the seventeenth century.

JOHN MORRALL

HISTORY

A HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT. By H. Jedin. Translated by Dom Ernest Graf, O.S.B. London : Nelson. 1957. 70s. net.

THE Lutheran Reformation has never lacked historians, Catholic as well as Protestant ; the Counter-Reformation on the other hand has never attracted serious attention to anything like the same extent. Numerous lives of Luther exist, by Denifle, Grisar and others, but there are few comparable studies of Catholic figures during the sixteenth century, with the great exception of Pastor's *History of the Popes*. Perhaps the most glaring deficiency has been the absence of any objective account of the Council of Trent. L. Cristiani's volume, *L'Église à l'epoque du concile de Trente,* when it appeared in 1947 (in the Fliche et Martin series) went some way towards filling the gap but was, generally speaking, a grave disappointment. In 1949, however, Hubert Jedin, Professor of Church History at Bonn, produced the first volume of what promised to be a magisterial work on the Council. This now appears in English translation ; unlike the same author's *Seripando* (1937) which was drastically abbreviated in English translation, it is a full version, complete with footnotes. Both translator and publishers deserve thanks for making it available in a most attractive edition.

With characteristic German thoroughness, Monsignor Jedin devotes the whole of this volume to the period before the first sessions of the Council in 1545. He provides an excellent summary of the Conciliar movement of Constance and Basle, and throws much light upon the neglected period between 1450 and 1517. The survival of Conciliar ideas, the " Devotio Moderna " and the influence of Erasmian ideas are all discussed. Political events are also dealt with, though one would have liked more on the politics of the Curia and of papal elections. The picture drawn of the Church is that of a society confident in its own unchallenged position, in which certain groups were aware of the need for reform, but at the centre of which vested interests tolerated lucrative abuses all too easily. When the Fifth Lateran

Council met in 1512, two Camaldolese monks presented Leo X with a memorial which anticipated the later Tridentine programme ; had their plans had any effect, Trent would have been unnecessary, and the Reformation might have been a passing phase. Monsignor Jedin points out the close connection between this document and the later *Consilium de emendenda ecclesia* (1537). The link between the two Venetian monks and the commission set up by Paul III was the Venetian layman Contarini who knew the monks in his youth. But in 1512 reform did not seem urgent to those in power ; and Monsignor Jedin's conclusion is a pessimistic one—the Church was not without reforming elements but " we should refrain from viewing Catholic attempts at reform in the period of the Middle Ages as a mighty stream which, by its own momentum, would have led to a general reform even if there had been no schism ". In a word, no Luther, no Loyola.

Book II begins with the appearance of Luther in 1517. The problem now discussed is how, in the face of this threat to Papal authority, the summoning of a Council came to be so long delayed. Part of the explanation lay in the fears of Leo X and Clement VII that a Council would renew the problems of Constance and Basle. Nor were they alone in this. Both popes were supported, not only by self-seeking elements in the Curia, but also by well-informed advisers such as Cajetan, Campeggio and Aleander. But even after Paul III's election in 1534, further obstacles blocked the way which enthusiasts for a Council found difficult to overcome. Political rivalry between Charles V and Francis I, the antagonism between Pope and Emperor, and the anxiety of Paul III to provide for his Farnese relatives, all delayed the convocation of a Council.

But this was not the whole story. In the 'twenties and 'thirties Lutheranism was not seen as a clear danger to the unity of the Church. Many Catholics were under the impression that Luther was not a heretic until he had been condemned by a Council. Melanchthon always insisted upon his Catholicism and as late as 1542 the elevation of the host was a normal feature of services held at Wittenberg. Joachim II of Brandenburg attended Mass during the Colloquy of Ratisbon, and even sent representatives to the second session of the Council of Trent. If the Lutheran position itself was so vague, it was small wonder that, in 1532, Cajetan could believe that a policy of generous concessions would heal the breach and that, as late as 1541, Contarini believed that compromise was possible.

Throughout this discussion of the problem, Professor Jedin is sympathetic towards Luther and Lutheranism. He takes the view that the Reformation occurred first in Germany because higher standards were being demanded there. The tragedy was that this caused a breach. By 1541 the breach was wide, much wider than it appeared to Contarini. Nevertheless, Professor Jedin does full justice to the lost cause of Erasmian humanism, and perhaps the most original chapter in the book is his treatment of Contarini's " Dream of an Understanding ".

It is to be hoped that Professor Jedin will be able to complete a work conceived on so vast a scale. Historical writing of this quality is rare and deserves the highest praise. Seldom can such be said of a general work upon the history of the Church during the modern period.

H. F. Kearney

AMERICAN CATHOLICISM. By John Tracy Ellis. University of Chicago Press. 1956.

FRONTIERS IN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM. By Walter J. Ong, S.J. New York : Macmillan. 1957. 2.50 dollars.

DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY. Edited by John Tracy Ellis. Milwaukee : Bruce. 1956. 8.75 dollars.

MGR TRACY ELLIS continues to set us all an example of systematic and continuous work, all of it without exception of an impressively high quality. In January 1955 he was invited by those responsible for the Walgreen Lectures —a series which is maintained and organized by the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions—to give four public lectures at Chicago on American Catholicism. Those (and there are far too many in this country) to whom the history of the Catholic Church in America is largely unknown will find in these four lectures a most stimulating and readable account of what has taken place within the boundaries of the modern United States in the past four centuries.

To many readers the time-limit of four centuries will come as somewhat of a shock : we are too apt to associate the development of the Catholic Church in the United States with Irish, German and Italian immigration. The work of earlier Spanish and French pioneers is easily forgotten ; and one of the most salutary lessons to be learned from this book is the need of shaking off, in American as in English history, the all-pervasive influence of what Professor Butterfield has taught us to discount as the Whig tradition of English history. The history of the United States does not begin simply with the Pilgrim Fathers of the eastern states. In the great arc of southern states, which stretches across the continent from Florida through New Orleans to New Mexico and California, there is a distinct cultural field which was first revealed to the average American student by Herbert Eugene Bolton.

Bolton's immensely fruitful search in the Spanish archives taught American scholars to reassess the debt which their country owes to Spain, and not least to the Spanish missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In October 1917 Bolton published an essay on " The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies ", which pointed the contrast between missionaries, whose conscious purpose was the conversion and education of the native Indians, and the Anglo-Saxon pioneers whose purpose was, only too often, simply to kill. In 1932 Professor Bolton was chosen as president of the American Historical Association ; and his presidential address on " The Epic of Greater America " marked the change of outlook which he had brought about.

From the colonial era Mgr Tracy Ellis passes to the War of Independence, and the part that Catholics played as citizens in the new republic. The great names here are Charles Carroll among the laity, and Archbishop John Carroll, the former Jesuit priest who became the first Archbishop of Baltimore. Archbishop Carroll was followed by John England, Bishop of Charleston, and a whole group of able and zealous men. During the first half of the nineteenth century the American hierarchy, as we know it to-day, began to take shape ; and the first great steps were taken in the organization of nation-wide parishes, schools and hospitals. The era of the Civil War brings us to Cardinal Gibbons and the men who worked with him in the great days of forward movement and general expansion. Mgr Tracy Ellis

is here on ground which is, in a very special way, his own. His brief survey of what was then achieved is fresh and stimulating, as well as soundly based on a wide knowledge of published and unpublished sources. His last chapter brings him to the present day. Those who have read his well-known essay on " American Catholics and the Intellectual Life " will know that what he has to say about the present position and future prospects of Catholic thought and life in America is sure to be critical as well as helpful, profoundly optimistic as well as frankly realistic.

Father Walter Ong is a young Jesuit priest-scholar who has spent several years in France, and who comes back to St Louis steeped in the most recent French thought. He is not consciously writing history, but his essays, gathered here into a slim volume, are challenging and most instructive. His theme is for the most part the practical problem of twentieth-century Catholicism ; his plea is for a better understanding of the message which the Church can give to a society which is so essentially the society of a business world. The contrast between modern France and modern America is plain for all to see ; but it has a peculiar significance for the Catholic scholar who wishes to see a Catholic laity in the United States, not imitating the French laity, but adapting to their own needs and historic background the vivifying spirit of French intellectualism and the bold enterprise of French apostolate. Father Ong's special interest is in the interpretation of scholastic thought, seen in relation to the Renaissance and Reformation which have so profoundly influenced modern European life. He looks forward to a new age, in which technology will have to be mastered and understood by Christian thinkers who are capable of producing a new movement of Christian humanism, adapted to the needs and ambitions of a technician's world and to vastly wider horizons.

In his large collection of documents to illustrate the whole range of American Catholic History Mgr Tracy Ellis has gone back to the early days of Spanish colonialism, translating for the use of his students such fundamental texts as Alexander VI's Bull *Inter Caetera* (1493), and the Bull *Universalis Ecclesiae* by which Julius II (in 1508) laid the foundations of the Spanish *real patronato*. Page by page (and there are more than 650 pages of text in this massive volume) he works his way steadily through each successive phase of American history.

In the earlier sections many of the texts have been translated from Spanish, Latin and French originals. There are moving narratives from the missionary era, such as Fra Junipero Serra's farewell to the Old World (1749) and his final report on the mission of Monterey in 1784, and eight well-chosen texts in illustration of the heroic work done by the French Jesuit missionaries, led by Jean de Brébeuf and Isaac Jogues.

From the foundation of Baltimore (1632) onwards, the texts are for the most part English in origin ; and Mgr Tracy Ellis has made the most of the materials at his disposal. Apart from the texts of official acts of Maryland, Virginia, Massachusetts and New York (where the grant of religious toleration dates from 1683), there are quotations from John Adams and George Washington ; Bishop Carroll's prayer for the Civil Authorities (1791) ; President Jefferson's message reassuring the Ursuline Sisters of Louisiana about their future under an American government ; comments by de Tocqueville on American Catholics in 1835 ; Father Hecker's plans for his

new Society of Paulist Fathers ; Father Edward Purcell's stand for the emancipation of the negro slaves in 1863 ; typical statements by Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Ireland and Leo XIII, whose Encyclical *Testem benevolentiae* on Americanism (1899) is translated in full ; Chief Justice White's decisions in regard to divorce (1906) and the Selective Draft Law (1918) ; and Al Smith's answer to the religious bigotry which was so prominent during his election campaign of 1928.

Add to this some poems of Joyce Kilmer (1913–18) and Mr Dooley's comments on keeping the Philippine Islands (1924), and it will be seen that this volume, though expensive, gives more than good value.

AUBREY GWYNN

LITERATURE

THOMAS GRAY : A BIOGRAPHY. By R. W. Ketton-Cremer. Cambridge University Press. 25s.

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH : A BIOGRAPHY : THE EARLY YEARS 1770–1803. By Mary Moorman. Oxford University Press. 50s.

THE publishers of Mr Ketton-Cremer's book declare that it was written for the general reader and that it will, in addition, satisfy the scholar. My own view is that while most librarians will feel obliged to acquire the book, neither the general reader nor the scholar will be wholly satisfied with Mr Ketton-Cremer's labours.

The general reader first. He will indeed be pleased by the care with which Mr Ketton-Cremer has presented, from the relevant volumes of Correspondence, material which clarifies the relations between Gray, West, Mason and Walpole. He will even tolerate such effusions as the following :

> During his walks the buildings of Eton often came into view. From his favourite vantage-points he would contemplate the grey pinnacles of the chapel and the warm brick turrets of Lupton's Tower, with the river among its trees and the long battlemented outline of Windsor Castle rising high above all. And so, contrasting the well-remembered happiness of his school-days with the melancholy of his present life, he came to write his *Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College.* (p. 62)

But the general reader will arrive at the final page wondering why the entire narrative seems so thin. The events are there, but nothing behind the events ; nothing *informing* the events. If he comes across Kenneth Burke's *A Rhetoric of Motives* he will find there a perceptive note on the attitudes involved in the " gem of purest ray serene " stanza from Gray's *Elegy.* These attitudes are highly complex and would seem to be rich in biographical possibilities. Another instance : the quality, in Gray, of class-consciousness, and its resolution in terms of pastoral, as these have been examined by William Empson. If certain attitudes seem to inform Gray's poems, it is clearly the privilege of the biographer to enquire into them ; especially if they are, in themselves, as engrossing as those involved in Gray's dialectic of pastoral. Mr Ketton-Cremer is content, however, to ignore this kind of enquiry and to remain on the surface of his subject. As a result there is a certain impoverishment in his narrative which the general reader may attribute, wrongly, to Gray's life itself. This could have been avoided if Mr Ketton-Cremer had chosen to work at a deeper level : Gray is more interesting than this book suggests.

As for the scholar, Mr Ketton-Cremer's procedures seem rather too lax

to satisfy a serious student. One citation will be enough. On page 59 we read :

> It has been suggested, for example, that Gray began his *Aggrippina* in emulation of West's *Pausanias*, an uncompleted drama the first act of which had been sent out to him in Florence ; and that he wrote his *Ode on the Spring*—as *Noontide, an Ode* was presently to be renamed—as a companion piece to West's invocation of ' the tardy May '.

Who has suggested this ? Where may we examine his arguments ? Does Mr Ketton-Cremer concur ? If so, why ? If not, why ? None of these questions is answered. The only other reference to *Aggrippina* is a statement that it is " inspired by and closely modelled on Racine's *Britannicus* " (p. 55).

The scholar would also be interested in Mr Ketton-Cremer's Bibliography, and would wonder why it does not include reference to Grierson's chapter on ' Blake and Gray ' in the *Background*, or Donald Foerster's essay on Gray in *The Age of Johnson* : *Essays presented to C. B. Tinker* (1949), or Capetanakis's study, or *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, or *Some Versions of Pastoral*. He would hardly feel satisfied by Mr Ketton-Cremer's simple statement that he dissents " from several of the conclusions in the remarkable article by Mr F. H. Ellis, ' Gray's *Elegy* : the Biographical Problem in Literary Criticism ' in P.M.L.A. for 1951 ". Similarly, Mr Ketton-Cremer " cannot agree with some of the views expressed by Mr Bateson ". It is difficult to conceive that this sort of thing would satisfy a scholar.

Mr Ketton-Cremer would probably have written a much better biography if his subject were not a poet. In preparing his book he felt obliged to insert occasional observations on the literature itself ; and these seem to be an embarrassment to him. I wonder whether his book would have suffered if he had omitted all such comments : I doubt it. Clearly there is need to revise the conventions of biographical writing if they have compelled Mr Ketton-Cremer to declare that the *Installation Ode* was " a genuine rekindling of the fires of noble poetry which had been so long dormant in Gray " (p. 236).

The embarrassment which I detect in Mr Ketton-Cremer's " critical " observations arises from several causes, one being that he is out of touch with literary thought. This would explain, though not condone, his assertion that the eighteenth-century didactic poem " is little esteemed to-day ". There is a good deal more in that strain.

Mrs Moorman's book is based on the belief that Wordsworth has been unfortunate in his biographers, and that in any event it was impossible to write a sound biography of the poet until Professor de Selincourt had published the early version of *The Prelude*, the edition of the *Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth*, and the complete text of Dorothy's *Journals*. Mrs Moorman has availed herself of this material (except for the *Collected Letters of Coleridge*, which arrived too late) and has written the most detailed account of Wordsworth's early years which we are likely to need. A second volume is promised.

The book before us is very well done indeed. Very long—over six hundred pages—it is never tedious. It would have been somewhat shorter and even more impressive if Mrs Moorman had not speculated quite so freely on such matters as the conversation which took place between William and Dorothy on 18 March 1802 ; but this is easily forgiven. The space saved, however, might have been devoted to a keener consideration of certain interesting questions. The famous " timely utterance ", for example. Mrs Moorman

considers that " it can scarcely have been anything else than *The Rainbow,* written only the day before the *Ode* was begun " (p. 531). This is rather brisk, however, even though it has Professor Garrod's authority. Mrs Moorman might have cleared a space for a consideration of Professor Trilling's suggestion that the " utterance " was *Resolution and Independence.* The question, though not momentous, is at least as worthy of serious discussion as several other matters which are treated at some length.

The quality which we welcome in Mrs Moorman's work—the absence of which is to be regretted in Mr Ketton-Cremer's—is the ability to deal adequately with literature when the necessity is felt. There is no great criticism in Mrs Moorman's book, but there is at least a persistent will to distinguish, in Wordsworth, the great from the mediocre and the mediocre from the inept. It is unusual and delightful to find a biographer—and one as " encomiastick " as Mrs Moorman—willing to devote a reasonable amount of space to *The Borderers* as a work of great biographical interest and at the same time to recognize that the play is very bad indeed. Mrs Moorman's is the only biography of Wordsworth I know which includes the word " unreadable " in its account of that work. For which much praise.

DENIS DONOGHUE

A STUDY OF GEORGE ORWELL. The Man and his Works. By Christopher Hollis. London : Hollis and Carter. 1956. Pp. 212. 18s.

BY the year 1945 George Orwell, whose real name was Eric Blair, was forty two, had published sixteen books and many shorter things and was still comparatively unknown. It was in that year that he became famous, quite quickly, as the author of *Animal Farm.* That frightening fable appeared at a time when it was bound to succeed, because it was apparently an amused and detached analysis of totalitarian tyranny which people had believed averted by a long disastrous war and which they now saw to be still very imminent indeed. The Soviet heart was not changed and the new palliative recipe of peaceful co-existence did not inspire confidence. The popularity of *Animal Farm* was increased enormously by the film. Of course the film was given a happy ending, to please the moronic multitude of cinema-goers, and was therefore a travesty of Orwell's message. The book ends in horrible despair. The animals see the Pigs, their pitiless masters, collaborating with the enemy Man. The Pigs grow more like the Men and the Men more like the Pigs, ". . . already it was impossible to say which was which ".

Orwell's ideas in *Animal Farm* were not new to him. Ever since the Spanish Civil War he had been convinced that power, because it corrupts, must inevitably be used in an evil way. It did not matter who held the power. Mr Hollis is surely right in saying that *Animal Farm* is directed, not merely against the Nazis and the Russian Communists (whom Orwell quite rightly lumps together), but against any State that arrogates to itself too much power, against all managerial bureaucracies, whether they call themselves socialist, conservative or republican. In other words, *Animal Farm* is a fable of political despair. Mr Hollis would like to disagree and points out that Orwell died comparatively young, before he had time to finish his thinking about the present or the future. Still, whatever he might have written had he lived, *1984,* a frightful picture of the not-too-distant future, is as despairing a last book as one could hope to find.

In *1984* there is one tenuous and vain ray of hope. The proletariat (symbolized by a fat and shapeless washerwoman singing at her work) will always be there, but impotent and incapable of revolution. For the others, Party Members and even the *élite* of the Inner Party, life must end in Room 101 with " the worst thing there is ". The " telescreen " has made privacy and secrecy impossible. Minds are defiled so that truth and falsehood mean the same thing. The heart has been emptied of all emotions except hatred, fear and self-pity. The clandestine and illegal love of the hero for the heroine (if I can call them that) can be efficiently obliterated by the machinery of the State. In fact, the world in *1984* is remarkably like Hell.

Orwell, because of his power and his genius, draws an awful picture but one that is *possible* : the seeds are there and we know it. Also, we expect a writer who criticizes life and history to have, as Orwell had, a terrible clear-sightedness seeing through all sentimental camouflage. We expect that such a man will be often angry and perhaps violent in the things he says about reality. But, if we once detect a feverish fretfulness in the anger, we suspect him of frustrated futility and he can lead us no longer. If a writer's despair is complete, then, forced by the deep human instinct that good is at least as permanent as evil, we are forced to suspect that he is immature. Some might say that Orwell, all his life, sought again the admirably tolerant, liberal and (in spite of the beatings) safe society that he knew as a boy in Eton but never rediscovered as an adult. Orwell was shocked by the world. A leader and a prophet cannot afford to be shocked by anything. Indeed, Orwell himself admitted that only the religious man, believing in an after-life of perfect justice, can contemplate evil honestly with clear, calm and compassionate eyes, without ever being surprised or ever losing grip. That is true as far as it goes. It is, however, not enough to be religious, it is necessary to be a saint.

Orwell thought that, for modern men, religion was beneath contempt and yet people are beginning to speak of him as a saint. They use the word in no orthodox sense, but it is easy to understand and to sympathize. His sincerity and integrity cannot be called in question. He believed in freedom and truth and was ready to die for his belief.

John C. Kelly

THE OUTSIDER. By Colin Wilson. London : Gollancz. 1956. 21s.
THE MIND AND HEART OF LOVE. By M. C. D'Arcy, S.J. London : Faber and Faber. 1956 (New Edition). 21s.

Over Mr Colin Wilson the critics have literally breathed their worst. In turn they have imputed his accuracy, his style, his age : ' He should have waited until he was thirty . . . , he would have written better . . . , he would have known more . . .' Such has been the sum total of their attack. In fact, it has been noticeable that in England it was the daily press which best evaluated the significance of *The Outsider,* since whereas literary editors and their reviewers sometimes lose touch with the reality beyond books, so the highly symptomatic nature of Mr Wilson's ' enquiry ' seemed instead to catch the interest of feature editors and their reporters, persuading them to treat the book as news. For the book is sub-titled ' an enquiry into the sickness affecting the Twentieth Century '. Moreover, if lack of religion is part of the answer, then it is only part. Men become outsiders because of the social

and spiritual malaise which they detect in their own particular society ; it forces them to take refuge on its ' outside '. The process is not new : it affected Blake in the eighteenth century, Van Gogh and Dostoievsky in the nineteenth, and Diaghileff and Lawrence of Arabia in our own ; and I choose this short list because it will show that Mr Wilson is not concerned solely with poets and novelists, but also with painters, men of action, and dancers.

The outsider, by Mr Wilson's terminology, is a man who finds ordinary bourgeois life meaningless. So for Barbusse's hero in *L'Enfer* (the study with which the first chapter begins), ' Death . . . [becomes] the most important of all ideas '. Or in the outsider's search to find a meaning, a typical Hemingway character prays : ' Hail nothing, full of nothing, nothing is with thee '. ' Men die like animals ' so that a premium is set on living which consequently makes life ' the most important of all things '. This would seem a complete reversal of the ideas behind Barbusse's hero ; but between death being ' the most important of all ideas ' and life becoming ' the most important of all things ', there is not the deadlock of contraries which might be supposed. Remember, both figures have been created by novelists and they are characters, like the novelists themselves, who are subject to human vulnerability ; and human vulnerability sooner or later leads men to *think* about belief. *Think* is the operative word, since it need not necessarily imply acceptance. Yet the very act of thinking pre-supposes the free-will to do so ; and as the will can only operate if there is a first motive, so without this motive there can be no willing. To telescope Mr Wilson's argument, motive becomes a matter of belief : ' You would not want to do anything unless you *believed* it possible and meaningful '. If this first motive did not exist, then the views of H. G. Wells and Sartre would be much easier to accept ; indeed, the acceptance that they have already won has been largely due to the power of their polemic to persuade others that freedom is mythical. Yet ' even if we decide in advance that the answer is No [to such thinkers], there is much to be learnt from the exercise of changing our viewpoint '.

This is an admirable precept, since it means temporarily learning the art of stepping into others' shoes. Metaphorically it is the ability to know whether such a thought is born by tapping a bistro table, or from carpet slippers shuffling under a desk, that lends *The Outsider* its rare quality. Not since the appearance of Fr Martin D'Arcy's *The Mind and Heart of Love,* eleven years ago, have I come across such intuition—an intuition of an order more common to the novelist or poet than the philosopher or theologian. It has been said that Father D'Arcy so well understands the authors whose ideas he wishes to elaborate that it is often difficult to know exactly where their thought ends and his begins ; his style blends too perfectly the text with the commentary. Certainly, Mr Wilson never alters the tone of his prose, so that the divisions between quotation and comment are clearly apparent. Yet both books reveal a sharing of many of the same sources ; and both can be read as diverting anthologies.

A story is told of how the Communists once imported an American newsreel as an example of Western decadence. The scene, expected to expose such degeneracy, was of some Kentucky negro rioters being brought to order by the truncheons of the U.S. Police. Yet from the auditorium there arose only cries of surprise : ' They are wearing shoes, the blacks are wearing shoes '. When the house lights went up, the audience began to stamp ;

some of the peasants grew singularly conscious of their poorly-covered feet. I have quoted this story because in the reaction of the Russian audience lies an unexpectedness that gives the scene a poetry not unlike that evoked by Dostoievsky when one of the brothers Karamazov fears to let the police take off his shoes lest they discover the holes in his socks.

This may not be poetry in the accepted sense of rhyme and metre ; but in essence it is poetry, saying many things at one and the same time. For example, the incident in the Russian Police Station is as much a commentary on human pride, self-respect and poverty as the reaction of the Ukrainian peasants to the American negroes. Again, both scenes are open to symbolic interpretations : the Karamazovs, like the negroes, are outsiders of a kind—as much scapegoats for the petty bourgeois officials of the Csar as for the white consciences of democrats. The desire to find scapegoats is universal. Moreover, whereas the psychiatrist traces the cause to a guilt-complex, the priest accounts for it as the price of original sin. Yet, at different levels, both are right—just as both the item in the newsreel and the scene from the novel are possessed of a poetic quality which makes them open to a host of different interpretations. All these interpretations are facets of the truth, although when added up they achieve a synthesis.

In music the effect might be compared with a fugue in which the main theme is developed and grows in revelation each time it is repeated. So it is that Father D'Arcy, his ear attuned to the inner music of a fugue, never scruples to appeal to poets, psychologists, philosophers and theologians, one after the other. Thus many of his truths, born of intuition, are later backed up by learning and footnotes. Yet sometimes intuitions can become obsessions.

Properly understood, obsessions are a healthy part of a writer's make-up. They create a bent in his work as natural as the bent created in men by original sin. From his first book, Father D'Arcy has had an obsession with love in all its forms ; in his first book, Mr Wilson shows an obsession with his ' outsider ' theme that looks like lasting the rest of life. It only remains here to show how various forms of love affect the outsider.

Sin is a shutting of the soul to love ; the effect of original sin merely emphasizes the imperfect nature of even the best human love. A perfect society is an impossible dream ; a healthy society is not. The present dilemma, or rather the dilemma of all thought since the Renaissance as T. E. Hulme pointed out, is that dogmas such as original sin have been discountenanced. But discountenanced, or passed over, they can never be obliterated. Shaw ended one of his later plays with the spotlights dying away until only the central character could be seen proclaiming that it was necessary to go on talking, that somewhere lost among the talk would be found the word, the voice or the idea which would make all other words meaningful. This sounds suspiciously like an unconscious echo of the last gospel ; it is perhaps what causes Mr Wilson not only to salute Shaw as a Master for the present age, but to see in his dramas a pronounced mystical element. By a curious coincidence, a tribute volume offered to the late abbess of Stanbrook contains many letters that passed between her and Shaw ;* constantly in the correspondence there are requests that the community shall never forget him in the prayers at their daily office ; perhaps, after all, there would come from their prayers the word, voice or idea that would illuminate all. Now, at the

* *In a Sweet Tradition.* By the Benedictines of Stanbrook. (Murray, 25s. 1956)

time of writing his book Mr Wilson could not have known of the details of this correspondence (the tribute volume was published several months after the appearance of *The Outsider*), and I think that this may be said to serve as a fair instance of the author's intuition. For at nearly every turn of his thesis, he can be described as a critic who is also an illuminator.

Father D'Arcy, with his superior years, is more of a dazzler. I coin the term specially. There is always a point at which the light blinds, at which the eyes must let the vision be subject to faith. Poets and mystics frequently try to record this experience ; then critics, philosophers and theologians try to dissect it. Yet there exists a territory, scarcely charted, where there can be no sharp divisions of approach between poetic, philosophical and theological ; where every experience—sensual, visual or oral—unites together. The problem of civilization (according to Mr Wilson) is ' the adoption of a religious attitude that can be assimilated as objectively as the headlines of last Sunday's newspapers'. Father D'Arcy has shown a tendency never to refrain from quoting extracts from newspapers in his books just as the author's judgements in *The Outsider* have been quite obviously tempered by his experience of sitting with the new generation who have once more turned London's coffee bars into ' penny universities '. Despite nearly forty years' difference, both writers have accepted life in the round ; their apparent unorthodoxy is really no more than an optical illusion, born from a steady refusal to let their minds become enclosed. For as religious or spiritual self-satisfaction is death to the priest, so provincial or academic self-satisfaction is death to the creative critic. Fear of such complacency may well drive the artist to the periphery of society where he will encounter the priest as another fellow outsider, since it must be remembered that the outsider is not necessarily an artist ; he is first an individual, and the individual who begins as an outsider may discover in seeking a meaning for his life that he ends it as a saint. Every soldier carries a Field-Marshal's baton in his knapsack ; he may not find it, but none the less he carries it. So every individual carries around him his own particular aura ; it may grow dull and clouded—or clarify into the sustained radiance of a halo.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

RELIGION

OUR FAITH. By The Rt. Rev. John C. Heenan. London : Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1956. Pp. 286. 12s. 6d. net. School edition 10s. net. THIS attractive book from the pen of Dr Heenan deserves a special welcome. It is a curious and regrettable fact that in England during recent years very few books have been published by Catholic authors for the instruction of young people in their faith, though there has been a good deal of able writing on the theory and method of teaching religion. Some five years ago a number of *Lumen Vitae*, the quarterly published in Brussels by the International Centre for Studies in Religious Education, was devoted to the teaching of religion in secondary schools. One section was devoted to recently published text-books. The chief continental countries and the United States were represented by an almost confusing profusion of such works, but England significantly received no mention. It is, however, reassuring to hear that at least two series of religious text-books are in preparation in England at the

moment, one—alluded to by Dr Heenan in his preface—for secondary modern schools, and another, sponsored by the Conference of Catholic Colleges, for grammar schools.

Our Faith is not exactly a text-book, but it is a book intended to be put into the hands of young people and hence, to some extent, supplies what is a serious want. Its forty chapters contain a broad outline of the Catholic faith, and are intended to help boys and girls to go out into the world filled with a sense of the value of that faith and armed with answers to the more usual objections which they will hear against it. Six of the later chapters are historical, dealing with the coming of Christianity to England, the Reformation on the continent and in England, the resistance of the English Catholics and the present growth of the Church in England and throughout the world. There are excellent chapters on vocation, whether religious or lay, and on the relations of the Church to Society.

The author specifies that he is addressing school-leavers. A certain amount of the matter, however, would seem to be rather beyond the capacity of the large number of those who leave at fifteen. He also suggests that the book might be used in the last year of school. If this were the year between fourteen and fifteen, the same difficulty would present itself in a more marked degree. Also the ground covered would appear to be rather too extended for a year's work. But for those who remain at school longer, and even for many of the earlier leavers, the book will be a most valuable *vade mecum,* whilst not a few adult readers will find that it provides an inspiring and realistic refresher course in the great truths of their faith. The author does not shirk awkward questions or regrettable facts, and his manner of exposition is simple and direct. He makes good use of example and analogy, though the minor criticism may be offered that his analogies are sometimes too fully expanded and tend to distract attention from the matter being explained.

The fundamental truths are dealt with in the following order : God, Man, the Bible, the Person and work of Jesus Christ, the sacraments. The commandments are not dealt with separately but are integrated into other topics, for instance the sacraments. The subject of sin comes between the chapters on the Church and those on the sacraments and is preceded by two chapters, " Why be holy ? " and " Why pray ? ". One may surmise that this order is dictated by the generally accepted belief that in the instruction of the young more stress should be laid on the acquiring of positive holiness than on the observance of prohibitions.

Under the sacrament of matrimony Dr Heenan includes a short paragraph on family limitation. It is carefully and prudently worded. Here an important catechetical problem presents itself. All are agreed as to the necessity for opportune instruction on such topics, but it is not so easy to define the age at which the necessity for such instruction arises. Catechists in Ireland would probably hold that this particular topic would not be necessary for the general instruction of young people of fifteen or sixteen. However, if this book is intended, as has been surmised, for readers of that age, it may be taken that such an experienced and authoritative writer has good reason to think that for them, under present conditions in England, the topic is unavoidable.

This book is most attractively produced. Some of the many illustrations are scenes in the life of Christ, mostly reproductions of the familiar Palestinian paintings by Sir William Hole. Others are photographs depicting Catholic

life in the world of today, the work of Father John Gillick, S.J., well known as the illustrator, *inter alia,* of Father Brodrick's *Saint Ignatius Loyola.*

FERGAL MCGRATH

THE LIVING PARISH. By Dr Pius Parsch. Minnesota : The Catholic Educational Guild.

ONE can hardly read a chapter of serious writing on religion nowadays without bumping into the words " The Mystical Body ". In fact the term has almost become a cliché. Very often nothing definite lies behind the words in the mind of the user, and nothing at all is conveyed to the reader. To many people the term " mystical " connotes something unrelated to ordinary religious experience or beyond the comprehension of the average mind, and therefore mysterious. Priests are rather nervous about using the words in the pulpit. Neither manuals of theology for seminary students nor books of piety and devotion for novitiates have yet become impregnated with a doctrine that deserves to be recognized as the basis of a sound, balanced, dynamic spirituality. Individualism dies hard. Its spirit has dominated religious thinking and devotion. A slight swing over to the old idea of the community has begun mainly through the prayers and practices of the liturgy. However there is a long road yet to travel.

This doctrine is supposed to be difficult to understand, and still more difficult to explain to ordinary folk. It asserts our " incorporation " in Christ, or union with Him through Baptism, and our union with each other : " I am the vine ; you are the branches " ; " Christ is head, we are the members ". The early Christians had no difficulty whatsoever about that teaching, which finds such prominence in the writings of St Paul. It was part and parcel of their religious outlook. They lived and acted on it almost unconsciously. They thought of themselves as members of a team or body formed for a mission to the world. Individualism either in one's way of living or devotion would be repugnant to the baptized and confirmed Christian who was permitted to share in the Eucharistic life of the Church. They prayed, worshipped and worked together. " How these Christians love each other", remarked the pagans.

It has to be admitted that most recent attempts to explain this revived doctrine of Christianity to the people are far too academic. Priests, teachers and missioners have long been on the look-out for a booklet that they themselves can absorb and recommend without reserve to ordinary enquiring folk. Father Parsch supplies the need. His little book *Study the Mass* is now accepted as a popular classic. *The Living Parish* will soon take its place beside it. It is the best popular exposition and illustration of the doctrine of the Mystical Body published in our time. For any teacher it is indispensable.

Dr Parsch, being a really great teacher, refrains from handing out chunks of indigestible theology to the people : he believes in proceeding from the concrete to the abstract, from the illustration to the idea, and so he begins by saying : " The parish is the Mystical Body of Christ in miniature ". Here is something concrete to begin with. Fr Parsch then proceeds to analyse the structure of this unit or cell and shows how it may be built up into a healthy, vigorous condition. He indicates the proper relationship that should exist between the pastor and his people, and between the parishioners themselves. He points out how vital it is that there should exist a feeling of " togetherness "

or sharing a common life between the members, and declares that the liturgy is the great bond between priest and people. Other forms of pastoral activity are secondary in importance to the liturgy : " Active participation in the Sacred Mysteries is the primary and indispensable source of the true Christian spirit " ; " The best organisation in the parish is the parish itself ". All this is nothing more than the teaching of the last four Popes. How obviously true, yet how often overlooked !

It is safe to assert that this little masterpiece of sound theology and genuine spirituality will exercise a powerful influence on anyone who reads it through.

JOHN FENNELLY

JOURNALS

ARCHIVIUM HIBERNICUM. Vol. XVIII (1955) ; Vol. XIX (1956). Catholic Record Society of Ireland. Maynooth : 10s. each.

REPORTORIUM NOVUM : Dublin Diocesan Historical Record. Vol. 1, No. 2. 1956. 20s.

JOURNAL OF THE COUNTY LOUTH ARCHAEOLOGICAL SOCIETY. Vol. XIII, No. 3 (1955). Dundalk. 1956.

SEANCHAS ÁRDMHACHA : Journal of the Armagh Diocesan Historical Society. Vol. 2, No. 1. 1956. 20s.

ONE of the most encouraging features of recent years has been the growth in the general public's interest in local history. *Archivium Hibernicum* has become a recognized organ for the publication of hitherto unknown materials for the history of the Irish Church, and these two recent numbers give a fair sample of its range. Father Ranson publishes the fifteenth-century annates of the diocese of Ferns, from transcripts made long ago by Father M. A. Costello, O.P. Father Brendan Jennings publishes a series of entries concerning Ireland from a Propaganda letter-book of 1672–6. Father Cathaldus Giblin publishes a most valuable hand-list of Irish materials from the Barberini Latin MSS in the Vatican Library. Father Conleth Kearns gives a short account of the Irish Dominican archives in San Clemente, Rome ; and Father Canice Mooney does the same for the Franciscan library at Dun Mhuire, Killiney. Father F.X. Martin publishes a general account of the archives of the Irish Augustinians in Rome ; he also edits a series of valuable entries concerning Ireland from the registers of the Augustinian priors general in Rome. Father Romuald Dodd gives a summary account of some documents of Irish interest in the collection known as ' Instrumenta Miscellanea ' in the Vatican archives. And finally Father John Brady continues his most useful series of extracts from Irish newspapers concerning Catholics and the Catholic Church in Ireland during the eighteenth century.

The second number of Dublin's *Reportorium Novum* carries forward the good work begun a year ago. Mgr Curran, its editor, here continues his calendar of the surviving letters of Archbishop Carpenter, and publishes a most interesting account of the Irish College under its second founder, Dr Michael Blake of the Dublin diocese. Professor MacBride continues his study of the letters of Archbishop Matthew de Oviedo ; and Father Kingston his account of some of the Catholic families in the Pale. Father Hawkes gives a full description of the two high crosses at Castledermot. The author of this notice

prints a biographical study of Archbishop John Cumin, Dublin's first Anglo-Norman prelate ; and Mr G. Hand describes the psalter of Christ Church, a fourteenth-century manuscript now among the Rawlinson MSS in the Bodleian Library. Perhaps the most useful of all the contributions is a succession-list of the parish priests of Dublin from 1771 to 1851, which has been compiled by Father W. M. O'Riordan, parish priest of Maynooth.

The *Journal of the County Louth Archaeological Society* and *Seanchas Ardmhacha* cover very much the same territory, but from a different angle of approach. The Louth *Journal* has now been in existence for more than fifty years, and shows no sign of declining vigour. In the current issue Father Colmcille of New Mellifont prints three more unpublished Cistercian documents, and there is every reason to hope that he will continue to add in this way to our knowledge of the Cistercian abbeys of medieval Ireland. The editor, Father Dermot MacIvor, seeks to identify the Saint Diomoc of Kildermock in County Louth, a companion of Patrick's disciple, Saint Benen : an admirable example of hagiographical study, aided by local knowledge. An American scholar, Robert L. Johnson, prints a short study of the process by which Nicholas Fleming became archbishop of Armagh in 1404. By way of contrast, Father Tomás Ó Fiaich, editor of *Seanchas Ardmhacha,* has asked a group of scholars to discuss once more, in the light of Professor Carney's recent work, the well-worn theme of one or two Patricks. Some of his contributors are perhaps more noted for their local patriotism than for critical judgment ; but the note by Seán Mac Airt on the chronology of Patrick's life, as evidenced in the older Irish annals, is an important contribution to the subject. Father Benignus Millett, O.F.M., has a fine study of the half-blind Scottish archbishop of Armagh, Robert Wauchop, who is here presented as a zealous pastor and worthy exponent of the reforms introduced by the Council of Trent, in which he was an active participant. An item of unusual interest is the text of an Irish poem by Giolla Brighde Mac Con Midhe, in which this thirteenth-century poet describes in some detail the new Cathedral of Armagh, which was built by Archbishops Maolpadraig Ó Sgannail and Nicholas Mac Maoliosa towards the end of that century. Eugene O'Curry copied this text from " Mr Richard Nugent's book " in 1849, and makes mention of the poem in his *Manners and Customs.* Quite recently Father Ó Fiaich found this text, which had been lost to view, among the O'Curry transcripts in Maynooth ; and he now edits it in collaboration with Seán Mac Airt, giving text, translation and notes.

AUBREY GWYNN

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A City on a Hill

by THE MOST REVEREND WILLIAM J. PHILBIN, D.D.
Bishop of Clonfert

IN spite of all the evidence we do not yet sufficiently realize that we are living through one of the most revolutionary phases in all human history.[1] The details of what is happening are so fascinating that we fail to get the whole picture in focus. Knowledge nowadays is multiplying itself in all directions and our capacities are expanding accordingly. Sciences have developed a way of turning themselves inside out in the course of a few years and making other sciences as well re-write their text-books. Oil is still in process of superseding coal ; it has not yet had time to transform the economies of all the oil-bearing countries, but already a new fuel is supplanting it. The penetration of the atom has brought us to the threshold of a new age in industry and has changed the whole meaning of warfare, with implications for world-order and national autonomy that cannot yet be accurately assessed. Half a century after leaving the surface of the earth by aeroplane we are presumably on the eve of leaving the atmosphere of our planet. We are scarcely interested nowadays in the phases through which aeronautics or radio-communication is passing : the current question is how far the mechanical brain will bring us and how our society will adjust itself to automation. The wide progress made in old-fashioned industries like agriculture, the introduction of plastics and of so many other new materials, the miracle-drugs of medical science and its almost equally wonderful new dexterities—all these and other parallel advances are taken almost casually by the side of so much that is even more headline-worthy.

Other aspects of our changing world are also in danger of being overlooked, with much more serious consequences. Even those who reject the Marxist thesis that material factors are all-determining must recognize that many new developments are having a profound effect on the ordering of our lives, on our habits and ways of thinking. External changes often call for decisions and adjustments in the realm of conduct, with social and moral implications of a far-reaching kind. The half-shamefaced, half-ostentatious detonation of those modestly-named " devices " which are capable of bringing all human life to an abrupt stop is demanding a good deal of fresh ethical thinking—and quickly. We have already got as far as an essay towards a parliament of nations which has at least shown that it may not always be safely ignored. Other groupings of neighbouring countries seem to point to important experiments in federalism. The re-ordering of the human family in either or both of these directions will require wide modifications in international law, which in turn will have to be based on some philosophy

[1] A lecture delivered to the Dublin Institute of Catholic Sociology on 30 June 1957.

of conduct. The new powers over mind and body which medicine has put in our hands have confronted us with a bewildering number of problems in the field of right and wrong, and different solutions are suggested by those who measure human nature differently and profess conflicting—or no—philosophies of life. In issues such as these society may not be content to take a pleasantly aloof view of the wrangles of the schools : its future will be deeply affected by what is permitted and what excluded. It must take sides and base its legislation on some system of thought.

Governmental policies themselves are nowadays being directly influenced by technical developments, and are intervening more widely in what have hitherto been considered the private life and personal responsibilities of their citizens. These extensions of the state's power involve greater claims on the property of individuals, and also on their docility, than have formerly been regarded as appropriate under democratic regimes. We must not slip into a way of thinking that every new development that brings gifts and becomes legal is thereby constituted just and good. The content and trend of legal enactments that have a bearing on human habits, character and liberty must be criticized and controlled in the light of some set of accepted moral principles. To imagine that legislators need not be interested in such considerations would be tantamount to saying that they need not mind in what direction they are travelling, that they may be content to be empiricists, guided by temporary expediency. If politics were to resent, as an unwarranted intrusion, the assessment of its tendencies on moral grounds, this science would be failing lamentably to appreciate its own dignity. Let us hope that public men will resist the suggestion that they are showing strength of character in proportion to their refusal to listen to religious leaders on matters that have to do with the ordering of human lives.

The position may be put into perspective if one realizes that the independence from moral authority which public men are sometimes urged to maintain is similar to what experts in other specialized fields are also disposed to regard as appropriate to themselves. The claim is often made that literary work should be judged only by aesthetic standards, or at any rate that only the most blatantly offensive matter should be condemned for moral reasons. There is hardly a war in which some commanders have not tried to exclude ethical considerations from influencing critical military decisions. We may remember how certain atomic scientists not long ago exhibited a deplorable lack of responsibility in communicating their special knowledge. Medical theorists who assert that they should do all that their science has made possible for the good of their patients sometimes forget that what is good for a human being is not always a simple matter to determine and may

involve a balance of the rights and obligations of human nature and of the interlocking claims of several individuals.

The underlying idea in all these cases is that a specialist need consider only the principles of his own science. The dignity of advanced knowledge is thought to require that it shall be a law to itself. We are encountering a tendency to minimize the place of morality in the higher and more significant departments of life and to regard its application as limited to offences against the letter of the decalogue. It is a tendency to regard the catechism as commensurate with the moral law and to feel that an elementary course of doctrine offers all that Christianity has to say on the intricate and delicate questions that crop up in those professions in which human nature is, as it were, the subject-matter that is being worked upon. Morality is in fact co-extensive with life and those who play a part in the ordering and moulding of the ways of mankind are bound to continue their studies of what is good and bad into their own high spheres of responsibility, where good and bad may have much broader and more lasting consequences than in private life.

Unless we accept the materialist, that is in practice nowadays the Marxist, position we must consider human affairs as governed in the first place not by external economic factors but by the nature and needs of men. Moral considerations are therefore the primary concern. Politics should begin with these, not with statistics.

* * *

There are two aspects of the Catholic Church's contribution to the world's well-being that are worthy of special attention in the present context. The keystone of the Catholic moral position is our concept of the Natural Law, which is the voice of God, pointing out to us what is good and bad through our knowledge of our own nature and of our place in creation. If there is one point more than another at which our moral philosophy diverges from all other systems of ethics and legal theory it is in the transcendent importance it attaches to the Natural Law and in the thoroughness with which it has analysed its principles and traced their application in particular cases. Sometimes Catholics speak as if the pronouncements of ecclesiastical authorities were the chief factor making us regard things as right or wrong ; as if the Church might equally well have decided the other way. Regularly, however, such pronouncements merely declare what Catholic philosophy has already determined in principle. From this unfailing source solutions are derived for innumerable particular problems. Where the legitimacy of governments is at issue we rely not merely on formal declarations or enactments but on a body of theory that has been woven into the science of politics, which is a department of moral philosophy. When the justness of war is in question, recourse is had to accepted definitions of the circumstances in which the use of force is proportionate. When

the adequacy of wages, the legitimacy of strikes, the fairness of prices come up for consideration Catholic philosophy provides, as no other system of thought even attempts, standards and tests founded on well-pondered axioms of justice and having a validity beyond arbitrary decisions and conventions.

This is not to say that the application of these principles is always easy or certain in particular cases—especially when circumstances have altered. A whole literature has grown around the application of the unchanging principles of Christian ethics to the restless pattern of the modern world, and that literature is always expanding, always coalescing into new departments and splitting into new divisions. Principles too are constantly being more fully explored. Let no one say that it is too vast and inaccessible a body of knowledge for any except academic students to assimilate : the Papal encyclicals of the last decades enshrine the most important of its applications and there are many useful summaries and handbooks.

Catholic moral philosophy is a unique contribution to human wisdom. It is significant that in recent years many thinkers in schools that had repudiated the Natural Law are finding themselves driven back to it, under other names, by the challenge of totalitarian laws and proceedings which, although legitimately enacted and carried out, are opposed to all our traditional concepts of justice. In the Nuremberg Trials, for example, when no positive laws could be found to provide the basis of charges against Nazi leaders, the notion of crimes against humanity had to be brought forward, which is another way of saying offences against the Law of Nature. During the visit of United States jurists to England this summer there has been a resounding affirmation of belief in the Natural Law both on the part of the visitors and of their hosts.

It is tragic that we should sometimes be persuaded to regard Catholic moral thinking not as a precious instrument of guidance in times of doubt and peril but as an unwarranted intrusion into fields where experts should be allowed to frame their own ethical principles. If this interpretation were true it should also be true that human conduct generally is the worse and not the better for moral restraint, that men would be happier if they were entirely free. Arguments against the relevance of morality cannot be confined to single departments. It is inconsistent to invoke the aid of religion in the places where it supports one's own position, while resenting it where its judgment is disagreeable.

* * *

There is a second kind of contribution which our religion makes to the conduct of human affairs and which is perhaps even more likely to be forgotten. Christianity does more than determine what is right and wrong. It points out what is better as well as what is good and offers the highest inspiration and help towards the further goal. It has always

understood its commission to teach and the command to act as a leaven in the world, a light before men and a city seated on a hill, as implying an obligation to provide directions and incentives for the bettering of human conditions. Such interests have not been regarded as conflicting with the Church's prior concern with purely spiritual and other-worldly values. "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline : think on these things."

The Bible is full of the major premisses of our civilization. The Christian appreciation of man's spiritual nature and immortality and of the value of the human soul as evidenced by the Incarnation and Redemption are the foundation of the unique estimate set on the human person and human life by all the peoples that have shared in our Mediterranean culture. Even anti-Christian writers recognize that the modern world's ideals of personal freedom and democracy and our respect for woman's dignity and rights have sprung from a religious soil and have been nourished by religious faith and sentiment. It is significant that Communism, which is the obverse of Christianity, has brought also the subversion of human rights. Our faults and failures, so incessantly referred to, must not blind us to what has been accomplished by God's grace.

The Christian virtue of fraternal charity, so incomparably delineated and realized in the New Testament, has been like a new elemental force released in human affairs. It has changed the whole climate of life in Christian countries and done much by example elsewhere, motivating not only private beneficence but also a long sequence of benevolent undertakings that have altered the framework of society. Help of the poor, the sick, the ignorant and the afflicted was first organized under Christian inspiration in a responsible and sympathetic way, in contrast with the bread-and-circuses fashion of ancient Rome, which is as harmful ultimately as giving alms to everyone that begs. Our universities were a Church foundation and for centuries their chief preoccupation was Catholic philosophy and theology. The laws of all the nations of Europe and in particular the great Common Law of England, the parent of the American system, were permeated by Christian thinking and the classical art of Europe for hundreds of years was predominantly Christian in its inspiration and themes.

Let no one think that, because most of these activities have now become the responsibility of the state or of secular organizations, Christianity may regard her function as a leaven in human affairs as now sufficiently discharged. The word still needs the inspiration of religion for the improvement of its everyday life. It is not likely that the dynamic ideas of Christianity which have been continuously unfolding themselves and extending their influence into new fields should suddenly have become exhausted. We are apt to be self-righteous about all that has been done for human welfare in recent times and

foolishly scornful of past neglect in certain departments. But there are still many blind spots in our social conscience. Recognition of abuses is a slow and selective process and every age has its typical alertness and imperceptiveness : we should not doubt that future generations will be just as critical of us as we are of our predecessors.

Even in one of the most progressive countries where the principles of equality and fraternity have been flaunted for a century and a half it remained for a Catholic priest—the Abbé Pierre—a few years ago to open the eyes of the community to the deplorable condition of a section of the population and to organize a crusade for their relief. In the English Welfare State there is room for Catholic enterprise in providing homes for the aged, and there have never been more calls upon the Society of St Vincent de Paul. World opinion is now more concerned than ever before to secure social justice within particular communities, but we have not yet begun to consider the claims of an impoverished, crowded country as against a rich and spacious one, though the same principles are involved in both cases. War should not be the only arbiter here. What thought has yet been given to the ethics of the destruction and sequestration of food and of the institution of land-banks in the midst of campaigns against over-population and increasing awareness of widespread undernourishment ?

Segregation of races is being tackled in recent years and is, please God, on the way to being eliminated. We are not concerned with that problem here : one of the special pleasures of walking through the streets of Dublin is to encounter people of other races who obviously have never been given reason to doubt that they are as much the children of God as the rest of us. But there are other fields in which advance is possible. What will be said in the future of our total failure to face the problem of itinerants in this country ? We have been extremely selective in dealing with disease and have greatly neglected certain classes of patients. It is time that some of our practical sympathy was exerted in the direction of mental illness. We have scarcely reacted at all to the revelation that smoking is the cause of an increasingly prevalent and fatal disease. We tolerate certain forms of sport which will almost certainly be reprobated in more enlightened times. Although every citizen is presumed to know the law, and will be punished for breaches of it on the basis of knowledge, we remain content to leave legislation a remote and unco-ordinated department of knowledge where anyone except a specialist is at sea.

Our greatest neglect of all—the capital sin of our young Irish state—is our failure to provide for our young people an acceptable alternative to emigration. Our version of history has tended to make us think of freedom as an end in itself and of independent government—like marriage in a fairy story—as the solution of all ills. Freedom is useful in proportion to the use we make of it. We seem to have relaxed our

patriotic energies just at the time when there was most need to mobilize them. Although our enterprise in purely spiritual fields has never been greater, we have shown little initiative or organizational ability in agriculture and industry and commerce. There is here the widest and most varied field for the play of the vital force that our religion contains.

It is time we appreciated fully that religious motives are not out of place in the field of material production, that charity at its best should be creative and constructive, sending its ripples far beyond the initial point of impact, not merely distributing alms to the needy but helping them to help themselves. To build up a larger and more contented Irish community is to increase the Kingdom of God and enlarge our supernatural potentiality. It is only by expanding and improving our economy that we can add to, or indeed maintain, our numbers. How can it be doubted that religious zeal will find a most appropriate outlet in the material betterment of our country to-day? We shall of course be considered partisan for introducing religion into such fields, but this should not deter us from giving to our country the advantage of the motives that count most with us in whatever spheres they are most needed and opportune.

* * *

To yield to secularist suggestions at a time when the contagion of change is running through every department of society would be for Catholics a betrayal of their responsibility to offer guidance and leadership to the world. We should make no mistake about it: this responsibility is implied in the commission given to the Church. Our Holy Father the Pope has repeatedly emphasized the critical times through which we are passing and has given us an inspiring lead in resisting attempts to treat the Church as an outsider in the formation of the new world. The Crusade for a Better World is a typical initiative. A little slackness in an age of such rapid movement may mean that important aspects of life will almost without our knowing have been pressed into a mould that is alien from Christian teaching.

Even in Ireland, which all the world regards as a Catholic nation, it is necessary to be vigilant. Specious reasons will be alleged for policies of indifference or neutralism. It is suggested, for example, that concessions should be made with a view to conciliating a dissident minority. No doubt we can have unity to-morrow if we are prepared to go over to the minority standpoint. It is difficult to see why the religious sphere rather than others is chosen for compromise. There is no movement, as far as I know, to give up the Irish language in the interest of national unity—and I personally hope there will be none. We should have sufficient self-confidence to stand for our integral traditions and to see that those principles are maintained which the great majority of our

people cherish. There was little point in all our struggles for national independence if this is not to be the means of bearing witness to the values and convictions that mean most to us. It is what nationality is the vehicle of rather than nationality itself that is truly worth while.

It is said that it makes for harmony to keep religion as far as possible out of public affairs and to allow legislation to be coloured only by broad and generally admitted divisions between what is good and bad, beneficial and injurious. "Sectarian" is a word that seems specially devised to support such a theory. We shall be told that technical experts should be left to work out by statistical enquiry and other scientific methods the best ways of reaching the goals that are recognized to be desirable. Apart from the questionable implication here that society as such may, or should, be neutral in matters of religion, the truth has to be faced that such a policy would not be practicable. It supposes that—outside the Communist camp—the same conceptions are generally accepted of what is good and bad for man and society. But this is not true. Catholics are bound to recognize clearly where they stand apart from much of the common thinking of modern times. We shall be false to our trust if we give less than full expression to the principles we have inherited. Our Lord Himself recognized that disharmony was to be the unhappy consequence of His uncompromising teaching but He did not abate His demands on that account. And He reminded us that the servant is not greater than his Master.

The Catholic Church has a distinctive conception of marriage and its obligations and a distinctive code of sexual ethics. We believe that many aspects of morality hinge on conduct in this sphere and that the well-being of the race is at stake in its attitude to the most intimate and basic of human relations. We should not allow ourselves to be laughed out of our special sensitiveness in these matters nor abate our demand that the customs and usages of the community shall reflect our principles. Those who say that we are childish or puritanical we may refer to page after page of the New Testament. Society may be compelled to react against the licence it has latterly been permitting. Some of you may have read recently the moving statement made by the father of a little girl who was brutally murdered in the United States. He said he did not blame the criminal but rather the society which permitted the shameless exploitation and advertisement of sex. Catholic moral teaching accords a unique importance to the safeguarding of life, even ante-natal life, even the life of unproductive and suffering members of society, because it has a unique appreciation of the individual human person. The encouragement and respect we give to the religious life—and have always given since St Benedict laid the foundations of our civilization and St Patrick rejoiced in the multitudes of youths and maidens entering religion—gives a special atmosphere and colouring to Catholic countries.

We have a characteristic attitude to education, insisting that religious instruction must constitute the formative and integrating element of the whole and maintaining that this is true not only in childhood but the whole way through. We are not willing, except for grave reasons, to allow students to be subjected to anti-Catholic, neutralist or Communistic influences in universities. When we are rebuked for our apparent fear of these forces and our unsureness of the constancy of our young people, we reply that of course we are afraid and unsure. We know that apostacy may occur at this stage of development and that the growth of a critical and disloyal attitude indistinguishable from hostility is also possible. And we are concerned with more than merely avoiding danger : it is part of our general standpoint to expect that higher studies should be pursued with reference to the relevant moral principles and in an atmosphere where an all-round cultivation of the mind on Catholic lines is possible. This is the ordinary teaching of the Church ; and in a Catholic country like Ireland it is reasonable to expect that there should be fuller conformity with it than is sometimes possible elsewhere.

Catholicism is an uncompromising defender of the family, holding it to be a society far more fundamental than the State and possessing rights on which the state must not be permitted to encroach. Similarly we are concerned for the individual's position as against the state and are slow to admit collectivist or paternalist tendencies as lessening the status of the individual. We believe that the State should encourage the formation of groups and associations for special ends and resist the trend to over-centralization.

We live on the borders of, if not within, a culture based on the traditional repudiation of Catholic philosophy and we must not forget Newman's saying that English literature will always be Protestant. In face of the prestige of an outlook so firmly established in the English-speaking world we have to exert ourselves to be aware of the vitality of Catholic thought outside the sphere of influence of such traditions. It requires still greater effort to familiarize ourselves with the continuing, and indeed expanding, richness of this central Christian heritage and to appreciate its incalculable value for the sane guidance of humanity.

* * *

Not only have we a distinguishing standpoint on these and other matters : we are unique in having any kind of fully worked out and integrated system of thought in regard to them. We should not forget this difference between ourselves and other religious bodies. The other day a well-known non-Catholic novelist was writing about the unimportance to the South African government of segregation in church by comparison with segregation elsewhere. Here is what he said : " For most white Christians mixed worship means nothing more than physical togetherness in a building called a church. But association

for social and or political purposes implies some communication of ideas and is therefore dangerous to an apartheid state ". I quote this rather casual statement because it is typical of a widely accepted point of view. Religion from this standpoint is a matter for moments of worship ; the preaching of the Gospel is not supposed to convey any of the vital and formative ideas that will act as a yeast in the community. Instead of offering guidance to human conduct through all the dilemmas and perplexities of modern life the evasive answer is given that these matters are best left to the individual conscience—which usually means that they are to be settled by instinct or positive law or by consulting some individual theorist.

One can easily understand how religious bodies which have no moral system to offer will resent the claims of Catholicism in this respect and will suspect the motives from which such claims proceed. It is not to the credit of some Catholics that they can be led to accept the same viewpoint, and that instead of the old-fashioned virtue *sentire cum ecclesia,* having the mind of the Church, they will choose a policy of opposition, advising us for example that we should confine our attention to liturgical matters which are our proper sphere. (On the other hand in so far as we restrict our interest to purely religious matters we are accused of maintaining a merely " academic Christianity ". Either way we shall not escape calumny. " We have piped to you and you have not danced : we have lamented and you have not mourned.")

The basic cause of faulty thinking on the matters which have been commented on is our failure to appreciate the full content of Catholicism. We are prone to regard our religion merely as impinging on conduct and liberties with a series of arbitrary requirements and restrictions and as making demands upon our time at certain stated intervals. We like to confine its influence as narrowly as possible and to be able to feel that we need not consider its point of view in planning our activities. We think of it in a negative rather than in a positive way, as making repeated irksome calls upon us rather than in offering us and the world a constant sustaining help.

This is an entirely wrong approach. Our religion is more than a private piety, more than a set of inconvenient bye-laws we have to keep in mind. It is, as Newman pointed out, a germinal idea as well as a set of beliefs. It is an integral system, an attitude to existence with characteristic values and ideals. It is not merely a furnishing for a compartment of the mind, it is a manner of looking at the whole of life. It has its special sanctities, its emphases, its inspirations—that word is not excessive when account is taken of what Our Lord said of His own abiding presence in the Church and of the rôle of the Holy Spirit in leading us to all truth. Catholicism is a way of life—the very first Christians spoke of it regularly as " the way "—having far more grounds

to be so regarded than any set of national customs or any political theory. Once it emerged from the Catacombs it began to make its voice heard in the ordering of society. Throughout its long history its greatest minds, basing themselves on the rock of revealed truth, have been thinking broadly and deeply on the whole domain of human affairs and their thinking has become knit together into a coherent Catholic philosophy of life. If we appreciated properly the treasure we have inherited in this body of thought and realized how much we personally owe to it and how great a force it has been in the civilization that has latterly been disowning it, instead of chafing at its inconveniences, we would cherish and defend it—in its outworks as well as its inner citadels. It will repay, indeed it requires, deep study. Just as there are counsels in the Gospels as well as precepts, and things dangerous and helpful are pointed out as well as what is clearly wrong or right, so Catholic philosophy goes beyond a catalogue of what is commanded and forbidden and traces the factors that lead to good and evil, praising or reprobating them according to the degree of their influence in either direction.

* * *

Let us appraise these possessions justly and see that their benefits are not lost to the world, particularly to that part of it with which we are most concerned, our own country. We may not assume that, because Ireland is mainly Catholic, our affairs will always be administered on Catholic lines. Reluctant as we are to criticize other religious groups, it seems necessary to point out that at present a concerted effort is being made by the religious minority to secure a dominating position in our public life. One has only to read a succession of pronouncements from their spokesmen to see that this is true. Offensive statements about the Church have now become common form with them. They claim that leadership in every community belongs to a minority and, recalling their long ascendancy here in the past, they assert that they should be the dominant group to-day. They recognize that they have positions of influence far out of proportion to their numbers, and in the same breath they exhort their members to secure more leadership and power. It is of course a leadership in thought and ideals that is in question, not mere personal prominence. I suggest that this is an explicit challenge to a Catholic nation which it would be unwise to overlook. Even if it does not succeed in making us desert our faith it may do much towards neutralizing our Catholicity, and preventing the application of its principles. It may have done much to this effect already. We are opposed by an extremely efficient propaganda machine. We may have reached a stage when calling Ireland a Catholic nation will itself be regarded as a challenge and even deplored by some Catholics.

The first step towards securing that Catholic principles shall be applied in Ireland consists in studying our Catholic philosophy of life

more fully. If we are ourselves aware of the riches of our intellectual and moral inheritance we shall not allow it to be a dead letter in so many departments of life, we shall be more intent on diffusing the light it can shed in every area of human activity. It is no virtue to choose a quiet life in order to avoid the stress and publicity involved in struggling for the truth. Our Lord was not always meek and compliant : on the contrary, His public life was full of strife and contention. In our age of universal suffrage we have all a voice in, and therefore a responsibility for the management of affairs. Merely to till one's own garden is not the full Christian ideal : St Gregory the Great said that in our religion everyone is the support of someone else and is himself in turn supported by another.

An apostolate for Catholic principles is a worthy and indeed a necessary undertaking in our critical times. " Without doubt," says Pope Pius XII, " outside the family circle professional and civic relations offer a considerable field of action to Christians anxious to dedicate themselves to the renewal of society." Let us not look on our religion merely as supplying a limiting framework of " do-s " and " don't-s ", and derive from secular sources the ideals that really interest and stir us. Catholicism rejects the caricature of a censorious step-mother, confining and restricting worthy aspirations. Our faith is an invitation, a stimulus to do good for the highest motives. We need a wider diffusion of its influence, more of what might be called applied religion. The resources from which our strength is drawn will never run down. We should not be content with a mere reluctant conceding of what is of strict obligation. Let us accept fully the genius of our faith, giving it a place among our real concerns in our emotions and in our hearts. Let us use our imagination on what we have received, our inventiveness, our sensibility. Let us not grudge to God our gifts of energy and enterprise. Religion sincerely embraced should be the mainspring of conduct, not merely a built-in alarm system : it should be a thoroughfare branching into many highways, not a terminus or *cul-de-sac*.

The chief change that our revolutionary age has brought into Church affairs is the introduction of the lay apostolate, an arm of the Church with more scope for varied initiatives than is offered to those who are formally dedicated to religion. To the challenge " Why stand you here all the day idle ? " it is no longer sufficient to reply " Because no man hath hired us ". Like the labourers in the parable at the eleventh hour, all the faithful have been called to apostolic work, " Go ye also into my vineyard ". The Catholic laity have been summoned by the Vicar of Christ to co-operate in ensuring that the gifts which have been unfailingly committed to Christianity shall be conveyed to the new world that is taking shape so rapidly on every side. The invitation is explicit. Surely the response from our Catholic nation will be equally definite.

Irish Economic Problems

by GARRET FITZGERALD

COMPLACENCY and cynicism are the enemies of constructive action ; with so many Irish people suffering from one or the other, it is scarcely surprising that, despite considerable achievements in certain fields, the first generation of Irish independence has been characterized by economic inertia. Action of any kind has too often been opposed, or even attacked, either on the grounds that the status quo is good enough or, alternatively, because there is no hope of achieving the desired objective.

Until very recently the natural consequences of the resultant economic stagnation have been obscured, and even mitigated by the realization of external assets and by emigration, which together have made possible the maintenance and, for a period, the improvement of living standards. But for the intervention of an external factor beyond our control—the impact upon our affairs of the post-war economic recovery in Great Britain, and of the subsequent improvement in living standards in that country—this situation might have persisted almost indefinitely. The expansion of the British economy since the beginning of the present decade has, however, disrupted the unhappy stability of Irish life, and has forced on us for the first time a full realization of the economic problems posed by political independence, and of our notable failure since 1922 to make any substantial progress towards their solution.

Economic growth in Britain has affected Ireland in three distinct ways, and the apparent suddenness with which our current economic difficulties appear to have developed is explained by the fact that these three different effects of improved British conditions have appeared, at least so far as the general public is concerned, to come almost simultaneously to a head.

The first effect of the British post-war recovery upon our economic situation was the stimulation of a series of temporary demands for different types of foodstuffs which Ireland was in a position to supply to the British market—e.g., mince-meat, sweetened fat, etc. In addition the volume of several other food exports (e.g., chocolate crumb and meat) was temporarily pushed up to an artificial level by transitory conditions in the British market. Although naturally welcome at the time, these successive export booms had several unfortunate effects : by providing a temporary addition to the nation's internal and external purchasing power they encouraged the growth of a demand for imported consumer goods which could not be maintained without a serious drain on external

assets when conditions returned to normal, and they induced a sense of false security in respect of Irish exports generally, the failure of whose more permanent elements to expand was overlooked in the general atmosphere of complacency.

The growth of prosperity in Britain also had a *direct* influence on the development of an excessive demand for consumer goods in Ireland, because of the close relations between the two islands, their common language and currency, the vast flow of personal travel between them, and the fact that one section of Ireland is politically and economically part of the United Kingdom. For all these reasons there have been powerful social pressures at work encouraging the level of consumer demand in Ireland to follow the British pattern, although necessarily lagging some distance behind.

During the years of depression these pressures were naturally in abeyance, and the same was true of the war years, but during the period since 1949—when living standards in Britain began to rise more rapidly than in Ireland—this has become an important factor in the Irish economy, especially with the growing impact of external mass communications media, such as the press, magazines, films, radio, and now television.

The third effect of prosperity in Britain upon the Irish economy has been the great increase in emigration—an increase which began in 1949 and grew in volume annually thereafter. During the eight years between 1948 and 1956 the population of the Republic is officially estimated to have fallen by 91,000, or 3%, for this period saw not merely the traditional export of the annual excess of new entrants to the labour market over vacancies occurring naturally through death, retirement or marriage, but also a new and enormously disturbing development—emigration by men and women in employment here who preferred to leave their jobs in this country in favour of better-paid work in Britain. (Between 1946 and 1956 the number of people at work in Ireland fell by 67,000, or 5%.)

Moreover, as many of those who gave up employment in Ireland during these years have been married men with families—quite different from the traditional unmarried emigrants in their 'teens or early twenties —there has been a considerable emigration by dependants during this period, for as the availability of housing has improved in Britain since 1951, a growing number of wives and children have left to make new homes across the Irish Sea, thus contributing still further to the decline in our population.

These diverse effects of British prosperity upon the Irish economy have become evident to the Irish people as a whole only since the beginning of 1956, when they all seemed to come home to roost simultaneously. Although the boom in " consumer goods " imports, which reflected the mounting competitive pressure of British living standards,

was well under way during 1954, it was obscured during that year by the favourable trend of certain food imports,[1] and it was not until the beginning of 1955 that the *total* level of imports began to rise alarmingly. At about the same time the end of the hectic period following the termination of meat rationing in Britain was followed by a sharp drop in meat exports, and by the middle of 1955 cattle exports were also in decline.

As a result of this almost simultaneous emergence of unfavourable trends in both imports and exports, the annual adverse trade balance which had been rising steadily since the beginning of 1955 deteriorated very sharply from May onwards, so that within nine months, viz. by February 1956, it had risen from £72 millions to over £100 millions. An adverse trade balance of £100 millions represented a net external payments deficit of over £40 millions, after taking credit for a favourable net *invisible* balance of £59 million.

The gravity of the balance of payments situation that developed during the course of 1955 was not, however, appreciated by the nation as a whole until the announcement of the first round of Import Levies in March 1956 ; four months later the coincidence of the second round of Levies with the announcement of the results of the April Census, brought reality home to the Irish people as a body for the first time in a generation.

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As the initial mood of depression and even despair begins to wear off, there are signs that the psychological shock administered to the Irish people last year may be producing a new determination to face facts, and overcome difficulties.

Thus, for example, public reaction to the European Free Trade Area proposal, as expressed in newspaper articles, the correspondence columns of the daily papers, and speeches by politicians, economists and businessmen, has been surprisingly positive. The prospect of emerging, however perilously, from behind the shadow of our tariff wall has been welcomed by many, and accepted by virtually all these writers and speakers, with the result that the protected manufacturers, long accustomed to tacit public acceptance of their subsidization through tariffs, have been almost overnight placed on the defensive and shocked into cautious silence or non-committal attitudes. So sudden and sharp has been the reversal of public opinion on this issue, indeed, that the case against Irish participation in the Free Trade Area has almost gone by default,

[1] During 1954 the total value of imports of wheat, sugar, cocoa and butter was £11 millions lower than in 1953.

although if and when the nation is finally faced with a concrete decision, the two sides of the argument will no doubt be fully heard and carefully considered.

But whatever the outcome of the Free Trade Area project may be, its emergence at this stage has already altered the balance of power in Ireland between protectionists and free traders. The days of unlimited tariff protection are now numbered, and in speaking of the Free Trade Area proposal early this year the present Tanaiste pointed out that even if Ireland did not join the Free Trade Area the whole policy of tariff protection would in any event have to be drastically reviewed in the light of our changed circumstances.

Earlier, in a policy statement on behalf of the Fianna Fail Party, Mr Lemass had said :

> Our industrialists have to cease thinking of tariffs as props to lean on and must consider them as a form of aid given to them conditionally by the Irish community, the main conditions being that they must never cease from striving to increase their efficiency until they are meeting any fair competition in the home market without protection, and that they will make their utmost endeavours to gain export business abroad as well . . . We are entering a new phase in Irish industrial development. Expansion on the home market in which tariffs were very effective instruments of policy, is now coming to an end.

The Reports of two Committees, published in March and April last, also illustrate this new, more realistic approach. In March the Capital Investment Committee recommended the abolition of the food subsidies, of agricultural de-rating, and of the guaranteed price for milk. In April the Committee of Inquiry into Internal Transport proposed that the railways be drastically pruned in what should be a final attempt to turn them into a subsidy-free transport operation ; if this attempt should fail, the logical conclusion should be drawn.

* * *

Conditions now favour a measure of ecomonic recovery, if this new spirit of realism can be maintained during the months and years ahead. Thus there is now an opportunity for a substantial increase in industrial productivity,[1] which has fallen sharply during the last year as production has declined more rapidly than manpower. Moreover some industries at least have maintained their investment programmes during this period and are now better equipped than before to achieve a high level of productivity, if the growth of exports and the revival of a soundly-based home demand, together create a requirement for a significant increase in output.

[1] In the sense of " output per worker ".

Furthermore our national expenditure has for the moment been re-adjusted to the level we can afford with present output ; the emergence and growth of farmers' organizations such as the National Farmers' Association offers hope of future progress in expanding agricultural productivity ; and the dairy farmers now appear reconciled to receiving no further increase in the price of milk (which is already so high that it has called forth a volume of production that can be disposed of only at heavy loss)—indeed, following the Report of the Capital Investment Committee they are on the defensive, fearful for the very concept of a guaranteed price for this product.

There is, however, a very real danger of a loss of national impetus following the marked improvement in the balance of payments position — an improvement which is largely a product of temporary factors, such as the boom in cattle exports, and a reduction in stocks of many commodities, together with the substantial cut in imports provoked by the Special Import Levies. It is, of course, true that there has at the same time been an underlying improvement in the trend of general exports, but this is still on too small a scale, and at too early a stage in its development, to warrant any relaxation of effort.

In general the size of an economic unit determines the degree of self-sufficiency that it can attain. Major powers, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, are in large degree self-sufficient ; smaller ones, like Ireland, can supply from their home resources only a proportion of their needs, and must rely on trade with the rest of the world for a much larger share of their requirements.

Thus a comparison of Irish and United Kingdom national income statistics shows that while only 18% of United Kingdom domestic expenditure is absorbed by imports, the Irish proportion of imports is no less than 35%—simply because the Republic of Ireland, being a much smaller economic unit, is correspondingly less self-sufficient despite much more intensive efforts to achieve self-sufficiency with the aid of tariffs and quotas.

Unfortunately, however, although the Republic has to import almost twice as large a share of its requirements as the United Kingdom, its exports represent a *smaller* proportion of its Gross National Product at market prices—20% as against 23½% in the case of the United Kingdom. These figures illustrate effectively the weakness of the Irish economy at the present time ; they show how we have failed to achieve either the hoped-for self-sufficiency (which is in any event unattainable by virtue of the small size of the country and of its population), or a volume of exports sufficient to enable us to pay out of current earnings abroad for the foreign goods essential to our standard of living.

The key to this situation is clearly the expansion of exports. This will not alone bring us the external purchasing power needed to maintain

living standards, but may also, by providing Irish industry with a broader base than the limited home market can offer, make possible a wider variety of home production and lower production costs. More varied home production could in turn lead to increased home consumption of Irish-produced goods, and a consequent reduction in imports.

The expansion of exports would, indeed, provide the solution to many of Ireland's economic problems—for it offers a prospect of increasing consumer purchasing power while at the same time providing the means of satisfying the demand for consumer goods thus rendered effective.

* * *

One element in the emergence of the present crisis has been an unfortunate emphasis on the *volume* of production and employment instead of, and indeed at the expense of, productivity which, together with marketing, is one of the essential elements of an expanding export trade.

Thus the policy of promoting increases in agricultural production by means of guaranteed prices fixed at arbitrarily high levels has had the financially unfortunate effect of securing the emergence of agricultural surpluses that can be disposed of only by means of large scale export subsidies. By bringing into the market a large number of inefficient high-cost producers, this policy has also undermined the ability of our agricultural industry to produce for export at the prices prevailing in the British and Continental markets.

It is true that these markets are 'rigged' against us, by domestic subsidies and by tariffs imposed on our products, and it is possible that but for this our present level of efficiency and costs would not preclude us from competing successfully. We must, however, take the world as we find it, at any rate until we discover some way of changing it to our advantage; and the fact that artificial barriers are raised against us, in all the countries to which we might reasonably hope to export our agricultural produce, is a powerful reason for exerting every effort to improve our efficiency and reduce our costs. We cannot hope to do this as long as current guaranteed price levels are maintained in the case of products such as milk.

We are, therefore, faced with the apparent paradox that price policies designed to maximize production, with a view to producing export surpluses, almost automatically rule out any prospect of selling these surpluses abroad, except at a loss. We have in fact started from the wrong end by seeking to maximize production regardless of cost, instead of bending all our efforts to improving agricultural productivity so as to put ourselves in a position to overcome the artificial financial barriers placed in the way of our agricultural exports.

There appear to be four courses of action open to us in these circumstances. We can accept the present situation, and continue to subsidize

exports either directly through payments to farmers derived from general taxation or indirectly by deliberately raising food prices at home and averaging the proceeds with the lower earnings from exports ; we can endeavour to share in the British farm subsidies by seeking some form of economic re-union with the United Kingdom, even at the price of a possible loss of effective political independence ; we can face up to the problem by raising productivity and reducing costs ruthlessly, so as to undercut the subsidized and protected agricultural industries of Western Europe ; or we can accept defeat, and reconcile ourselves to an agricultural export trade confined to livestock and possibly meat.

Permanent subsidization of agricultural exports would impose an intolerable burden on the non-agricultural sector of the economy which is already carrying a disproportionate share of the cost of central government—the amount of income tax paid on farm income being negligible. In the United Kingdom where only 4% of the working population is engaged in agriculture, the remaining 96% of the population—whose *per capita* income is almost 60% higher than that of the non-agricultural working population in this country—can afford to subsidize the British farmer, a levy of 1½% on the non-agricultural sector providing the agricultural community with a 50% increase in their incomes.

In Ireland, however, no less than 40% of the working population is engaged in agriculture, despite more than a century of ' flight from the land '. To boost the natural level of Irish farm income by 50% under these conditions, a levy of at least 20% on non-agricultural incomes would be necessary for this purpose alone and it is evident that the already shaky non-agricultural sector of the economy would founder under an imposition of this magnitude.

This is equally true whether the subsidies are found from general taxation, or from inflated food prices as is proposed by the National Farmers' Association. Price regulation of foodstuffs in the home market might, perhaps, be acceptable as a means of levelling out oscillations in farmers' income from year to year, but, as Mr Lemass pointed out earlier this year, these " support prices, the average prices which farmers would be assured, would have to be related to average world prices and the aim of the whole arrangement would be to protect them against an exceptional slump, such as occurred with turkeys last season, and not necessarily to guarantee a profit regardless of production costs. There cannot be, for this country, any permanent arrangement for subsidizing agricultural exports generally. If production costs cannot be kept in line with the average prices which can be realized on export sales, then export sales cannot, in the long run, be kept up, much less increased ".

The second suggestion, to seek a greater share in British farm subsidies, would be acceptable only if it did not involve the loss of effective economic and political independence ; to make fundamental concessions of this

kind might be foolish even from a strictly material standpoint, for farm subsidies in the United Kingdom are now threatened by the growing British realization that the feather-bedding of home agriculture must not be allowed to stand in the way of the participation of the United Kingdom in the proposed European Free Trade Area.

Unless, therefore, our agricultural industry is to be written off as a source of exports other than cattle and meat, there is no alternative open to us but to eliminate the obstacle of high guaranteed prices for certain products—an obstacle which stands in the way of any growth in real agricultural prosperity, or in the prosperity of the nation as a whole.

There are, of course, social reasons for these price guarantees, and particularly for the guaranteed price for milk : the sale of milk provides many small farmers with virtually their only source of cash income, and by maintaining this price at a high level these small farmers are encouraged to remain on the land. But there are (or at any rate should be) limits to the extent that social considerations can be allowed to outweigh economic factors, and while social subsidies and doles of various kinds may be acceptable even when they constitute a heavy drain on a nation's resources, they become anti-social, in the broader sense, when they begin to exercise a positively harmful effect on a country's economic development.

The emphasis that is continually placed on maximizing the volume of production implies that in some way our problem is one of achieving surpluses, whereas the real problem, especially in an economy whose agriculture is bolstered up by guaranteed prices, maintained at an artificially high level, is to avoid producing *unsaleable* surpluses. Much of our land is so rich, and our population is so small, that even when the land is badly managed our farmers can scarcely avoid producing more than we can consume ourselves or sell abroad profitably at present cost levels and with current marketing methods. With improved productivity and good management a very much smaller acreage worked with greatly reduced manpower, could produce all of the present output at lower cost—and there perhaps lies the key to the problem.

It is, indeed, difficult to avoid the conclusion that an important factor bedevilling our whole agricultural development is the fact that even if there is not too much marginal land in production, this marginal land is at any rate being used to produce the wrong things. This situation is currently being aggravated still further by the policy of recovering additional marginal land by means of drainage schemes. In its present form at least much of the pasture-land on which dairy cattle are grazed is unsuitable for this purpose : it does not produce economic milk-yields, such as would make possible the production of butter for export.

Undoubtedly the productivity of some of this land could be increased to the desired level by increased use of fertilizers ; it has recently been

estimated[1] that " with manures and management " the present average butter fat output per acre in creamery districts could be *doubled* on a country-wide basis. But in other cases land which even under favourable conditions might be marginal for dairying purposes is probably being used in this way solely because of the artificial level of milk prices.

In so far as the elimination of artificial price levels for agricultural products might lead to a reduction in the acreage of land at present in use, much if not all of the decline might be offset by an increase in sheep-grazing ; demand for both mutton and wool appears to be strong, and it seems evident that during the years ahead the woollen industry in Ireland is likely to continue to expand its output in response to a growing demand for Irish woollen yarn and woollen fabrics in the export market.

No doubt such a change-over would involve a further reduction in already declining agricultural population, and a drop in the number of farms. But in endeavouring to stave off this development is there not a serious danger of condemning the economy as a whole to a stagnation which will result—is, indeed, already resulting—in a much more widespread emigration from the whole country ?

It is, indeed, difficult to avoid the conclusion that a factor in the development of large-scale emigration from urban areas during the first half of the present decade was the deliberate re-distribution of purchasing power from the non-agricultural to the agricultural sector, by means of guaranteed farm prices, and an uneven burden of direct taxation. This re-distribution had the effect of depriving industrial workers of all but a fraction of the fruits of their increased production and productivity, to the benefit of a farming community whose output increased very little, and whose increased productivity was much lower than that of industry, and was moreover entirely negative—having been almost exclusively due to a decline in manpower.

Undoubtedly some such re-distribution of income was essential to bring real agricultural income up above the subsistence level of the pre-war period, but on this occasion the pendulum seems to have swung too far in the opposite direction, with disastrous results for the morale of the non-agricultural wage-earner, and perhaps also to the detriment of agricultural output—for high farm incomes sometimes act as a deterrent to increased effort by farmers, instead of as an incentive.

Extravagant guaranteed prices for certain farm products are not, however, the only signs of excessive preoccupation with the *volume* of production in agriculture, to the detriment of productivity, cost reduction and marketing. There is a disturbing tendency to rely on the index of agricultural production as a measurement of achievement in this sector—

[1] " A Half Century of Fertiliser and Lime Use in Ireland " ; a paper recently presented to the Statistical and Social Enquiry Society of Ireland by Messrs T. Walsh, M.Agric.Sc., Ph.D., D.Sc., P. F. Ryan, B.Agr.Sc., and J. Kilroy, B.Agr.Sc., of the Department of Agriculture.

doubly disturbing because, in the first place, the volume of production proves nothing by itself, and, secondly, because if it did prove anything it would prove that we are making virtually no progress anyway !

It is possible to produce a statistical illusion of progress by choosing as the base year for a comparison the year 1947, when agricultural production fell to its lowest level in decades, two months of snow in the Spring having aggravated the war-time decline in the productivity of the land. Moreover by employing the index of *gross* agricultural output, which was further depressed in that year by the low post-war input of feeding-stuffs, fertilizers and seeds, the illusion can be further enhanced, and an apparently respectable increase of almost 27% in eight years (1947–1955) can be contrived.

Anyone seeking to prove the contrary case would, however, compare *net* output in 1949 and 1956, during which period there was a drop of 1%.

Finally the *true* trend of events, if one were interested in ascertaining it, could perhaps best be described by saying that no net progress was made between 1948 and 1951 ; between 1951 and 1955 production increased by 11% or an average of about 3% per annum ; and last year it declined slightly.

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Although the conflict between the social aim of maintaining the maximum population on the largest possible area of land, and the economic aim of improving productivity and reducing costs, is, perhaps, the most fundamental problem facing Irish agriculture, the substitution of machines for men throughout the country is not necessarily a solution ; and, indeed, under Irish conditions it would be unwise to place too much emphasis on mechanization in agriculture. Despite the flight from the land, and the persistent complaint of many farmers that labour is not available when they need it, the labour shortage in the Irish countryside is not acute by European standards, and farm labourers' wages, although they have now risen to three-and-a-half times their pre-war level, are still relatively low. The labour problem in agriculture seems to derive rather from a widespread unwillingness to do a good day's work than from an actual shortage of workers in the countryside.

Under these conditions mechanization will not necessarily always be economically justified, although the temptation to mechanize must be a strong one for many farmers who find labour problems troublesome and time-consuming. Possibly some tightening up of the present arrangements for the payment of unemployment benefit and assistance in rural areas might alleviate these difficulties, for under the present system labour-hungry farmers and idle workers drawing the dole seem to exist side-by-side in many areas.

The avoidance of excessive investment in farm machinery is desirable as much in the interest of conserving capital as with a view to maintaining

rural employment. Lack of capital is, of course, one of the chief disabilities from which Irish agriculture has always suffered. The problem can, however, be exaggerated, not alone by excessive emphasis on mechanization but also by disregard of the favourable position of Irish agriculture in respect of farm buildings ; owing to the equable nature of the Irish climate our investment in cowsheds, for example, can be on a much smaller scale than in countries such as Denmark, whose winters are much more severe.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the amount of capital required by Irish agriculture may be somewhat smaller than in other countries, a shortage of capital remains one of its main problems. There are fundamental difficulties about investment in agriculture, deriving from the nature of farming, which is a skilled trade rather than an industry and, in Western Europe at any rate, tends to be organized in relatively small units, each owned and operated by an individual.

Under present conditions it is impossible for anyone to invest in agriculture in any other way than by purchasing a holding, thus taking on the full responsibility for the success or failure of the enterprise. If opportunities for *industrial* investment had been limited in this way during the past two centuries, the growth and expansion of industry would have been very much reduced, and it would have remained underdeveloped and inefficient—like much of agriculture.

Obviously until this institutional defect is remedied, investment in agriculture will be very limited, indeed, for there is no way by which existing farmers can raise risk capital, and new entrants into agriculture frequently find that their initial capital is wholly absorbed by the purchase price of the farm and stock, and that they have inadequate working capital left for its development, improvement and expansion.

In Britain this problem is less acute: a substantial proportion of the land is still held in relatively large units by members of the landed gentry, many of whom still retain some of their inherited capital, despite the operation of death duties; and other farms are owned by businessmen, whose investment in farming may be provoked by motives of tax avoidance, but who nevertheless are bringing new capital into agriculture.

* * *

Of the many technical aids to increased agricultural productivity two deserve special mention—although both have been so exhaustively dealt with elsewhere, that no more than a mention is necessary in a general article of this kind. These are the use of fertilizers (already referred to in connection with dairy pastures) and the aids afforded by modern veterinary science. The economies, increases in productivity, and reductions in cost levels that can be achieved by making full use of such facilities seem to be startling indeed. In their recent paper on the use of

fertilizers[1] Messrs Walsh, Ryan and Kilroy of the Department of Agriculture estimated that the volume of fertilizers at present used should be increased at least four to seven times in order to achieve optimum results, which at present prices would yield returns up to six times greater than the cost of the additional fertilizers used.

In a recent paper on Veterinary Science[2] animal losses through disease were estimated at £30,000,000 per annum, and the author expressed confidence in the ability of veterinary science to go a long way towards eliminating these losses.

Above all, the need for a vast expansion of agricultural education at every level is evident—there is probably no branch of education in which increased expenditure is likely to produce such rapid and concrete results. The new Agricultural Institute will provide an apex for this system of agricultural education, and should in its own right make a major contribution to the improvement of productivity.

But behind all these aids to expansion and improvement there is a need for a new attitude of mind, experimental, restless, dissatisfied with past achievements, sceptical of present methods, questioning traditional agricultural policies, such as the encouragement of the dual-purpose cow and the exclusion of the Landrace pig. No matter how sound it may have been when first enunciated, no agricultural policy should be sacrosanct for more than a few years, and should automatically come up for comprehensive review at frequent intervals. In every walk of life there are to be found examples of how circumstances alter cases—examples of the gradual, unnoticed erosion of the basis upon which past decisions have been made ; agriculture is assuredly no exception to this universal human experience—despite the fact that it is said to be a slow-moving industry.

To achieve this persistent review of policies and methods a continuous influx of new minds is needed, especially in view of the remarkable stability of outlook that often characterizes both farmers and civil servants, who may have little else in common.

Moreover, where major policies are concerned it might be desirable that these reviews should be public. The reluctance of successive governments and of the continuing civil service to test public opinion on major issues has recently for the first time been overcome in the case of the Free Trade Area project. It is to be hoped that this precedent will so far as possible be followed in the future.

Finally, instead of concentrating our energies on the achievement of an *optimum* level of exports viewed from a price viewpoint—viz., a level sufficiently high to force home prices up, but not so great as to depress prices in the foreign markets served—we must in future take a longer

[1] Op. cit. p. 23.

[2] " The Significance of Veterinary Science in the National Economy " by P. Harnett, M.R.C.V.S., read to the Statistical and Social Enquiry Society, 2 March 1956.

view and aim to maximize the volume of exports even at the expense of lower prices, recognizing that in the long run prosperity must lie along the expansionist rather than the restrictionist path.

The problems of Irish agriculture are not, however, confined to the improvement of agricultural productivity. Marketing difficulties are equally important, and in some ways more intractable, for while the answer to low productivity lies largely in our own hands should we be prepared to face up to the issues involved, we are almost powerless to control the factors which depress the external price levels of agricultural products.

Certain steps we can take, however, such as improving the quality of our agricultural exports, which in some respects at any rate compares unfavourably with that of some of our competitors' products. Much has already been done in this direction, but we still seem to lag behind, largely because of our unorganized marketing procedures. With the growth of the strength and stature of the National Farmers' Association, and the government's expressed willingness to invest directly in marketing, we may, however, be on the verge of important developments in this field. The elimination of T.B. in cattle is another aspect of the same problem, but once again recent legislation provides evidence of a new determination to deal fairly drastically with this threat to our main agricultural export.

The problem of developing markets on the Continent is, of course, closely tied in with the new Common Market and the proposed European Free Trade Area. Even under present conditions, however, it has proved possible to open up new markets for Irish cattle and meat. Thus in the twelve months ended May last the value of cattle exported to France, the Netherlands and Germany increased tenfold by comparison with the year ended May 1956, and the total value of cattle exported to Continental Europe was almost £5,000,000, or 11% of all cattle exports. Since the beginning of this year there has also been a sharp increase in meat exports to the Continent—notably fresh beef to Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, and frozen beef to Algeria, Germany, and Sweden, and to the United States.

Some of these new markets are precarious and possibly impermanent —e.g., lamb exports to France ceased when licences were withdrawn owing to French balance of payments difficulties. Nevertheless these developments have served to encourage interest in the Free Trade Area project, Irish participation in which might reasonably be expected to lead to a further expansion of food exports to member States on the Continent.

The impending negotiations for the establishment of such an Area will be a real test of Irish diplomatic skill. None of the countries concerned, except Britain, has such a difficult task ahead, for we have a

dual pre-occupation with the maintenance of our privileged position in the British market and at the same time with the expansion of our exports to the Continent. If we are to open up new Continental markets for Irish agricultural products which are at present excluded by quotas and tariffs, it is essential that agriculture should be included in one form or another within the scope of the Free Trade Area project. If, however, its inclusion led to a refusal by Britain to participate in the scheme, we might be forced to make the agonizing choice between our present privileged position in the British market and access to new Continental markets through membership of the Free Trade Area.

If, on the other hand, as now seems increasingly likely, the British Government is forced to yield ground on this issue, and to agree to participate in a Free Trade Area which would include agriculture in some form or another, we might find our privileged position in the British market undermined, for the whole system of Commonwealth Preference would then be overturned.

Our aim must naturally be to seek the best of both bargains ; and bearing in mind the relatively limited agricultural benefits that we receive from Commonwealth Preference (as distinct from those deriving from the bi-lateral Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement), it seems clear that our objective must be to secure British participation in a Free Trade Area covering agriculture as well as industry, and to face up to whatever dislocation of our British market may follow. The prize—Irish membership of a European market for agricultural goods—is a substantial one, especially in view of the relatively high agricultural cost and price levels in many Continental countries. Whatever arrangement may emerge from the present Free Trade proposals—and it seems likely that it will take the form of some kind of managed market—we have something to gain by participating in it.

In the meantime efforts might be made to supplement traditional Irish exports with new ventures. Because of the poor home demand for fruit and vegetables, market gardening has not been developed on a large scale in this country ; a suitable opportunity for an expansion of market gardening into the export trade may, perhaps, be provided by the relatively new frozen food industry, and by the even more recent trend towards graded and packaged fruit and vegetables, still only in its infancy in Europe. The success of the airborne mushroom export business shows what can be achieved by employing modern methods of growing and transporting vegetables and fruit.

The limitations of the home market are not, however, the only obstacles in the way of the expansion of market gardening. The difficulty of obtaining suitable labour appears to be a source of discouragement to those seeking to expand their activities in this field. The paradox of labour shortages in a country with an unabsorbable labour surplus

seems to be at its most acute in this branch of agriculture. The reluctance of Irish labour to undertake agricultural work even at wages well above the statutory minimum is surely one of the most disturbing phenomena of Irish life today. Nevertheless the experience of the Irish Sugar Company shows that agricultural industries requiring a large volume of labour in the fields can be successfully organized, if an assured market is provided and if the processing and marketing is carried out efficiently, so that the farmers' share of the price finally paid by the consumer is maintained at a high level.

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With agricultural exports still forming almost 60% of the total, our efforts must clearly be directed in the first instance towards expanding this side of the export business, by improving agricultural productivity and agricultural marketing arrangements. In the long run, however, the continued growth and expansion of the Irish economy must depend increasingly upon the expansion of industrial exports, not only because of the higher wages earned by industrial workers and the higher standard of living enjoyed by them, nor simply because of the fact that increased employment can develop only in the non-agricultural sector, but also because the prospects for agricultural exports during the years ahead are unsatisfactory. Quite apart from the fact that the current trend of world prices favours industrial as against agricultural products—the main cause of the adverse trend of our terms of trade during the past year—the demand for agricultural produce in Europe is not expected to increase substantially during the years ahead ; and the rate of growth of demand will, it is anticipated, be very much less than that for industrial products, and especially consumer durable goods.

Thus the Eighth Report of OEEC[1] forecasts an increase of only 13% in the demand for European farm products between 1955 and 1960, and in North-Western Europe, which is our natural market, the increase is expected to be less than 10%. The overall increase in the demand for consumer durable goods, on the other hand, is expected to exceed 30% during this period, while the number of passenger cars in use is expected to grow by over two-thirds. Moreover the rate of increase in the demand for consumer durables in North-Western Europe is expected to be above this average European level, in contrast to the anticipated development of demand for food in this area.

These contrasting trends reflect directly the diminished emphasis that is placed on food consumption in countries with relatively high standards of living, where the population is already well fed. Their significance for countries like Ireland and Denmark, whose economies have hitherto depended largely on agricultural exports is unmistakable ; and although the bulk of the increase in the demand for food is expected

[1] *Europe To-day and in* 1960, vol. II.

to be concentrated on meat and dairy products, which Ireland should be well equipped to supply, it is evident that the future lies with the industrial nations, or at any rate with those whose economies have a strong industrial bias.

Our long-term aim, therefore, must be to expand industrial exports, so that ultimately the majority, rather than a minority, of the goods exported will be of industrial origin. Once again the problem is a dual one—first the improvement of industrial productivity, and then the expansion of our markets for industrial goods.

Industrial productivity has been a favourite subject for discussion in this country in recent years, and there appears to be a fair measure of agreement on the proposition that there is no inherent weakness in the working capacity of Irish labour—no abnormal laziness or inability to do skilled work. There is, of course, a dearth of skilled workers for historical reasons, but many Irish skilled workers in Great Britain would be glad to return if given a prospect of steady employment in this country. In any event the Irish worker has been found by foreign industrialists setting up factories in this country to be quick and willing to learn ; and any management that selects its workers with care in the first instance, and is prepared to offer them a thorough training in the work they are to perform, is unlikely to have many worries on this score.

Moreover because so much of Irish industry is new, the equipment employed is in many instances at least as up-to-date—in some cases more so—than in other more highly-industrialized countries.

The problems may, therefore, be summed up under the headings : poor management, trade union restrictive practices, and the small scale of many Irish industries, so many of which have hitherto confined their activities to the tiny home market.

Poor management can embrace a wide variety of defects—bad selection techniques, poor industrial and public relations, inadequate costing systems, excessive tolerance of inefficiency and incompetence at management or supervisory level, lack of energy, initiative and the urge to expand. It is true that many firms excel in some or all of these fields, but many others seem to fall short of any reasonable standard—partly, perhaps, because of natural but remediable defects in the Irish (Southern Irish ?) character, but more, perhaps, because of the enervating effect of thirty years of tariff protection, and because of the small scale of so many industries and their ' family ' character, which discourage the entry of keen and ambitious young men who, in other circumstances and in other countries, would find their natural home in industrial enterprises.

Some may be inclined to blame the various State enterprises for drawing off so much talent from the private sector of industry, but in the first instance at any rate this tendency—which contrasts so markedly with

conditions on the other side of the Irish Sea where it is the State enterprises that find difficulty in attracting talent from private industry—developed because of the absence of opportunities in privately-owned Irish industrial undertakings. As a result employment in State enterprises is now more popular—not merely, as is sometimes cynically suggested, among those on the look-out for an easy job with a pension at the end of it, but also with the ambitious and the energetic.

The foundation of the Irish Management Institute is gradually broadening the base of good management in this country, not merely because of the training facilities for management that the Institute is increasingly able to place at the disposal of its members, but also because for the first time industrial management is developing a self-consciousness which is the first step towards self-confidence and pride in its achievements. There is, of course, an ever-present temptation to cloud these real issues with words—and there are few subjects that provoke such a ready flow of nonsense as does Management—but the Institute is conscious of this danger and is determined to avoid it. It has also been careful to avoid the danger of degenerating into a second Federation of Manufacturers, whose functions are, and must remain, entirely different.

While management is endeavouring to help itself in this way, the State's best contribution might, paradoxically, be to make life more difficult in some respects for industrial management, for nothing is so likely to stimulate enterprise and initiative, and particularly to encourage the expansion of exports, as a tightening up of conditions in the home market (such as that imposed by the recent credit squeeze). During the years ahead this tightening up might best take the form of a gradual withdrawal of tariff protection—whether or not this is imposed on us by membership of the European Free Trade Area.

Such a programme should not, however, be arbitrary or haphazard. A scheme of tariff reduction covering a period of ten or more years ahead, published as a firm statement of government policy, to be adhered to regardless of any representations subsequently made on behalf of particular vested interests might encourage not merely a revival of enterprise, but also forward planning.

Another way in which the State could foster good management and improved productivity would be by allowing some form of additional tax relief to firms which employ reputable industrial consultants to advise on the organization of the work, the streamlining of administration, etc. Already many Irish firms are seeking the expert aid of consultants, with favourable effects both on prices and profits, and probably also, in many instances, on the quality of the goods produced. Several British industrial consultancy organizations have set up branches in this country and experience no difficulty in finding full-time employment for their staffs in this country, some of whom are Irishmen who have been specially trained in Britain for this work.

One of the chief problems facing industrial consultants, and the managements they advise, is the wide range of trade union restrictive practices designed to maintain employment, and in some instances to force up wage levels. These restrictive practices are, possibly, due in part to the failure of industrial management to win the confidence of the trade unions and the industrial workers generally, a failure attributable, perhaps, to the negative approach of so many managements to industrial relations problems. So long as the workers know that the employers' attitude is always to give as little as possible, and then only under extreme pressure, they can have little confidence in assurances as to the effects on employment and wage levels of giving up restrictive practices. At the same time the trade unions and their members must accept the main share of the blame for the frustrating restrictions that they impose on productivity—restrictions which are probably the biggest single barrier to the improvement of living standards for the Irish people as a whole and for industrial workers in particular.

What is at stake here is a whole attitude of mind. Not alone the trade unions but the entire community is infected with a horror of unemployment which is an understandable, and indeed a creditable, instinct in a country with such a large labour surplus, but which, nevertheless, when carried to extremes is productive of every kind of economic aberration and stands in the way of any imaginative attempt to cure rather than alleviate the basic maladies from which the economy is suffering.

In seeking to replace this entirely negative reaction to our employment problems by a new and constructive horror of inefficiency and low productivity, the State must be prepared to take the lead in some imaginative way. Instead of collaborating in the unspoken conspiracy to play down restrictive practices by trade unions and their members, it must hold them up to contempt and ridicule, just as the restrictive practices by managements are pilloried by the Fair Trade Tribunal as a first step before proceeding to more drastic measures—which frequently prove unnecessary. The employers' experience has, indeed, shown that in most cases the mere threat of publicity is enough to send those concerned scurrying for safety, dismantling the complex system of controls built up by rings, cartels, and trade associations over the years.

If an official agency were given the task of investigating all trade union restrictive practices reported to it, with no greater power than to publish its findings, it is at least possible that many trade unions would run for cover before the enquiries even started. Those that stood their ground would have to be prepared to face growing hostility on the part of public opinion as details of time-wasting, costly and stupid restrictions on output were published at regular intervals. Public opinion can be a potent force in public life, but its positive influence is too often

neglected, while its negative, demagogic potentialities are all too often exploited.

The third problem that stands in the way of improvements in industrial productivity is the small size of the Irish market which makes it difficult, often impossible, for Irish managements to take advantage of the potential economies of large-scale production. The answer to this particular problem lies in the expansion of exports—although it must be recognized that there is a danger of a vicious circle here, for the expansion of exports may in turn depend upon reductions in cost that can be achieved only by mass production methods.

This vicious circle can be broken into only by an imaginative decision to take the risk implicit in a large-scale expansion of productive capacity for export purposes. Here again Irish participation in the proposed Free Trade Area might provide a partial solution—if the new markets opened up on the Continent outweighed the loss of sales to Great Britain following the loss of the benefit of Commonwealth Preference in that market.

At the same time it must be recognized that, so far at any rate, Irish manufactures have not penetrated the Continent in any significant quantities, and no less than 97% of these exports were last year directed towards English-speaking countries—including overseas territories whose foreign commercial tongue is English. The range and volume of Irish exports of manufactured goods is already considerable, and it is difficult to believe that for some peculiar reason none of them are saleable on the Continent of Europe. There is, therefore, clear evidence of failure to exploit our opportunities in these markets, a failure explained, but certainly not justified by the language problem which in this particular field seems to have limited our efforts to English-speaking areas, many of them much further afield than our natural markets on the Continent of Europe.

Moreover our bargaining position vis à vis most Continental countries is strong, for despite the expansion of cattle and meat exports to Continental countries last year, and the decline in imports from the Continent following the imposition of the import levies, the balance of trade continues to run in favour of all the Continental countries except France. Thus, imports from Germany last year exceeded exports to that country by 250%; imports from the Netherlands exceeded exports by 180%; imports from Belgium exceeded exports by over 50%; and we imported twelve times as much from Sweden, and thirty times as much from Finland as we exported to those two countries respectively.

In some instances our ability to export both to Britain and to the Continent may be inhibited by private agreements between Irish and foreign firms restricting the right of the former to export. In many cases these Irish firms are mere branches of foreign undertakings, or are only

agents for these companies, manufacturing in Ireland under licence from their principals. In opening the country to foreign investment on an even wider scale than hitherto, this danger must be borne in mind, for in many cases the price being paid for security from outside competition in the home market may be excessive, bearing in mind the export potentialities of the particular product.

On the other hand just as the formation of agricultural marketing organizations may be expected to improve the prospects of Irish agricultural exports, so also co-operation between manufacturers for export purposes might prove well worthwhile, especially as the small size of so many Irish firms precludes them from setting up individual export organizations. Once again government assistance, in the form of some kind of additional tax relief, might reasonably be extended to marketing organizations of this kind in the industrial sector.

In the long run, however, the problem of expanding Irish industrial exports will best be overcome by intelligent concentration on goods with low transport costs, which have a high labour content and are, therefore, relatively uneconomic to produce in countries favoured with full employment ; because the absence of a mass market at home makes mass production difficult, these goods would ideally be quality products.

This analysis suggests the desirability of concentration on textiles and clothing, and especially on woollen fabrics and footwear, whose raw materials are to an increasing extent home-produced. It is, therefore, interesting to note that it is in these particular fields that some of the largest increases in the export of manufactured goods have been registered during the past year.

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Reference to transport costs leads naturally to a consideration of transport both as an element in the cost structure of exports, and as an important service in itself—one which, moreover, provides a large volume of employment.

From an exporter's point of view the existing transport facilities between Ireland and other countries leave much to be desired. On the one hand he feels a natural frustration at the additional cost barrier that they impose between him and his markets in Britain or the Continent, and is reluctant to accept without protest the disabilities imposed by Ireland's geographical isolation.

At the same time those exporters who handle livestock—which constitutes the bulk of our agricultural exports—resent the Shipping Conference system of fixing rates, which is alien to the free market tradition to which they are accustomed in buying and selling their wares; and their suspicion of shipping cartels is aggravated by the fact that they are up against another 'ring' on the labour side—the unions which impose unreasonable charges for services that are in some cases obsolete

and never in fact performed. Finally, the recent emergence of a major Continental market for cattle and meat has naturally thrown into relief the limitations of direct shipping services between Ireland and the Continent which, because of the relatively small volume of direct trade in past years, are not fully geared to handle a rush of new business of this kind.

The present government may be disposed to take some action in respect of these complaints, for in his policy statement of January last Mr Lemass said :

> There is a widespread belief that unnecessary and avoidable costs are not only tolerated but sometimes enforced by both monopoly transport concerns and by the trade unions, and also, indeed, that some Government regulations impose unnecessary impediments to trade. The prevalence of this belief is a serious deterrent to the effort to expand production for export. This situation requires ventilation by means of a public enquiry covering all aspects of it, including internal transport arrangements, port facilities and operating methods, shipping charges and services, to be followed by effective action.

No doubt such an enquiry will be instituted during the months ahead ; it is to be hoped that its members will approach their task with a determination that all unnecessary obstacles to the provision of cheap transport facilities must be swept away—but at the same time with a clear appreciation of the hard facts of our geographical situation, and an understanding of the problems of the shipping industry.

In particular they will be faced with the problem of one-way loads, which more than any other single factor raises transport costs. There are obvious difficulties about utilizing in the return direction the shipping space provided for cattle exported from this country to Britain and the Continent, and in any event the nature of Irish imports from the Continent would make it difficult to secure return loads in all cases.

This problem has arisen on the air transport side also: one of the chief obstacles to the large-scale development of airborne meat exports to the Continent has been the almost complete absence of adequate return loads from Continental points ; even the diversion of all-cargo aircraft into British airports in search of import loads has failed to solve this problem, partly because of the depressing effect of the import levies on British exports of consumer durable goods to Ireland.

Some at least of the transport problems of Irish agricultural exporters are, therefore, attributable to the inadequate scale of trade generally, and particularly trade with the Continent. Here again the removal of tariffs would prove a direct assistance to economic development by stimulating a general growth in trade which would make possible the provision of better, more frequent and cheaper shipping facilities.

The sea barrier will, however, always remain a serious obstacle to trade with both Britain and the Continent. But however frustrating it may be

for exporters to see markets developing on the Continent in which they could compete without difficulty but for the extra burden of transport charges imposed by the cross-channel haul from Ireland, there is nothing to be gained from railing against the facts of geography; nor is it desirable that exporters should be encouraged to believe that some outside agency, such as the State, has a duty to subsidize the high external transport charges which are an inescapable consequence of our geographical situation.

As regards internal transport, the refusal of successive governments to face economic facts has now brought matters to a crisis in which at any rate the need for some decision is recognized by all—although divergences of view as to what form this decision should take are profound. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Internal Transport examined the various alternatives with care, and rejected, for reasons that must surely appear irrefutable to any open-minded observer, the continued subsidization of railways by the State, and also the further restriction of private transport. Recognizing, however, that the railways are important, although not essential, to the national economy, it recommends that they be given a last chance to demonstrate their ability to survive—with all their pre-1950 assets written down to zero, with the heavy burden of compensation for redundancy shouldered by the State, and with the rail network pruned of its uneconomic secondary and branch lines, and poorly-utilized stations on main lines.

This conclusion might reasonably be criticized on the grounds that it reveals an optimism which the Committee do not support with any forecast of the financial results of the changes they propose, and also on the grounds that the Committee appears to accept the continued subsidization of the C.I.E. railways by the Board's road services, to the tune of half a million pounds per annum. It is not, however, on these grounds that the Committee's Report has been criticized—but simply because it has had the courage to face the fact that, with the possible but dubious exception of services between key stations on certain main lines, rail transport in Ireland is fundamentally uneconomic ; the volume of traffic per mile of line simply does not cover the minimum costs incurred in keeping lines and stations open and trains running.

The reaction of the trade union vested interest affected by these recommendations has been characterized by irrelevant *argumenta ad hominem* which are presumably intended to disguise the weakness of its case.

If in internal transport the State is now faced with the problem of cutting its losses and relieving the economy of the burden of rail subsidies—both direct subsidies from taxation and indirect internal subsidies from monopoly profits on road transport services—in the external field its agencies, Aer Lingus and Irish Shipping, are faced with the task of increasing their earnings of foreign currencies, which represent one of our valuable invisible exports.

The inauguration of three new Continental services by Aer Lingus is clearly a step in this direction for on these routes, and on the seasonal Lourdes-Barcelona service, Aer Lingus is earning revenue from the carriage of people between foreign countries as well from the provision of transport to and from Ireland.

Meanwhile Irish Shipping is maintaining the profitable expansion of its activities, which has been such a notable feature of this State enterprise since its earliest years. As in the case of Aer Lingus, an increasing proportion of its earnings is being drawn from operations between foreign ports; and despite captious criticism of this aspect of the company's activities, and of its failure to enter the cross-channel market, it is this line of development that is of most value from the national viewpoint because of the foreign currency earned by these activities.

Transport and tourism are closely linked, but the chief problems of our tourist industry are largely unconnected with transport. The shortage and high cost of hotel accommodation is perhaps the most fundamental problem, although the price of first-class accommodation is reasonable by outside standards. Moreover, in the absence of any Irish shipping or airline company publicity in North America, Bord Failte has to concentrate a high proportion of its publicity effort in the United States and Canada, leaving the much larger British market to be covered mainly by Aer Lingus, and to a lesser extent by the cross-channel shipping lines.

The short season is, perhaps, the main obstacle to the provision of adequate hotel accommodation outside Dublin, but in view of the experience of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands and many British resorts (where in some cases the season is even shorter than here), it is difficult to believe that this problem is insuperable, especially in a country with adequate reserves of labour for seasonal work.

It is true that CIE's virtual monopoly of coach tours creates something of a vicious circle in so far as the provision of good, cheap, second-class accommodation is concerned: in the absence of coach tours there is little incentive for the provision of this type of accommodation, while the shortage of suitable accommodation in turn discourages British tour organizers even from attempting to make a start in this field by hiring CIE coaches with a view to organizing tours of their own.

The urgency of these problems is evident from the adverse trend in tourist travel to Ireland this year, which those in touch with the market are slow to attribute entirely to the Border raids—although these raids have undoubtedly played a major role in discouraging tourists during the 1957 season. Another important factor by all accounts is the fact that we are falling behind in the highly competitive race for the British tourist traffic—due to hotel prices which by comparison with Great Britain and many Continental countries appear to be high, relative to the standard of accommodation and food provided, to costly coach tours and to lack of adequate publicity in Britain.

There are, of course, other sources of external income that could, perhaps, be more fully exploited, such as insurance. And there are some whose contraction we must expect and accept—viz., dividends and interest on external assets—or hope for—viz., emigrants' remittances.

Moreover, quite apart from problems of production and marketing, the financial system could, perhaps, be adjusted to advantage in several respects; but, as the Central Bank Report for the year ended 31 March 1957 has pointed out:

> efforts to overcome our difficulties by resort to financial or monetary devices or to fundamental changes in the existing banking and credit machinery are not likely to be successful. To say this is not to suggest that the existing arrangements are incapable of improvement, or that consideration of their possible improvement is irrelevant to the solution of current problems . . . (however) the difficulties which we have experienced and are now experiencing are in no way attributable to any defects in our monetary arrangements but to the pursuit of economic and social policies in which insufficient attention has been paid to the limitations of our resources and to the methods by which these resources could most readily have been expanded on a sound basis.

Accordingly, in giving consideration to some of our economic problems in this article, these financial problems have been excluded from consideration.

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It seems clear that we have passed through the worst of the critical re-adjustment period, and are now beginning to re-emerge, somewhat battered but at least solvent and hopeful. Moreover, we have some solid grounds for optimism—opportunities for the expansion of exports, both agricultural and industrial, and of tourism and earnings from external transport services. The obstacles in the way are to a large extent of our own making—notably the heavy burden of our multifarious social objectives, which have hitherto short-sightedly been allowed to take precedence over economic development.

To emerge from our difficulties and to overcome these obstacles, we require leadership of a high quality in politics, in the administration, in agriculture, in industry, in tourism, in transport and in the trade unions. We need a strong-minded government and a constructively critical opposition, willing and anxious to carry out its duty of keeping the government up to the mark. We need a new spirit of ambition and urgency, a new horror of inefficiency and low productivity, a new, constructive and far-sighted attitude to employment problems. None of these requirements is unreasonable, or impossible, and all are, indeed, already present in some degree in our community to-day—but it will require political leadership of a high order to inspire the Irish people with the hope and confidence in its own abilities and in its own future that will be necessary if these requirements are to be fully met.

Advancing Science

The Rôle of the British Association for the Advancement of Science

by J. M. ROBERTSON

ONE hundred and twenty-six years ago, about 250 scientists travelled by stage-coach to York for the first Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Their successors will arrive in Dublin by sea, rail and air for this year's Meeting (4–11 September 1957) of what is sometimes called the ' Parliament of Science '. They will come in much larger numbers this time—we expect about 2,000—from all over Britain, from Commonwealth countries, Europe, the United States and other parts of the world. What sort of people will these visitors be and why will they come? To answer the latter question first: the British Association, to put it briefly, seeks to promote general interest in science and its applications—including its impact upon society as a whole. The Association believes that this can be done in two ways, first by scientists comparing notes among themselves and, second, by engaging the interest of the public in what they are doing and what they are finding. For the results of science are the concern of all of us.

Before attempting to answer the first question it may be of interest to say something of how it all began. The Association was founded in 1831 by far-seeing men of science who realized that science was no longer something to be pursued in isolation. It was becoming, they felt, the concern of all those who were willing and ready to learn something of its meaning and its method, and of those who were interested in the practical applications of scientific discoveries. These pioneers decided to supplement the few great learned societies with headquarters mainly in London, which were in effect ' closed shops ' for specialists. They would create an entirely new body which would open its membership to all interested in science. Meetings would be arranged in a different centre each year; always, preferably, outside London.

There was considerable opposition to the Association in its early years. Some of it originated with persons whose scientific achievements were rated less highly by their contemporaries than by themselves. There was more than one scientist who considered appearance on a public platform undignified and one of the things " not done ". This curious vendetta was based, in part, also, upon a view of scientists promulgated by those who had been subjected to a limited field of education. On their view, scientists were self-centred persons whose knowledge was of

no particular use to anybody. They might be rather amusing when (as contemporary cartoons exhibit them) they pervaded the countryside in pot-hats and frock-coats, plucking plants, or hitting rocks with hammers, or grubbing in ponds for aquatic creatures, or when they were poring over retorts in laboratories, or doing any other of the peculiar things which cultivators of science did. But such things—to the people I am speaking of—were valueless to governments, or to historians, or to clerical scholars, or to people in the mass.

The most pointed attacks came from Charles Dickens, the novelist. He wrote a series of scurrilous articles, later collected as the " Mudfog Papers ". They dealt with the first two meetings of the " Mudfog Association for the Advancement of Everything ", and recorded the doings and sayings of Professors Snore, Doze and Wheezy. Perhaps the most serious opposition came from *The Times,* which refused to print reports of meetings except to ridicule them. So much so that a ban of excommunication from its columns was pronounced, and no account of the Association's transactions could be allowed to appear except by way of advertisement. In *The Times* of 1835 the only notice of the B.A. meeting in Dublin in that year was a paragraph written for a Dublin magazine and republished by *The Times* without comment. There—as Francis Darwin, President of the Association at the meeting in Dublin in 1908, recalled—" we were described as ' So-called scientific men '. It was pointed out that we did nothing for the advancement of science, that the whole thing was a picnic and that the Association was obviously going to die, although the writer was pleased that we were going to see Dublin before the thing did actually expire ". A President of the Association complained of all this at one stage to Palmerston, then Prime Minister. His reply was : " No man who is not Times-proof can hope to succeed in life ". In later years, of course, *The Times*, in common with all the more responsible press, has recognized the worth of the B.A. as a national institution. There is, in fact, vastly more press publicity for science at the time of the Association's meetings than at any other time during the year.

Throughout its history, the major activity of the Association has been its great annual meeting, of which more will be said later. The Association has, however, engaged on a number of other activities. Take research first. The reports of the first hundred years are packed with records of original work sponsored by the Association, and in many cases paid for by the subscriptions of members. How many people remember now that electrical standards initiated in 1861 and adopted internationally in 1908 were devised by the British Association ? That the first iron ships to cross the Atlantic were designed on the basis of work by the British Association ? That the Association spent over £12,000 at mid-nineteenth century values to maintain Kew Observatory ? To give one final example:

Professor J. D. Bernal in his recent book *Science in History* refers to a report prepared by Baron Liebig at the invitation of the British Association. He comments that this was perhaps one of the most significant researches initiated by the Association since it turned that great chemist's attention to the practical problems of food production and provided a starting point of the sciences of soil chemistry and nutrition. In its long history the B.A. has given something like £110,000 to research.

Publication has been the other principal activity. Until 1938 the Association's proceedings appeared in the form of an annual report ; since then in a quarterly journal (*The Advancement of Science*) which is intended to appeal chiefly to the non-specialist reader. Apart from this the Association has published many special reports dealing with particular subjects. Most noteworthy of these, perhaps, is the series of invaluable scientific surveys of the regions of annual meetings that have been prepared and published on the occasion of these meetings by the Local Committees. The Association is greatly indebted to the Organizing Committee in Dublin for its generous decision to add yet another volume this year to the series. One other current work may be mentioned. In 1952 the Association set up a committee to enquire into the reasons for the delay in the application of the results of science to industry. The report of this committee has been published by the Oxford University Press under the title *Industry and Technical Progress*.

There is much more that one could say of the British Association's work : the many special committees set up to advise on particular problems; the many recommendations put forward for the advice of governments ; the major part it has played in creating the conditions in which bodies like the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the National Physical Laboratory and the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee could be brought into being ; the invaluable and impressive war time work (1939–46) of the Association's Division for the Social and International Relations of Science—it convened a number of most successful and widely representative conferences at which many of the problems which were to face the country and the world after the end of the war were considered.

But this is all too long a story. Let us rather come back to our first question and see what sort of people belong to the Association and what they may expect from an annual meeting. They will, first, be a mixture of learned age and exuberant youth—and vice versa. They will include representatives from every branch of science, industrialists, government servants, teachers, representatives of the press and television, and last but not least, very many laymen interested in the progress of science and its social implications. As the Rev. William Harcourt, one of the founders of the Association, said at the meeting in Dublin in 1835, " every important advantage which these meetings possess will entirely depend on

the continued presence and concurrence of the master spirits of science. These are the persons whose attendance from the value of their time it is most difficult to secure". This is still an important criterion of the value of a meeting and one which—as the programme of this year's meeting clearly demonstrates—is more than met. Membership of the Association is, in fact, open to all who are interested in science—without degree or qualification. Nearly a thousand of Dublin's citizens and interested people from all over the Republic of Ireland have already enrolled as members for this year's meeting.

The Meeting, broadly speaking, attempts to do three things. First, to offer a platform on which leading scientists can discuss their work in all its theoretical complexity. For fundamental work is not only at the heart of all progress in science but it is also important to demonstrate the ' compulsion of facts ' and the ' dignity of expertness ' and to give the public an understanding of the integrity and discipline involved in the search for scientific ' truth '. Secondly—for such is the specialization and fragmentation of science—to encourage scientists to discuss in joint sessions problems in related fields and to develop common problems involved in subjects on the frontiers of present knowledge. For if communication between scientists is limited, the advance of science is retarded; and new outlooks and avenues of enquiry may emerge from such juxtaposition of the work of different specialists. Thirdly, to provide for non-specialists—whether they be scientists outside their own field or interested laymen—an annual stocktaking in intelligible language which will review the progress of science and help to make clear its significance and possible consequences.

The meeting lasts a week and the highlight is the Presidential Address, which takes place on the evening of the opening day. The Presidency of the British Association is one of the highest honours which science can bestow, and the list of presidents includes nearly all the great names in British science, except Charles Darwin, whose health did not permit him to undertake the public obligations involved. The presidential addresses have gradually become the principal scientific pronouncements of the year, and are accorded the widest publicity. Recent examples are Professor A. V. Hill's address on " The Ethical Dilemma of Science " and Lord Adrian's on " Science and Human Nature ".

If you like, then, you can think of the B.A. as a travelling university, with a short term of one week. In the curriculum, there is something for everyone. The President this year is Professor P. M. S. Blackett, F.R.S., a distinguished physicist and Nobel Laureate. His Address, which is entitled " Technology and World Advancement ", will deal with the impact of western science on other lands. This theme will be followed up to some extent in the Sections, and in other special lectures, one of which will be given by Dr H. J. Bhabha, who was recently Chairman

of the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. To summarize the very varied subjects that will be dealt with in presidential addresses and sectional communications would need a separate article. Here it may suffice to mention just a few of the topics for discussion and to say that while most aspects of scientific endeavour are included there will be, as is appropriate in a country that is significantly interested in agriculture, an appreciable emphasis on matters of agricultural importance. 290 speakers will talk on a wide variety of subjects, which will include many subjects of particular Irish interest as well as such topics as thermo-nuclear reactions, chemistry and lung cancer, computing in the modern world, photosynthesis, perception, archaeology as a science, science and industry, advances in aeronautics and so on. The President of the Agricultural Section is Sir James Turner, President of the National Farmers' Union and an outstanding public figure in the agricultural world. He will speak on the role of agriculture in the British economy. The list of Section Presidents, of whom there are 14, includes the names of Professor J. Z. Young, F.R.S., well known amongst other things for his Reith Lectures on " Doubt and Certainty in Science ", Sir David Anderson, Principal of the Royal Technical College, Glasgow, and Professor C. F. C. Hawkes, who is Professor of European Archaeology in the University of Oxford. There will be many other things going on at the meeting including exhibitions and film shows.

It is certain that this year's meeting will long be remembered not only as a notable scientific occasion, but also as a worthy successor to previous meetings in Dublin, for there have been four previous meetings in the city (as well as one in 1843 in Cork). The first meeting—in 1835—was distinguished by the Presidency of the Rev. Provost Bartholomew Lloyd, F.R.S., Provost of Trinity College from 1831 to 1837. Of this meeting it is recorded that in every respect, scientific and social, it fulfilled all expectations, and moreover, in quaint but expressive words:

> . . . the silent undercurrent of refined and invisible hospitality by which the guests of Ireland found their expenses contracted and their cheer enhanced . . . were not ineffective in kindling a warmth of feeling by which the powers of the mind are capable of being invigorated even in the pursuit of abstract truth.

The next meeting—in 1857—is now notable amongst many other things for a contribution from John Scott Russell in which he gave details of the construction of the famous steamer, Great Eastern, which was then building at the Millwall. He reminded his audience that the ship as a novel structure, as far as her lines were concerned, was a child of the British Association. At the previous Dublin meeting he had laid before the Mechanical Section a form of construction which had since become well known as the 'wave line'.

Just over 20 years later the Association visited Dublin once more. Sir Oliver Lodge, in his book entitled *Advancing Science*, says that the meeting in Dublin in 1878 was " memorable to me because I saw something of the great men in Trinity College having breakfast with the Provost, Dr Salmon. What struck me about the senior fellows of Trinity was that they seemed to spend their time in telling comic tales, each one capping the other and not having much serious conversation. Professor Mahaffy was conspicuous at that breakfast and it seemed early in the day for so much sparkle. It was at this meeting that I began my long tenure of the office of secretary of Section A ". The President of the Association in 1878 was Mr William Spottiswoode, F.R.S. who was at the same time President of the Royal Society, an eminent mathematician. It may be of interest to quote a short extract from his Address since it bears directly on what is still one of the Association's main purposes—the dissemination of science to the non-scientist. He said : " Considering our limitations of time, and the varied nature of our audience, it would seem not inappropriate to suspend mentally if not materially over the doors of our Section rooms, the Frenchmen's dictum that no scientific theory can be complete until it is so clear that it can be explained to the first man you meet in the street ". At the same meeting Professor Huxley, in the course of an address, pointed out that " Whoever may be speaking at the Association 30 years hence will find that the very paradoxes and horrible conclusions, things that are now thought to be going to shake the foundations of the world, will by that time have become part of everyday knowledge, and will be taught in our schools as accepted truth, and nobody will be one whit the worse ". This is perhaps a reassuring thought in times when science is in a ferment, and when each year seems to bring new discoveries which threaten to revolutionize our world. What is, perhaps, more important is that it also makes it obvious that since the pace of scientific discovery has speeded up so rapidly the need for public understanding of science becomes all the more urgent. A time-lag of a generation or more may be disastrous when discoveries are made which may require immediate political, social and even moral decisions.

All of these meetings were most successful and none more so than that in 1908, which was attended amongst many others by the present distinguished Prime Minister of Ireland, by William Ramsay, E. T. Whittaker (then Astronomer Royal of Ireland), Rutherford and Sherrington. The President for the year was Francis Darwin, F.R.S., third son of Charles Darwin, and then Reader of Botany at Cambridge. The transactions of this meeting, published later in a formidably bulky volume, are too comprehensive to allow more than a cursory review. Let a leader writer on the *Irish Times* sum things up :

> The whirl of lectures and educational amusements is rapidly producing in the majority of us who are unaccustomed to being improved at such a breathless rate a sort of mental indigestion. Our days are occupied with every imaginable form of instruction, from a visit to a biscuit factory, to a minute explanation of the manners and customs of a tribe whose very name was in happier days unknown to us. Our nights are haunted by vain efforts to grasp the intricacies of suction gas producers or the problem of warble flies. And over all, like a horrific nightmare, the shadow of impending doom. (If there is one thing that the Presidents of every Section have insisted upon it is that the only chance for the salvation of the Empire is for instant attention to be given to the wants of their particular subjects.) . . . Economics and agriculture were by far the most popular Sections . . . The weather of the past week has supplied members with their only disagreeable memory : the intellectual atmosphere has been calm and cloudless.

It has been seen that there was considerable opposition to the Association in its early years. As if this were not enough, as soon as it was well established, critics appeared who asserted either that the Association was not doing or that it had done its proper work. Such a cry arose at the time of the brilliant Jubilee meeting in York in 1881, and a few years later when the B.A. made its first journey overseas (Montreal, 1884) the position was summed up in a verse of one of the Red Lions' songs, entitled " The Travelled Ass ". The verse goes as follows :—

> At York they thought she was sure to die,
> For she did not seem to enjoy age,
> But at last the Doctors bade her try
> The effect of an ocean voyage.

The ballad asserted later " Now the voyage is over the ass is well ". Pessimism persisted, however, and from time to time there have been those who felt that the Association " had better settle its worldly affairs and compose its robes around it in becoming fashion before lying down to die ".

It is often argued today, indeed, that the original objects of the Association have been very largely achieved. There have been many occasions in the Association's life which have passed into the history of science, such as that when Bessemer first announced his revolution in regard to the making of steel (1856) ; when J. J. Thomson disclosed the discovery of the electron (1899) ; when Oliver Lodge gave the first public demonstration of transmitting signals by wireless telegraph (1894). It cannot be denied that this sort of thing is hardly possible nowadays. The weight of numbers of those engaged in scientific research and the continual flood of published work makes it impossible for the

Association, with its Meeting once a year, to hope to be the platform for the announcement of results and discoveries. Moreover, the cost of research has grown so enormously that much of it can only be financed either by the Government or by large scale industry.

Nevertheless the continuance of science is vital to modern society and, this being so, continued public goodwill is essential. To ensure this the methods and results of science and the nature of fundamental research must all be better understood by those concerned with government, industry and business, and by the public at large. Such understanding is essential because in any democratic state an informed public is necessary if valid decisions are to be taken ; because the public—as taxpayer and consumer—pays for science ; because if, in the future, scientists and technologists are to be forthcoming in the numbers that the national interest requires, the public should learn to value the contribution of science and come to appreciate the potential satisfaction and opportunity for service implicit in careers devoted to science ; and above all because scientific discovery must be applied for the well-being of the nation.

What then of the future ? The Annual Meeting lasts for one week a year only, and the Association is conscious that to give continuity to its efforts other forms of service are necessary. It is even now discussing ways and means of achieving this. Science has assumed such a fundamentally important role in our industrial and technological world that it becomes extremely important for the non-scientist to understand its nature. Helping to create such understanding is one of the major functions of the Association in the world today. It feels confident that it has a major contribution to make to this vital task.

Criminal Responsibility and Punishment

by MICHAEL CONNOLLY

CAPITAL punishment was debated in Seanad Eireann in May, 1956. This subject was, no doubt, suggested by the discussions, in and out of Parliament, which preceded the passing of the recent British Homicide Act. A speech by the Home Secretary, Mr Butler (House of Commons, 13 March 1957), on prison problems in Britain won general approbation by its account of the humane, enlightened attitude with which penal authorities were undertaking the difficult task of criminal re-habilitation. France, especially since the War, and the United States of America for several decades past have been conducting remarkable investigations and experiments on problems of penal reform. The causes of and remedies for juvenile delinquency have been a dominant interest. These researches have been accompanied by new methods and experiments in the treatment of condemned delinquents, aiming primarily at their re-education rather than their punishment. Problems of crime and punishment are therefore in the forefront of actuality.

Before discussing the subject in some detail I want to call attention to three lengthy and formal addresses of Pope Pius XII. In the first he dealt with the need for punitive laws binding internationally, the categories of crime in question and the appropriate penalties, ending with some reflections on the philosophy of punishment.[1] A little over a year later, his theme was " The Function of Punishment ".[2] His third and most recent address was given on 26 May 1957 when the Holy Father spoke to a large group of Catholic Lawyers on the subject of " Christian Aid to the Imprisoned ".[3] He had been respectfully petitioned last year by the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists for some instruction on questions which had occupied their attention at an international congress. The theme of the congress had been : " Respect for the Human Person in the Application of Penal Laws ". The Pope was all the more willing to comply, we may suppose, since many of his own pronouncements since the beginning of his pontificate have dealt

[1] " International Penal Law ". Address to the Sixth Congress of International Penal Law, 3 October 1953. (See *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, vol. 82, pp. 51 sq.)
[2] Discourse of His Holiness Pope Pius XII to the Catholic Jurists of Italy, 5 December 1954. (See *The Dublin Review*, Summer 1956, pp. 66 sq.)
[3] *Osservatore Romano*, 27–28 May 1957, p.1.

with the dignity of the human person. Many of the Pope's hearers on 26 May last belonged to an organization of lawyers whose object is to befriend prisoners not merely by professional advice and assistance but in every way they can. An unusual feature of the audience was the presentation to the Holy Father of a parchment-memorial, signed by over two hundred convicts and expressing their humble respect and devotion to the person of Christ's Vicar. The papal address had all the characteristics we have learned to expect from Pius XII—good order, clarity, instruction, deep spirituality. Its opening paragraphs recapitulated what he had said on previous occasions regarding the justification and purpose of penal action ; the central portion advised his hearers on the methods of coming to a kindly understanding of the imprisoned and of helping them to become re-integrated into their social milieu when their term in prison was completed ; the concluding section dealt with the teaching and example of Christ.

The Holy Father's concern to provide guidance and instruction on the subject of State punishment reflects a preoccupation which is pretty general among civilized peoples at the present day. It is the outcome of two centuries of vigorous debate on the theory of civil punishment, its justification and purposes. Not that the earlier centuries lacked their philosophy of punishment. But it is the Treatise of Beccaria (1764) which is generally regarded as having initiated in modern times the movement for reform of criminal law and the spate of writing on the purposes of punishment which has continued to the present day. The intensive cultivation of the social sciences in the past hundred years helped to focus attention on the problems of crime and punishment. Two overlapping branches of sociology, criminology and penology, have taken these subjects for their province, the former investigating the causes and the latter the remedies for crime. Between them they have amassed an enormous amount of useful information, together with some fruitful theories and valuable suggestions for the prevention of crime and the treatment of the criminal.

Yet it must be said that two errors, or at least exaggerations, mar much modern writing on the subjects of delinquency and its remedies. One is the tendency to deny personal responsibility for wrongdoing : the criminal is represented not as wicked or culpable but as ill or unfortunate—the blameless victim of mental and emotional disturbance, or of heredity, environment, faulty education and upbringing. The other exaggeration is an almost exclusive emphasis laid upon the reformative purpose of penal treatment, with the result that its deterrent purpose is relegated to the background and its retributive purpose denied altogether. In the present article I propose to deal with the first of these errors, reserving the second for future treatment.

Many currents of thought have produced that modern form of determinism which denies the criminal's freewill and responsibility. One school finds the sole cause of crime in the physical make-up, in the delinquent's defective heredity or misfunctioning endocrine glands. Others have been led by the development of empirical psychology and psychiatry to see in mental abnormality the source of all crime. The economic determinism of Marx and his disciples drew attention to the social determinants of crime, particularly poverty but also greed and ambition. We may add to these trends two longstanding errors which unhappily still flourish, positivism which denies metaphysical reality and materialism which denies a spiritual soul.

A standard American textbook[4] declares :

> These religious and metaphysical notions about the character of the criminal and about criminal behaviour have been abandoned by scientific students of crime, as a result of the rise of a rationalistic attitude towards man and the growth of scientific knowledge with respect to his behaviour. It has come to be understood that a criminal is a man whose antisocial actions are the inevitable outcome of bad surroundings, a twisted and thwarted personality or of both. (p. 3)
>
> Modern physiological chemistry, dynamic psychology and sociology have proved the free moral agent theory of human conduct alike preposterous in its assumptions and its implications. Every human being finds his conduct and his thoughts determined by the combined influences of his biological heredity and social surroundings. (p. 426)
>
> The closest we can come to a statement that answers the question of cause for certain behaviour is that the individual is a product of both his heredity and his environment, is motivated by innumerable factors, so is *conditioned* to act, and therefore is not a self-propelling individual. Naturally this thesis is contrary to the traditional belief that he is a free agent and capable of deliberately choosing between right and wrong, good and evil. (p. 173)

Professor Olaf Kinberg of Stockholm in his paper at the Congress on Mental Health, London, August 1948, is equally unambiguous. The very title (" Criminal Psychiatry without Metaphysics ") suggests the entirely positivistic view therein proposed. Professor Kinberg believes that the right to punish is based, legally and morally, on a group of concepts—freewill, responsibility, imputability—" which lack empirical foundation ". " If one admits ", he declares, " that every human act is the result of real cerebral conditions and surrounding influences at the moment when the act is committed—and there is no other acceptable theory—then every act is itself the proof that the impulses or stimuli which have determined it have been irresistible." " There exists at

[4] *New Horizons in Criminology*, Barnes and Teeters. (New York : Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1946)

the interior of the organism no special spiritual force independent of the organism which can command our reactions, since these are the product of all the bio-psychic forces prevailing in the organism at the moment of the act."

On examining more closely the notion of freewill thus categorically rejected by the determinist criminologists, the careful reader will often find that it bears little resemblance to traditional Catholic doctrine on the subject. Barnes and Teeters, for instance, do not apparently consider the freewill doctrine of Christian Fathers or Scholastic philosophers as of great importance. They write :

> The Greek metaphysicians and moralists and, even more, the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed the idea of the criminal as a perverse, free moral agent, with the more general notion of man as a creature of his conscience, perfectly free to determine whether he will be a law-abiding citizen or a dangerous criminal. He is fully capable of doing this, no matter what his heredity or environment. This notion of the criminal as a wilful lawbreaker, when he could just as well be law-abiding, still provides the foundation for nearly every existing criminal code and constitutes the intellectual frame of reference for our court procedure and our administration of criminal institutions. (p.3)

One would never suspect from this summary that the medieval or renaissance scholastics had anything worth while to say on freedom and wrongdoing.

Professor Willard Waller writes :

> There are in point of fact but few who hold to the freedom of the will in its logical completeness. Those who now take that side of the argument prefer to say that the will is partly free, or that it is sometimes free, preserving for man some of his original prerogative, but admitting partial determinism. They have sacrificed logical impregnability for the sake of conformity to the facts of modern science, and their peculiarly exposed position renders them liable to attack from either side. (Cited by Barnes and Teeters, p.3)

This last quotation represents the moderate form of indeterminism which has been taught for centuries in Catholic schools of philosophy as a belated and begrudging concession to the pressure of modern scientific fact. It makes one suspect that the concept of freedom which the determinist criminologists have been so busily demolishing is the exaggeration, sometimes associated with the name of Descartes, which neglects the influence of motives, indeliberate impulses, physiological, educational and environmental factors in predisposing the will's free choice.

Christian tradition, however, does not underrate the obstacles to freedom. Its emphasis on the weakening influence of Original Sin and the need for the grace of God in order to persevere in well-doing is far indeed from exaggerating the force of human freewill. Our Lord declared that " the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak ", and bade His Apostles (select men, surely) watch and pray lest they enter into temptation. In His treatment of sinners, while not condoning their sins or suggesting that they were not to blame, He showed the most sympathetic understanding of man's weakness in face of adverse circumstances. Few have given more agonized expression to the obstacles against which freewill must struggle than St Paul : " For to will is present with me ; but to accomplish that which is good I find not. For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. For I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man. But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ Our Lord ". (*Rom.*, VII, 18 sq.) And St Augustine echoes St Paul : " The new will which I now began to have, by which I willed to worship You freely and to enjoy You, O God, the only certain Joy, was not yet strong enough to overcome the earlier will rooted deep through the years. My two wills, one old, one new, one carnal, one spiritual, were in conflict and in their conflict wasted my soul ". (*Confessions*, X, v.) The medieval and later Scholastic philosophers in their treatises on free acts do not fail to expound the principal conditions which destroy, diminish or modify the voluntariness of those acts. (See St Thomas : *Summa*, I. II, q. 6.)

Catholic philosophy, then, has always acknowledged that freewill is not a despotic master in its own house; that its rule is disputed by passion, fear, ignorance ; that there are degrees of responsibility which may shrink to vanishing point, at which the agent is no longer deserving of blame or praise ; that human freedom needs to be developed and buttressed by the acquisition of virtues and good habits which enable the agent ever more perfectly to perform what he judges is right to do. Modern advances in physiology, in psychology and psychiatry, in the empirical study of social and cultural formative influences have added much detail and precision to the traditional theses. They have made it possible to assess responsibility more accurately, to discern and combat the physical, psychical and social predispositions to wrongdoing.

Courts of Justice recognize more and more the help they may derive from the psychiatrist and social welfare officer in understanding and treating the delinquent who appears before them. But to treat all or even most criminals as irresponsible agents, whose conduct has been completely determined by their physical and mental incapacity or by the

social milieu, is a more dangerous exaggeration than the attitude which made too little allowance for these factors. It leads to denial of the delinquent's personality. And denial of personality is to-day's great error. Whether it leads immediately to tyranny, as in totalitarian countries, or, after the manner of Welfare Socialism, filches liberty of action by gradual diminution of responsibility, it issues in the depersonalization of the individual, who forthwith becomes a " thing ", a chattel, a cog in the social mechanism instead of an " end in himself " to subserve whom the social mechanism exists. True, the depersonalization of determinist criminology is benevolent and humanitarian in its intent, just as Welfare Socialism is. But this renders the danger more insidious. Moreover, if the principal aim of penal action is (as we are told) the re-education and re-socialization of the criminal, does not the denial of the criminal's responsibility remove from him every incentive to improve? When he is persuaded that he could not help his wrongdoing in the past, that, as he is, he simply cannot resist and cannot be expected to resist temptation in the present, what chances are there that he will bend his efforts to the task of improvement with the seriousness that task requires?

The remote purpose of civil penalties, in any theory, is the common good, realized through co-operation of all members of the community under the direction of civil authority. For this co-operation a sense of duty and a spirit of obedience are indispensable. Mere fear of penalties is never enough. Of the less exalted motives, dread of the social stigma attaching to crime is, for all but hardened criminals, at least as potent a deterrent as fear of prison. Once the persuasion becomes widespread, however, that criminals and lawbreakers are not free agents, the effectiveness of both duty and shame as incentives to keep the law is notably diminished. And the common good suffers in consequence. The State is a moral institution. Its purpose can best be realized by the responsible co-operation of all. The more personal responsibility is discouraged or shirked, the greater is the danger of perverted forms of civil organization. In this age of rapid social change, when totalitarianism is an ever-present threat, there is great need constantly to emphasize the truth of personal freedom and its consequence, personal responsibility.

Medieval and modern Catholic philosophy, while acknowledging the conditions, limitations and obstacles to freewill, has always tenaciously affirmed human freedom. Freewill and responsibility are rooted in the spiritual conception of human nature and are indispensable elements of personality. Man can know and desire universal good, and so is able to perceive the limitations of any finite good and resist its solicitation. Hence our consciousness, our spontaneous conviction that we often act freely. We are aware of this in the deliberations which precede

choice, in the act of choice itself and in the self-reproach or self-approval which follow our action. The moral order, of whose reality men are irradicably persuaded, entails freedom of the will. It is implied by those characteristics of right and wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy, meritorious or demeritorious, which many of our acts possess.

Criminal responsibility is denied in many modern works on penology largely because of philosophical prejudice which either rejects metaphysics altogether or fails to unravel the metaphysical difficulties to which the fact of freedom gives rise. In addition, there is the misunderstanding (above alluded to) of the very nature of freedom and responsibility. The basic capacity to act freely, which is the uniform and natural endowment of every human personality, is equiparated with " ethical freedom ", the hard-won mastery of passion and weakness, the strength of character which is the fruit of years of self-conquest. This latter may truly be called the liberty of the children of God ; but it is the prize of a good life, not just part of everyone's equipment for life. Man is not born perfect master of himself, having his instincts and impulses in perfect control. But he can achieve that mastery. And it is his duty to do so. He has a right to be aided by society—family, school, state—in the conquest of his freedom. And if this aid is not forthcoming or adequate, his transgressions are excusable in greater or lesser degree. But, on the other hand, when self-control has been diminished or lost by growth of vicious habits, he is not excusable for the crimes which ensue. He has culpably allowed himself to be enslaved. His crime is voluntary *in cause* and he is deserving of penalty in proportion to this voluntariness.

Belief in freewill and criminal responsibility is not disproved by the fact that statistical laws concerning human conduct can be elaborated, nor that sociological research into conditions predisposing to crime can enable scientists to forecast with reasonable accuracy how certain large groups of people will behave. The significance of these facts is, not that delinquents are devoid of freedom, but that, like most men, they commonly act upon the motives which allure them most strongly. This is perfectly in accord with the moderate view of human freedom which is traditional in Catholic philosophy. This view holds, not that men choose without motives, nor even that their free choices are independent of the motives which their upbringing and circumstances represent as most compelling, but that they freely choose to follow certain motives rather than others.

Unfortunately, social and economic environments, inherited traits or acquired quirks of character often make anti-social and unethical behaviour seem more attractive than good behaviour. And large numbers will drift with the current rather than struggle against it. This makes it possible for statisticians to establish constant relations

between such factors as slum-dwelling or mental deficiency or unemployment or unhappy home-life, on the one hand, and delinquency on the other. But it by no means follows that the unhappy victims of these adverse conditions were all, or even for the most part, fatally predetermined to a life of crime, and bereft of all power of choice or responsibility for their choices.

Commenting on the relation between poverty and crime in her recent book on the English Penal System, Miss W. A. Elkin observes :

> There is still the general question : if poverty, or bad housing or unemployment are the sole causes (of rising crime rates) why is it that only some people who experience these conditions of life become delinquent ? There must be some personal factors which determine why certain individuals can face these conditions and still remain law-abiding and others cannot.[5]

The desire to diminish or entirely eliminate certain conditions known by experience to predispose to wrongdoing is entirely commendable. But it must not lead us into the exaggeration, fraught with its own disastrous consequences, of denying all responsibility in the wrongdoers.

The conclusion would seem to be that courts of law, prison-officers, social workers, teachers and all whose task it is to deal with erring and delinquent humanity must make it their initial assumption that wrongdoers—those at least who have passed the age of childhood—act with freedom and responsibility. But, by all means, let this initial assumption be challenged and tested in individual cases by the resources and techniques which the psychological and sociological sciences today place at man's disposal.[6] This attitude and approach, respecting as it does the personality of the delinquent, is in reality more humane than the misguided humanitarianism which automatically excuses him from all culpability by denying that which is most human in him, his freedom of action.

When determinist criminologists, basing themselves on the findings of a bare century of empirical research, confidently deny freewill, Catholics should not allow themselves to be unduly impressed. Even from a merely human viewpoint, no institution on earth is better qualified to pronounce upon the motivation of the wrongdoer than the Catholic Church. For two millenia her priests, as spiritual directors and confessors, have been probing the delinquent conscience. They have been taught ever to keep

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[5] *The English Penal System.* By Winifred A. Elkin. (Pelican Books, 1957. 3s. 6d.)

[6] Pius XII (26 May 1957) ; " It is not enough today to take account of the attenuating circumstances recognized by traditional jurisprudence and natural and Christian morality. One must consider, in addition, those recent findings of scientific psychology which in some cases permit the recognition of a notable diminution of responsibility." (*Osservatore Romano,* 27 May 1957)

before their eyes the example of Christ, uncompromising in His disapproval of sin, but infinitely comprehending of the sinner's weaknesses and difficulties. For centuries before the word " psychoanalysis " was coined, the *psyche* of criminal and delinquent had been laid bare, with the utmost candour and confidence, to the Catholic priest. And all that time, but especially since the dawn of scholasticism a thousand years ago, problems of delinquent responsibility have been rigorously discussed and debated in treatises, articles and disputations by innumerable theologians and moralists. The enormous wealth of experience thus garnered has not been allowed to fall into oblivion, but has been passed on from generation to generation in the wise, conservative way of Catholic ecclesiastical education. It is against that tremendous background of true, criminological experience that we should read those words of Pope Pius XII, deprecating the modern tendency unduly to deny delinquent responsibility :

> As against this unfounded generalization (viz., that the practical possibility of free choice is confined to a very narrow minimum), it may be asserted that, both in law and in morality, in practical life and in scientific experiment, the average, indeed, the great majority of men have not only the natural capacity but the concrete possibility of free choice and of control of their conduct. Hence they are subject to obligation and responsibility unless the contrary has been proved in each case. Morality and law, therefore, maintain that what must be established is, not where liberty begins but where it ends. Sound reason and commonsense revolt against the determinism that would reduce freedom and responsibility to a minimum. And of this there is ample confirmation in the practice of law, in social life and in the revelation of the Old and New Testaments. (*Osservatore Romano,* 27 May 1957. p. 1.)

The Founder of Muintir na Tíre

JOHN M. CANON HAYES
1887–1957

by JOHN RYAN

STANDING at the graveside of Father John Hayes one could not but recall a line of Goldsmith : " A man he was to all the country dear ". For every section of the people was represented : bishops, priests, men and women religious, ministers of state, legislators, administrators, doctors, lawyers, teachers, farmers, labourers, staunch national and cultural organizations from the Twenty-six Counties, and admirers of very different outlook from the Six. Whatever their background and whatever their aspirations they were all one in the common bond of mourning. In the cemetery that morning the sorrow was almost palpable. The gathering round the coffin had a quality quite unusual. It was not so much the last tribute of respect to a great public figure as grief at the loss of a dear personal friend. Time must of course pass before the man who inspired such sentiments can be seen in perspective and his place in the history of Ireland assessed. The purpose of the present sketch will be fulfilled if something is told of his career as it appeared to contemporaries.

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John Hayes was born on 11 November 1887, in the parish of Murroe a few miles from Limerick. More important for his life than the date of his birth are the circumstances under which it took place. Though the son of a farmer, he was not born on a farm but in a wooden hut on the side of the road. The reason is easy to guess. His father had been evicted with his wife and five children from their home on the Cloncurry Estate and had been compelled to find refuge where they could. Thanks to the Land League, a host of sympathizers came to their aid and built for them this shack as a temporary abode. It was thought that their stay there would be short ; in fact it lasted for thirteen years. Five of the ten children of the family were dead before the survivors returned to the ancestral farm. John, the youngest child, was sent to the National School in Murroe and later to the Crescent College, Limerick, where he received a solid secondary education with the emphasis on Latin and Greek. He was to retain to the end of his days a deep affection for his

old school, for the teachers, even those most firmly attached to the principle that knowledge maketh a bloody entrance, and to the Jesuit Order to which he always stood in the relationship of a loyal and devoted pupil.

From Limerick he passed to St Patrick's College, Thurles, thereby proclaiming his sense of vocation to the priesthood, for St Patrick's was exclusively an ecclesiastical college, whose students in due course would become ministers of Christ, some at home, the majority as missionaries in many parts of the world. At this time three of the Irish Colleges abroad, at Rome, Salamanca and Paris, were still flourishing. John Hayes was one of the privileged few sent to the last-named city where, in 1913, at the conclusion of his theological studies, he was ordained priest. This sojourn in France in the relatively spacious days before the first World War brought him into close contact with French culture, gave him fluency in the use of the French language and, last but not least, gave him an insight into the plight of the French Church from which he was not slow to draw lessons.

As there was no vacancy for a priest in his home diocese of Cashel, he was sent on loan to Meath and later to Liverpool. In that crowded industrial and business centre beside the great port his unique talents began to show themselves. His energy was inexhaustible, his zeal all-embracing, his courage equal to every task. He stood well with everybody: with his parish priest, an Englishman whom he always spoke of as a saint, with the clergy, with the native-born among his flock, with the Irish contingent, with the coloured Catholics of sailor stock, with the police, with the magistrates. Of course he met with opposition ; indeed the Orange Order often singled him out for special attack but threats were ignored and obstacles calmly brushed aside where the salvation of souls was concerned. Not that he was truculent or provocative ; on the contrary his whole nature pined for good understanding with his fellow men and this he generally achieved without apparent effort because of his genial approach, his manly way and his disarming humour. Why should Catholic and Protestant dockers refuse to work together in harmony ? Surely they all had troubles enough without adding to each other's miseries. This was the doctrine which he preached and wherever his influence reached it was effective.

To agitators anxious to disturb that spirit of mutual trust and comradeship, he gave short shrift. Against them he used a weapon which turned up very unexpectedly in his armoury—eloquence. Words had always come to him easily. It was at Liverpool, in a moment of crisis, with blood about to be shed, that he discovered within himself an indefinable faculty, the power to lead based on passionate oratory. He would speak afterwards to his intimate friends of a feeling akin to panic which gripped his heart when he realized that the immense audience before him was a

toy in his hands. They would hearken to his words of wisdom but just as readily they would follow him, as an angry and dangerous mob, to any folly. He was careful not to misuse that sovereign gift. Its contribution to peace and goodwill may be judged from the fact that when he left Liverpool in 1924, after a stay of nine years, he was played solemnly on board ship by a mixed band of Catholics and Orangemen.

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From the maelstrom of Liverpool to the little rural haven of Castleiny near Templemore was an abrupt change. 'Here,' he might have said to himself, 'will I sit and rest, for here there will be no problems'. The people, like their fathers and their ancestors now in bliss, will require no stimulus to attend to their religious duties. They will continue to live tranquil and useful lives, tending their cattle and tilling their fields, ploughing, reaping, threshing, harvesting, in due season. Here there will be nothing to recall the jarring complexity of the great city. Instead there will be the simplicity of Irish farming economy, universal concord and content'. It was not long before such fairy dreams were shattered. The people of Castleiny had their difficulties, as serious for them as were the fluctuations of trade in world markets for the industrial magnates. This part of north Tipperary lived by tillage, chiefly by the sale of corn. Prosperity or distress depended on the price which this commanded. Now the price had fallen, and fallen because of the importation of cheap foreign grain. To ward off disaster a Grain Growers' Association had been formed but it soon found boulders in its path, for there were cattle-raising farmers as well as tillage farmers and the former wanted cheap grain for their stock. So Castleiny was being driven to the wall in a conflict of economic interests.

Needless to say, Father Hayes did not stand idly by and allow this to continue. His first duty being to the people of his parish, he supported them energetically. To lend the parish as a unit strength, he gave it a focal point in the shape of a parochial hall built by voluntary labour and used thereafter for cultural purposes, concerts, lectures and plays as well as for bread-and-butter discussions. Strange to relate, the problem at Castleiny proved in the end to be more intractable than anything he had met in Liverpool. It caused him suffering and endless anxiety and left him with a sense of frustration which it required all his buoyancy of character to overcome. It had, however, one good effect. It showed him pitfalls to avoid, and the lines that it might be well to follow if he were to bring some help to rural Ireland in the days to come.

It was typical of his pertinacity that the set-back made him but the more determined to proceed. His experiment in Castleiny had attracted attention; while his activity as an occasional preacher was growing. Proof of his reputation in this field is the invitation to deliver the Advent lectures in San Silvestro, Rome, in 1930. During this stay in the Eternal

City he saw Mussolini who discoursed with him pleasantly about Irish conditions. Travel here and there through the country gave him an opportunity of meeting people with ideas similar to his own. In March 1931 the discussions bore fruit when a group came together for informal talks in Jury's Hotel, Dublin. On a few main principles all ultimately agreed. They would form a society open to all who were prepared to work for rural Ireland. This society would be independent of all political parties. It would not oppose any existing agricultural organization (*exempli gratia*, the Grain Growers' Association) but would strive in the manner of a parent body to give cohesion and strength to all such sectional movements for the benefit of the whole rural community. Two months later, on 17 May 1931, the society was formally established under the name of Muintir na Tíre, and with the seal and badge of the plough and the cross. It was registered as a friendly society. In its formation the Belgian *Boerenbond*, founded in 1890, had served as model, with emphasis on the statute :

> The general purpose of the *Boerenbond* is to work for the religious, social and intellectual welfare of its members and to watch over their material interests ; in a word it seeks to weld our agricultural population into a class, powerful, well educated, sincerely Christian.

A sharper point is given to this purpose in the Foreword to the rules of Muintir na Tíre :

> It shall be incumbent on the Society and its individual members to inculcate a love of God and of country and to strive to secure peace and prosperity for all through the observance of the principles (held sacred by everyone bearing the name of Christian) laid down forty years ago by Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, and today by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.

Though the society was in theory open to all in the rural areas, it was joined in practice only by the farmers. Its development, therefore, was a disappointment to Father John himself. The criticism was also heard, inside and outside, that it was merely another attempt to secure material prosperity, ornamented with a thin veneer of religion. It was clear that changes would have to be made. To consider what these should be Father John called to his aid a number of able laymen and two distinguished priests, Dr Daniel Murphy, C.S.Sp., later Provincial in Ireland, now Procurator General of his Congregation in Rome, and Fr J. McCarthy, C.S.Sp., then President of Rockwell College, Cashel. They worked out a plan, which was further debated at a Rural Week-End in Roscrea, the first of its kind to be held in the country. The chief speaker at this meeting was Fr E. J. Coyne, S.J., an authority on questions of

economics, sociology and rural organization generally. It was unanimously decided to bring the friendly society to an end and re-constitute Muintir na Tíre on a broader foundation. This was in 1933. Four years were to pass before the new constitution was promulgated. Meanwhile the form agreed upon at Roscrea had become consolidated to such an extent that when Muintir na Tíre was mentioned in Ireland it was Muintir na Tíre as it existed after the reconstruction of 1933.

The essence of the movement might be described as co-operation based on the fullness of Christian charity within each parish. Parish again would co-operate with parish within each diocese or county, and diocese or county would co-operate with diocese or county within the country, all as a matter of course and with the maximum of good-will. In Ireland there are over a thousand parishes. About ninety per cent. of these are rural, that is to say, parishes in which farming is the chief activity of the people. It is obvious, therefore, that parish life cannot flourish unless the farmers are prosperous. But beside the farmer in the parish are others, the farm-labourers, traditionally a large and important class, the members of the professions, the priest, the doctor, the teacher, the solicitor perhaps, and the veterinary surgeon, the business people whose shops provide normally for local needs. Then half the population is certain to be women and these have a point of view peculiarly their own. Finally, there is the youth of the parish, the boys and girls with legitimate interests distinct from those of their elders. If any one of these sections is disregarded and therefore discontented, not merely that section but the whole parish suffers. Conversely, if all sections live together in the greatest harmony, each helping the other to the utmost of its resources, the whole parish community will be a happy family. There will be an atmosphere favourable to virtue and therefore to religion ; there will be peace and concord, inestimable blessings ; and there will even be material progress, since none will be pressing selfish claims but all will be working generously for the common good.

Muintir na Tíre, thus conceived, won practically universal respect. The President of Ireland, at the Rural Week of 1948, spoke of it in glowing terms. Cardinal MacRory gave it his benediction. Most Reverend Dr Harty, Archbishop of Cashel, praised it in these words: " The society has high ideals, since it tends to bring harmony into Irish life, to render the people more efficient, to foster self-help, to encourage a spirit of Christian endeavour and to put into practice the social teaching of the Papal Encyclicals ". The Bishop of Kilmore and, when he died, the Bishop of Cork accepted the position of President. Support came from every one of the thirty-two counties, for Muintir na Tíre knew no border. In its ranks were a number who were neither nationalist in sympathy nor Catholic in faith, and with them their ministers. In the " fireside chats ", where discussion was often heated though tempers

were rarely frayed, they were models of friendliness and courtesy. And there came what I am sure was the happiest moment in Fr John's life when, in July 1954, he received from Our Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, an Apostolic letter, lauding Muintir na Tíre for its work on behalf of the rural population, and invoking on the organization and all those connected with it the special blessing of Almighty God.

With the expansion of the movement went growth in Fr John's personal prestige, great as this had always been. The Irish in the Argentine asked that he should be sent to them in 1934, to prepare the way for the international Eucharistic Congress held that year in Buenos Aires. He spent three months in the country giving lectures, missions and retreats. During the years 1939–1943, he was a member of the Commission on Vocational Organization, of which the Chairman was the Bishop of Galway, Most Reverend Dr Browne.

In 1946 he left Tipperary to become Parish Priest of Bansha. There he set himself the task of rebuilding the two churches and, being fortunate enough to secure the services of an accomplished architect, Mr Sheahan of Limerick, achieved results that were truly astounding. The thing of beauty which the church at Bansha became may be regarded as his memorial, but the tears shed by his flock when he was laid to rest behind its apse would be esteemed by himself as the only tribute worth the gaining. He certainly was devoted to their interests. However heavy the public demands upon his time he made sure to be present for even the smallest parochial duty. While he was a curate in Tipperary, the front door of his house was literally never closed (though this entailed the possible loss of his " silver "—a calamity which he faced with hilarious equanimity) ; in Bansha the door had to be pushed to, owing to a perpetual and impish gusty breeze from the nearby Galtee mountains, but the closing was ignored as a mere technical necessity and visitors strolled in at midnight as if it were midday, sure of the same cheery and genial reception. Should a visitor, be he parishioner or stranger, be in trouble, time was no consideration. He would spend the night, if needful, listening and the day trying to find a solution or to provide help.

The founder of Muintir na Tíre had naturally many contacts abroad. In the United States of America there was the Catholic Rural Life Conference ; in Australia, the National Catholic Rural Movement ; in Nova Scotia, the St Francis Xavier Movement of Antigonish. Fr John accepted an invitation to the Congress of the American Association just mentioned in Columbus, Ohio, late in 1949. He profited by the occasion to make Muintir na Tíre better known. The tour increased his admiration for the Church in America and especially for the Archbishop of Boston, Most Rev. Dr Cushing, whom he came to revere as a prelate and as a friend. When Dr Cushing came with hundreds of the faithful from his diocese on pilgrimage to Ireland, Fr John met him at Cobh and organized

demonstrations in his honour at Bansha and Tipperary. An invitation to visit Australia could not be accepted but Fr John attended the International Rural Life Congress in Rome in 1951, and the Catholic Migration Commission in Barcelona in 1952. His easy manner and exuberant good nature made him an ideal representative of Ireland in such gatherings.

At home he was created a Canon of the archdiocese by Most Rev. Dr Kinane in 1954. As a preacher he was much in demand. His largest audience, estimated at 94,000, was at Croke Park, Dublin, at the Jubilee celebrations of the Pioneer Total Abstinence Association in 1949. In June 1956 he preached in Glenstal at the dedication of the monastic church ; and in November of the same year at Mount Argus, Dublin, in connection with the centenary celebrations of the Passionist Fathers. This was to be his last important public engagement. Immediately afterwards he had to receive treatment for the disease that in a matter of weeks was to cause his death. All through life his devotion to God and souls had made cruel demands upon his strength. It was a surprise and a consolation to his friends to see it holding almost unimpaired into his seventieth year and to see him active, as they knew he wished to be, to the end. That his death would be holy those near to him had always foreseen. His was the simplicity of the child to which Our Lord had promised the kingdom of heaven, and his a tender and touching devotion to the Mother of God, the mark of predilection in life, a sure pledge of efficacious help from her Son in the passage from time to eternity.

* * *

Looking back upon his career two questions immediately present themselves : why did he take up the cause of the rural population rather than any other of the many worthy causes which he might have championed ? And what success did Muintir na Tíre achieve under his direction in its aim of making the rural countryside more self-reliant, more united and more prosperous ?

It is obvious that his deep concern for the rural community was first excited by the hardships of his flock in Castleiny. But that was a temporary problem which time was certain to solve. The Ministry of Agriculture had power, in the last resort, to establish a balance between tillage and cattle-raising by legislation and regulation. The real difficulty lay at a much deeper level. Its root was the reduction of agriculture to an almost servile status in a world where industrial development alone was glamorous and its fruits fantastically rewarding. Who but a fool would be a drudge on a farm, trailing through mud and dirt for long hours for a meagre recompense, when he could have high wages, insurance, protection, short hours, free week-ends, pleasant holidays, by transferring his labour to a dry, clean, well-equipped factory. It is true that Ireland herself had no great industries, but these were within easy reach in

England and America, and the way to these two countries had been known and trodden for generations. To this competition agriculture had no answer. The countryside was therefore being deserted and the broad acres diminishing in value for lack of hands to work them.

Rural life seemed fated then to shrivel if not to die. Fr John felt this as a deadly menace to Ireland. His instincts, no less than his reason, were engaged in the struggle to overcome it. In his view the agricultural parishes of Ireland were the repository of her traditional civilization. This had been assailed again and again by the Vikings, the Normans, the mediaeval English state working from Dublin Castle, the Tudors, the Stuarts and Cromwell. Even when the Gaelic order had been swept away and a hostile political and social order intruded in its stead, much of the old civilization was preserved in the rural countryside. The towns were alien in origin and outlook, and, after the Puritan triumph, little better than fortresses held by enemy troops ; the link with the past was the rural population. With faith and love and with a quiet dignity in the face of poverty and obscurity, they had clung to their country and its ideals when both seemed broken beyond hope of recovery. And though much was lost in the unequal battle much, too, had been saved from the wreck. The Gaelic character of the people remained strong in the rural parishes. Between the Union and the Famine, when Carleton was describing the Ireland which he saw about him, the pre-eminence of these was unchallenged. From them flocked the multitudes who gave to O'Connell's demand for Catholic Emancipation its irresistible force. The greatest meeting he ever addressed was not convened in a town, but in a rural setting, on the Hill of Tara. His most resounding victory was associated with the rural parishes of East Clare. During all this time the towns were treated as almost accidental growths. To give them an Irish pattern was not contemplated, perhaps not even desired.

Even after the Famine the picture remained substantially unchanged. Many, no doubt, left the countryside for the towns, many more for the emigrant ship ; but those who stayed behind were lineal descendants of the old families. In number they might be few, but they were at the end of a line of generations that stretched back for two thousand years. The parish, therefore, represented a mighty asset of inherited strength. To keep this safe for the nation, to preserve its sterling quality by keeping it sound in all its parts, each healthy, all co-operating in living, organic activity for the good of the parish as a whole, was the ultimate purpose of Fr John in founding Muintir na Tíre. The rural population was necessary to the country, not merely nor primarily because of the wealth which it produced, but because of the cultural tradition which made it the true representative today of the Gaelic community, the Irish people of all the centuries.

Did Muintir na Tíre prove in fact to be the full realization of his hopes? That would be much to expect of any organization. Most founders are satisfied if the society which they call into being is successful to a certain degree. Fr John had disappointments which he did not conceal. There was opposition, sometimes harsh and embarrassing, for strange or trivial motives, from persons who were one with him in principle. This alone made him " bitter ", a term which he liked to use when keenly annoyed. It was greeted generally with laughter, for nothing could be more evident than the fact that there was not a drop of bitterness in his being. After a while he too would laugh and treat the contradiction as a jest, as if someone had just hurled a brick through his window from sheer *joie de vivre*.

What troubled him most was the consciousness that his work was a labour of Sisyphus; it would be so hard to make it prevail against the spirit of the age. By an unfortunate coincidence the movement from the Irish countryside to the towns began to reach flood proportions when Muintir na Tíre was launched. It was a movement that went back to the Famine but for long was confined to a small minority, for the native tradition in Ireland was not urban. Only in the present century did migration to Dublin and other cities become a popular fashion. It marked a revolution in Irish ideas. From 1930 to 1957, the fashion lost nothing in strength. There is no need to stress the unfavourable reaction of this practice on Muintir na Tíre : the countryside must lose prestige when people are fleeing from it, and the doubt about the future which the flight suggests is discouraging to those who remain. Fr John tried to stem the tide by establishing small parish industries, but these cannot arise in a day, nor can they be multiplied, nor can their solvency be guaranteed even when they are capably directed. So migration and emigration continued to impede progress and cause heartbreak.

What Muintir na Tíre could do and did was to concentrate on those who remained. It did this in every effective way within reach. To begin with, it gathered into the organization men of intelligence and high idealism and made them conscious of rural needs. Some of these were old, some young, some were lay, and some were clerical, and all were an *élite*, ready to spend themselves and their means in service to the cause. They were frank but loyal counsellors and they were devoted friends. Enthusiasm was an essential condition of this movement and it was most abundant at the top. These men and their women helpers gave themselves without stint under Fr John's leadership to the improvement of rural life. Guilds of Muintir na Tíre were established in no less than 420 parishes. There were annual Rural Weeks and many Rural Weekends, Summer Schools of Agriculture for young men, Summer Schools in Domestic Economy for the girls, courses in sociology and in the training of Guild officers. Film records of educational value were exhibited year

by year, up and down the country, by the Muintir na Tíre Co-operative Film Society. A Muintir na Tíre Credit Society was registered in 1949. Farmers nominated by Muintir na Tíre were sent to the United States to study that country's agricultural methods. With the special mission of the E.C.A. to Ireland, and the mission's chiefs, Muintir na Tíre maintained friendly contact.

Local guilds were encouraged to undertake various tasks, to build halls, attend to fairs, markets, tillage, drainage and reclamation, shelter belt and afforestation schemes, the repair of bye-roads and of cottages, to co-operate in buying machinery and seeds, to build and manage lime-kilns, to have concerts, plays, exhibitions, shows, social functions. It was a fundamental principle that local patriotism should manifest itself in voluntary service, so that improvements should involve no expense to the community. The sap of life in each guild was justice, peace and harmony, in the spirit of the great Encyclicals and ultimately of the Gospels. Constant guidance to the guilds was afforded in the *Landmark* and other publications.

There are many reasons to think, then, that the name of Fr John Hayes will be held in eternal honour, as a great priest, a great leader and a great Irishman. He saw that the countryside must flourish if the country itself is to survive. He saw the rural population, and indeed all the rest of his countrymen with them, as children of the one mother, destined to find their salvation, not in force, nor in social conflict, nor in measures imposed from above by the omnipotent state, but in mutual respect, kindliness, co-operation, under the banner of Christian charity. The hand should be on the plough, but the eye should be fixed on the distant star, with its promise of the eternal home, where the soul of man can find ultimate rest. Muintir na Tíre deserves well of the nation for it is at once an inspiration and an instrument of true social progress.

Men Speechless

by JOSEPH VEALE

The right word is a sure sign of good thinking.
Isocrates

RHETORIC has come down in the world. For over two thousand years it was a sufficient definition of an educated man to say with Cato and Quintilian that he was *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. But ' rhetoric ' is now a term of disparagement. You say ' That is mere rhetoric ' ; or half-defensively, as Belloc to Dean Inge, ' You may say all this is rhetoric '. The word implies bombast, rodomontade, sophistry, the art of saying nothing impressively. If you suggest that microphone speaking requires rhetorical training, people visualize someone addressing them from the TV screen in the style of Meagher of the Sword. The English, especially, even when they most rhetorically protest that they would not sully the fair face of truth with that pestilent cosmetic, dislike the word and are suspicious of the thing ; they have always preferred to muddle through.

Yet there are signs that thoughtful men are having second thoughts. Very cautiously a recent report on the teaching of English suggests :

> At this stage . . . the main rhetorical devices should be examined and treated as recognised methods of obtaining particular effects by the use of language. . . . By comparing, for instance, what the cheap-jack crockery-salesman said to the crowd in the market with the description he gave in private to his partner. . . .[1]

The British Ministry of Education pamphlet *Language* is bolder :

> The word ' rhetoric ' is out of fashion, but it is perhaps not impossible to claim that much of what the word used to mean is still wanted in schools and ought to be possible. . . . (The Sixth Form student) still needs to refine his thinking and his writing, and he still needs a great deal of what used to be known as ' rhetoric ', the art of persuasion, the rules of eloquence, the power of arranging material effectively for the purpose in view.[2]

Finally, throwing all caution to the winds, the *Times Literary Supplement* reviewer of Professor H. I. Marrou's *Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité* says :

> Only in one respect has ancient education something to offer which would perhaps to-day not be passionately rejected by the majority. Rhetoric,

[1] *The Teaching of English*, issued by the Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools, Cambridge University Press, 1952, p. 82.

[2] *Language ;* Some suggestions for teachers of English and others, Ministry of Education Pamphlet No. 26, H.M.S.O., 1954, pp. 75, 78.

> the art of eloquence and persuasion, for the Greeks ' the queen of subjects ', is not taught in our secondary schools and universities. Yet if one listens to the complaints made of our graduates, that too many of them cannot express themselves easily or clearly in speech or writing, this charge seems to sound much like a demand for the replacement of the long missing subject of rhetoric. . . . It is precisely the absence of this art in their highly qualified recruits that the more thoughtful directors of industry are apt to bemoan to-day.

There are two problems which recur in modern discussions of education. It is felt that there is something wrong with a school system where the Humanists are ignorant of physical science and the Scientists have no time for the humanities. Education has split up into " subjects " with little co-ordination or contact between them. More and more subjects are added to courses. An effort is made to ensure a balanced education by juggling with the parts of the curriculum. Where can be found a subject which will unify and co-ordinate the other subjects? By what means can it be guaranteed that the technologists on their progress to being the masters of to-morrow's society will get more than a splash of the Humanist brush? Since there is every sign that Ireland is eager to panic in the current technological stampede, and since there is some uneasiness about the inadequacy of an education based on a multiplicity of subjects hastily and superficially assimilated, it is worth considering the two problems as they affect us here.

From the time of the Sophists to the French Revolution, Europe was educated by a single uninterrupted living tradition. We can understand what the tradition was only if we know in what sense rhetoric was " the queen of subjects ". For that reason alone Professor Marrou's book[3] should be read by any educator who would understand the culture of Europe and the roots which still fitfully nourish us.

Professor Marrou shows that the preference of the Greeks for rhetoric cannot be explained by supposing that they had nothing better to do. They were aware of the claims of mathematics and gave it its due. They considered the claims of technology, but ' (ancient thought) had no use for technique . . . it simply rejected it '. The only real rival to rhetoric was philosophy. Plato had wished to make mathematics the centre of preliminary education, the propaedeutic to philosophy. But ' on the level of history Plato had been defeated. . . . The victor, generally speaking, was Isocrates, and Isocrates became the educator first of Greece and then of the whole ancient world. . . . Rhetoric is the specific object of Greek education and the highest Greek culture '.

[3] Quotations are from the English translation, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, Sheed and Ward, 1956.

To say that for the Greeks rhetoric was ' the queen of subjects ' is almost bound to be misleading to our modern minds. We think of a subject as another item on the curriculum. But rhetoric was not a " subject " in that sense. In the first place, it was not a body of knowledge, facts or information to be conveyed; it was a skill or art to be acquired, chiefly by the activity of the pupil. Secondly, it was the formal object of education, giving it its specific form or character, and to which all the other activities of schooling were subordinated. There was no curriculum problem, because the educators of the classical tradition had a clear idea of what they wanted to do, of the kind of man they wanted to form.

We have to free ourselves, too, of a misconception of the word ' rhetoric ' itself. ' For us moderns, rhetoric means artificiality, insincerity, decadence. Perhaps this is simply because we do not understand it and have become barbarians ourselves.' We think of the rhetorician as a man more concerned with form than with matter, a writer or speaker who frivolously cultivates a refined style and has no care for what he has to say. The history of rhetoric has its fantastic artificialities and insincerities. The Greeks had their Gorgias and their Sophists and were not so simple-minded as to be unaware of the danger of aesthetic trifling. They also had their Socrates and Plato, and their devotion to the Word did not kill their love for Truth or the Good. In the teaching of Isocrates himself rhetorical training has a moral value. For him language was ' the word that turned a man into a Man, the Greeks into a civilized people '.

Educators in the tradition of Isocrates were not indifferent to knowledge, to acquiring facts and information; but learning of that kind was subordinated to and controlled by the formal object of all their effort. They were free from our problem of " undigested gobbets of information ". Facts and information were properly assimilated in the process itself of training the eloquent man. The Greeks did not reject in practice Plato's scheme of education and accept Isocrates' unthinkingly ; unlike us, they knew what they wanted and why they wanted it. Isocrates' immediate aims were as practical as any modern could wish ; among other things he wished to ensure that Athens should not be a prey to demagogues. He was Greek enough and philosopher enough to offer profounder reasons for his education. They are reasons which explain why the rhetorical tradition was accepted wholeheartedly by his own and the Hellenic world, why the Romans accepted it, why the Church welcomed it, why it remained alive up to the time when it was given a new impetus by the forces of the Counter-Reformation.

Professor Marrou asks why, from the time of Isocrates, rhetoric was always, in practice, accepted as the normal means to the highest flights

of education. He rejects as an adequate explanation the natural hidebound conservatism of educators. He believes that the explanation lies in Isocrates' remarkable teaching about the Word.

> Learning to speak properly meant learning to think properly, and even to live properly. . . . The things that Isocrates tried to foster in his disciples were—ability to make decisions, an intuitive grasp of the complexity of human affairs, and a perception of all the imponderable factors which help to direct one's " opinion " and make it a just one. Literature—the art (not the science) of speech—is the best instrument for sharpening the faculty of judgement. The instrument is not in itself sufficient. . . . Form and content . . . are inseparable : and this is so because the effort to find the right expression demands and develops a sensitivity of thought, a sense of the different shades of meaning. . . . The result is that an " oratorical " kind of education, which in appearance is entirely a matter of aesthetics, whose one aim is to create " wizards with words ", is in fact the most effective way of developing subtlety of thought.[4]

There we find ourselves far indeed from the devices of the cheap-jack crockery-salesman.

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We have become so accustomed to a world of inarticulate scientists and dumb experts, of university graduates in English who ' explain ' literature in a debased and unintelligible jargon, that it is difficult to think ourselves back to a time when all education was controlled by the aim of enabling men to think and to communicate their thoughts as clearly and coherently as possible. It is one of the virtues of Professor Curtius's *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* that it demonstrates the living tradition of rhetorical training, uninterrupted from Isocrates to Goethe. ' In his Leipzig period, Goethe found " everything to do with poetics and rhetoric pleasant and gratifying ". In his Strassburg period he fills his *Ephemerides* with extracts from Quintilian. In his older years (1815) he holds rhetoric " with all its historical and dialectic demands " to be " commendable and indispensable ", and reckons it among " humanity's highest needs ". In him the whole European tradition was alive '[5].

The tradition would seem to have died. But there is a footnote to the history. Curtius adds : ' Rhetoric retains a secure place in the Jesuit Order '.

History has an ironic comment on the footnote. It was the French Revolution, the whole movement of ideas conveniently so labelled, that set out to destroy, among other things, the living tradition of which

[4] Ibid., p. 90.
[5] Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, translated from the German by Williard R. Trask, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, p. 63.

Marrou and Curtius write. But it is in the secondary school teaching of French that the tradition has remained alive and nowhere else. In 1879 a member of the French Chamber of Deputies addressed his fellow members with that crystal-clear illogic of which only some Frenchmen are masters :

> Ce ne sont pas les Jésuites qu'il faut proscrire, ce sont leur methodes que vous avez conservées et qui vous empêchent d'arriver au niveau qu'ils ont eux-mêmes atteint aujourd'hui.[6]

The Jesuits had added nothing to the main tradition of European education. They had accepted the prevailing demands of the late Renaissance and given them a Christian orientation. Dean Rashdall writes of 'that most thoroughgoing application of the principles of classical education which gained such marvellous popularity . . . for the schools of the Jesuits'.[7] The originality of the *Ratio Studiorum* of the Jesuits lies in the word "thoroughgoing" : it was St Ignatius who insisted on the *modus et ordo Parisiensis* which the codifiers of the *Ratio* developed into a minutely planned school system. The European tradition was still alive when the *Ratio* was formed : it takes for granted everything that we have to learn anew in Quintilian, in Isocrates, in books like Marrou's and Curtius's. It is necessary to go to them for a true understanding of the practical prescriptions of the *Ratio,* because these are bound to mislead if they are not studied in the context of the tradition they presupposed.

The preliminary part of the *Ratio Studiorum,* which we should nowadays call the secondary school section, was a highly efficient system, the object of which, on the merely academic side, was to train *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. When a pupil had achieved the immediate aim of that part of the course, *eloquentia perfecta,* and had therefore and thereby acquired the ability to think soundly in a way suitable to his years, then he was encouraged to proceed to the study of mathematics, natural science, philosophy and theology. But the first aim was to make him an "eloquent" man, in the sense in which Europe had always understood that word. It is misleading to say that 'the only subjects the Jesuits taught were Latin and Greek'. Properly, they taught one subject, and it was not a 'subject' as we understand it, with our modern preconceptions of a scientific study of language and literature. The Jesuits were successful educators because they took one thing at a time, they had one clear aim and everything was subordinated to it and determined by it. They knew they were training in a skill or an art, the art of rhetoric as it had always been understood.

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[6] cf. A. P. Farrell, *The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education.*
[7] *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,* II, p. 65.

It happened at the time that the language of eloquent men was Latin. So the first thing was to teach the young boy to speak and write Latin grammatically. This was not our modern formal or scientific grammar, but what is now fashionably called functional grammar. It was designed, in other words, to enable the pupil to express his thoughts correctly and well. When he had mastered a correct command of words, he began his training in humanities and rhetoric. It was a training, not inculcation of fact or information. He picked that up on the way by study of text, by directed reading, by means of academies ; he knew that he should extend his knowledge later when he had trained his mind and tongue to deal with it. It surprises and rather appals us to think of spending a whole schoolday at Latin, with an hour's Greek in the afternoon by way of change. But the pupil was active all the time, exercising himself in oral exercises and written exercises carefully graded and planned with one aim in view.

The teacher, of course, explained the text. It was a " rhetorical " explanation. The rules of the *praelectio* (the ancestor of the French *lecture expliquée*) were clearly laid down. The text was the centre and source of the training. A ' rule ' was announced briefly and explained. The author was read with a view to examining his practice of the rule. At every step the pupil kept in mind that he must shortly do likewise. The soul of the lesson was the student's subsequent practice : *imitatio est anima praelectionis*. No doubt in the hands of a bad teacher this sometimes resulted in an arid verbal copying. (He was warned : *Potius res expendendae quam verba*). That it was inevitably so is the false assumption of modern historians of education who have no concept of the living tradition.

The *Ratio Studiorum* warned the teacher to keep *eruditio* to a minimum, though he might use it to keep monotony at bay, rather after the fashion of our use of red herrings in class. *Eruditio* meant tit-bits of history, philology, ' science ', mythology, biography. It is worth noting here because it is precisely that *eruditio* which has taken the centre of the stage in much modern examining and teaching of, for example, English, and has shouldered out rhetoric, the principles and practice of organizing one's thought in a clear and coherent way.

At the risk of fulfilling Voltaire's definition of a bore and saying everything, it is necessary, I think, to make it clear that the teachers of those days were not so naïve as to imagine that you could train a boy to speak well even if he had nothing to say. But they were happily free from the modern craze for originality at all costs. Then as in the days of Isocrates ' the schoolboy was not obliged to be original : all that was required of him was that he should learn to write and criticize according to certain rules '.[8]

[8] Marrou, op. cit., p. 175.

When the Jesuit Order was restored '*ex illa potissimum causa, ut iuventutem et litteris et moribus instituendam susciperet*'[9], one of its first concerns was to re-establish its teaching tradition and to keep abreast of the new things in demand. Mathematics and physics were to be provided for ; but "the study of Latin and Greek letters must always remain intact and be the chief object of attention".[10] The vernacular languages and literature were raised to a major subject.[11] The aim and methods of the *Ratio Studiorum* were to remain in force not only in the teaching of Latin and Greek but in the teaching of the vernacular tongue. In other words, the clear and single aim of Jesuit secondary teaching was still *vir bonus dicendi peritus* in accordance with the requirements of a different age and different circumstances.

This educational programme was a success where circumstances allowed it to work. Increasingly in many countries the demands of external examinations set by the State or by the universities or other bodies required that the teacher should organize his work with a divided mind, keeping one eye on a set course and the other on his professional aim. In other ways, too, circumstances had changed. The eloquent man was no longer required to speak or write in Latin, but in his own tongue. In France alone the teaching of the vernacular with the old aims and methods survived as a living tradition. New aims in teaching Latin and Greek invaded the schools from the universities : what the *Ratio Studiorum* had called *eruditio* became of chief importance. Embattled classicists appealed now to this aim, now to that, to recommend their work—mind-training, ability to think logically, the necessity of Latin and Greek as the only means to familiarity with the culture and thought of the ancients. Some claimed that Latin and Greek were the best or only means of training in the use of the vernacular.[12]

* * *

Since it is my purpose to consider the European tradition of education in relation to the current practice of teaching English and examining it in secondary schools, it is necessary to say something about the claim of the teacher of Classics to teach English expression as well as the English teacher does. It must always astonish anyone familiar with the genius of the English language to hear it suggested that there is some native virtue in Latin and Greek whereby they automatically train a boy to speak and write English well. Translation is a useful exercise in language when one has a good command of both languages. It is true that a man will command a better English for knowing his Latin well. But a man

[9] Pope Leo XII, May 17, 1824, in the Brief by which the Roman College was returned to the Jesuits.

[10] [11] Fr Roothaan, S.J., General of the Society of Jesus, in his preface to the completed adaptation of the *Ratio Studiorum*, July 25, 1832, quoted by A. P. Farrell, op. cit., p. 390.

[12] That is not to deny that the best liberal education requires a humane study of the Classics, where that is possible. Education, like politics, is the art of the possible.

who knows only Latin will more probably write a stiff and Latinized English. There are more elements in the living English tongue than its Latin source, partial and remote. A good Latin colleague is an invaluable help to an English teacher, provided he demands in translation a rendering in true English idiom. Like any other teacher who is unaware of the difficulties and pitfalls of English expression, he is the English master's greatest enemy if he exacts or tolerates a word-for-word translation into anglicized Latin. In other words, he hinders the training of the *dicendi peritus* if he ignores the rhetorical aim of language study.

The movement in England to adopt something like the French system has long been under way. In 1908, Sir Philip Hartog wrote in the Preface to his *The Writing of English* :

> The plan of this book, as it was originally conceived, may be briefly summed up as follows : The English boy cannot write English. . . . The French boy can write French. The French boy can write French because he is taught how to write. . . . How the French boy is taught to write. How the English boy may be taught to write.

It is interesting that the same book contains two long notes in the Appendix headed ' The *Ratio Studiorum* of the Jesuits ' and ' Extracts from the *Ratio Studiorum* ', just as it is significant that the recent Ministry of Education pamphlet *Language* has a long chapter on ' French in France ', with an account of the *lecture expliquée*.

They hesitate in England to have the courage of such convictions. Rhetoric, if it means anything, must mean the re-enthronement of the imperial intellect. Romanticism dies hard and the English continue to be suspicious of the meddling intellect : their writers on education remain for the most part Wordsworthians and elevate imagination and sensibility to an importance beyond their due. When the formal teaching of English in English schools was getting on its feet, anyone who thought or wrote on education, anyone responsible for training teachers or setting examinations had probably read, not Isocrates or Quintilian, but Rousseau and the rest. If one reads anything of the vast, dull literature on the subject, one comes across vague suppositions that, for example, all that is required to write English well is to have something to say and to say it. That is splendid for the occasional genius with the literary flair, but it is the plodder and the scientist busy with his Logs for whom a teacher must provide ; and the genius will not suffer much for being shown occasionally how to organize his thought or his refined sensibility in words that are clear and coherent. Of course there are the experts for whom every child is a potential artist. The French think differently. The instructions of the French Ministry of Education issued in 1938 ' express disappointment with the results . . . of the reforms of

1923. It is all very well, they continue, to expect fine writing, fresh feeling and originality in children's composition. A few children have these qualities and they ought to be encouraged. But how many? Probably not more than two or three in a class of thirty or forty '.[13] Current literary fashion, too, and psychology imperfectly understood influence school practice. There are writers on education who value English teaching chiefly as a method of psychotherapy for all.

* * *

Is a rhetoric in English possible? It would seem not. Something of the kind has been attempted in America and sceptics point to those Americans who can speak fluently and with confidence on any subject and sometimes say very little about it. There has never been a living tradition of English rhetoric in England. The language has grown without it and seems to resist it. English is not a classical language. No attempt to fix a canon of English prose has been permanently successful. You cannot take Dryden or Swift or Gibbon and say: 'There is your model. Write exactly like that and you will write well'. As George Orwell said, 'To write or even to speak English is not a science but an art. There are no reliable rules. . . .' In his excellent introduction to the fifth volume of the Pelican anthology of English prose, Kenneth Allott writes:

> The word 'tradition' is changing in the Victorian period. The older meaning of inheriting a manner from an earlier generation and transmitting it with modifications to the next generation—as Macaulay, for example, inherits and modifies the rhetoric of Burke and 'Junius'—has begun to give way to a favoured modern meaning. Tradition enables us, we think, to pick and choose whatever is most useful to us from different ages of the past.[14]

So it is no service to young students to encourage them, after the fashion of Stevenson, to play the sedulous ape.

These are difficulties, certainly. To attempt to impose with violence a rhetorical aim on English teaching, without taking into account the nature of the language and the pattern (or lack of it) which English prose has taken from the circumstances of its growth, must inevitably lead to constraint and artificiality. There is some truth in the exaggeration that English prose has grown up in a fit of absence of mind. I returned to English teaching a few years ago with the conviction that an English rhetoric is necessary and possible. Experience has confirmed my belief. Before discussing the circumstances which make it more than necessarily difficult in this country at present, I shall give a very brief sketch of an English course designed with the ancient rhetorical aim in mind.

[13] cf. *Language*, p. 120.
[14] Op. cit., p. xxv.

There is nothing so useful as a principle. *Imitatio est anima praelectionis.* Young people are naturally mimetic : the ancient teachers exploited their imitativeness to get them to use language effectively. In the early stages of secondary training, the chief thing is to overcome the paralysis induced by the blank page or an expectant audience. The old ' grammarians ', according to Professor Marrou, started with the ' fable ' : the child wrote down as exactly as possible a little story he had just read or had told him. He progressed then to the ' narrative ' : he was told a story and asked to repeat it, not develop it, in his own words. The qualities demanded were brevity, clarity, verisimilitude and correctness. He was gradually encouraged to develop his subject matter for himself. From the start he was instructed to introduce six elements in strict order : agent, action, time, place, manner and cause. If that is too rigid for modern taste, it had the merit of not leaving the tyro at a loss for something to say and inculcated from the start the prime importance of order. Children enjoy telling stories and fixing flesh to the bones of a plot. By this method they can gain confidence in their power to put words on paper, if the teacher can exercise enough self-control to refrain from too much fussy and school-masterish correcting. Even at that age he can persuade them of the importance of a principle they will always have to use : a piece of writing should have proportion, a beginning, a middle and an end.

That is, I expect, what every teacher of a vernacular has found useful from experience. What is of importance, with a view to later rhetorical training, is the formation of a habit of studying what is read in order to be able to do likewise. That is where the French *lecture expliquée* comes in. Without killing altogether the enjoyment of what was written in the first place to be enjoyed anywhere but in the class-room, a teacher must be able to analyse selected passages for their full meaning and draw attention to the means a writer has used to achieve his object. The ideal thing is that the pupils themselves should be able in time to assess a writer's aim and to analyse his technique.

" Before the age of fourteen or fifteen the pupil will deal almost wholly with narrative and descriptive matter and with the exposition of simple facts." [15] It is probable that not nearly enough time is given to that most necessary skill—to be able to put relevant facts on paper in a clear and orderly way. As was wisely said a few years ago, ' Teachers of English will have met the assumption among some pupils that whereas in Geography and History you write about what you know, in English you just write '.[16]

There are some things which cannot be done : one cannot ask every youth for ' verbal inventiveness, sensibility and style '. What

[15] *Language*, p. 70.
[16] *The Use of English*, Vol. VII, No. 3, p. 170.

can be done is to show him that it is ' worth his while . . . to weigh his words, to consider the form of his sentences, the correct placing of emphasis, and the smooth transition from one idea to another '.[17] And one can train the ear. It is important to contrive by the least painful means that the memory and imagination are stored with passages of prose and verse : they train the ear to listen to the appropriate fall of English words. They must do this to some extent in any case. It is the point of *lecture expliquée* that the attention is deliberately drawn to such things as rhythm and cadence with a view to imitation.

It is in the middle years, when the teacher judges that a class is beginning to be able to reflect and argue, that normally, I think, the cart is put before the horse. This is not the time to start chronologically from Bacon and bring the reluctant student through Addison and Johnson up to, or down to, Ruskin and Osbert Sitwell. Where the chief aim of English teaching is rhetorical and it is hoped that the student may be enabled to say what he has to say in a manner acceptable to a modern audience, his eye should now be on contemporary writing ; not " artistic " writing, but workmanlike specimens taken from current publications and the better kind of journalism and broadcasting.[18] The French method of teaching English should by now have formed in him a habit of analysing a piece of writing and of recognizing the hundred ways a good journalist has of stating his aim by implication, of engaging the reader's interest, of stating relevant facts concisely (and sometimes choosing them too carefully), of using anecdote and comparison to entertain or clarify, of illustrating, of disgressing, of repeating the same point without seeming to, of illuminating it from different angles, of using irony, of suggesting what he does not wish to state, and of bringing his theme to a conclusion.

It is here that the *lecture expliquée* with its expected sequel of ' imitation ' becomes training in sound thinking. Boys at this age take only too ready a delight in diagnosing a *non sequitur* or a *suggestio falsi*. It is no great harm if they learn incidentally to be dubious of the infallibility of the popular press or the more dogmatic pundits in the Sunday reviews. They may even be inoculated against the bogus philosophizing and imposing language of much that goes by the name of literary criticism,

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[17] *The Teaching of English in Schools*, A Symposium edited for the English Association by V. de Sola Pinto (Macmillan, 1953) p. 88.

[18] A reasonably satisfactory text-book for this purpose is *Précis and Comprehension Practice*, by Black & Lawley (University of London Press). It contains extracts from modern writers and from *The Observer*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *Spectator*, Pelican Books, etc. : the sort of writer whose technique we might imitate with profit and whose assumptions and arguments it is useful to question. The " comprehension " questions set after each piece are designed to prepare students in England for the G.C.E.; from the point of view of rhetoric the exercises do not go far enough.

Educationists sometimes condemn the use of what they call second-rate journalism and " frivolous fourth-leaders from *The Times* " and argue that only the best is good enough for young people. That has always seemed to me to be an example of strange thinking. One asks : Only the best is good enough—for what ?

what Sir Compton Mackenzie calls cerebral congestion and metaphysical claptrap.

Finally, at a stage when some little experience of life and fairly wide reading have given students something to say, it should be time to introduce them to the older writers and to extract what is of value from them. Nor should artistic prose, with its genuinely poetic values, be neglected. At every stage of an English course there should be much concomitant reading of poetry and of prose that is not merely a statement of fact or of argument—he would be a poor rhetorician who acted on the assumption that men are reasonable animals. To teach English and to ignore that side of the language would almost be to present a cavalry charge without the horses. If I have seemed to neglect that side of English teaching, it is because I believe that it receives in practice too exclusive an attention ; and because too great a concern with style and artistic expression, and the effort to exact it from students who have no gift for it, results in frustration and disgust and much woolly thinking and expression in writing and public speaking. At the same time, I cannot see that anything of freshness or spontaneity will be lost to English prose if students now are made to analyse the rhetorical and logical structure of a great oration and to use the ancient principles of *inventio* in a manner suitable to modern ears. The " grave and upright " teaching of Isocrates would suggest that, now as always, the purpose of rhetoric is to come to a just knowledge of your theme and of the mind of the men whom you address and to use the best means, from the present or the past, to persuade them of the truth.

It may very well be objected that all this is being done anyway and done successfully. If that be true, so much the better. It may seem, too, open to the objection that it gives over much importance to the technique of saying things and too little to the thing said, of introducing an unreal distinction between " matter " and " style ". Here a second principle of the old teachers of rhetoric is important : *potius res expendendae quam verba.* The student's eye should be chiefly on the object, on the thing, not on the technique, on what the words mean rather than on the words. If there is one conclusion to be drawn from a study of English prose, it is that the greatest English writers did best when they forgot themselves and their " style " in their concern for what they had to say.

It is the chief object of these pages to establish a case for restoring rhetoric to its traditional place as the formal object of secondary education ; not of excluding all the other valuable objects of literary study, but of subordinating them to that ruling and master principle. A necessary condition for its success is that a student should read widely and enjoy what he reads. The valuable humanistic formation of such reading should be favoured by a rhetorical aim properly understood.

If current English teaching has any formal object, it would seem to be " appreciation " or " literary criticism ". Those who require of young students that they write a piece of literary criticism seem to forget that very few of even the most gifted English critics succeeded in writing any specifically literary criticism at all. It is a most difficult literary exercise even for adults. Educational theorists who prescribe it assume that because a boy writes a " good appreciation " of an ode by Keats, he therefore appreciates it better. If examination questions in " appreciation " are designed to foster aesthetic experience, I think that the aim is mis-conceived and the results illusory. For many, an exercise of that kind kills true appreciation for a work of art ; it encourages the habit of thinking that an aesthetic experience requires intellectual analysis : the butterfly must be dissected to be enjoyed. And if their chief experience of writing, at that age, is preparing specimen answers of literary appreciation, at its best it fixes their mind not on the outside world but on the reactions of their own immature sensibility to the artistic expression of someone else's emotion. Briefly, education in the use of language and examination of the ability to use language could with profit drop " criticism " of that kind altogether and get on with the job of trying to help young people to enjoy what was written to be enjoyed. Rhetoric should train and test, not critics, but men capable of expressing thoughts about things.

It was in 1921 that the Newbolt Committee added to their report on the teaching of English in England a ' Note on the Teaching of the Mother Tongue in France ' and said : ' There is everything to gain from a close examination of the methods adopted in France '. There is much in the history of education in England since then that we are glad to have escaped. I think no one will claim that we have succeeded better here in teaching English in secondary schools, except by accident and in spite of circumstances. As in so many other things, in education we have accepted uncritically practices inherited from our neighbours (and long ago discarded even by them), and, with the practices, many of the unacceptable philosophical principles which determined them in the first place. The result has not been happy. An experienced broadcaster wrote a few years ago :

> Radio discussions have exploded the theory that Irishmen are *ipso facto* good debaters. What passes for debate in the atmosphere of a bar-room bears no resemblance to what the listeners at home regard as intelligent, or even adequate, discussion . . . And even sound thinkers, with an adequate knowledge of their subjects, sometimes become a prey to microphone shyness which gives to their delivery a formal style which is unsuitable to this type of programme.[19]

[19] Maxwell Sweeney, *The Technique of Radio Discussions. Irish Monthly*, December, 1953.

The writer was kind to put it down to microphone shyness. It is sobering to compare the hesitations, the vague words, the irrelevancies, of a Radio Eireann discussion in English with the fluency, the cogency, indeed the courtesy of a group of men from Connemara debating on the Radio in Gaelic. Radio discussions are only one form of public speaking, but a fair test of a man's command of thought. A radio speaker reading his own script often brings to mind Belloc's test of an educated man : Can he read aloud with intelligence a piece of prose which he sees for the first time ? If Irishmen, for all their reputed eloquence, cannot talk, then they cannot think. And if Isocrates was wrong about the relation between thought and its expression, then many Irishmen who can think cannot express what they think, so in practice it amounts to the same thing.

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External examinations, for good or ill, determine what is taught and how it is taught. The N.U.I. Matriculation examination in English determines the way in which many Irish secondary students are trained in English. One of the two papers sets an ' essay '. It is not known what proportion of the marks is given to this exercise. Ten per cent ? Fifty per cent ? It is not known what qualities of expression are valued by the examiner. A teacher may try to train his pupils to say simple things simply and hope for the best, though he might himself hesitate to set topics so vague and vaguely directed as " Old houses and new houses ". ' In setting a youngster to write on a one-word topic such as ' Competition ', ' Music ', ' Trees ', or ' Newspapers ', you are asking too much of him ; you are simply inviting him to flounder in a mass of incoherent commonplaces. (And if you are an examiner, you have only yourself to blame for the difficulty in assessing the result).'[20]

The other paper requires the candidate to answer a number of questions on set texts. The questions are largely a test of memory, some of them demanding the reproduction of large blocks of lines of verse arbitrarily chosen : this year, for example, over 2,700 lines of verse were set for study ; candidates were asked to quote the last two verses of *The Scholar Gipsy* (250 lines) and, in an alternative question, from *Il Penseroso* (176 lines) to quote ten lines beginning ' Sweet bird that shunn'st the noise of folly . . .', together with another ten lines beginning ' Thus, Night, oft see me in thy pale career . . .'. It is fair, I suppose, that a boy's future professors should expect him to have read some English prose and verse before beginning professional studies, and to be able to show proof that he had read them. It is not so clear that it is wise to train a boy of seventeen to discuss ' the relationship between Keats's presentation of the nightingale and the general theme of the poem ' ; or ' To whom does Dryden refer by the name of Atticus ? Quote eight lines to show

[20] English Association symposium, p. 91.

that, in this poem, Dryden employs the same method of satire as that used in *Absalom and Achitophel*'. If a boy can answer these questions off his own bat, he is either precocious or cunning. If he cannot, he can be trained to go through the motions of writing a passable answer. If he cannot be trained, it is rumoured that stock answers and opinions can be dictated and memorized. In any case, it is not good training in expression to write pretentious answers to questions that invite pretentiousness. It is certainly bad for the soul.

A sound secondary training in any subject should not be forced to ape the perhaps legitimate demands of a university school in the same subject. When the tradition of rhetoric was a living one, ' criticism ' and ' appreciation ', literary comment, taste, personal culture, were necessary means to the end of eloquence. They were by-products of the system. Culture, at an early age, is all the better for not being pursued self-consciously for its own sake. There may be something to be said for centring university English studies on criticism, though Mr F. L. Lucas, who teaches English at Cambridge, expresses some doubts in his recent book *Style*. There is nothing to be said for a secondary school system which imposes the same pattern on English teaching at the expense of sound training in ' eloquence ' and thought.

Set text-books, for good or ill, determine what is taught and how it is taught. What a boy must study intensively he will take to be a headline for his own stumbling practice. He is asked currently to read something of Bacon, Addison, Goldsmith, Lamb (two essays), Hazlitt, Mitchel, Ruskin, Stevenson, Quiller-Couch, Somerset Maugham and Sir Osbert Sitwell. There is nothing of Dryden, the father of English prose ; nothing of St Thomas More, who might be presumed to have something to say that would engage the interest of a Catholic lay-man ; nothing of Belloc, whose deliberate magisterial manner in some of his later essays would provide one excellent model for a contemporary rhetoric ; nothing from any expert journalist or broadcaster ; nothing by one of our Irish authors who writes with an Irish rhythm and an Irish accent. There is a piece from Mitchel, on Bermuda, in debased Carlylese. And Lamb, and Somerset Maugham and Sir Osbert Sitwell.

The introduction and notes in a text-book are taken by many teachers to be an indication of what examiners will look for. Indeed, in future a teacher must presume that even the Introduction to the text is prescribed ; this year, Matriculation candidates were asked a question which presupposed their familiarity with the exotic phrase ' concentrated literary pemmican '. In the current text-book there are 290 pages of text and over 300 pages of Notes, consisting of largely useless *eruditio* of the most time-wasting kind. One hopes that they are not widely used. In the Introduction the editor sets the note :

> Literary criticism is the art of judging literature . . . The essential duty of a literary critic is valuation . . . We must take it that the pieces prescribed for our study in this anthology are on the whole well-written ; of their period and individual style they are samples of " good literature " . . . What we must aim at in our reading and study is not how to become literary critics, but how to interpret and appreciate what is good, in short, how to acquire a good taste in literature . . . As, with only one or two exceptions, all the pieces prescribed for our study in this anthology are either essays or near-essays . . . the question of style will be considered in relation to the various authors' productions in this literary form.

With an approach of this kind, it is no wonder that our young students of English are knocked speechless. The method is precisely calculated to swell the ranks of literary critics. There is no effort to show the student how to organize a simple statement clearly and effectively with a view to his own practice. And if there were, Lamb and Ruskin and Stevenson, so personal, idiosyncratic, sophisticated and allusive, are no models for the average young mind. And one cannot be indifferent to the dubious morality of encouraging young people to sit in solemn judgment on genius. The Introduction to this anthology for young Irishmen concludes :

> Essays by writers such as these edify, instruct and amuse ; they both relax the mind and brace it for the work of life ; and they add to the sum of human happiness. The essay, in one guise or another, continues to appear in contemporary periodicals and reviews, and sometimes reaches a high level. It is a form of writing that makes a powerful appeal to most readers, and which writers of almost every type and class delight to practise.

Even in England they have recognized long since that the ' essay ', that highly sophisticated, personal, deliberately diffuse and digressive genre, is an outmoded literary form. The ' essay ' does not appear in contemporary periodicals and reviews. It is a form of writing that does not make a powerful appeal to most readers, least of all to the majority of young people of seventeen. It is education of this kind which gives people a permanent and justifiable dislike for everything that is ' literary ', that can be labelled ' culture ' : a rooted conviction that literature is precious and necessarily associated with posturing and pretentiousness. It has long been an axiom in England that one is wiser not to ask young people to write ' essays ', or to hold up Lamb and his like as models for their imitation. The ' composition ' and the essay-type answer are another matter. There is everything to be said for training the young, in a way appropriate to their years, to write a letter, to develop simply a simple statement, to state a case clearly, to adduce evidence and authority concisely and economically, to make a point clearly and effectively and to bring their statement to a conclusion. But that is rhetoric.

What examinations omit to test determines, in practice, for good or ill, what will not be taught. There is no public test of spoken English. For every word the average citizen writes, there are thousands he is forced to use in business, from public platforms, on committee and even at the microphone. There is good reason to think that Radio and TV will once more restore the ascendancy of the spoken word. Command of the written word is no guarantee of effective mastery of speech. But speech is relegated in the secondary school to haphazard work in the Debating Society.

The people who set examinations are responsible for their effects for good or ill. It is much easier to set a vague paper which demands a vague ' literary criticism ' in reply, than to test objectively a student's command of language. It is difficult to assess that accurately ; but it is possible. The variation in marks given by different examiners to an ' essay ' and by the same examiner at different times to the same ' essay ', is explained by the fact that they are looking for different qualities and for the wrong qualities of expression. They look for that undefined thing "style ", that modern bogey " originality ", that impalpable thing " imagination ". These are excellent qualities in their way, but they can safely be left to nature and to the conscience of a good teacher. Trying to test what cannot be tested does not ensure, in any case, that they are taught. It is doubtful if they can be " taught " in that sense at all. But one can test reasonably objectively, if not easily, the ability to make a clear and effective statement.

" English " is a subject notoriously difficult to examine objectively. The present examinations test nothing except, possibly, memory or cunning. They are not qualities which a system of education should pride itself on fostering. They will continue to be fostered so long as it is assumed that the only way to examine is to test the student directly by means of a nation-wide written test which takes no account of the individual character or the individual aims of a school. In an excellent series of articles in *The Journal of Education* just two years ago, under the title " External Examinations Examined " [21], the effects of a mass examination were analysed. ' We have seen that the worst features of the (G.C.E.) Ordinary level result from its being a mass examination. This characteristic can be defended only in terms of the need for standardization. If the examination is to provide an assessment which is reliable and valid, widely accepted as such, and stable in its standard from one year to another, then it must be taken by large numbers of pupils from many different schools in a number of different areas. However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the objectivity of standards thus dearly bought is in reality largely illusory '. The writer asks ' If a pass-fail criterion is all that is required, would it not be possible to devise

[21] *The Journal of Education*, November 1955 to February 1956.

a method of assessing internal examinations?' It should be possible to examine the examiner, or at any rate his examination.

However that may be, any country needs, for its intellectual health, a sound contemporary rhetoric in its secondary schools. We need it in this country, whether in our own language or in English. It is necessary. It is possible. At the very least, it is by a change of emphasis from 'appreciation' to 'eloquence' that a proper system of language teaching might be enabled to develop. It is the key, I think, to humanizing the Science side of the curriculum. And a valuable unity and co-ordination might be given to all the diverse 'subjects' which are with us to stay, by restoring to secondary teaching the single central clearly-conceived aim of the great European tradition, *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.

The Early Irish Muse

by R. A. BREATNACH

'IT is true, of Irish prose a good deal has been published and translated, so that any one can form an idea of its merits ; but for Irish poetry next to nothing has hitherto been done. The metrical festologies, the topographical, historical, chronological, geographical, grammatical, lexicographical compositions, which mainly for philological reasons have received the first attention of editors, do not represent Irish poetry. They were written for purposes of instruction or as a *memoria technica* by learned professors at the monastic schools. Indeed, the true appreciation of the merits of Irish poetry has often been obscured by the fact that metrical productions of this class have been taken as the offspring of the Irish Muse. But Oengus the Culdee, Flann of Monasterboice, Mac Coise and Gorman are not the great poets of Ireland. Their works loom large indeed in our manuscripts, but they were copied so busily for the sake of the information which they conveyed in a convenient form. Meanwhile the genuine poetry of Ireland . . . was relegated to the margins and blank spaces of vellum manuscripts, or, written on paper, has the more easily disappeared. What is left of such poetry is rarely to be met in the great and celebrated tomes ; it has to be searched for.'

Kuno Meyer wrote those words in 1901 as an introduction to the first edition of ' King and Hermit ', one of the finest nature poems in Irish. With the publication of Professor Gerard Murphy's *Early Irish Lyrics*,[1] where naturally the poem is included (No. 8), there is no longer any need to search for the ' offspring of the Irish Muse '. Meyer's own search was a long and arduous one, beginning as far back as 1884 in *Revue Celtique* with another of the lyrics chosen by Professor Murphy (No. 57) and ending only with his untimely death in 1919. His achievement was remarkable in that he succeeded not only in discovering much good poetry and in editing it with scholarly care but also in communicating his unique knowledge and enthusiastic appreciation to the non-specialist reader. When he died what he had described as ' the earliest voice from the dawn of West European civilization ' was no longer unknown and the literary claims he had never tired of advancing for its poetry were widely acknowledged.

It was unfortunate that Meyer died before he had an opportunity of consolidating his pioneer work by gathering together in one book the mass of poems and fragments which he had dispersed throughout a variety

[1] Edited with translation, notes and glossary by Gerard Murphy. Oxford : Clarendon Press. London : Cumberlege. 1956. 42s. net.

of publications, many of which, as time passed, became almost as difficult of access as the original sources. It was ironical that, as a result of haphazard publication, students found that Meyer's discoveries too had to be searched for. He had made better provision for those whose needs are satisfied by translations by publishing in 1911 *Selections from Ancient Irish Poetry,* a book which ran into two editions and which, until the appearance of Professor K. H. Jackson's *A Celtic Miscellany* in 1951, was the only reliable general anthology in English renderings of early Irish poetry.

The lack of an anthology was not only a serious handicap to students : without a readily accessible corpus of texts, the study of the subject lacked a focus. In these circumstances, had Professor Murphy decided simply to make a selection from published texts and translations and re-print them with a bare minimum of necessary emendation and correction, the work would have been adequate to the needs of the general public and of service to the student. But he chose to compile what is essentially a scholarly text-book and incidentally, by reason of the nature of the poems selected, an anthology that must appeal to a wide public. *Early Irish Lyrics,* then, is at once one of the most notable contributions to Irish learning of recent years and a well-chosen representative selection of the finest examples of vernacular poetry composed between the eighth and the twelfth centuries. By applying philological techniques the editor has brought chronological and linguistic order into a corpus of over two-thousand-three-hundred lines of Old and Middle Irish verse, comprising fifty-eight separate items, nine of which are single quatrains and the remainder short or long poems. And with order has come, on every page, fresh illumination.

All circumstances considered, it was a wise decision on the part of the editor and the publishers to make *Early Irish Lyrics* a work which, unlike other Oxford anthologies, will appeal more particularly to specialists, and to equip it accordingly. The full critical apparatus provided here will serve as a reminder that learning must take pains—but it need not give them unless the reader so wishes. All the texts have been published before and all but a few translated. But, while he handsomely acknowledges his indebtedness to previous editors, Professor Murphy, on the basis of a fresh collation of the manuscripts, determined that the time had come to provide critically restored normalized texts, to the extent this was necessary, and to make his own translations. The magnitude and difficulty of the undertaking will be apparent from a moment's consideration of the manuscript history of the poems.

All but a fraction of them are preserved in manuscripts of a much later date than the compositions themselves. In many cases, on linguistic evidence, it is possible to show that the original poem antedates the surviving copy or copies by several centuries. Were Irish a dead language

like Latin, this lapse of time would have made little difference to the texts. When, however, ' the language is not fixed, but in a constant state of development ' ; when ' scribes deliberately modernize, emend (as they suppose) language which is unintelligible to them, use their memory, rely on oral tradition ' (p. xix), the textual hazards to which poems were exposed can be easily imagined. But despite such adverse circumstances, poetry of monastic provenance as a rule has been sufficiently well preserved to render critical restoration of the original feasible.

It is another matter with early secular poems in the preservation of which oral tradition apparently had played a significant part before they were committed to writing. ' Secular poetry, like story-telling, was, however, normally preserved orally. Some of these orally recorded poems ultimately indeed found their way into manuscripts. But from the beginning of their manuscript existence it would seem that faulty memory, unconscious alteration, and interpolation, had so injured the integrity of many of them that to obtain a text understandable in almost all its details, and linguistically and metrically uniform, is to-day impossible ' (p. xvii). This judgment goes to the root of the problem of the nature and extent of the textual corruption and provides a satisfactory explanation of it. Besides it accounts for the passing over of poems which a less meticulous editor might have chosen to include on grounds of general literary merit alone.

It has long been recognized that the outstanding characteristics of early Irish personal poetry are freshness of spirit and technical brilliance. Even in translation, the former is palpable. Without a working knowledge of Old Irish and some acquaintance with the metrical system, the reader of the poems must miss something that is essential for full enjoyment of them. Irish prosody is best understood as an attempt to achieve in the field of language the artistic effects which Irish metal workers and illuminators of manuscripts achieved in their respective spheres. What Mlle Henry says of the art of these craftsmen applies *mutatis mutandis* to the poets : Vu en dehors de toutes considérations historiques, il apparaît comme la forme la plus satisfaisante et la plus parfaite d'art non-représentatif qu'ait connu l'Europe, et, à ce titre, il est d'un intérêt brûlant et immédiat pour les artistes de notre temps. Il nous retiendra aussi par son étonnante perfection technique . . .[2]

Pre-occupation with a delight in formal perfection is characteristic of Irish poets from the eighth to the eighteenth century. Even in our own time Yeats insisted on it :

> Irish poets, learn your trade,
> Sing whatever is well made,
> Scorn the sort now growing up
> All out of shape, from toe to top.

[2] *Art Irlandais*, p. 16.

But ' well made ' has a more exacting connotation in the native tradition. A prosodist of the modern period could define a poem as ' concise, understandable, musical speech confined within determined limits, (each line) having a fixed number of syllables, congruence of sounds and quantities '. It is not perhaps a very good definition by any standard, but it is an indication of the traditional attitude of mind. After 1200 the learned poets of the early modern period, as is well-known, carried their prosodical refinements so far that *dán díreach* encomium became a display of metrical virtuosity. Their poetry, as Miss Waddell says of the Latin verse of the early Irish monks, is ' beaten copper '.[3]

In *Early Irish Lyrics* we meet poetic art before it had had time to become an end in itself. While lacking the subtilization they were to undergo later, the metres are fully developed. In origin the system goes back to the period when the early monks, having learnt the rhythms of Latin hymns, began to marry them to Irish words. Already about the year 600 these *núachrutha* or new measures had begun to replace the archaic alliterative verse of the native tradition and by the eighth century they had ousted the latter except to some extent in saga. Variety is their keynote. As Bergin has pointed out : ' What Irish poets aimed at was not identity, but similarity combined with variety '. This principle is not only basic to the fundamental syllabic structure and to the kinds of poetic ornament developed, but is reflected in the freedom the poet enjoyed to improvise at will. The richness of the metrical resources at his disposal is suggested by the tradition that there was a measure for every day in the year.

Elaboration of poetic techniques on such a scale argues an urge to poetry of considerable vigour. Unfortunately, whether as a result of wholesale destruction of manuscripts or of a change of taste in later times or of a combination of both factors, the amount of Old and Middle Irish personal poetry that has survived is meagre enough. But sufficient has come down to show that, probably by the eighth century and certainly by the following century, it had attained a remarkable thematic variety, and an emotional sincerity and intellectual maturity unique in its time. It is a reminder that the Golden Age of Irish learning had a vernacular as well as a Latin side to it. To some extent, then, *Early Irish Lyrics* may be regarded as a treasury of the intimate thoughts and emotions expressed in their own language of some of the company of saints and scholars who re-civilized Europe. Without copious quotation it is impossible to illustrate the quality of the poetry, and accordingly what follows is merely broadly descriptive of the contents.

The first section of the anthology is devoted to religious poetry composed by monks and hermits. Many of the poems are straightforward prayers : not formulae, but spontaneous prayers offered up for

[3] *The Wandering Scholars* (Pelican ed.), p. 63.

the first time out of the fullness of hearts and minds spiritually exalted and reverently and vitally aware of the majesty of God and of His universal immanence. They range from what might have been the simple private prayer of a monk for a peaceful night's rest (No. 19) to invocations of great power and beauty like that to the Blessed Virgin Mary (No. 20) and to Christ's Cross (No. 14), which conceivably were hymns chanted in community. Another poem which matches these two in intensity of devotion and makes a like impression is the ninth century *Día lim fri cach snim* ' God be with me against all trouble ' (No. 10).

Religious fervour is not the only characteristic of the poetry of the monks. Much of its charm derives from the fact that it touches and reveals at many points the warm humanity of the holy men. Later Irish hagiography is full of fabulous tales in which the saints, having shed their humanity, have become shadowy figments who behave more like pagan magicians than virtuous Christians. In these poems, however, saints are real human beings. Daniél úa Líathaiti, abbot of Lismore and Cork, who died in 863, is solicited by a woman penitent who, having been gently but firmly reproved, bows before ' his perpetual purity ' (No. 7) ; an unknown monk of the tenth century describes, in a measure that could not be better suited to the subject, how his thoughts wander during meditation—a delightfully mature lyric (No. 17) ; another, who evidently found the scriptorium a less congenial place than the author of ' I and Pangur bán ' (No. 1) did, complains that his hand is weary from stretching his ' little dripping quill without ceasing over an array of great beautiful manuscripts ' (No. 33) ; and the poet who imagined St. Íte nursing the Infant Jesus in her little hermitage (No. 11) shows a sensitive appreciation of maternal tenderness. When the monks, looking outwards beyond themselves or in their longing to seek out holiness in solitude, observe—to adapt a phrase of Francis Thompson's—nature's delicate fellowship, their poetry (Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 30) is a spontaneous expression of delight in and praise of the beauty and wonder of God's creative power.

Adram in Coimdid
cusnaib aicdib amraib,
nem gelmár co n-ainglib,
ler tonnbán for talmain.

' Let us adore the Lord, maker of wondrous works, great bright Heaven with its angels, the white-waved sea on earth ' (No. 4). That is how one of them in the ninth century expressed the hermit's attitude to nature, and he speaks for all.

The secular poems, which form the second section of the anthology, are of a more miscellaneous nature and two or three at least of them strike a less truly lyrical note. The group of Otherworld poems (Nos. 39 to 42), with which possibly the Finn-Cycle poem in praise of Créide's

house (No. 48) belongs, are scarcely lyrics in the strict sense. But they are good illustrations of the imaginative quality of the poetry with which prose sagas are interspersed. They illustrate, too, how the truth of what Dr Helen Waddell has observed about the uninhibited approach of Irish men of letters to the old mythology, as exemplified in their Latin verse, applies, in so far at least as sensitive treatment is concerned, with greater force to vernacular poetry : ' what the Irish scholars did give was their feeling for classical literature : their handling, sensitive and fearless, of paganism '. That the characteristic of fearlessness does not apply is suggested by the apparently deliberate euhemerization of pagan gods and goddesses, of which there is widespread evidence, and by the christianizing of mythological themes. A typical instance of the latter process is the well-known ' Lament of the Old Woman of Beare ' (No. 34). Originally the Earth Goddess, in this poem, composed about A.D. 800, she is regarded, as Professor Murphy tells us, ' as a very old human being who, having outlived friends and lovers, received the *caille* or nun's veil from St. Cuimíne, probably the seventh century Kerry saint of that name.'

To what extent, if at all, the poem on Líadan's love for Cuirithir (No. 35) derives from a like inspiration is not clear, nor does it greatly matter, because such knowledge is unnecessary for enjoyment of the sensitive handling of a theme which can never grow stale : the sorrow of a girl whose lover has embraced the religious life. The emotional quality of this poem is matched only by Gráinne's tender sleep-song for Díarmait (No. 55), which is later by at least three centuries. Tragic love is the theme of three other poems (Nos. 36, 45, 49), all of them deeply moving. Others appeal particularly by virtue of their simple pathos. Such are those in which Oisín laments his lost youth (Nos 57, 58) and Cúilte recalls the Fíana (Nos. 50, 51). For the same reason the sequence of Middle Irish poems attributed to Mad Suibne (Nos. 43—47) impress. But their especial interest is the vivid descriptions they contain of wild nature. Two other remarkable nature poems are Finn's lay on May-day (No. 52), the reconstructed text of which is a feat of mature scholarship, and the perfect short lyric, also attributed to Finn, ' Summer has gone ' (No. 53). The latter is unsurpassed for verbal economy and artistry :

Scél lem dúib :
dordaid dam ;
snigid gaim ;
ro fáith sam ;

Gáeth ard úar ;
ísel grían ;
gair a rrith ;
ruirthech rían ;

My news for you :
the stag booms on ;
winter drips down ;
summer has gone ;

Wind high and cold ;
low down the sun ;
short is its course ;
sea running strong ;

[4] *The Wandering Scholars*, p. 63.

Rorúad rath ;
ro cleth cruth ;
ro gab gnáth
giugrann guth.

Fern ruddy brown ;
beauty laid by ;
well-known become
the wild goose cry.

Ro gab úacht
etti én ;
aigre ré ;
é mo scél.

The chill has gripped
the birds' wing-plumes ;
season of ice ;
they are my news.

It has been remarked above that the study of Old and Middle Irish poetry has hitherto lacked the focus that only an adequate text-book can provide. Of course, on the higher level of scholarship there is less need for this. During the past twenty-five years a small but valuable nucleus of literary studies has been published. One of the results likely to follow from the appearance of the work under review is a revival of interest in them. The first in order of publication was an important essay on ' The origin of Irish nature poetry ' contributed to this journal by Professor Murphy in March, 1931, pp. 87–102. A year later, in *The Church of Ireland A.D. 432–1932*, pp. 66–78, Dr Robin Flower dealt with the influence of the Culdee movement of the late eighth century on literature. Then followed a full-scale work entitled *Studies in Early Irish Nature Poetry* (Cambridge, 1935) by Professor Kenneth Jackson. This study is of fundamental importance both for its discussion of poetic genres and their origins and for the literary criticism it contains. Next came a long appreciative essay by Flower entitled ' Exiles and Hermits ', published as chapter II of his *The Irish Tradition* (Oxford, 1947), which no reader of *Early Irish Lyrics* ought to neglect. Not the least of Flower's gifts was his skill in re-capturing the mood of a poem in a neatly contrived verse-translation. His essay contains several examples, a number of them renderings of poems and quatrains included in *Early Irish Lyrics*. Very likely the general literary public will prefer them to Professor Murphy's close translations, which are clearly intended to convey the exact sense. It were vain for him to attempt to do more, for the Muse's gift, as Dr Waddell has observed, is ' incommunicable in mere scholarship '.

Meyer has been quoted for the statement that anyone, as long ago as 1901, could form an idea of the merits of Old and Middle Irish prose. No one to-day would agree fully with him but there was a grain of truth in his opinion. To say the same thing now about the personal poetry of those periods on the grounds of Professor Gerard Murphy's great work supplemented by the literary studies to which reference has been made, would be, in the words of Líadan's declaration of her love for Cuirithir, *firithir ad-fíadar* ' as true as anything told '.

Reviews

THE COMMUNIST PERSECUTION OF THE CHURCH

THE RED BOOK OF THE PERSECUTED CHURCH. By Albert Galter. Dublin : M. H. Gill. 1957. Pp. xi, 491. 30s.

THERE are many sources of information about the *Church of Silence*, the Catholic Church in the several countries under Communist rule. Among them are articles in papers and pamphlets, like those of the *Sword of the Spirit* in Britain, books of personal experience written, for instance, by missionaries expelled from China, and the data available from the Vatican and the headquarters of religious orders. M. Galter and the contributors to this Red Book claim that the material has never yet been collected in a single volume and that some of it may have been incomplete and viewed in isolation. " In presenting the Red Book to world public opinion the Commission for the Persecuted Church fulfils the duty of offering objective information on the Communist persecution to those who are prepared to examine without prejudice documents and facts."

Readers of *Studies* will scarcely require to be persuaded that Communism is violently opposed to all religion, but particularly to the Catholic Church. It is not in the first place an economic or social or political system. It is a philosophy, however warped and twisted, that militantly rejects everything that transcends matter and this world. And this is not exclusively the result of its Marxist parentage. There was a long nineteenth-century current of revolutionary thought among Russians, and it was strongly impregnated with the twin elements of Nihilism and denial of God. " We Russians are all Nihilists ", declared Dostoievski who, himself a revolutionary in his early years, knew the soul of Russia more profoundly than any other Russian writer. He saw just as clearly that the revolution of the future would be primarily a revolt against God. In his eyes, the Antichrist of to-day has the traits and garments of the social reformer who will offer men the bread of earth while he does all he can to banish and destroy the bread of heaven.

This book has three purposes, we are reminded in its Foreword. It is a defence of those values that Communism rejects and a reminder of what Communism is doing to destroy these values. Secondly, it describes the actual situation in different countries. Finally, it appeals to all " who are interested in the cause of human liberty and the fundamental rights of man " to consider one of the most terrible tragedies of our tragic century ; it urges them not to underestimate Communism or to minimize its threat.

The position is examined in country after country : in the Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Yugoslavia) and in the further East, in China, Korea and Viet-Nam. The central policy is the same, but tactics vary according to the strength of the Communist Party and of the opposition and the possibility of playing off one

group against another. Throughout the " technique of the vice " is being applied. Here it may be tightened, here it may for some local reason be relaxed.

The first object has been to ruin the Church's prestige. A monster campaign of propaganda is initiated. The Pope is presented as a warmonger and the Vatican as a tool of American capitalism. Slav feeling is stirred up against the Latin world. In Viet-Nam and Korea the Holy See was depicted as the ally of colonialism. When this atmosphere has been developed, the first measures are taken against the Church. The Catholic Press is gradually smothered, religious associations are disbanded. Church schools are taken over by the State and Church property confiscated. In future, no social or charitable activity is permitted to the Church.

An attempt is then made to break the links between the local hierarchy and Rome. With the exception of Northern Viet-Nam no Communist country admits a representative of the Holy See. Nuncios have been expelled from Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Roumania. A further effort is made to divide the higher from the lower clergy and to sow seeds of discord between clergy and laity. Use is made of staged trials to discredit prominent Catholics. Where possible, associations are started for accommodating or so-called " patriot " priests, mercifully a small handful, for example the *Union of Catholic Priests of Peace* in Hungary or the *Association of Patriot Priests* in China. Alternatively, Catholic publications are placed in the hands of " patriots ", as in the notorious *Pax* movement of Piasecki in Poland.

The Church is driven out of public life. Bishops may not exercise their jurisdiction without giving some profession of loyalty to the State and accepting crippling statutes. In some countries a Bureau for Church affairs controls Church property and administration, and infiltrates " patriot " Vicars General into dioceses from which the lawful bishops have been removed. In short, every cunning device is employed and every underhand trick made use of to defame, cripple and destroy the Church. Confusion of issues is another favourite ruse—usually to meet some political or economic emergency or to bewilder foreign opinion. The authors of the Red Book warn their readers not to be deceived by the apparently more moderate policy since the death of Stalin. As a matter of fact, the Soviet treatment of Hungary in autumn, 1956, should have inoculated the world against that particular danger.

The book does not deal with the resistance of Catholics, which very often has transcended courage to become positive heroism, nor does it assess the effects on Catholics of this insidious persecution. Certainly, great numbers have deepened their spiritual life, and it may well be that the Church in Western lands will one day—indeed very shortly—be reinvigorated by Catholics from behind these curtains of iron and bamboo. Events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and 1957 have shown how slight is the ideological hold of Communism on their peoples, how great is the disgust for Soviet cruelty and barbarism, and how tenacious is the Catholic faith.

Messrs M. H. Gill and Son are to be thanked and congratulated for making this work available in the English language. It should be available in every

Catholic library and centre, not only for consultation but for continual study. We have the scriptural warning that the children of this world are frequently wiser in their generation than ourselves. This volume will be a great help to us to have that wisdom, so necessary at the present time, that is based upon a knowledge and understanding of the great enemy.

JOHN MURRAY

CLASSICS

THE ART OF GREEK COMEDY. By Katherine Lever. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1956. Pp. x + 212. 21s.

THE religious and ritual origins of comedy, as also of tragedy, are lost in the obscurity of the sixth century B.C. It is an easier task and a more fruitful one to investigate into the literary antecedents of drama in Greek epic and lyric poetry. This has been done much more adequately for tragedy than for comedy, and one of the best things in Professor Lever's book is her discussion of Ionian influences on comedy, such as mythological burlesque, elements of satire and caricature, the use of the vernacular and folk songs.

The central portion of her book is rightly given to Aristophanes, to whom we owe, more than to anyone else, our intimate knowledge of Greek life. The poet is first discussed as teacher, satirist, critic of all things in earth and heaven, then more technically as comic dramatist, constructor of plots and inventor of ideas, and lastly as the supreme word-artist and creator of lyric song. A very full picture of the poet and his audience is presented here in small compass. Miss Lever brings out very well the deep humanity of Aristophanes, and that most attractive communal self-sufficiency of ancient Athens, without hiding its faults.

A chapter follows on the fragments of Middle Comedy (404–338 B.C.). The comedy of this period continued to pursue with even more emphasis the delight of Old Comedy in mythological burlesques, and must have contributed in no small degree to the decay of traditional beliefs in the gods. This comedy which has been little studied in detail (we know the names of 40 dramatists, the titles of over 600 plays, and we have over 1,000 fragments), is full of types and stock characters, concerned greatly with food and drink, cooks, courtesans and parasites. It is not necessary to share Professor Lever's view that Middle Comedy was of particularly low quality, since the transmission of the fragments, mainly through Athenaeus, offers us little basis for a sound judgment. Again, one need not accept the view that " flight from reality is the distinguishing characteristic of Middle Comedy ". It is rather the fact that no branch of ancient Greek literature represents a flight from reality. One can scarcely imagine that the people who invented reality should flee from it. On the contrary Greek literature is a continuous approach to reality whether in the home-grounds of human life or in the wide fields of animate and inanimate nature. The only imaginable " flight " was in the direction of an inspired idealism, and Greek idealism was never an escape-mechanism but rather a closer mental approach to reality.

Miss Lever's book ends with an interesting section on New Comedy, mainly devoted to Menander, but continuing the history of comedy down to the second century B.C. and discussing its influence on later writers such as Lucian and Alciphron. Her very able treatment of Menander stresses the poet's rich and varied range of human sympathies, the plastic quality of his style, perfectly suited to every kind of character and circumstance, his realism of character, setting and dialogue within a conventional framework of plot. She can only hint at his ideal qualities, his tenderness, his spiritual sincerity, his distaste for self-complacency and sham, or in another sphere his wonderful use of realistic psychological motivation within the traditional plots. With a full index, valuable and up-to-date bibliographies appended to each chapter, and an adequate running commentary on the historical and intellectual background, this book can be warmly recommended as an introduction to Greek comedy.

J. J. Tierney

POETS IN A LANDSCAPE. By Gilbert Highet. London : Hamish Hamilton. 1957. 30s.

Professor Highet, taking some exercise after the hours of midnight oil and toil which produced *The Classical Tradition* and *Juvenal the Satirist,* here leads a literary pilgrimage to the rustic haunts of Catullus, Vergil, Propertius, Horace, Tibullus, Ovid and Juvenal. His object is " to recall some of the greatest Roman poets, by describing the places where they lived, recreating their characters, and evoking the essence of their work ". One could wish that all scholars attempting such *haute vulgarisation* would look to this as a model. The three indispensable ingredients for this type of book are copious extracts from the poets themselves, good photographs which allow the earnest reader intermittent relaxation, and a commentary which can help the Latinless reader by ranging freely through more familiar literatures for purposes of comparison and illustration.

The extracts have all been translated by Highet himself, and one must acclaim both the principles on which he worked and the felicity of the renderings. He has retained where possible the metrical effects of the original, but has replaced the Roman dactylic hexameter with the iambic hexameter, and the elegiac couplet with a combination of iambic hexameters and iambic pentameters (rejecting the heroic couplet because it does not reflect the masculine-feminine relationship of hexameter and pentameter). The result is an admirable fidelity to the original, but somewhat difficult to read aloud. Highet is not afraid to lay cheek-by-jowl Milton's and his own version of the Horatian ode about " a beautiful blonde called Pyrrha " (the author teaches at Columbia), and he gets away with it. His renderings of the Propertian extracts are particularly happy. Inevitably there are the blind spots : " Quick, quick, Catullus, turn your face to the wall and die " (*quid est, Catulle ? quid moraris emori ?* The pun cannot be ignored). And there will be a shudder or two at this attempt to render Horace's *Albi, ne doleas* with modern names :

See how Audrey—a rare beauty with clustered curls—

burns for David ; but he yearns for the arrogant Eileen . . .
I too, though a liaison with a kinder girl
was quite possible, still cling to my cruel Sue . . .

" The arrogant Eileen " and " my cruel Sue " would be more at home in *Oklahoma* than doing duty for *asperam Pholoen* and *Myrtale libertina*. But these are occasional lapses ; the general level is outstandingly good.

In any consideration of the meat of this book—the attempt to inter-relate the background of each poet with the sort of poetry he wrote, and thus " to evoke the essence of their work "—one central and damning objection must be faced. Roman poetry finds little direct inspiration from nature. All these writers, Tibullus possibly excepted, are urban poets, drawing their material from the events of city-life, from the topics aired by the coterie of intellectuals, and from the Greek writers whom they closely studied. Catullus's fondness for flowers, Vergil's country-scenes in the *Eclogues* are evoked not so much by the beauty of Northern Italy as by the idyllic descriptions of Theocritus and Meleager. This ineluctable fact impairs the whole purpose of the book. The chapter on Propertius, for example, has a fine description of the environs of Assisi and the springs of Clitumnus ; but then Highet, admitting that " love appears to him (Propertius) to be the only thing worth writing about", shows that these rustic sights and sounds have no place in his poetry. In a rather desperate effort to pin Propertius *somehow* to Assisi, the author suggests that we should couple the Roman poet and St Francis as " spiritual kinsmen " ! This is so comic a conceit that we turn eagerly to the chapter on Juvenal of Aquinum, half-hoping (alas in vain) that he may be labelled a " spiritual kinsman " of St Thomas.

But there is a still more fundamental criticism to be made of the chapters on Catullus and Ovid. Highet's concern to " recreate their characters " leads him to apply a purely biographical interpretation to their works. This encourages the reader to regard Catullus as a naïve emotionalist, pouring out his verses in the infrequent intervals of his pursuit of women and wine ; we see nothing here of the unremitting study of his literary models, of the pride in his craft. (This point is too large to argue here ; perhaps we may develop it in a future issue of *Studies*.) And Ovid is depicted as a disreputable roué and professional seducer, our attention being constantly drawn to the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Amores* ; however did he get time to work up fifteen books of *Metamorphoses*—the delving into numerous sources, the superb organization of his material, the consummate charm of presentation ? It is surely regrettable if we can interest our audience only at the heavy price of such distortion.

But perhaps these issues are too fundamental to be discussed in what is after all a *jeu d'esprit*. The photographs, taken by the author himself, are magnificent ; the book is beautifully and carefully produced. Not the least of its merits are the occasional *obiter dicta*, as when the *Art of Love* is compared in its systematic presentation with a " five-hundred page manual of trout-fishing, with statistics of water-temperature ". But the description of Crassus as a " deaf, sober, politically blameless millionaire, the Herbert Hoover of his age " is an extraordinarily inapt judgment, as well as being a libel on Hoover.

P. G. Walsh

ESSAYS ON EURIPIDEAN DRAMA. By Gilbert Norwood. Cambridge University Press. 35s.

This the last book of the late Professor Norwood contains four essays on Euripides. The first is a general discussion entitled " Towards understanding Euripides ", while the others treat respectively of the *Bacchae*, *Hippolytus* and *Supplices*. The first essay quotes the very diverse views of modern poets and scholars on the value and qualities of Euripides and approves of a subjective rather than an objective approach to the poet. Scant praise is given to Aristotle's *Poetics* as a representative of the latter approach. The effect of such influences on Euripides as religion, contemporary events, earlier and contemporary playwrights, is described as comparatively unimportant. There follow some intelligent pages on the inequalities in Greek drama, e.g. poor plot-construction hand in hand with excellent lyric composition, and again (after Kitto) on the variety of play-types such as melodrama or tragi-comedy in Euripides. Then comes a discussion of the poet's habit of philosophizing, his free inventions in mythology, his sardonic piquancy, his fondness for melodrama, his methods of heightening suspense. Next we have a treatment of " flaws " ranging from little inconsistencies through feeble and bad writing to faulty plot-construction. Finally, Euripides in Norwood's opinion is not a classic but a romantic, dramatically a groping experimentalist, intellectually an unequal genius but magnificently readable.

In the second essay, on the *Bacchae*, Norwood considerably modifies his earlier views expressed in his *The Riddle of the Bacchae* (1908). He drops altogether the opinion that the mysterious " Stranger " is to be regarded as a human prophet and that the miracles of the plays were intended to be understood as sham miracles. He still, however, maintains his earlier view that the destruction of the palace of Pentheus (ll. 632-4) is intended as a " bogus " miracle. Most readers, I am convinced, will prefer to reject this theory of a secondary illusion (or rather a critical moment) within and conflicting with the primary dramatic illusion, although opinions may legitimately differ as to how the earthquake and destruction were represented or symbolized on the stage.

The third essay is an interesting character-discussion on " God and man in *Hippolytus*." The prig Hippolytus, the " good woman " Phaedra, the grossly-philosophizing nurse, are acutely characterized. On these follow the " divine " characters : Poseidon with his gifts and miracles, Artemis in her beauty and frigidity, Aphrodite in her vitality and cruelty, all representing a divine profusion which governs man and Nature, while scarcely caring for man except to do him harm. Norwood speaks well of the " celestial Monroe doctrine " with its restraints on trespass upon the prerogatives and spheres of particular deities. We may regard the play as a criticism of the lack of centralization in the hierarchy of Olympus with the human figures as mere puppets, or as a purely human drama if the gods " merely symbolize the permanent facts of the Universe and of human life". Truly we may say that it was Euripides, more even than the sophists or the philosophers, who unsparingly castigated the disharmonies and inconsistencies of popular Greek religious feeling, while admitting that these divine creations represent in their beauty and majesty, in their indifference and cruelty, as never elsewhere,

a synthesis both of man's impressions of Nature and of the permanent directions and diversities of the human soul.

The last and longest essay presents a very peculiar theory on the origin of the *Supplices*. Norwood here details a long catalogue of alleged difficulties or additions in the play. He also rejects the usual arguments which have caused the majority of scholars to date the play in 421 B.C. and analyses the play into sections, some by Euripides, others by an anonymous writer, the passages by Euripides amounting in all to 526 lines, or less than half our present text. He assumes, for it is nothing more than an assumption, that the " Anonymous " was a little-known tragedian named Moschion whose date is vaguely fourth or third century B.C., and who wrote a play on a theme similar to that of Euripides. The original play of Euripides is assumed to have been a private or closet play written for the pleasure of the poet and his friends. Lastly Norwood conjures up a " botcher " of the second or third century A.D., who patches up Euripides' play with lavish additions from Moschion.

I do not think that many readers will be convinced by Dr Norwood's theory. The *Supplices* is a fine play and can certainly be read and enjoyed without any sense of the alleged inconsistencies. Some of them, the discussions on politics for example, have always been regarded as the highlights of the play. Moreover, it has long since been shown (by Polenz and Schmid) that the mental and emotional milieu of the play is that of the years of the Archidamian War. Schmid in his notes (*Schmid-Stählin, Geschicte der griechischen Literatur,* Part I Vol. 3, First half p 449ff. 1940) points to many connections between the play and the early books of Thucydides ; and it is only necessary to compare the views of the piece on democracy versus autocracy with those in Thucydides (particularly in the Funeral Speech of Pericles) to see that the connection is even closer than Schmid indicates.

How is this relationship to be explained ? Euripides is naturally not borrowing from Thucydides whose work appeared probably twenty odd years later than the date of the *Supplices*. The opposite could be the case, but I think it obviously unrealistic to judge such matters on the narrow ground of literary borrowings or filiations. These political views are part of the reasoned defence of Athenian democracy as expressed by Pericles in his Funeral Speech and are not necessarily at all as late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Most of the facts about the democracy which are proudly proclaimed by Pericles long ante-date 431 B.C., and Athenian theory never lagged behind the facts, but always ran at least slightly ahead of them (Thuc. I, 70 ; II, 40).

As for views on war, Dr Norwood is clearly wrong in postulating such a difference in view between the fifth and fourth centuries. The Greeks were never war-mongers. What then would Dr Norwood make of the solemn exorcism of the inventor of war in *Ajax* 1192 ff. ?

On the whole this is a rather unequal book, a thing perhaps to be expected since the author tells us that the essays were conceived and written at widely separated times. All are, however, stimulating. The first and third in particular contain many valuable ideas and parallels from modern literature.

J. J. Tierney

ECONOMICS

LORD NORMAN. By Sir Henry Clay. London : Macmillan. Pp. 506. 36s.

IF Montague Norman had not existed it might have been necessary to invent him ; in fact he invented his own myth and lived it for over a generation. Supreme arbiter of British banking when bankers excited more awe or more obloquy than they do today, he became the popularly accredited source of the most diverse and unconnected events. Few men of his time evoked so many contradictory attitudes from their fellow men, and none behaved with more apparent calculation to justify the wildest surmises or the most unlikely legends. To critics of the " money power " he seemed to manipulate the purse strings of " international finance " in its alleged conspiracies against society. In equally disordered but less fevered imaginations his handsome, bearded, aristocratic look was the mask of a hardfaced advocate of deflation, balanced budgets and unemployment, who wanted to build a world fit for bankers tolive in.

There is little foundation for any of these fables in the present book, though the reader may still wish that Lord Norman had done more to belie them. The sinister, if unlikely, role for which he was cast in popular repute seemed no further from reality that the air of mystery which he appeared deliberately to cultivate. Educated people were antagonized by his exhibitionist reticence ; his ostentatious secrecy and refusal to explain or justify often forfeited him support which he might otherwise have gained. When his aloofness and reserve were construed as contempt for the views of others, he was as much to blame as his malicious detractors. As he communicated himself ineffectively, his legitimate contempt for the vulgarity of organized public relations was wrongly interpreted as unbecoming indifference to public opinion. When he quoted the Arab proverb, " the dogs bark but the caravan moves on " in one of his rare public statements, the least sensitive of his critics can hardly have felt complimented.

Sir Henry Clay, who undertook this study of Lord Norman's life and work, had been a close associate and adviser of Norman when he was Governor of the Bank of England and had access to all the relevant documents. The result is a most important contribution to the financial history of the thirty years from 1914 to 1944 and an invaluable survey of central banking in the period, and of the role that Norman played in its evolution. Clay describes in detail the relations between the principal central banks during the attempts at international reconstruction in the 1920s, before and after the return to the gold standard and during the great depression. Above all, there is a splendid account of Norman's achievement in modernizing the Bank of England and equipping it technically for the responsibilities it undertook when war came again in 1939.

Clay did not live to complete his work, but he had selected and assembled his material with distinction even if the style lacks the grace which he would have been likely to impose during revision of his final draft. Apart from a last chapter on the Governor as a man, which is written with urbanity by an anonymous colleague, the book is primarily a study of Norman as a banker. The engaging interest, however, of the purely biographical material, which is confined mainly to the earlier chapters, persuades the reader that Clay

must have intended to trace the influence on the character and behaviour of the later Governor of the strange and prostrating illnesses which had been a feature of his formative years. But the editors who prepared the material for publication took Clay's unfinished portrait as they found it. A good deal is told of Norman's habits and personality, particularly in the final memoir, though no comprehensive or consistent assessment of his character is attempted.

Clay recalls that in 1912 Norman, suffering from fits of depression and disabling attacks of pain in the head, resorted to Jung in Zürich. The visit was a disappointment. The patient was found " fit to go everywhere except for a mechanical kink in the brain but too far down the ladder for him to tackle then ". At the same time, in his report to Norman's friends, Jung said that he would not live three months. In the event, Jung's apparent diagnosis of neurological illness proved in error, for subsequently Norman saw another Swiss doctor who prescribed intent concentration on a complicated series of linear patterns. The patient's condition in due course improved as much, one feels, as a result of his release from the worries of business disagreements with his partners as from the linear pattern treatment. Soon afterwards his long association with the Bank of England began. If Clay had lived to finish the book in his own way he might have found in the story of Norman's illnesses during his earlier years some clues to the later strange behaviour of the man who only embarked on a great career at the age of forty-five. But in the book, as it is, the reader finds clues only by inference.

The account of the Governor's official life is excellent although the character of the man remains largely unexplained. The attempts made in the personal memoir to resolve his contradictions are polished and subtle but, somehow, implausible. The narrative generally is successful in describing the myth which Lord Norman invented for himself, but the myth remains detached from the man who must also have existed. The omission impinges, of course, on some of the more crucial activities of Lord Norman, the Governor. His relationship with Dr Schacht, for instance, must have owed as much to personal friendship as to official association. Clay's treatment of the subject displays a reticence in keeping with Lord Norman's own practice of the virtue, though one feels that this was not a relationship which Norman or Schacht would have sought to conceal. Norman was godfather to one of Schacht's children and the child was named after him. Schacht confided to Norman his plans for organizing a revolt against Hitler. Both men were in correspondence after the second world war, and Schacht would have attended Norman's funeral had he not been refused a visa.

Even if nationalization has done little to diminish its prestige and authority, the Bank of England which Sir Stafford Cripps, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, once described as " not my agent but my creature " is a far cry from the institution over which Lord Norman had presided. More than eighty years ago the great Walter Bagehot decided that the Governor of the Bank should not be appointed for more than two years, that a " permanent Governor . . . would be one of the greatest men in England ". Lord Norman's colleagues in the Court of the Bank also had misgivings on this issue, but, even if their convictions had been as strong as Bagehot's, circumstances left them little choice but to elect him annually from 1920 to 1944. He remained Governor

for twenty-four years because of his eminence among bankers, because of the incomparable personal qualities and technical qualifications which his colleagues believed him to possess—a belief indeed which he himself seems to have shared.

Ironically, however, their admiration of the qualities which made him indispensable to bankers probably blinded them to limitations which had such serious consequences for the history of the 1930s. More closely than any save Mr Churchill's advisers at the Treasury, Norman was associated with the disastrous return of an over-valued sterling to the gold standard in 1925. It was the advice of a man who thought exclusively in banking terms. Within the Bank of England, however, he was rightly regarded as a great Governor. He weaned it from the easy-going, old-fashioned ways and converted it into a national institution staffed with personnel of the highest administrative and technical calibre. He had world-wide banking and business connections and in England during the period between the two great wars he was the repository of immense power and influence. He exercised power partly by direct action, partly by advice. His actions were often brilliant and courageous, though wisdom after the event questions the correctness of some of them. History, however, testifies to the unfortunate consequences of his advice on some of the larger problems of his time.

As Governor, Lord Norman emerges from the biography as a great public servant. " All in all ", says his colleague who wrote the last chapter, " he was a man of such stamp and stature that any country may deem itself fortunate if it is served by more than one in the course of a single generation." Two of his leading characteristics were " his vehemence and his passion for work ". " Without some sort of work", he himself wrote, " it is barely possible to get along." " He could ", we are told, " on occasion be light-hearted, but never frivolous, and could never learn enough about anything and everything." But he had no use for learning as an end in itself. He regarded information, and still more understanding, as instruments which have value in use. His respect for academic learning was " untouched by envy ". In his view, academicians " arrived nowhere ; or at best they made it easier for more practical men to take advantage of their labours by putting them to better use ". Norman was a pragmatist who dealt with situations as they arose and believed that he rejected all sets of systematic principles. In fact, of course, he did have certain guiding principles, though if he had publicly formulated them they might have been seen to be wholly inappropriate to the problems of his time. He wanted to restore the kind of ordered world that had existed before 1914. He deserves praise for having tried so energetically to promote greater financial cooperation between nations, and for his internationalist ideals. He laboured for the restoration of economic stability throughout the world, and was still awaiting the return of the " normal " conditions he had known before 1914, when the world was once again overwhelmed by war.

On the famous occasion of his interrogation by Keynes and his colleagues on the Macmillan Commission, Norman failed as a witness partly because of limitations of mind, partly because he and his questioners were at cross-purposes. Clay says that Norman refused to generalize, that he explained

his actions " as a series of responses to particular market situations which were never quite the same ". In moving the Bank Rate, for instance, he said that he had the consequences to the industrial position of the country in view " but the main concern is the international consideration ".

Confronted by the devastating dialectics of Keynes, Norman seemed to cut a poor figure. The truth, however, is that they were working on different planes. To Keynes it seemed important that Norman should be compelled to admit, as he eventually did, that there was a connection between his monetary policy and increasing unemployment. But Norman had earlier explained that the advantage to domestic industry and commerce of maintaining the country's international position was paramount. It seemed never to have occurred to him that any useful purpose might be served by formulating rules or principles or by reducing the day-to-day operation of the Bank of England to a theory of credit. For him, as for many distinguished British civil servants of his time, generalized theory was suspect ; it was enough to be able to see clearly over short distances. Clay says that " his powers of explanation and advocacy fell far short of his powers of insight and decision ". It seems possible, therefore, that this indifference to theory may be attributed to his making a virtue out of necessity, and his reticence to the rationalization of an inability to justify his actions persuasively.

No doubt, Norman had good reason for impatience with the foolish application of general economic principles by impractical dogmatists. He failed, however, to recognize the valid uses of theory, the need for accurate analysis, clear exposition and the value of the guidance afforded by a systematic code of principles. Like other practical men unwilling to learn from history, he repeated the errors of his forerunners and after 1918 committed himself to financial policies little different from those which had brought distress after the Napoleonic wars. He relied too much on what he regarded as intuition. Intuition has a legitimate place in the formation of judgment if it be an expression of unconscious thought. Too often, however, the intuition of the so-called practical man is only another name for " hunch ", or an excuse for conscious but concealed prejudice.

The consequences of Norman's secretiveness were, perhaps, more serious and enduring than those of any other trait in his character. They led to a distrust of bankers generally by politicians and the public. Unnecessary secretiveness damages the reputation of bankers and of their institutions by giving the impression that they have something to hide even when they have nothing to disclose. It exposes public policy to the influence of enthusiastic amateurs without scientific financial knowledge and prevents those who are technically expert from instructing their real masters—responsible public opinion. Sir Henry Clay's book does justice to Lord Norman's real achievements. It leaves, as well, the inescapable conclusion that a capacity for systematic analysis, full disclosure of all permissible information and lucidity of expression are no less important than intuition and decision in a banker.

PATRICK LYNCH

G2

THE STERLING AREA IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Philip W. Bell. Oxford : Clarendon Press. London : Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1956. 63s.

DR BELL'S book is mainly a comprehensive factual survey of the monetary union termed the Sterling Area and the problems which have beset it in the postwar era. It is a useful book since the Sterling Area is a concept frequently talked about, but not too widely understood. The Area comprises the United Kingdom, all Commonwealth countries (with the exception of Canada), British Protectorate Territories, Ireland, Burma, Iceland and Iraq. The common bond is the holding of the foreign exchange reserves of these countries in a common pool in London and the maintenance of parity between their currencies and the pound sterling, although certain of the Overseas Sterling Area members (New Zealand, Pakistan, British Honduras, Iceland) have revalued their currencies in terms of sterling since the war.

The monetary mechanisms of the members are described, and their adjustments to balance-of-payments' difficulties in the period 1946–1952. In this connection the author includes an interesting account of Ireland's postwar economic situation. A statistical analysis of Area trade and the chief commodities entering into it is also given.

There is nothing very new in this account. The claim of providing " the first really systematic survey " of the Area is somewhat excessive in view of the monumental dissertation on the economies and trade of member countries prepared by a European Co-operation Administration mission to the U.K. and published in 1950.

By far the most interesting part of the book is the section devoted to a study of the future prospects of the Area. In Dr Bell's view the Sterling Area is now in a transitional stage, and is unlikely to continue in its present form. He argues that, whereas the basis of the Sterling Bloc of the 'thirties was the common financial convenience of participation, the older harmony of interests has largely disappeared in the existing situation. Britain has lost her strong creditor position and has become, more especially since the war, a net debtor country.

Throughout the 'thirties London was a prominent source of new capital, and sterling had worldwide acceptance as a medium of international payments. Sterling has, however, yielded its position as a world currency to the dollar, and Sterling Area countries have been forced to adopt rigorous measures of exchange control against the dollar. Further, while formerly contributions of dollars and other foreign exchange to the common " pool " were completely voluntary, now they are mandatory ; and resort to the " pool " is subject to severe regulations.

Access to sterling balances, accumulated during the war, was restricted in the case of certain member countries in the post-war period, in order to prevent a spree of spending by these countries which would have weakened even more the international position of sterling. Yet another change is that Overseas Sterling Area countries have not now the freedom of access to the London Capital Market that they formerly enjoyed. Such access is now controlled by a Capital Issues Committee. This slowing down of the flow

of capital, argues Bell, greatly weakens one of the major advantages of membership. Pressing the point still further he sees the possibility of Overseas members incurring dollar loans to maintain their investment programmes and the repayment of such loans would constitute an extra strain on the dollar " pool ".

Dr Bell mentions two possible alternatives to the present system which would remove the existing restrictions. They are (1) a system of freely fluctuating exchanges and (2) a clearing arrangement possibly along the lines of the European Payments Union. Although the category of changes in the Area, which this book discusses, makes a formidable list, I believe that any such radical development is extremely unlikely. The situation is not one of growing weakness. It is indeed true that postwar British investment overseas has dropped substantially in real terms though remaining almost unchanged in money value ; the postwar yearly average of approximately £130 million corresponds closely to figures for the mid 'thirties. However, the Commonwealth Finance Ministers have shown themselves conscious of this particular problem and the Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation has been formed to encourage private investment overseas. The Colombo Plan, which limited the volume of accumulated balances that might be used by India, Pakistan and Ceylon, is due to expire this year and this will relax blocking of balances within the Sterling Area. Releases by negotiation have in fact been liberal all along.

In 1950 the International Monetary Fund proposed that certain members of the Area, including the United Kingdom, might relax restrictions against the Dollar Area in view of the current level of their dollar earnings. This proposal was rejected on the ground that all dollar earnings were held in common and that the sterling balances of each member constituted a proportionate claim on the " pool ". This instance reflects the strong spirit of co-operation which still marks the Sterling Area. The " harmony of interests " survives, even if it be merely the rather negative bond of facing common difficulties together.

The appendix provides a mathematical treatment of adjustment by a country to shifts in its import and export prices; and a complete bibliography is given.

GERARD QUINN

THE THEORY OF WAGE DETERMINATION. Edited by John T. Dunlop. London : Macmillan. 1957. Pp. xvi × 438. 36s.

THIS book contains the Proceedings of a Conference of the International Economic Association held in Switzerland, 4–13 September 1954. As the 35 participants from 13 countries included general economic theorists and specialists in labour economics, these Proceedings have a very wide range and are difficult to review briefly. Some of the papers, especially those in Part II, " The general level of wages ", make difficult reading because it is here that the theoretical economists with their graphs and many-valued functions make their chief contribution to the debate. Parts III and IV, " The impact of the

labour union " and " The wage structure ", are less abstract and apart from giving a good account of the differences between the " institutionalist " and the " economic " approach to the activities of unions, contain two interesting papers on French trade unions—Brochier " An analysis of Union models as illustrated by French experience " and Marchal " Wage theory and social groups ".

In Part V, " The nature of bargaining ", we again meet with the theoretical economist when Professor Shackle expounds the " psychological " theory of the wage bargain. Using the ideas propounded by Neuman and Morgenstern in their *Theory of games and economic behaviour* and in his own *Expectations in Economics*, he concludes that " an adequate theory of bargaining requires us to study psychological questions which many economists even today regard as outside the proper scope of economics ". This conclusion is confirmed by the judgment of Rothschild: " it is not at all unlikely that in the search for a realistic theory of wage bargaining the ' psychological ' and ' institutional ' theories can aid each other ".

It is only when one has struggled through these very diverse papers that one appreciates the editor's introductory account of " The task of contemporary wage theory ". As he closes the book the reader will re-echo Professor Robinson's final words: " The discussion had been valuable if it had left everyone with a feeling that we did not yet know all the answers ".

KEVIN QUINN

METAPHYSICS

GEORGE BERKELEY AND THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. By Edward A. Sillem. London : Longmans, Green and Co. 1957. 21s.

IN his Preface the author of this book gives the impression that he is about to engage in that fascinating but hazardous exercise, the setting forth of what his subject would have made of a particular problem had he been asked to treat of it. Dr Sillem does himself less than justice. For his book abundantly establishes, not alone that Berkeley had a great deal to say about the proof for the existence of God, but also that this proof is an integral part of his philosophical system.

Berkeley looked for certain qualities in the theistic argument, notably that it should be clear, short, cogent and securely based on the facts of immediate sense-perception ; and also that it should conclude, not to the metaphysical abstraction of an unmoved mover, but to the one, true, living God of the Christians. But before the problem of such a God can even be posed there must be knowledge of the world. Berkeley's general metaphysics and epistemology must, then, be discussed first. Dr Sillem gives a very full exposition of Berkeley's rejection of abstract ideas, of his polemic against Locke's conception of material substance and of the unique form of knowledge by which we know spirit. The position is epitomized in the principle that Berkeley himself regarded as his great discovery—*esse est percipi et percipere.*

The stage has now been elaborately set for the proof for the existence of God. Berkeley, in fact, gives two proofs but one of them, despite Dr Sillem's protestation, seems scarcely more than a variant on the usual argument from design. The peculiarly Berkeleyan proof is based on the need for a perceiving Mind to ensure the continued existence of material things when they are removed from the observation of men ; the tree that, in the words of the limerick, " continues to be when no one's about in the quad " does so because there is Someone who can truthfully say " *I* am always about in the quad " ! The proof is less straightforward than might have been thought. Berkeley's principle *esse est percipi et percipere* does not take him all the way and he has to supplement it with an argument from design. This appears admirably in Dr Sillem's clear, although occasionally repetitive, account.

The most original part of the book is the last chapter in which Berkeley's proof is appraised in the light of contemporary theistic controversies in England. After a brief effort to capture Berkeley's system, which eludes the normal categories of idealism and empiricism, Dr Sillem sets down what he considers to be the outstanding merits and defects of Berkeley's natural theology. Five strong and five weak points in Berkeley's approach are listed. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that they seem to cancel out and give a null result. It is to Berkeley's credit, for example, that he should stress the importance of making the theistic argument available to ordinary people and not the preserve of the metaphysician ; but against this must be set Berkeley's defect of unduly minimizing technical argument (" Naïve theism", Dr Sillem quotes Laird with approval, " is of no greater account than naïve economics or naïve trigonometry "). Still, the result is not negligible. Berkeley's argument does raise those points in the theistic proof that are the present object of controversy: the analogy of causality, the part played by experience in the proofs for God's existence (what thomists sometimes call the " facts " of the proofs), the nature of our knowledge of God, the alleged insincerity—or worse—of setting out to prove from reason the existence of a God of Whom we already know a great deal from other sources. This last point leads Dr Sillem to the suggestion that Berkeley would share Gilson's famous—and controverted—view of the legitimate influence of Christianity on philosophy.

There are many other points of interest which cannot find a place in this brief account of Dr Sillem's painstaking and scholarly study of Berkeley. Enough has been said to suggest that this book, with its emphasis on the unity of Berkeley's philosophical thought and on the capital position of the theistic argument within that unity, is a useful corrective of those facile historians of philosophy who assume that natural theology was a side-issue with Berkeley or who write off the Berkeleyan God as the merest *deus ex machina*.

M. B. Crowe

ST THOMAS AND THE FUTURE OF METAPHYSICS. By Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., M.S.D. The Aquinas Lecture, 1957. Milwaukee : Marquette University Press. 1957. Pp. 97.

The last seventy years have witnessed the rebirth and steady growth of Thomistic metaphysics. Today it has reached that stage of development in

its new life which enables it to reflect upon itself and to recognize its resources, to look out upon a world whose mental vision is confined within the limits imposed by experimental science and to recognize the needs to which it can minister. Such considerations inspire this book with the optimism of the Thomistic revival : a modest optimism that makes no extravagant claims because the task still to be accomplished is held clearly in view.

In what sense can we speak of a future for metaphysics ? This is the introductory problem of Father Owens's lecture. For some, in whose eyes the deposit of metaphysics was already complete at the death of St Thomas, the question is meaningless : metaphysics has had its past but it cannot have a future. This view, however, not only contradicts the evidence of history, but also betrays the spirit of Thomistic metaphysics. For others, in whose eyes metaphysics has outlived its usefulness, the question is likewise meaningless : metaphysics was a support of man's immaturity, but the days of his immaturity have passed. Then why does mature man still pose the old problems ? True enough, metaphysics would seem to have lost its influence on our general culture. But perhaps we have here an indication of the work which will define the future of metaphysics.

But what is metaphysics ? Here Father Owens is vague, chiefly because he seeks " a formula comprehensive enough to extend to all the various conceptions of it which history has unfolded ". He goes on to acknowledge that " if one wishes to work seriously toward a future for it, one has to select a definite type of metaphysics which will inevitably exclude other types of thought that have borne the name ". On what basis is this selection to be made? Father Owens approaches his answer to this question by examining those needs which metaphysics might be expected to satisfy.

To take but one example, there is the need (so obvious on this side of the Atlantic to those who have listened to B.B.C. discussions) for a science whose competence to speak on such questions as the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul would command the same universal respect as the competence of the experimental sciences within their own special fields. If this need could be satisfied, then might the " millions " be guided in their attitude to such questions by those only whose metaphysical formation would entitle them to be heard.

Father Owens goes on to show that a metaphysics based upon the principles of St Thomas responds to the needs he has outlined. It is truly scientific. Moreover, by its penetration of being in the light of the primacy of the existential act, it reaches the authentic subject-matter of a distinct and universal science, properly equipped to demonstrate its conclusions concerning ultimate problems. In the development of such a metaphysics, much remains, and indeed will always remain, to be done. As St Thomas himself has pointed out, the development of metaphysics is not a work that can be accomplished by any single individual : it calls for the co-operation of generations of scholars.

I liked this little book particularly for its presentation of Thomism as a living insight into modern problems and a scientific challenge to agnosticism. Some will find difficulty in following the author's treatment of the existential interpretation of St Thomas's doctrine, and indeed I should have welcomed greater clarity especially where he sketches its application in the proof for the

existence of God. At the same time, one will appreciate the limitations which brevity imposes on the lecturer. An excellent series of notes is included at the end, some of which will be stimulating for the specialist : for example, note 23 which deals with Father Arthur Little's conception of the limiting function of essence, and note 30 in which it is claimed that the demonstration of the real distinction between essence and existence presupposes the proof for the existence of God. I should like to see this claim further developed.

DESMOND CONNELL

POLITICAL THEORY

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES. His Theory of Obligation. By Howard Warrender. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1957. Pp. 346. 42s. THOMAS HOBBES (1588–1679) who ranks with Bacon and Locke amongst the most eminent British philosophers, is best known for his celebrated work *Leviathan, or Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil.* It was first published in 1651, three years after the execution of Charles I and when Hobbes was a royalist exile in Paris. *Leviathan*, though a political treatise of permanent interest, was very much a tract for the times. Its author had lived through much of the unrest of the Civil War in England and, in consequence, was deeply convinced of the benefits of strong, central government. But he rejected the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, the ideological basis of Stuart absolutism, and sought instead a rational justification of autocratic government, preferably monarchical. *Leviathan* was the result.

Political theory was only one of the many philosophical and scientific interests which occupied Hobbes during his long life. He was the first British ethician, shaping negatively the course of British moral speculation for a century after his time. Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke and, to some extent, Shaftesbury and Butler are in the first instance critics of Hobbes. His ethical doctrine rested on a psychology of deterministic egoism, which in turn presupposed a materialist natural philosophy. Hobbes, however, was not an atheist, as Mr Warrender's book amply shows. His early formation had been in the scholasticism of Oxford and, though he later rejected most of the theses of his tutors, the imprint of their teaching is discernible in many of his writings. Of these his output was copious all his life long. They were collected into sixteen volumes by Sir William Molesworth in 1845. Except for *Leviathan* which has always been of interest to political philosophers, Hobbes's works were largely neglected till the early decades of the present century. There was then a revival of interest both on the Continent and in his native country. A Hobbes Society was founded in 1929, and last year he was added to the number of " Pelican " philosophers.

Hobbes attributes the origin of the State to " social compact ", by which men contract with one another to form civil society and thus terminate the " State of Nature " in which they have hitherto lived. It is not certain whether he regards the State of Nature or pre-civil condition of man as an historical

phase or as a logical pre-supposition of civil status. Mr Warrender leans towards the latter view. The Natural Law alone obliges men in the State of Nature. Owing, however, to a variety of circumstances characteristic of that State (notably, lack of " security ") most of the obligations by which their egoistic actions might be curbed are in abeyance. The result is a war of each against all and a condition of things in which " the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short ". To end this wretched plight man's self-interest dictates that he should " seek peace " and as a means thereto set up the State. Each one contracts with each of his fellows that he shall hand over control of his actions and liberty to a single man (or assembly) on condition that the others all shall do the same. He who is thus empowered becomes a civil sovereign, and the State comes into being. It is the sovereign's function to give security, peace and unity of action to what has hitherto been a multitude of warring individuals. His subjects in turn are obliged to render him absolute (or nearly absolute) obedience and submission, to accept and fulfil his interpretation of their duties at Natural Law, and even to make their own (externally, at least) his view of the meaning of the Christian scriptures. For them he is a " mortal god ". In him their multiple personalities are unified and thus is born Leviathan, the Commonwealth, ecclesiastical and civil.

Some version of this celebrated theory is familiar to most students of political theory. But detailed accounts of it differ considerably. And this applies not merely to the versions retailed at second and third hand by compilers of manuals but also to the accounts given by scholars who have studied Hobbes's own copious writings. Thus, to mention two recent commentators, Professor Michael Oakeshott and the late Professor A. E. Taylor have given accounts of Hobbes's doctrine on political obligation which differ from each other and from that given by the author of the book at present under review. This diversity is due to certain ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in Hobbes's text, but also, I think, to the distribution of emphasis occasioned by the fact that Hobbes wrote not as a dispassionate philosopher but as the ardent advocate of a remedy for the political discontents of his time.

One of the most common misapprehensions of Hobbes's doctrine is that which attributes to him the denial of all moral obligation prior to the formation of civil society. In consequence he is supposed to have derived all distinctions between right and wrong from the " fiat " of the sovereign. This implies, moreover, a serious illogicality in that pivotal point of his political theory, the compact or covenant by which the State comes into being. If all obligation, it is argued, comes from the State, whence arises the obligation of observing the covenant by which the State is set up ?

The central thesis of the present book aims at refuting the above interpretation and criticism of Hobbes's theory. It is Mr Warrender's contention that Hobbes does not derive moral obligation, nor even a new type of obligation, from the State. Moral obligation, both prior to and subsequent to the civil covenant, is imposed by Natural Law (the Will of God made known by the natural exercise of man's reason). The first and basic precept of Natural Law is " Seek Peace " ; from this all others are derived, notably that, as the means to peace, men shall form the State by covenant with one another (Second Precept), and carry out their civil obligations in virtue of the precept (the

third of the Natural Law) " that covenants must be fulfilled ". To the unwary reader Hobbes gives the impression of denying moral obligation prior to the political covenant, because in the State of Nature most obligations, though real, are " suspended " through lack of certain circumstances necessary for their validity. It is one of the merits of Mr Warrender's work that it clarifies the considerable obscurity on this issue and presents an account of Hobbes's teaching that is coherent and persuasive, in spite of being, now and again, against the letter of the Master's text. (See for instance the quotation on page 166.) This is effected through the instrumentality of certain distinctions in Hobbes's doctrine which are not ordinarily adverted to, such as that between *the grounds, the conditions* and *the instruments* of obligation.

The kernel of any political philosophy is its theory of political obligation. That is, no doubt, why the present study of Hobbes concentrates on that subject. Having elucidated Hobbes's teaching in Parts I and II of his book, Mr Warrender, for good measure, adds Part III on the Ground of Obligation in general. This matter belongs more perhaps to Hobbes's ethical theory than to his specifically political philosophy. Further, his writings on this subject are more ambiguous and fragmentary than those on the State. Here Mr Warrender's chosen role of conscientious interpreter rather than critic or commentator becomes very evident. Since he finds the text capable of at least two interpretations, he contents himself with expounding each of them. The question at issue is : why ultimately should a person fulfil his moral obligations ? Hobbes sometimes gives, as the reason, hope and fear of Divine Sanction, and sometimes seems to say we should do God's Will (manifested in Natural Law) simply because it is God's Will. Neither answer will satisfy the modern ethician. For, in the first place, we think we ought to do our duty irrespective of whether or not there is a reward attached ; and, in the second place, when we ask : why ought I do God's will, we think the question a reasonable one and that obligation has not been fully explained till it is answered.

Those who consider Thomas Hobbes's political theories worthy of attentive scrutiny will find the present work a valuable aid. The style is clear and readable. Relevant passages from Hobbes's works (and they are very many) are printed in full. This has the twofold advantage of saving the reader considerable trouble and of enabling him to savour Hobbes's own vigorous, forthright English.

It emerges (somewhat unexpectedly) from Mr Warrender's analysis that Hobbes, as a political philosopher, belonged to the Natural Law tradition, was a theist and even a Christian of sorts. As such he tackled a perennial problem, that of safeguarding civil cohesion and harmony against the divisive influence of different opinions about the application of Natural Law and of conflicting interpretations of the Christian Scriptures. His solution was to make the civil ruler final arbiter on both those points. The Catholic Church (of which Hobbes was always a resolute opponent and critic) teaches that it is she who is the authentic, divinely-commissioned interpreter both of Sacred Scripture and of Natural Law. It is understandable that modern Catholics should applaud this arrangement as a wise dispensation of Providence. In this

totalitarian century we have clearly seen how irresistible can be the unchallenged might of Leviathan and how perilous the doctrine that assigns to him power not only over men's bodies but over their souls and consciences as well.

Michael Connolly

GUILIELMI DE OCKHAM OPERA POLITICA. Vol. III. Edidit H. S. Offler. Pp. ix, 322. Manchester University Press. 1956. 55s.

The leading intellectual of the first half of the fourteenth century was the English Franciscan, William of Ockham, the initiator of important movements in theology, philosophy, logic and politics, and deeply involved in the ecclesiastical controversies of the day. In many ways, his life and work characterize the spirit of the age—its intellectual and political turbulence in an atmosphere of envenomed strife, leading inevitably to extremism and frustration on immediate issues, but hastening a process of change of immense future significance. The right understanding of his thought is central to an understanding of the later middle ages.

An impressive amount of recent research devoted to Ockham has done much to discredit the more exaggerated notions of earlier historians about the radicalism and ' modernity ' of his work. It has not yet, however, produced a new definitive judgment. In these circumstances, the resumption of the present edition of the *Opera Politica,* of which the first volume appeared in 1940, is a noteworthy event.

The present volume comprises three polemical treatises from the general context of the Evangelical Poverty dispute, the resulting split in the Franciscan order and the struggle of the rebels with the papacy. As far as Ockham was concerned, the issue raised the whole question of an allegedly heretical papacy, with further reference to the theological eccentricities of John XXII concerning the Beatific Vision. The battle was then carried on against Benedict XII. The tracts are *Epistola ad Fratres Minores* (1334), *Contra Ioannem* (1335), *Contra Benedictum* (1337–8). In these writings, to the virulence and tenacity common to all the rebel Minorities, Ockham brought his own special brand of perverse ingenuity.

Dr Offler is a most competent editor. Each tract is admirably presented with textual discussion, an historical background and an indication of the main points of interest. His balanced account of John XXII's unhappy experiences at the hands of professional theologians deserves special mention as a brief and masterly exposition.

In general, these three works are not of the first significance for a final assessment of Ockham's contribution to political thought. Their importance is rather for the evolution of his own thought. The editor considers that the central problem of Ockham's political thinking was the " right relations, fair delimitation of functions and frontiers of Church and State " (p. vii), and that it was not until the *Contra Benedictum* that he passed from " ecclesiology to a developed interest in political matters " (pp. 162–3). One is not at all sure that this is the most accurate way of putting it. It seems rather that the central problem, arising directly out of his struggles with the papacy, was the definition of the *plenitudo potestatis* which was a term of both ecclesiology and

politics. He was not attacking the concept as such, but only certain current interpretations of it (pp. 273 ff.). As he was to put it later, his attack was on those " qui papalative, adulatorie et hereticaliter fabulantur ". The analysis of the term necessarily included the papal power in both spiritual and temporal affairs, because the definition he was attacking was phrased in those terms. Medieval hierocratic thought knew no distinction between ecclesiology and politics. Hence Ockham's political thought was, so to say, in the margins of theology. If it is true that, on one level of his thought, he contributed to the separation of theology from philosophy, it is by no means clear, on another level, that he contributed to the separation of politics from theology. And it is at least arguable that Ockham had no theory of the state in any real sense of the term.

A thinker such as Ockham must be studied from at least three interconnected points of view—for the understanding of his own thought, for its influence on future thought, and for the light it throws on earlier thought. Looking now at these treatises from the latter angle, it is interesting to see how Ockham has penetrated to the heart of hierocracy, and formulated its central tenet with a clarity worthy of close attention :

> It is maintained that because Christ made provision for all the needs of His Church, therefore He gave to blessed Peter and his successors all power, even in temporal matters, of supplying defect and culpable negligence in the actions of all kings and princes and generally of all the laity, concerning all those matters without which the harmony and security, peace and tranquillity of the *ecclesia* (Christendom) cannot be safeguarded and upheld. (*Contra Benedictum,* c. XIII. Pp. 296–7).

With this statement of his opponents' position, Ockham has illuminated the whole crux of hierocratic interpretations of the function of the *vicarius Christi* in Christendom. It had been put most firmly by James of Viterbo (*De regimine Christiano,* ed. Arquillière. pp. 167, 212, 269, 272), extending a *dictum* of Aquinas (*Contra Gent.* IV, lxxvi). But the idea itself was too important to be confined to theologians, and had already been formulated juridically by the canonists (Innocent IV, *Commentaria,* 11.2.10.; Hostiensis, *Lectura, ibid.* Similarly, Alvarus Pelagius, *De planctu ecclesiae,* I. *art.* 37. n. 19).

Ockham made great play with canon law in arguing his various positions. He was not, however, a trained canonist, and it is clear that his thinking had no distinctively juridical cast—a point to be borne in mind when examining his discussion of political authority. For him, as for other theologians, canon law supplied a *corpus* of authoritative texts. There were two specifically canonist traditions which Ockham exploited to the full. One dealt with the problem of an heretical pope, which, in raising the question of ultimate power in the Church, had already contributed to the beginnings of conciliar theory among canonists. The other dealt with the problem of the dualism of the powers. In respect of both Ockham was not especially original, though he showed a remarkable flair for minute analysis of texts. That he gave each tradition such publicity was undoubtedly very important for the future development of both these fundamental notions concerning papal power.

One would have appreciated an index to this book. To make a last small point : there is, surely, no justification for ' Lewis the Bavarian ' instead of ' Louis of Bavaria '. But this is a fine book, admirably edited, and handsomely printed.

J. A. Watt

HISTORICAL STUDIES

A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN ANTIQUITY. By H. I. Marrou. Translated by George Lamb. London : Sheed and Ward. 1956. Pp. xviii, 466. 42s.

SOME PHILOSOPHERS ON EDUCATION. Papers concerning the doctrines of Augustine, Aristotle, Aquinas and Dewey. Edited by Donald A. Gallagher, Ph.D. Milwaukee : The Marquette University Press. 1956. Pp. 95.

Monsignor Ronald Knox suggested once that every young man contemplating marriage should be examined on *The Egoist*. Would that it were possible to insist on a thorough familiarity with Professor Marrou's *A History of Education in Antiquity* before any man were allowed to make public pronouncements on education. The student and the expert will have known this monumental work in the original. With the welcome appearance of its English version it is to be hoped that it will become widely known to the general reader for whom also the author writes :

> The general educated public . . . has a right to be acquainted with the results of scientific research. Learning is not an end in itself : it should become one of the sources helping to create the culture of our own day.

Professor Marrou's scholarship goes without saying. He is equally at home with the philosopher discussing first principles and ultimate aims and with the positive scientist in his careful accumulation of fact. His sources range from the great guides, Plato, Isocrates, Quintilian, to the evidence of contemporary boys' exercises, book-lists, copy-books, a school library catalogue. The scope of his discourse is enormous : from the beginnings of Greek education in Homer to the baptizing of the great European tradition, roughly from 1000 B.C. to 500 A.D. His purpose, finally, is to enable the modern reader to understand the roots of European civilization as that was epitomized in its system of education. To know the past " is a means of escape . . . from the bondage of historical necessity, liberating us from absolute dependence upon the tradition which upholds us and has made us what we are ". But chiefly, " historical example compels us to test the validity and cogency of the reasons for our choices—it makes our decisions conscious ones ".

This is not a question of merely academic interest in our country. It would be well to pause and test the validity and cogency of the reasons for our choices before wholly jettisoning the last shreds of the humanist tradition with unthinking statements about " liberal education being all very well for a leisured class who could afford it ", or " One must be realistic and teach what is useful nowadays : after all, they have to earn their living ". One is tempted

sometimes to wonder if perhaps we are not more crassly material in our aims than the least Platonic of the ancients. A system of education which remained substantially intact with varying fortunes for over 2000 years, through wealth and poverty and international upheaval, cannot be dismissed with a phrase about ivory towers or privileged minorities.

Marrou describes the choices made long ago and the clearly-conceived reasons for their making. The ancients knew the alternatives they rejected or subordinated to their predominantly ethical aim. For example, " Ancient thought had no use for technique. It was not unaware of the possibility of technical development ; it simply rejected it. Its one aim was to form the man himself, the kind of man who would ultimately be ready for anything but had no special bias in any particular direction ". The hidebound conservatism of educators, which Marrou so wittily illustrates throughout his book, should not cause us to turn aside now from technology when the need for it is so pressing. But the human experience detailed here should make us hesitate before we produce a generation of dehumanized scientists :

> There is a terrible tyranny at the heart of technology. Any particular technique tends by its own inner logic to develop exclusively along its own line, in and for itself, and thus it ends by enslaving the man whom it should serve. It is only too clear today that science can make scientists inhuman.

What does he know of science who only science knows ? For that matter, what does he know of modern life who only letters knows ? It is the immediate future which will decide whether or not the humanist tradition finally dies or succeeds in assimilating science and technology as it was itself assimilated by Christianity.

However, Professor Marrou is a historian, not an advocate :

> The sympathy which a historian must feel for his subject obliges me to appear as advocate for the ancient system of education—for we must understand before we pass judgment : but the reader must remember that I present him with it simply as an example to reflect upon, not as a model to be slavishly imitated.

We have learnt much, even in the last hundred years. We should have no time now (we hope) for the brutality and the stupid rote-methods of the old " grammarians ", for their serene indifference to the way a child's mind works. But it is salutary to discover that the questions we are still asking were asked so long ago—co-education, the place of music and the arts, mathematics *v.* language, philosophy *v.* letters, games *v.* books, the educational value or otherwise of hero-worship, shorthand, the problem of character training and excessive intellectualism, the part of the state in education, the contrast between wretched pay of teachers and public profession of their supreme importance in the community.

If a reviewer must carp, then some disappointment may fairly be expressed with the brevity of the last three chapters, those on the meeting of Christianity and the classical tradition. (A small point : the translator makes St Columba the founder of Bobbio, p. 348). The need for a full treatment of the history of Christian humanism in the manner of Professor Marrou is pointed by the second

book, five papers read at a summer-school at Marquette University. They are simple, clear, solemn and abstract—one cannot ask of every writer Marrou's lightness of touch, his constant shrewd and entertaining asides and illuminating comparisons, his equal magisterial control of the idea and the fact. They have the merit of at least seeing the point of a question which, we fear, would be met with embarrassment and incomprehension by many educators here who are also Catholics : what does he know of any secular subject who, however learned and widely informed, does not contemplate the universe and all it contains with the eyes of faith ?

JOSEPH VEALE

THOUGHT AND LETTERS IN WESTERN EUROPE, A.D. 500–900. By M. L. W. Laistner. London : Methuen. Second edition. 1957. Pp. 416. 30s.

A NOT unlearned person once remarked, as he glanced at the title of this book, that he had not imagined that there had been any of either. There could be no better proof of the need for a second edition of what has become, since its first appearance in 1930, something of a standard work. Those readers who may have acquired a certain taste for " Dark Age " literature after sampling Miss Helen Waddell's brilliantly-prepared *hors d'oeuvres* may welcome the chance to proceed to more solid fare. The second edition of Professor Laistner's book has been completely revised and in some instances enlarged, while the bibliography and footnotes between them provide an excellent conspectus of recent scholarship. An appendix containing translations of Latin poems quoted in the text has been added.

The book is divided into three parts. The first is an introduction describing the state of Western learning in the two centuries of gradual collapse of the Western Roman Empire between 300 and 500. The initial chapter sets the historical and political background to this period. Professor Laistner does not hurry to approach the main subject of his book and it is not until p.34 that we hear anything about literature. Then we get an extremely interesting survey of pagan and Christian education, their interactions and the literature produced by both. A small section on pp. 76–77, new to this edition, gives a list of Greek Christian writers translated into Latin during this period.

The " big four ", Boethius, Cassiodorus, St Benedict and St Gregory, open the second part of the book, which discusses Latin Christian learning from 500 to 750 on a local geographical basis, corresponding to the political fragmentation of Western Europe before the rise of the Carolingian Empire. The paramount influence of Boethius in transmitting to the Dark Ages what it knew of Aristotle is strongly underlined and Professor Laistner pauses to speculate " on the development of medieval thought which might have resulted had Boethius lived to complete his task of making the entire corpus of Aristotelian and Platonic writings available in Latin dress " (p. 87). St Isidore of Seville and Gregory of Tours are given pride of place in Professor Laistner's treatment of culture in Visigothic Spain and Merovingian Gaul. Incidentally, the family history of these two distinguished bishops shows how far many episcopal sees in the West had come to be occupied on an almost dynastic basis. Isidore succeeded his brother as bishop of Seville and Gregory points out somewhat snobbishly in his *History of the Franks* that " all the bishops

but five who held the see of Tours were connected with my family " (p. 129). Chapter V of this section deals with Irish and English scholars up to the death of Bede. Professor Laistner gives due weight to the work of renovation of the Continental Church which these men achieved, not least by their interest in Biblical exegesis of a more literalistic kind. Bede's works have been the object of personal research by Professor Laistner over the past twenty-five years and his general conclusions are neatly summarized here. In particular he tries to show that, besides the generally admired *Ecclesiastical History*, Bede's theological works are also worthy of attention.

The third part of the book deals with learning and literature in the largely unified Western Europe created by Charlemagne. The influence of the great Emperor himself in sponsoring Christian learning is emphasized and the work and personalities of his circle of scholars are well sketched. Particularly striking are the portraits of Alcuin (who emerges as Charlemagne's theological " grey eminence "), Einhard the historian and Theodulfus the poet. An illuminating chapter on libraries and *scriptoria* describes the development of handwriting and the copying and circulation of manuscripts. Professor Laistner warns against over-emphasizing, on the strength of spectacular figures like John Scotus Erigena, the extent of knowledge of Greek at the period ; he thinks that, apart from a few tags and liturgical survivals, it must have been slight. One might add that this would account for the lack of contemporary influence of John Scotus's own unfamiliar Greek-inspired philosophy.

There is only space to mention a few of the facets of Carolingian literature brought out by this book. The student of political thought will find an admirably concise account of the views on Christian government held by such thinkers as Sedulius Scotus (who was something of a " Caesaro-Papist "), Jonas of Orleans and Hincmar of Rheims (who both upheld the superior authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy) ; all these writers owed much to the seventh century Irish treatise *De duodecim abusivis saeculi*. Amalarius of Metz's attempt to inaugurate a standard liturgical order of services is described, as are the practical and theological difficulties which met his efforts. To the chapter on Carolingian poetry have been added some remarks on the epic *Waltharius*, previously dated in the tenth century but now accepted as belonging to the second half of the ninth. Professor Laistner points out that we cannot be certain of the identity of the author of this poem and that it is improbable that the poem was an adaptation of an Old High German original. A closing chapter gives a brief survey of vernacular literature ; this in effect boils down to Anglo-Saxon and German literature. Professor Laistner deliberately rules out Scandinavian and Celtic literature from his purview on the ground that most of its finished products took shape after the period with which he is concerned.

A reviewer may perhaps be allowed a word of regret that Professor Laistner did not extend his survey to cover the tenth century (only briefly touched on in an epilogue), especially as he himself regards that century as no mere " period of disorganized barbarism " (p. 387). Such criticism does not of course detract from the general gratefulness of a medievalist to both author and publishers for the re-issue of this excellent handbook.

John B. Morrall

CALENDAR OF THE JUSTICIARY ROLLS, IRELAND : I–VII, EDWARD II. Prepared under the direction of Herbert Wood and Albert E. Langman, and revised by Margaret C. Griffith. Dublin : Stationery Office. 1956. 63s.

In 1905 and 1914 James Mills edited a *Calendar of the Justiciary Rolls, Ireland : XXIII–XXXV, Edward I,* in two volumes. It was then planned that a calendar of the whole of this series of justiciary rolls, extending to the eighteenth year of Richard II, should be published. In 1922, with the exception of one surviving roll (6 and 7 Edward II), the whole series was destroyed ; but calendars had already been prepared covering the years 1308 to 1318. Miss Griffith, who is now Deputy Keeper of the Public Record Office of Ireland, has revised and prepared for the press this latest volume, which covers the years 1308 to 1314. The next volume in this series will contain the full text of the one surviving roll for 6 and 7 Edward II ; and it is very much to be hoped that Miss Griffith will give us, not merely an English summary, but the full Latin text of this important original roll.

In England the mass of surviving King's Bench rolls (which roughly correspond to the justiciary rolls of Ireland) is so great that publication has so far daunted even the boldest scholars. Hence, quite apart from their very great importance for students of medieval Irish history, and more particularly of this country's social and economic history, these Irish justiciary rolls interest all students of legal procedure, as being the authentic records of a court with wide and central jurisdiction ; they belong also to an era when English law and English administrative government were at their height, thanks to the very able officials who represented Edward I in this country.

From the first days of the Norman conquest, the justiciar was the king's normal representative in Ireland, and there must have been legal proceedings n his court from the earliest times. The justiciar's jurisdiction did not extend to the whole country, for the great liberties (Meath, Leinster, Ulster, Connacht) were exempt from the control of his courts. A map based on these surviving records would show the justiciar of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century most frequently in Dublin, but constantly on the move from Drogheda, through Kildare and Carlow, to Kilkenny, Cashel, Limerick and Waterford. Within this area the cases that came to be heard in his court cover a very wide range of social and economic interest. Professor Sayles has more than once reminded students of the great mass of evidence to be found in these records concerning such matters as tenure of land, taxation, payment of fines, felonies of various kinds, the contact between English and Irish ways of life and speech, food and drink, fisheries, domestic economy, marriage and divorce, merchants and merchant law, and many similar topics.

It should be noted that one at least of the cases here calendared in English has been printed before in the original Latin. On 16 April 1312 the justiciar, John Wogan, heard a case at Drogheda which concerned the Verdon family in Co. Louth ; and further proceedings took place in 1312 and 1313. These proceedings are calendared by Miss Griffith in this volume on pp. 237–9, 265 and 278. The full Latin text was printed by Gilbert as an appendix to the second volume of his *Chartularies of St Mary's Abbey, Dublin* (Rolls Series,

1884), pp. 417–23. Gilbert published this text as a document illustrative of an episode briefly chronicled in the anonymous Anglo-Irish annals which he printed on pp. 303–98 of his second volume. It is a good example of the wealth of contemporary material which can be found in these ancient records by those who take the trouble to search for it.

AUBREY GWYNN

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. By Terence Kenny. London : Longmans, Green and Co. 1957. Pp. x and 208. 21s.

THE IMPERIAL INTELLECT. A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal. By A. Dwight Culler. New Haven : Yale University Press. 1955. Pp. xiii and 327.

IF the indiscretions of modern biographers have added a new terror to death, the diligence of Research Professors has added a new hazard to the expression of one's thought. Newman can have little more to suffer from biographers. The evidences of his private and public life lie open, arranged and docketed by himself, and already worked into several good biographies. But his thought —and for eighty years Newman thought furiously and unremittingly—has not been, and is unlikely ever to be exhaustively worked. The two rooms in the Birmingham Oratory which house his literary remains will be the goal of scholarly pilgrimage for many a year yet. Mr Kenny in his study of the political thought of Newman is in fact a pioneer ; and Professor Culler, though he travels a well-worn path in Newman's educational ideal, is so remarkably well equipped for his journey, and blessed with so sharp an eye, that he can write with the freshness of a true explorer.

When Fr Rickaby was compiling his index to the collected works of Cardinal Newman, he included very few political terms among his headings. Newman's political thought seemed insignificant in comparison with his religious and educational work. If men thought of his politics at all, they associated him with the reactionary Toryism of his early years at Oxford. Any idea that men had of his political thought was largely a wrong idea, and Mr Kenny has written this monograph both to fill a gap and to right a wrong.

Its effect is to qualify severely the half-truth that Newman was conservative in politics. Whatever conservative leanings he had were inspired not by temperament, for to the end his thought was flexible and receptive ; nor by self-interest, for he was unsympathetic to Church Establishment in his last years as an Anglican, and to the Temporal Power of the Papacy as a Catholic ; nor yet, despite his admiration for Walter Scott, was he conservative out of any romantic idealization of some golden age in the past. His conservatism is characterized by his theory of the development of ideas, which tempers a love of traditional wisdom with an openness to and expectation of adaptations to the needs of the age : " In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often." He opposed political liberalism not out of a dislike of progress and change, but on account of his deep awareness of original sin. Throughout his life he attacked the prevalent assumption that the Englishman was improving materially and morally with almost inevitable ease. Yet despite his objection to the facile

optimism of the liberals, he held many positions which they defended. He supported the idea of a tolerant, secular state, and in general fell far short of modern Catholic theorists in the positive value he put on the state, and in the powers with which he would endow it.

Newman's political thought eludes epithets, is impatient of labels. To determine the extent of his liberalism has therefore been a delicate, even a tortuous task, and Mr Kenny has not altogether succeeded in keeping the tortuousness out of his writing, which abounds in qualifications and distinctions. Yet if only for the unusual quality of its subject, at once modern, Catholic, and non-scholastic, this patient study is of considerable interest and value.

The Imperial Intellect is a good deal more interesting and easy to read. Its theme is that interaction between the educational and the religious interests of Newman which Professor Culler sees as the central pattern of his entire life. As a treatment of that pattern it can hardly be overpraised : fresh, mature, backed by learning, written with grace and assurance, beautifully printed and bound. The division is clear and massive : Part One, Oxford ; Part Two, Dublin ; Part Three, The Idea of a Liberal Education. The first two parts are lucid and sympathetic narrative, the third part a lucid and searching analysis of the Discourses on the Idea of a University. Yet it is, even more than Mr Kenny's, the sort of work that adds hazards to the expression of one's thought. Newman was no Scholastic, either by temperament or training. He was known to disparage a type of " medieval deductive rationalism " with which " to speak truth is to be ready with a definition ". The texture of his thought is by no means as close-knit as that of a philosophical text-book. But in Professor Culler's study every seam and every strand of that texture is probed and pulled and examined. It is not surprising that some strands are found to split and some seams to yawn.

Why does Newman describe the intellect sometimes as a storehouse, which must be enlarged, and sometimes as a living organism which can grow only by digesting and assimilating ? What does he mean by the Architectonic Science ? the study of being as such, or the discipline which arbitrates between all the other sciences, assigning to each its province and its method ? Why does he speak of theology sometimes as one segment in the circle of the sciences, and sometimes as the Queen in the hierarchy of the sciences ? Why does he devote a discourse to proving that liberal knowledge requires no further justification beyond itself, that it is its own end, and go on in the next discourse to justify it by proving that it is really useful to men ? Why did he, who had raised storms in Oxford by insisting that tutors should be also the pastors of their pupils' souls, raise more storms in Dublin by confining the university's function to the intellectual development of its students ?

Fortunately Professor Culler is even more concerned with answering these questions than with asking them ; and his answers are full and satisfactory, informed by a deep understanding of Newman's purposes and circumstances. For all his teasing and testing he respects the robe, and leaves intact the fabric of Newman's theory. He reconciles the divergent images for the intellect, cites the controversies that lie behind the discourses on liberal knowledge and on the aim of the university ; and all through the narrative and the analysis he points the tension in Newman himself between a yearning for " the sweet food of

sweetly uttered knowledge " and his sense that to the religious man this knowledge was somehow forbidden. In adolescence and early manhood that tension erupted in a series of illnesses and psychological crises, and in his educational theory in the famous portrait of a gentleman, which is painted so convincingly only to be rejected as an inadequate ideal.

Having finished this book, the reader will feel that he knows more about the composition of the discourses than did Newman himself. There is one necessary and infallible remedy : to take up the discourses and read them. If this excellent book was worth writing, it is because Newman, with his ripe learning and experience, has still much to teach us about the aim of education. Professor Culler shows us the teacher's note-books, and the sources of his thought and inspiration. But the only attitude in which one can learn from a master is, not looking over his shoulder, but sitting at his feet.

PAUL ANDREWS

RELIGION

PRINCIPLES OF SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY. By Bernard Leeming, S.J., Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Heythrop College (England). London : Longmans Green and Co. 1956. Pp. lviii and 690. 30s.

LONG experience in teaching theology has convinced Fr Leeming that a large number of people are interested in the " science of faith ". Priests, brothers and nuns who have to give religious instruction are professionally involved. But he also found that " doctors, lawyers, accountants, civil servants, secretaries, business people and even housewives " took a special interest in it, comparable to contemporary interest in music and arts. Further, Fr Leeming has found that many people show considerable power of penetration in religious discussion, and are not to be put off with vague and evasive answers.

It became plain to him that no fruitful discussion was possible unless the questioners were prepared to learn a number of technical terms and discipline themselves to systematic progress through the relevant subjects. He also had to meet the difficulty of explaining to some hearers that even the most highly-trained theologian does not know all the answers, and he felt the constant need of distinguishing between what is certainly part of Catholic faith and what is merely pious or probable opinion. The next conviction followed naturally. There was no point in urging patient study on the enquirer unless books in English were available for those who wished " to carry their study of religion to something like University level ". But the only books in English were, he found, " either out of date, or not sufficiently systematic or too general ".

This treatise, which deals with what the sacraments have in common, is an effort to cover, completely and not too technically, one particular field of Catholic theology. It is written " to enable a reader without a specifically theological training to grasp the issues and to see something of the practical bearing and application of the doctrine ". Since it is the teaching of the Church, which is echoed emphatically by the Orthodox Church, that the seven sacraments are divinely instituted as necessary means of sanctification, the practical interest of the subject to all Christians is unquestionable. The Irish way of referring to the sacraments as one's " duties " is significant.

The main contents of Fr Leeming's book are : the radical Catholic conviction that sacraments convey the gifts of God independently of the merits of man ; the precise nature of the grace bestowed by the sacraments ; the character or lasting mark impressed on the soul by certain sacraments, and its relation to the symbolic reality produced by all the sacraments ; the validity of sacraments which may be, at least temporarily, fruitless of grace ; the nature of the causality by which the sacraments bestow grace—where Fr Leeming makes a fruitful contribution to the theology of the sacraments ; the origin and institution of the sacraments ; the qualities (faith, morality, intention) required or not in the administration of the sacraments. The last section, which for its general interest, warmth and stimulating force might well have come first, deals with the sacramental economy of Christianity as a whole. It ends with a chapter on " The Sacraments and Human Nature " where the pastoral and practical tendencies of the theologian are at last allowed to dominate over debate and abstract enquiry.

It would be outside the scope of this notice to single out, much less to discuss, the various points on which Fr Leeming has a personal view to propose. The only question here is whether the theology of the sacraments has been presented with sufficient clarity, at least for those who are prepared to master the sources, history and argument to some extent ; and whether the matter, which is in part arid and forbidding, has been made readable or even attractive. The answer must be that Fr Leeming has performed very ably his self-set task of introducing systematic theology to readers of English. He does not pretend to be to anything but a sort of Alpine guide, and the paths he travels have all the bracing allure of the mountain heights. They are not easy, but they are rewarding. To seminarists, this book will be a delight and a treasure, while it may also show them that most of their difficulties in theology are not due to the Latin language in which it is ordinarily propounded.

Parts of the book are necessarily apologetical and most of its rare polemics are directed against Protestant positions, since the Greek Church is at one with the Catholic on the sacraments. But all the discussion is marked by a gentle and illuminating charity, and serious readers of all religious allegiances will find it instructive and helpful.

KEVIN SMYTH

ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR : The Ascetic Life ; The Four Centuries on Charity. Translated and annotated by Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B. Ancient Christian Writers, XXI. Maryland : Newman Press; and London : Longmans. 1955. 25s.

ST AUGUSTINE : The Problem of Free Choice. Translated and annotated by Mark Pontifex, O.S.B. Same Series XXII. 1955. 25s.

ATHENAGORAS : Embassy for the Christians ; The Resurrection of the Dead. Translated and annotated by Joseph Hugh Crehan, S.J. Same Series XXIII. 1956. 21s.

TERTULLIAN : The Treatise against Hermogenes. Translated and annotated by J. H. Waszink. Same Series XXIV. 1956. 21s.

THIS admirable series of translations has now made such good progress, and is so well established in the English-speaking world, that a reviewer can do

little more than list the titles of each successive publication, and thank Heaven that American energy and money are available to make these venerable texts accessible to students in modern form and English speech. Of the four volumes listed above St Augustine's *De Libero arbitrio* is unquestionably the most important, and the publishers are to be congratulated on having secured so competent an editor as Dom Mark Pontifex for this classic of patristic theology. Father Crehan, of Heythrop College, gives us a sound translation of two early apologetic texts by Athenagoras, with some account of his theology ; and Professor Waszink of Leyden adds to his translation of *Adversus Hermogenem* a very useful account of this early heretic's doctrines, which are known to us mainly from two passages of Hippolytus and from this treatise by Tertullian. Maximus the Confessor is probably the least-known name of the four. Dom Polycarp Sherwood has wisely given his readers an exceptionally long Introduction, in which he describes the career and analyses the doctrine of this seventh-century theologian, who was a close student of Origen and the Neoplatonic *Corpus Dionysiacum,* and was in his day a champion of orthodoxy against the Monothelite heresy. Dom Sherwood is concerned to depict the character of this simple monk and scholar, who had the courage to resist the Emperor at Byzantium and who played a notable part in the Lateran Council of 649.

AUBREY GWYNN

EVIE HONE AND MAINIE JELLETT

A TRIBUTE TO EVIE HONE AND MAINIE JELLETT. Dublin : Browne & Nolan, Ltd. 1957. 15s. net.

THIS tribute to the memory of two Irish artists, Evie Hone and Mainie Jellett, takes the form of appreciations by a group of friends and acquaintances. It is fitting that they should appear within the covers of the same volume for in the minds of their friends the names were closely linked together. From this varied collection of impressions there emerges, as from the piecing together of a mosaic, the portrait of two exceptionally gifted artists.

Although both were born in Dublin, within a few years of each other, Evie Hone in 1894 and Mainie Jellett in 1897, they did not meet until 1920 when they were students at a London school of art ; from that time until death separated them in 1947 they were very closely associated. After the London period of study they crossed to Paris and joined the studio of André Lhote, who taught a discreet form of cubism, a compromise between extreme abstract design and naturalistic form. But this semi-cubism did not completely satisfy them. Compromise in any form was foreign to the nature of both and so they moved to the studio of Albert Gleizes where there was no compromise but a wholehearted dedication to purely abstract painting. Here they found what they were seeking and soon became fervent disciples of pure abstract design.

Doctor C. P. Curran, in his scholarly contribution, skilfully analyses the theory of cubist-abstract design as taught by Gleizes, its most intransigent

disciple. An understanding of this theory is essential for an appreciation of the work of his two pupils, for undoubtedly it was the teaching of Gleizes which exercised the most profound and lasting influence on both. He was, as Dr Curran calls him, a " cubiste intégral ", permitting no compromise with natural representation of form, designing purely abstract compositions with pure colour in a single plane.

The influence of Albert Gleizes lasted right through the lives of his two pupils. It was as pioneers in this abstract movement that both Evie Hone and Mainie Jellett first gained recognition in Ireland, and to the end of their careers it was this dedication to abstractism which deeply influenced their work and gave it that peculiar cachet which so distinguishes it from the work of their Irish contemporaries. When Evie Hone had come to full mastery of design in stained glass and when, as the result of other deeply spiritual and artistic influences, she was expressing her inward vision in naturalistic designs, her composition was directed and controlled by the laws of harmony and linear form which she had so laboriously acquired and so perfectly assimilated in the studio of Albert Gleizes. Deep down beneath the shimmering seas of colour and the clouds of heavenly witnesses which filled her window spaces there flowed, gently restraining and directing, the calm and disciplining influence of the lessons learned in early days of " abstract " teaching.

It was likewise with Mainie Jellett. Her long years in close contact with the keenly analytic mind of her master, who taught his pupils to ignore the superficial and to seek the " inner meaning ", equipped her most efficiently for the role of teacher which she brilliantly exercised. Her pupils were taught to approach the study of art, not through unstable artistic intuition but with principles, directed by essential laws of design.

It was a happy thought of the editor to include as a frontispiece a painting of Albert Gleizes. It is an apt and delicate compliment to his memory and one which was well deserved.

The other illustrations are given over to the work of the two artists. With one exception they are reproduced in monochrome which does little justice to stained glass or abstract design, in both of which colour is of the very essence of the composition. In addition I cannot help feeling that the selection —at least in the work of Evie Hone—is disappointing. Evie Hone's main claim to greatness as an artist rests on her achievements in stained glass, yet of the five illustrations given to her work two are of sketches of stone carvings, and of the other three none are of her major works in stained glass. But perhaps there were technical difficulties in reproduction which limited the editor's choice. Apart from this, it is an admirably produced book which does credit to its editor, and which will bring much pleasure to all those who shared the friendship and appreciated the work of two " valiant women " who were also brilliant artists.

DANIEL SHIELDS

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Uniting Ireland

by DONAL BARRINGTON

MR Frank Gallagher published recently a book entitled, *The Indivisible Island*. It contains the best written and most fully documented statement of the orthodox case against Partition that has yet appeared, but the very title reveals a weakness that has bedevilled all nationalist thinking on the Partition problem for the past forty years : a complete refusal to face unpleasant facts. There is little use telling us that Ireland is an indivisible island when, in fact, it has been divided since before many of us were born and is further from unity today than at any point in modern history. Surely it is time we faced the fact that our country is divided and is in danger of remaining divided forever ?

There is another unpleasant fact we must face. It is that all the policies which the South has adopted in the past thirty-five years with a view to ending Partition have, in fact, tended to strengthen and perpetuate it. The purpose of this paper is to inquire why this has happened and to make suggestions towards the formulation of a new policy which may be more successful than the old ones.

In the course of it I shall say some hard things about our Southern leaders so that it is well to make clear that I am adopting two standards of criticism throughout the paper. I criticize the Unionists only when they fall short of the elementary standards of justice, but I judge our Southern leaders by a much higher standard. Irish nationalists have always claimed to speak for all Irishmen regardless of class or creed. This imposes on our national leaders a duty to show restraint, wisdom and understanding in their dealings with all the people of Ireland. It is not enough for them to be just ; they must also be wise, for they claim to be, not merely the leaders of a party or a faction or a sect, but the leaders of a nation. Their aim is not to divide, or to perpetuate division, but to unite ; they must display wisdom and greatness of soul proportionate to the task they have undertaken ; and those of us who claim to be Irish nationalists must show the same qualities proportionate to the role we play in society.

One weakness in the Southern approach to Partition in the years immediately after the Treaty was that we never fully faced the danger that Partition might be permanent. As a result, we were rather slip-shod in formulating a policy to deal with it. We started from a few simple assumptions concerning the origin and nature of Partition, assumptions never fully examined to make sure that they were true. Partition, we said, was the greatest injustice which England perpetrated against Ireland. The British Government imposed Partition upon us against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people. Neither the Nationalists nor the Unionists ever wanted it. The British set up a puppet

regime in six of our counties and continued to support it with British money and a British army of occupation.

We, therefore, claimed that what England had done, England must undo. She must take home her money, her men, and her influence, liberate the six occupied counties and re-unite Ireland. To force her to do this, we decided to mobilize world opinion. We exposed the injustice of Partition and the iniquities of the puppet regime throughout the world, but, despite all our efforts, Partition remains, and seems stronger today than ever before. When a policy has been such a failure as our anti-Partition policy, the time has come to re-examine the assumptions on which it rested.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARTITION

Take first the assumption that Partition was imposed on Ireland against the wishes of all Irishmen, both Nationalist and Unionist. There is no doubt that Partition sprang ultimately from England's policy of divide and conquer and that, in its implementation, the British Government was guilty of treachery and deceit towards nationalist leaders. Yet, from the time when Gladstone introduced his first Home Rule Bill down until 1914, Partition was not the policy of any party in England any more than it was the policy of any party in Ireland.

The policy of the Liberals was to grant Home Rule to all Ireland and thereby to pacify her and to encourage her to play a quiet and contented part within the United Kingdom. The policy of the Tories was to defeat any measure of self-government for Ireland and to preserve the Act of Union intact, which policy was identical with that of the Unionist Party in Ireland.

By 1914 the Orangemen had raised an extremely large, well drilled and well equipped army to oppose Home Rule, and had some of the most experienced generals of the age to lead it. They had something more valuable still which was a complete conviction in the righteousness of their own cause, and a determination to defeat Home Rule no matter what the cost.

The weakness of the Nationalists was that they never fully understood the nature or violence of the Unionist opposition to Home Rule and never believed that the Unionist leaders would go as far as they subsequently did. Redmond saw Home Rule as something to be won from England rather than something to be created in Ireland. He was prepared to give the Unionists guarantees to protect them against victimization in a United Ireland but he did not see what more he could do. Home Rule was something to be implemented by means of an Act of the British Parliament, and, if the Orangemen resisted it, the British army was to coerce them into obedience.

This paradox, that the Irish Nationalists ultimately relied on the

British army to coerce all Irishmen to live together, illustrates the poverty and weakness of the Nationalist position. It was a strange form of nationalism the ultimate sanction behind which was the British army. The United Irishmen and the Young Irelanders had seen that any true Irish nationalism must be based on the unity of Catholic and Protestant and not on the coercion of one of them by the other or of either of them by the British Government. Indeed, Thomas Davis at one time dreamt of a mighty convention of Orange and Green to meet at the Boyne to negotiate a charter for the whole of Ireland.

Eventually, the British Government ordered the army to move from the Curragh to intimidate the North, only to find that Sir Henry Wilson and his colleagues had undermined the discipline of the army from within. Almost all the officers at the Curragh resigned their commissions rather than move against the North, and the British Government found itself faced with a civil war and a mutinous army. The inevitable had happened. The British army could not be relied on to enforce the claims of Irish Nationalism upon unwilling British subjects, and the Protestants of England would not support their Government in an attempt to force the Protestants of the North under a Catholic Parliament.

It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the British Government panicked. Brigadier-General Gough, the leader of the recalcitrant officers at the Curragh, went to London and came back with a guarantee from the British Government that the army officers would not be asked to march against the North. This closed one chapter in the history of Home Rule. The Ulster Unionists had said they would fight against Home Rule and the British Government had said it would not fight for it. That left only two alternatives—to abandon the Home Rule Bill or to exempt Ulster from its provisions, in other words, to partition Ireland—and it was at this time, accordingly, that Partition first became a serious political issue. The British Government had not, however, to make its choice immediately, for the outbreak of the World War caused the whole question of Home Rule to be shelved. Before peace returned the 1916 Rising had shattered the Act of Union. The first alternative had been destroyed. Some form of Home Rule had now to be granted to Ireland—but to a partitioned Ireland.

It is quite misleading to say that Partition was forced on Ireland by the British Government against the wishes of North and South. It would be more correct to say that Partition was forced on the British Government by the conflicting demands of the two parties of Irishmen. It is true that both North and South were dissatisfied with Partition but that was because the North wanted all Ireland for the Act of Union and the South wanted all Ireland for Home Rule. Both demands could not be met, neither party was prepared to give way, and the inevitable result was Partition. In one sense Partition may be England's crime against Ireland but in a more important sense it is Ireland's crime against

herself. Until we recognize this fact, we have little chance of formulating a realistic policy to deal with it.

RELIGION AND PARTITION

Just as we nationalists have tended to lay all the blame for Partition on England, so we have tended to minimize the importance of the part which religious bitterness played in creating Partition. Irish nationalism in the hands of its ablest exponents has always claimed to transcend race and creed, and to stand for a society in which all Irishmen will be treated equally. Unfortunately for Ireland, however, in the course of the nineteenth century, nationalism and Catholicism became confused, with the result that the cry of the Orange leaders that Home Rule was Rome Rule raised very real fears in the heart of an Ulster Protestant.

The Orange Order is described by its official historian, Mr Sibbet as 'organised Protestantism'. It had its origin in agrarian troubles between Catholic and Protestant in the County Armagh in the year 1795 but it grew into a powerful body designed to maintain the political ascendancy of those who profess the Protestant religion, and to resist the conspiracies of the Church of Rome. It loudly professed its loyalty to the British King but made no secret of the fact that this loyalty was conditional upon his supporting the Protestant ascendancy; and it reminded him, occasionally, that if he failed to do this, it would kick his crown into the Boyne.

The importance of religion in Irish politics is illustrated by the fact that the Orange Order was originally very dubious about the merits of the Act of Union. It had, in Grattan's Parliament, a Protestant parliament and it wished to keep it. The Act of Union was regarded at the time as part of a scheme, the other part of which was to grant emancipation to Catholics. For this reason, the Catholic Hierarchy, which despaired of ever getting emancipation from a parliament of Irish Protestants, supported the Act of Union. The British Government, however, with all its influence, could only secure the neutrality of the Grand Orange Lodge. The individual Orange Lodges, which passed dozens of resolutions condemning the Union and not one in its favour, were violently opposed to the measure and accused their leaders of having betrayed them.

But the hopes of the bishops and the fears of the Orangemen were alike unfounded, for the British Government failed to fulfil its pledge to the Catholics, and it took another thirty years and a fierce struggle before Catholic Emancipation was won. It was unfortunate that the first great political struggle in Ireland in the nineteenth century should have been a religious one and should have seen the Catholics ranged on one side and the Orange Order on the other.

It was unfortunate, moreover, that Daniel O'Connell, the leader

of the movement for the repeal of the Act of Union, should also have been the leader of the Catholics, and that his Repeal Association should have been virtually indistinguishable from the Catholic Association of earlier times. Some of O'Connell's lieutenants, including his son John, often spoke as if they thought nationalism and Catholicism were the same thing, and this identification of nationalism with Catholicism was facilitated by the virtual loss of the Irish language in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Orangemen were quick to perceive, after the Emancipation Act, that an Irish Parliament would now be a predominantly Catholic parliament, so they threw themselves into the struggle against Repeal and, subsequently, against Home Rule. Indeed, to the ordinary Ulster Protestant it began to appear that the Home Rule movement was aimed simply at setting up a Catholic Government in Ireland, and that the whole thing was a gigantic conspiracy, organized by the Church of Rome.

The Presbyterians

The Orange Order had originally been an Episcopalian Association, and the large body of the Presbyterians had held aloof from it. They were democrats and republicans who took their political principles from the American and French Revolutions, and it was they, through their association, the United Irishmen, who laid the foundations of modern Irish nationalism, and who organized the Revolution of 1798. Yet, when that revolution came, it was strongest in Wexford, where it assumed a character which greatly shocked the Presbyterians, for the Wexford Rebellion was priest-led and had many of the characteristics of a Holy War. The massacre of Protestants at Scullabogue had a profound effect on Protestant opinion in the North and, as the French Revolution progressed from democracy to imperialism, the Irish Presbyterians lost faith in many of the ideas they had previously held. The Emancipation Act removed the Presbyterians' chief grievance, and also the chief barrier between them and the Episcopalians. Their remaining grievances were to disappear with the abolition of tithes and the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. In 1803 the Government had increased the state endowment of the Presbyterian ministry and accompanied it with conditions which, in fact, gave the Government control over the appointment of ministers. So that the way was gradually prepared for that conservative revolution within the Presbyterian body led by the Reverend Henry Cooke, which was to bring the Presbyterians into alliance with the Episcopalians and ultimately into the Orange Order.

The Orange Card

I have dwelt so long on this aspect of the case because I wish to stress the vital importance of the religious factor underlying Partition, and also the enormous importance of the role which the Orange Order

played in Irish politics in the nineteenth century. Nationalist propagandists sometimes talk as if Orange opposition to Home Rule dated from Lord Randolph Churchill's decision to play the Orange card. It is true that Tory leaders came over to Ireland to wake up the Orangemen to the dangers of Home Rule, but the Orangemen did not need much waking up, and little is to be gained by counting all the Tory leaders who came to Ireland to speak to the Orangemen and ignoring all the Orange leaders who went to England to speak to the Tories. It is true that Churchill's speeches in Belfast in 1886 touched off riots which cost many lives, but it is also true that religious riots were a feature of Belfast life long before Churchill ever thought of visiting that city. Churchill decided to play the Orange card, and this was a shameful decision, but we should remember that Churchill could not have played the Orange card if there had not been an Orange card to play.

Orangemen and Catholics

It is difficult for a Southern Catholic to realize that the Orange Order sees, or at any rate saw, the Catholic Church as a world-wide conspiracy aimed at destroying human freedom. Yet this is the picture which Mr Sibbet paints in his official history of the Orange Order, published as late as 1938. A Southern Catholic gasps with astonishment when he reads that the Pope was one of the conspirators who organized the 1916 Rising, and that ' the evil work to which they set their hands . . . might have been expected when the Pope was in the game '. After this, one is hardly surprised to read that the driving force behind Mr de Valera and his party has always been ' unblushing and vengeful Popery ', or that republican ideals are made the instruments of sedition and crime by ' Jesuitical influences ' with a view to promoting a ' well known type of ecclesiastical exaltation, predominance and power '. But when Mr Sibbet warns England that the British Foreign Office and the League of Nations have been infiltrated by the agents of the Church of Rome, who are using these institutions to destroy the British Empire, we get a clearer idea of where he stands.

This aspect of the subject is of vital importance because religious bigotry based on fear was the force which partitioned Ireland and which helps to maintain Partition. Part of the answer to Partition, therefore, must be to show that this fear is groundless and to avoid incidents and speeches which tend to inflame religious bigotry. Unfortunately, we Irish, clergy and laity, have a talent for the sweeping phrase which sometimes causes us to make wild statements in public. A collection of such public statements made over the last ten years makes depressing reading and gives one a very false impression of the Catholic Church in Ireland. It is worth noting that such statements are collected and remembered in the North and help to strengthen Partition.

THE NATURE OF THE PARTITION PROBLEM

The paradoxical result of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and of the Treaty of 1921 was that Ulster, which had struggled so long against Home Rule, ended by getting Home Rule, but Home Rule for Six Counties, while the rest of Ireland became a Dominion and ultimately a Republic. The Treaty settlement left Ireland free but divided. Each part of Ireland was free in the sense that each became master of its own destinies, each acquired the form of government which the majority of its inhabitants demanded, and each was free to develop along the lines which it thought best. After 1922, certainly after 1937, all Ireland was free and *the problem was no longer to free the Irish people but to unite them.*

It is inaccurate to speak of the Northern Government as an English puppet regime. The first Ulster Provisional Government was established as a revolutionary government in defiance of the British Parliament in much the same way as the first Provisional Government of the Republic was established, though, of course, the objects of those who established the two governments were utterly dissimilar. It is hardly more correct to speak of the British having set up the Northern Government than it is to speak of them having set up the Southern Government. Each government was established in Ireland by Irishmen and, in each case, the British merely recognized the logic of a situation which Irishmen had created.

It is true that British troops remained in the Six Counties after 1920 but they remained in conformity to the will of the majority of the inhabitants of that area. It is a sad thing to have to say but the Unionists retained them partly to protect themselves against us—a protection which recent events have tragically demonstrated to be necessary. Under these circumstances it is as absurd to speak of the British troops in the North as an army of occupation, or to refer to the North as unfree or British occupied territory, or to talk about liberating the North from the British yoke, as it would be to speak of the American troops in France as an army of occupation, or to refer to France as unfree or American occupied territory, or to talk of liberating France from the American yoke.

It is also misleading to suggest that the British Government deliberately subsidizes the Northern Government for the purpose of maintaining Partition. There is no doubt that the Six Counties do not pay their way. But neither does any other distressed area within the United Kingdom, and the North of Ireland is one of the most distressed areas of all. Were it possible to isolate the accounts relating to parts of Scotland and Wales they would reveal much the same story as is revealed by the accounts relating to Northern Ireland. As long as Northern Ireland remains within the United Kingdom it is entitled to all the privileges which membership of the United Kingdom implies. Indeed, the Isles Report makes clear that it is not at present getting all these privileges

and the North, so far from feeling bribed, feels that it is not getting fair play from the British Government.

We, in the South, have persistently refused to face the implications of the above facts. After 1922 we were confronted with an entirely new problem but we never faced up to it. As pointed out above, the problem was no longer to free the Irish people but to unite them. The two traditional weapons of Irish nationalism had been physical force and constitutional agitation but both were equally inappropriate in the new situation : you cannot unite a people with either bombs or abuse. What was needed in 1922 was a revision of all our policies in the light of the new situation but that revision never took place, and has not taken place yet. The result has been that ever since the Treaty we have been travelling along a road which leads only to frustration and civil war.

There were many reasons which helped to obscure the true situation from us. First, the traditional enemy was England, and when something was wrong, it came naturally to Irishmen to assume that England was to blame. This idea was assisted by the treachery the British Government had displayed in the Treaty negotiations, in the setting up of the Boundary Commission and in the implementation of Partition generally. Secondly, the plight of the Nationalist minority in the North, dealt with below, served to keep bitterness alive and to prevent us from seeing the situation in its true perspective. Thirdly, the attitude of the Unionist leaders was so negative that our leaders felt that no agreement could ever be reached with them, so they instinctively decided to ignore the Unionists and to try to persuade the British Government, which they hoped would be more amenable, to do something about Partition.

OUR ANTI-PARTITION POLICIES

Mr de Valera has said, from time to time, that the only way to achieve the unity of Ireland is to create a unity of wills, which in fact means converting 300,000 Unionists to a belief in a United Ireland. Yet, Mr de Valera has never committed himself to this policy, but on the contrary has supported the policy of solving Partition by bringing pressure to bear on the British Government. But, whatever his policy, in the later years of his first Administration, he kept silent about the Partition question, and this silence, if it did little good, did no harm. The benefits of Mr de Valera's silence could be seen in the liberalization of Northern politics in the years after the war, in the growth in the number of Labour and Independent representatives in the Stormont Parliament, and in the rise to power within the Unionist party of moderate men like Mr Brian Maginess.

For some reason, after he fell from power in 1948, Mr de Valera abandoned his former policy of silence, and made Partition the central

issue on the Irish political stage. Mr Costello decided not be outdone, and Mr MacBride wished to do something dynamic about Partition, so that the politicians were soon launched on a vigorous anti-Partition campaign. Mr de Valera went to the United States and Australia, Mr Costello went to Canada, Mr MacBride toured the world, and they were soon joined in their travels by Sir Basil Brooke. What they hoped they could achieve it is difficult to imagine. They certainly succeeded in putting Partition on the world stage, but to achieve that was to achieve nothing, for Partition is essentially a problem for Irishmen, a purely domestic matter, and will be settled here in Ireland by Irishmen or will never be settled at all.

Out of Mr de Valera's renewed enthusiasm for solving Partition and the Government's reaction to it arose the ill-fated Mansion House Committee, the purpose of which was to raise funds to finance the election campaigns of anti-Partitionist candidates, to publish propaganda exposing the evils of Partition, and generally to co-ordinate the anti-Partition campaign. I should not like to reflect in any way on the well-intentioned men who worked hard for this Committee in the honest belief that they were serving Ireland. But the results of the Committee's activities are plain to be seen. At the general election in the North in 1949 the Unionist Party secured one of the greatest victories in its history ; the Northern Ireland Labour Party was wiped out at the polls and after its defeat decided to come out for the first time in favour of Partition; and reactionaries regained the ascendancy within the Unionist party.

The Ireland Act

But the defeat for our leaders was not yet complete. The campaign ended by the North securing from the British Government a guarantee underwriting Partition, and Mr Costello, in his disillusionment, made his famous speech about hurting England in her pride, her prestige, and her pocket. The wording of the British guarantee to the North is interesting :

> It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of His Majesty's Dominions and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.

This guarantee means two things which I propose to consider separately. It means, first, that the British Government will not force the people of the Six Counties to join the South without the consent of their Parliament. If the giving of this guarantee infuriated our Southern leaders, it must have been because they aimed to persuade or force England to hand over the Six Counties to the South against the will of the majority of the people of the Six County area, in other words,

to coerce the people of the Six Counties to come into the Republic against their will. It never became clear how such a policy was to be implemented, whether by military force or economic sanctions or in what other way. But it is virtually impossible to see how any statesman could have expected such a policy to succeed. Our leaders were attempting to re-fight the battle which John Redmond had fought and lost at the time of the Curragh Mutiny. But no English Government will ever again place itself in the position in which the Liberals found themselves in 1914. Protestant England will never expel Protestant Ulster from the United Kingdom. The British army will never be used to coerce Irishmen to live together.

The amazing thing about our demand that England should force the people of the North to come into a United Ireland against their will is not that it should have failed, but that it should ever have been made. Such a demand was utterly reprehensible and ought never to have been made in the name of Irish nationalism, because it represented an appeal by our leaders to England to coerce a group of our fellow-countrymen. The fact that Redmond was prepared to use the British army to coerce the Unionists was mentioned above as illustrating the poverty of Parliamentary Nationalism. But there was some justification for Redmond because he was operating within the frame-work of the United Kingdom, and he was attempting to fulfil the declared wish of the vast majority of the Irish people in favour of Home Rule, while the Unionists were attempting to frustrate that wish and to keep all the people of Ireland in bondage. But our present leaders had no such excuse. By 1949 we in the South had established our independent state and were free to pursue any policies we might wish. Under these circumstances the fact that our leaders could think of no other way of uniting Ireland than appealing to the British Government to coerce Irishmen to live together shows that there must be something fundamentally wrong about their whole approach to the Partition problem.

There is a second point covered by the British guarantee to the North : the British Government will not give over any part of the Six Counties to the South without the consent of the Northern Parliament. If the object of the Anti-Partition campaign was merely to secure the incorporation into the South of Tyrone and Fermanagh and other Nationalist areas, then that campaign becomes much more justifiable, for every argument used to justify the Unionists opting out of a United Ireland can be used to justify the Nationalist areas adjoining the Border coming in with the South, and the greatest injustice of Partition was putting these large Nationalist areas under the Northern Government against their will. Britain must accept her share of responsibility for this injustice, and it might seem reasonable that Southern politicians should organize a campaign to force England to rectify the wrong she has done. But if the object of the anti-Partition campaign was confined to liberating

the Nationalist areas in the North that fact was never stated by any Southern statesman.

Even if the object had been merely to secure the redrawing of the Border with a view to incorporating these Nationalist areas in the South, the campaign would still have been unwise for the following reasons: first, the Unionists would have resisted any attempt to take any part of the Six Counties from them as fiercely as they would have resisted an attempt to take away the whole, and nothing short of overwhelming physical force would have dislodged them from this position. There is no use, therefore, pursuing the liberation of the Nationalist areas of the Six Counties as a separate object of Southern policy, as this object is likely to be as difficult to accomplish as the winning back of the whole of the North, and, if accomplished, would still leave us with a partitioned Ireland. Secondly, if successful, it might cause the remaining Unionist areas to abandon their experiment in Home Rule and go back under the direct rule of the London Government, thereby making Partition permanent. Thirdly, any Southern policy which demands the return of certain areas to the South, because they contain local Nationalist majorities, encourages discrimination or worse, on the part of the Orangemen, with a view to liquidating those majorities. Finally, if we agree that the only way to end Partition is to win over a majority of the people of the Six Counties to a belief in the unity of Ireland, then the fact that one-third of those people already believe in a United Ireland can assist us in implementing a properly thought-out policy for national reunion. So whether you conclude that the main object of the anti-Partition campaign was to coerce the Unionists (which I think is the correct view) or to liberate the Nationalists, in either event the campaign was equally futile and misconceived.

The Armed Raids and Southern Propaganda

But we have not yet paid the full price of the folly of that attempt to enlist the support of outside powers to coerce the Unionists to come into the South. When the attempt failed, as it was bound to fail, some of our young men took the matter into their own hands. Anyone who thought at all about the history of Ireland could have expected no other result. This result was made all the more probable by the kind of propaganda which we in the South have always employed in relation to the Partition problem, and to which our young people have been exposed from their earliest days. This propaganda has always employed emotionally charged phrases such as 'occupied Ireland', and 'the British army of occupation' with a view to isolating Britain as the party solely responsible for creating and maintaining Partition. Mr Gallagher in his recent book on Partition refers throughout to the Twenty-six Counties as 'free Ireland' thereby implying that the North is unfree or enslaved.

The logical follow-through from such propaganda is a resistance movement. If the North is 'occupied territory' held in subjection by a 'British army of occupation', one need not be surprised if the young men of the North rise in arms against the invader or if the young men of the South go to the assistance of their Northern fellow-countrymen. The propaganda is rendered all the more insidious by reason of the fact that the deceit employed by the British Government (referred to above) gives it a certain element of truth. But that propaganda injures the cause of Irish unity by disguising from our people the real issue which is that the Northern Government exists because 800,000 Irish Protestants insist that under no circumstances will they allow themselves to be governed by a predominantly Catholic Parliament in Dublin.

A Tragic Situation

Once one accepts that proposition, one sees the present raids not as an attack upon an invader but as an attack upon our fellow-countrymen. That is the real tragedy of the situation. The young men who are engaged in these raids are as brave and idealistic as any young men who ever fought for Ireland. But instead of helping Ireland they are doing her great harm. They think they are driving the invader from our soil but, in fact, they are merely increasing the bitterness which already divides Irishmen, and the only effect of their efforts will be to turn the present border into a military frontier and to postpone the unification of Ireland for many years. Indeed, we will be fortunate if they do not provoke some outburst of fanaticism which will never be forgotten. There is a tragic contrast between the deaths of Kevin Barry and Fergal O'Hanlon. Both were young men in their teens. Both were fired by the same burning desire to serve Ireland. But while Barry's sacrifice helped to free Ireland and was therefore heroic, O'Hanlon's merely added to the hatreds which divide Irishmen and can only be described as pathetic.

It is not enough to deplore the present situation and to continue with the policies which have produced it. For thirty-five years our leaders have been waging a cold war against the North, and if the cold war has now become a shooting war, those who started and carried on the cold war must accept their share of the responsibility. The policy of our leaders has been to coerce the North through the intervention of England, America, the United Nations or some outside power; the policy of the illegal organizations is to do the job themselves. You may call the former policy a constitutional policy, and the latter a physical force policy, but both are basically policies of coercion. Both policies spring from the same presuppositions concerning the origin of Partition, both refuse to face the facts of the situation, and both are doomed to failure.

Persuasion

If we rule out these anti-Partition policies we have to attempt to put something in their place, and the only thing left is a policy of persuasion. This is also the only policy which has never been given a proper trial. We have had co-operation between North and South relating to the Erne Scheme, the Lough Foyle fishery and the Great Northern Railway but these have been isolated cases, and the general policy of the South has been to ignore the Northern Government except for the purpose of abuse.

If you accept the premiss that our problem is not to free our people but to unite them, all the rest falls into place. If North and South are ever to come together, it must be on the basis of mutual trust and understanding and the task for modern Irish statesmen is to create the conditions in which that trust and understanding can grow. The walls of prejudice and bigotry which separate North and South are so great that it may take fifty years to remove them. There is no point in looking for a short-term solution to the Partition problem because, in the short run, there is no solution. The wounds inflicted and suffered by both sides have been too great. The search for a short-term solution will end only in frustration. Fifty years is not a long time in the life of a nation and a nation which believes in itself and in its destiny will not hesitate to plan for that time.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE NORTH

It is only when one turns to look at the situation inside the Six Counties themselves that one realizes the enormity of the task which confronts those who desire an Irish unity based on mutual goodwill. We in the South find it difficult to appreciate the fears and suspicions which divide Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland. There may be in the North a few Catholics who support the Unionist cause, and there may be a few Protestants who are Nationalists, but by and large the terms 'Protestant' and 'Unionist' are interchangeable, as are the terms 'Catholic' and 'Nationalist'. Moreover, the Unionists are permanently in power while the Nationalists are political outcasts. The cleavage between the groups is not merely political and religious, it is also social and affects business life. By and large it is true to say that each group has its own doctors, its own lawyers, its own shopkeepers and lives within a closed system of its own. I realized this for the first time some years ago while talking to a young Northern Catholic, aged about 25. He came from a small town with a population of about 1,000 souls of whom half were Catholics and half Protestants. He told me that never in his whole life had he exchanged one word with a Protestant boy or girl of his own age. It is this system of *apartheid* which constitutes the real partition of Ireland.

We sometimes refer to the persecution of the Catholic minority in the North but there is no persecution if by that word we mean an organized attempt to prevent people from practising their religion. The North has all the forms of a democratic society and the Nationalists possess full freedom of speech. Yet there is a religious discrimination which reduces those democratic forms to a nullity by perverting them in such a way that they defeat the purpose for which they were set up.

This system of discrimination operates in several ways. The first is by interfering with the electoral system. One of the first acts of the Northern Parliament was to introduce the system of gerrymandering, and this system was later to be reinforced at local level by a property qualification which effectively disenfranchised a large number of Nationalist voters, and on both national and local levels by the abolition of Proportional Representation. The ultimate effect of this extraordinarily ingenious system of gerrymandering is to give one Unionist vote the effective voting power of two Nationalist votes, so that Unionists control the local administration even in predominantly Nationalist areas such as Fermanagh and Tyrone.

Once in control of the local councils the Unionists proceed to elect committees to deal with housing, education, etc., and all these committees are overwhelmingly Unionist, though, occasionally, they contain one or two Nationalists as a face saving device. But even then decisions are not made in committee or at council meetings. All decisions are discussed and made at the local Orange Lodge, and the committee or council meets only to hear the final decision of the Unionist majority and the ineffective protests of the Nationalists.

The second way the system of discrimination operates is in the allocation of county council houses. These allocations usually betray the most flagrant injustices. For instance, on March 11th, 1950, the Omagh Rural Council allocated 40 houses at Coneywarren, Co. Tyrone, the first council houses built in the area for several years. The Nationalist members of the council submitted the names of 22 desperately badly housed families. Every Nationalist applicant was rejected and the houses were allocated to 40 Unionists, a majority of whom were unmarried, or married but without children or had but one child. Some of those who were allocated houses were already so well housed elsewhere that they refused to move in. There must be, among the Unionist councillors, some who feel troubled in their consciences when a council house built with public money is allocated to a Unionist ahead of a more deserving Catholic. Such councillors may protest inside the Orange Lodges but their voices are not heard in public so that it is not possible to know how numerous they are.

Thirdly, this system of discrimination operates in the allocation of appointments in the public service. The four counties of Armagh, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone have together a population of 232,600 Nationalists

to 222,500 Unionists. These councils employ 541 officials on their executive, administrative and clerical staffs. Of these only 55 are Nationalists. That is to say, the Unionist minority get 90 per cent of the appointments at these grades.

The same pattern reveals itself in private business. The Unionists who control the greater part of the wealth of the area will not employ a Catholic if they can possibly avoid it, and an Orangeman who sells his house or farm to a Catholic will almost certainly be ostracized by his fellows. No matter what price a Catholic offers, the Orangeman must sell to a Protestant, and a special Unionist fund was started some years ago, with the encouragement of the Government, for the purpose of buying any property in danger of falling into Catholic hands.

The purpose of this discrimination is explained by two simple quotations taken from Unionist sources. The first is from an editorial from the *Strabane Weekly News* for June 11th, 1949, and warns that any Unionist

> who sells a farm or lets a house to an Anti-Partitionist is assisting the Anti-Partitionists to win the Local Government representation in that area at the next election and their action can only be regarded as treachery to their party.

The second quotation comes from a speech made by Mr E. C. Ferguson at Enniskillen, the capital of the predominantly Nationalist county of Fermanagh, on April 9th, 1948. Mr Ferguson is a solicitor and was at that time a Unionist M.P. He is reported as follows :

> The Nationalist majority in the County, notwithstanding a reduction of 336 in the year, stands at 3,684. We must ultimately reduce and liquidate that majority. This county I think it can safely be said is a Unionist County. The atmosphere is Unionist. The boards and properties are nearly all controlled by Unionists. But there is this millstone around our necks.

Everything was Unionist except the people ! Eighteen months after he had made this speech Mr Ferguson was appointed Crown Solicitor for Co. Fermanagh by the Northern Government.

There is no doubt that the entire Northern system of government is based on a system of discrimination the purpose of which is to prevent Catholics from getting any political or economic power, and to prevent any growth in their numbers by denying them housing and employment, thereby compelling them to emigrate. This has been proved, and anyone still in doubt can consult Mr Gallagher's book where the matter is fully documented and from which most of the examples given above are taken. Worse than the system of discrimination itself is the psychological effect it produces on the Catholics who feel themselves to be outcasts in their

own country, and who feel when the Unionists speak of liberalism or fair play that they are merely adding hypocrisy to their other sins. If a revolutionary situation exists in the Six Counties today there can be no doubt that the Unionists themselves are largely to blame.

The Major Cause

Yet this is not the whole story. The discrimination which the Unionists undoubtedly exercise against the Northern Nationalists cannot fairly be considered apart from the policies which we in the South have pursued since 1922. To the Unionists it has always appeared that they were fighting to prevent themselves from being forcibly placed under the power of a Catholic Dublin Parliament, and that in this struggle the Northern Nationalists were fifth columnists who were attempting to sap the foundations of the Northern State, destroy the ascendancy of the Protestants, and deliver them into the hands of the Church of Rome. That is why the Unionist usually classifies the people of the Six Counties as the ' loyal ' and the ' disloyal ', and why he concludes that the ' disloyal ' must be excluded from public office and, as far as possible, deprived of political and economic power. In practice, the test of whether a man is ' loyal ' or ' disloyal ' is the very simple one of what Church he attends on Sundays.

The fears of the Unionists strike us as irrational but we should remember that to the Unionist himself they are very real. Unionist bigotry like all bigotry is based on fear. It is true that we have offered the Northern Protestants adequate constitutional safeguards to protect their rights and to guarantee them equality in a United Ireland, and we have been able to point to the tolerant state we have established in the South. But the Unionists doubt our sincerity, and the fact that we have continually pursued a policy designed to coerce them to join the South against their will has lent substance to their suspicions.

If the argument of this paper is correct, there was never any prospect of Southern coercionist policies succeeding against the North, and the Unionists need not have been unduly perturbed. Yet, it was elementary prudence on the part of the Northern leaders to warn their people of the Southern threat. Moreover, that threat was a godsend to Orange politicians, for as long as the Northern Protestants could be convinced that they were in danger of being coerced to join the South, they would continue to rally around the Unionist party. So long as this threat continued, reactionary and bigoted Orangemen would continue to control the Unionist Party, and the ordinary Protestant would tolerate acts of discrimination against his Catholic fellow-countryman which he would never tolerate were he not afraid that his own social position and way of life were threatened by the Catholics. In this way, the constant threat from the South has kept alive sectarian bitterness in the North, has

prevented the emergence of a Liberal or Labour Party, has defeated the ambitions of liberals within the Unionist Party itself, and so has played right into the hands of those Orange leaders who owe their position to sectarian bigotry.

Mr Gallagher has extracted from the election Manifestos or Eve-of-the-Poll messages issued by the Northern Prime Ministers in each of the seven elections since 1921 the following quotations which show the use the Unionist Party has made of the Southern threat :

> The fate of the Six Counties hangs in the balance (1921).
> Defeat your enemies, save the Border (1925).
> Scatter your enemies. The fate of the country lies in your hands (1929).
> Defeat the designs of our enemies . . . Ravenous eyes are concentrating on our province (1933).
> Ulster's fate is in your hands . . . Forces . . . are at work to deprive us of our birthright (1938).
> Ulster's constitutional position . . . is the supreme issue. It dominates every other question (1945).
> Our country is in danger—Ulster's heritage is at stake . . . Loyalists stand to your defences (1949).
> Overshadowing all else is the constitutional issue (1953).

Mr Gallagher is outraged at the way Unionist politicians have used the threat from the South to spread panic among the Northern electorate and to deflect its attention from the ordinary political and economic problems which preoccupy the minds of voters in other democratic countries. Yet he has nothing to say of those Southern leaders who for 35 years have adhered to policies which seem to be ineffective for all purposes except that of keeping alive sectarian bitterness in the North and maintaining the Unionist Party in power.

A NEW POLICY

The time has come, accordingly, for us to abandon the coercionist policies we have been following hitherto, and to replace them with policies designed to reduce tension and to create an atmosphere in which a unity of wills can grow. As we are the people who believe in the creation of a United Ireland we must make the first move. We must make it clear that we unilaterally renounce all thought of using coercion against our fellow countrymen in the North, or of asking or allowing anyone else to use it against them. The best way for us to prove that we would respect the wishes of the Northern Protestants inside a United Ireland is by respecting their wishes as long as they want to remain outside it.

As pointed out above, nothing is to be gained by pursuing the liberation of the Nationalist areas of the Six Counties as a separate aim of Southern policy, but if we are formally to guarantee the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland we will want in return effective guarantees to protect the Northern Nationalists against the kind of discrimination

they have been suffering from hitherto. If it is true that that discrimination sprang largely from the coercionist policies pursued by the South, then the abandonment of those policies by the South should remove any justification there ever was for that discrimination. To ensure that any guarantees given to Northern Catholics would be effective, we would require tokens of good faith, such as that Proportional Representation should be reintroduced in Parliamentary and Municipal elections in the North, that the property qualifications for Municipal voters should be abolished, and that Parliamentary and local constituencies should be redrawn so as to make them truly representative of the wishes of the people, such a redrawing of constituency boundaries to recur every ten or fifteen years, and to be presided over by an impartial judge appointed by agreement between the two governments or by the United Nations.

In return Dáil Éireann would solemnly renounce any intention of using coercion against the Northern Protestants and would guarantee the territorial integrity of Northern Ireland in much the same way as the British Parliament guaranteed it in the Ireland Act, that is to say, that the South would recognize that Northern Ireland would never enter a United Ireland without the prior consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. The South would also recognize the Government of Northern Ireland as an Irish Government entitled to respect not only from the people of the Six Counties but from all Irishmen.

Such an agreement would be the foundation on which the new policy designed to create a unity of wills would rest. But it would merely be a beginning. It would also be necessary to call off the propaganda campaign which we have been carrying on against the Northern Government throughout the world, and it would also be wise to dissolve the anti-Partition Association, which, for all its good intentions, has done a great deal of harm.

The Northern Nationalists

Inside the Six Counties themselves the Nationalists could take many steps designed to reduce tension. In particular, they could ask themselves if the rigid division in Northern politics between Catholic and Protestant produces anything but evil. There will be little hope of creating a better atmosphere in the North as long as you can tell a man's politics by the Church he goes to on Sunday. It is at least worth asking if the Northern Nationalists should not dissolve their existing political organizations, so as to allow room for the growth of a Liberal or Labour party which could bridge the gulf between Catholic and Protestant. Certainly, it would be wise for specifically Catholic organizations such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians to refrain from interfering in politics, and the clergy should not play an active part in any political organization. These recommendations may demand great sacrifices from men who have devoted a life of labour to the service of Ireland. But such men have

already sacrificed so much for their country that they will not deny her this further sacrifice if they are once convinced that it is wise and necessary.

It would also be wise for the Nationalists of the North to refrain from displaying their sentiments in an unnecessarily provocative manner. One can have great sympathy with the position of the Northern Nationalists and yet see that the aim of Nationalist propaganda should be to create a unity of wills and not to provoke the Orangemen to acts of violence. The same thing applies to the carrying of the tricolour in processions in the North. The tricolour is meant to symbolize the unity of the Irish nation, and there is no point in displaying it in the North until the unity which it is meant to symbolize in fact exists there. Otherwise, the tricolour will merely come to be regarded as a Catholic party symbol and will become an object of hatred to most Protestants.

Confine Partition to Political Field

Again, while we recognize that Partition exists in the political field, and is likely to continue for a very long time, we must try to prevent it from spreading into the fields of economics, culture and sport. We must localize the area of disagreement. Voluntary organizations with branches on both sides of the Border should ignore the Partition problem as far as possible and should confine themselves to achieving the purposes for which the organizations were founded. It has been the habit of Nationalist members of such organizations to introduce the question of Partition into them by demanding that the organizations should declare themselves in favour of a United Ireland, or should display the tricolour on public occasions even when this was likely to cause offence to Unionist members. As often as not the efforts of such well-intentioned but misguided men have split the organizations in question and thereby extended Partition a little further. Nationalist members of such organizations should avoid introducing politics into them and, if some political question inevitably arises, they should show great understanding of the Unionist position, remembering that the most effective argument against Partition is to demonstrate that Irishmen can live in peace together and can solve their problems in a spirit of friendship.

Sport

As already pointed out, the real Partition of Ireland consists in the apartheid between Catholic and Protestant in the North. Anything which tends to end this *apartheid* is to be welcomed and the converse deplored. The fields of athletics and sport offer opportunities for Catholics and Protestants to meet in a spirit of friendship. The G.A.A.'s ban on foreign games in so far as it tends to prevent such contacts is wholly deplorable. This ban may have been justified in the circumstances which prevailed in Ireland in the past but, as it operates in the North at present, it helps to prevent social contacts between Irishmen and, therefore, to maintain Partition.

Economic Policies

We must also try to avoid any unnecessary rifts between the economies of the two parts of Ireland. The volume of legal trade between North and South has steadily decreased since 1922. Part of this decrease may have been inevitable, due to the policy of industrialization pursued in the South and the protective tariffs which went hand in hand with it. The loss in legal trade may have been off-set in part by a thriving smuggling industry but even this has been destroyed by the heavy frontier patrols called into existence by the recent armed raids on the North ! The fact is that the Southern Government has made very little effort to promote trade between North and South, and we have not even got a trade consul in Belfast. It is surely time we took this matter in hand. The tourist industry in particular deserves attention as an increase in the volume of tourist traffic may help to promote understanding between the people of the two parts of Ireland.

Education

In the educational field there are already some points of contact. Both Unionist and Nationalist students attend Queen's University, Belfast, which seems to help in fostering an increasingly enlightened approach to Northern politics. Moreover, several hundred Unionist students come to Dublin each year to study at Trinity College, which can and does play an important part in bringing Irishmen together. A corresponding number of Northern Nationalists come to study at University College, Dublin. This makes it all the greater pity that there is so little contact between two universities which are not a quarter of a mile apart. Each University has its own tradition and there may be important reasons why each should retain its independence. But there seems to be a strong case on political, economic and academic grounds for closer co-operation between the two universities, particularly in the faculties of Arts, Law, Medicine and Science.

CULTURE AND NATIONALISM

But the most important contacts between North and South will be cultural contacts. If we can produce a distinctive Irish culture this will be a magnetic force which will tend to draw all Irishmen together. Such a culture should grow out of the conditions of modern Ireland, and should appeal particularly to the people who live in Ireland today.

The problems of Irish culture and of Irish nationalism are allied but, unfortunately, in recent years, both Irish nationalism and what is popularly regarded as Irish culture have tended to become exclusive and narrow. This exclusiveness is seen, on the one hand, in the repudiation of the work of men like Yeats or Synge or O'Casey and, on the other hand, in a tendency to deny to the Unionists of Northern Ireland the title of Irishmen. Both forms of exclusiveness tend to cut Ireland in two, the

former by repudiating a cultural heritage common to all Irishmen, and the latter by minimizing the importance of the affection which every man feels for the country in which he was born.

We cannot expect the Northern Protestant to interest himself in Irish culture as long as we continue to revile him as an alien and a planter. Here is where the narrow and exclusive nationalism which has been current in recent years shows itself at its worst. It may seem strange to deny the title of Irishman to a man whose people have been living in Ireland since before the 'Mayflower' sailed to America, but that one should do it in the name of Irish Nationalism is quite incredible. There are many Ulster Protestants, not necessarily Nationalists, who claim they are as well entitled to describe themselves as Irishmen as anyone else in Ireland, and such claims should be recognized and respected by us. The Ulster poet, Mr John Hewitt, deals with this very problem in one of his poems :

> Once alien here my fathers built their house
> Claimed, drained, and gave the land the shapes of use.
>
> . . .
>
> So, I, because of all the buried men
> in Ulster clay, because of rock and glen
> and mist, and cloud, and quality of air
> as native in my thought as any here, . . .

The Unionist *Belfast Telegraph* also returns to this theme from time to time, and has advised its readers to resist the pressure of those who say that Ulster is not a true part of Ireland, and that Ulstermen have not an Irish birthright. The people of the North, it says, should take advantage of every world to which they have access. An editorial on St Patrick's Day, 1953 opens as follows :

> St. Patrick's Day comes as a reminder that although deep-seated differences between peoples and religions have caused it to be divided Ireland still inspires a common sentiment. The sadness is that the festival should be turned to political account when it best can demonstrate that the border has nothing to say against love of country.

The editorial adds that St Patrick himself offers the best hope of ultimate amity and reunion between Irishmen.

The New Nationalism

We need a new culture and a new form of nationalism broad enough to meet the needs of a society of men of different origins and different religions. But it is the Anglo-Irish element in such a culture which, initially at any rate, will be most important for the purpose of bridging the Border. We are fortunate in having such a rich heritage to draw upon from the Irish and the Anglo-Irish traditions, and from the general

civilization which grew up around Christianity in Europe and in the English-speaking world. All this is our common heritage, and it would be a pity to turn our backs on any of it. We, too, must take advantage of every world to which we have access. Our national culture should arise from a happy combination of the various cultural traditions we have inherited, and not from concentrating on one and ignoring all the others. The new Irish nationalism will have to be tolerant and non-exclusive, and to recognize that Irishmen display an infinite variety of gifts and serve Ireland in a bewildering variety of ways. Thomas Davis came nearer to such a concept of Irish nationalism than any other Irishman and that is why his writings form the best point of departure for a new nationalism designed to draw all Irishmen together.

FOREIGN POLICY AND PARTITION

The approach to Partition which we have pursued hitherto has led us to make the ending of Partition the dominant aim of our foreign policy. The argument of this paper has been that Partition has nothing to do with foreign policy, but is a domestic matter for Irishmen. If the people of Ireland wish to unite under one government neither England nor any foreign power will keep them apart. For this reason, it is better that we should not even mention Partition in international assemblies, for our doing so would savour of the old coercionist policy of enlisting outside support against our fellow-countrymen, and, like that policy, would merely irritate without effecting any useful purpose.

There are many objects for Irish foreign policy to pursue. We are interested in international peace and justice, in supporting the United Nations, in the defence of European civilization, in promoting international trade, in exploring the avenues to European unity, in assisting the countries which are struggling for independence, and in promoting understanding between them and the colonial powers. Like other peoples, we need as many friends abroad as we can get. But none of these things has any direct or immediate bearing on Partition. When the time for establishing a United Ireland eventually comes, we shall need many friends in England in order that the English may be helpful with the economic and financial problems which the ending of Partition will raise, but the best way to get these friends is not by carrying on a campaign against England in international assemblies.

The Commonwealth

In this connection, the question of re-entering the Commonwealth arises. I think most Irishmen feel that re-entering the Commonwealth would be a small price to pay for Irish unity, and that the repeal of the External Relations Act was a mistake, in as much as it broke one of the links between North and South. But it is unrealistic to speak of going

back into the Commonwealth again, except as part of a scheme for re-uniting Ireland. Those who think we can solve Partition simply by going back into the Commonwealth should reflect upon the fact that we were in the Commonwealth for 27 years during which Partition grew in strength. More significantly still, they should reflect upon the Home Rule Bill of 1912, under which Ireland would have received limited powers of self-government but would have remained within the United Kingdom. Yet the Unionists brought Ireland and England to the verge of civil war rather than accept the Home Rule Bill. It is clear, then, that what the Unionists object to is government by a predominantly Catholic Parliament in Dublin and that they are not prepared to accept this within the United Kingdom much less than within the Commonwealth. So re-entering the Commonwealth offers no hope of solving Partition in the immediate future, though it may form part of the solution when we have brought about a change of heart in the North.

THE ROAD AHEAD

I am aware that I have discussed no concrete proposal for establishing a United Ireland. I have refrained from doing so deliberately. Schemes such as the D'Alton plan are admirable in themselves but they are premature as there is no hope of their being accepted in the North in the immediately foreseeable future. Our immediate task is to create an atmosphere in which the people of the North will be prepared to consider such plans. It is to create a unity of wills, and once we have created that unity of wills, no great difficulty will be found in giving it practical expression. But the creation of that unity of wills is going to take very many years and during the interval many of the political institutions which we know today may have been transformed completely and a United Ireland may come into existence only as part of a United Europe, or of some other political association, the nature of which we cannot now even guess. All we can say is that if we lay the foundations of peace and goodwill between Irishmen we can look to the future with confidence.

I am aware also that I have not referred to the superior social services which exist in the North, and which are often used nowadays as an argument in favour of Partition. Yet, while these are important, they are not the essence of the Partition problem. If the North ever joins the South, it will want to retain the social services and other economic advantages which it at present enjoys, but that does not mean that we should immediately introduce social services identical with those which prevail in the North. What is of vital importance is that we should streamline and develop our economy in such a way that when the time comes to invite the North to enter a United Ireland, we shall be sufficiently wealthy to ensure that the North can join us without sacrificing any of the advantages which she at present enjoys.

This paper has underlined the religious problem behind Partition, but it has said little of the economic problem. The Orange Order aims at supporting not only Protestantism but Protestant Ascendancy, and there is little doubt that it has been used by a wealthy and privileged caste to keep the poor at war with each other on the religious issue, so as to prevent them from forming a popular or labour party. But the working of the Welfare State, introduced into the North for tactical reasons to prevent the Unionists falling foul of Mr Attlee's Labour Government, will, in time, tend to undermine the position of this wealthy and privileged caste by creating a class of able and educated young men who will perceive the barrenness of the Orange position, and will not easily be fobbed off with the cry of 'No Popery'. Already, after 37 years of Unionist rule, there must be many people who are weary of the Unionist Party, and would welcome a change of government. But these are problems for the people of the Six Counties themselves and they must be left to solve them in their own way. Our task is simply, by withdrawing the threat of external coercion, to permit Northern politics to evolve in a normal and peaceful way.

Once we have taken the steps outlined earlier in this paper to reduce tension between North and South and to create the conditions in which a unity of wills can grow, then we should say no more in public on the subject of Partition than is necessary, but should let commonsense and goodwill do their work. It would be a good thing if every man who contemplates speaking on Partition in public should ask himself the question—'Will my speech really help to unite Ireland?' We should, however, keep ourselves well informed on the problems of the North for knowledge will help to protect us against mistakes of policy such as we made in the past.

There will be plenty of work for us to do in the South, which will assist in bringing both parts of Ireland together. We must develop our economy to the highest degree of efficiency of which it is capable. We must raise the educational and cultural level of our people as high as we possibly can, Finally, we must strengthen those principles of tolerance on which our free society rests, in order to ensure that our problems are faced fully and openly and that the natural talents of our people find full expression. Tolerance is the key to a United Ireland.

The problem of uniting our people is a new and difficult one for Irishmen and the old ways of thinking are very little help to us in tackling it. Indeed, they have obscured the problem from us for more than 35 years. In tackling this problem we will need the gifts of perseverance, restraint, moderation and, above all, charity. It is possible that once we set our people on the road of peace and mutual understanding their journey to national unity may be a short one, but we must not expect it. The odds are that the road will be long and difficult and we cannot even be sure that it will lead to unity. But of one thing we can be quite certain : there is no other road.

A Sample of Loyalties

by CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN

TOWARDS the end of 1953 a class of 26 boys, aged 13 to 14 years, attending a large Protestant secondary school in the Six Counties, was set an essay on 'Ireland'. Their teacher explained to them that he required, not a geographical essay, but an account of what they felt about Ireland. He also mentioned that, although Ireland was politically divided, it was treated as a unit for certain other purposes including ecclesiastical organization and sport. Apart from this he gave no hint as to how the subject should be handled.

I had an opportunity of reading these essays and, having read them, I felt that an analysis of the ideas and feelings which they contained should be of interest to all those who are concerned with the problem of partition. It is generally recognized that, in that problem, the feelings and loyalties of the Protestant population of the Six Counties play a determining part. Little, however, has been done to ascertain what the pattern of these loyalties and feelings now is, in relation to partition or unity. The ballot-box does indeed make its terse and relevant contribution, but can of its nature give us only a final result. Those who wish to predict, or to affect, the future should try to know something of the pattern of thought and emotion which leads, at present, to an electoral result sustaining partition.

The present paper is a very modest and limited contribution to knowledge about this pattern. The boys, who form the quite fortuitous 'sample' of opinion, appear to be of average ability for their age. I believe that they express certain ideas and feelings prevalent in their community with more candour and clarity than might be used by older or more intellectual members of that community. The pattern discernible in their essays cannot, on this view, be discarded as merely juvenile. Modern educational theory suggests that such a pattern is likely to subsist, usually in a more sophisticated form, into adult life, and to influence political behaviour.

It is quite true that so tiny a sample will not bear any great weight of presumption. I present the following analysis for its intrinsic interest, and in the hope of attracting to this area of enquiry persons who are better placed and better equipped to carry out a reasonably wide and scientifically planned public opinion survey.

I. FEELING TOWARDS IRELAND

Twenty of the twenty-six essays express, in varying degrees, a positive feeling towards Ireland.

Of these, eleven reveal clearly that the writers regard Ireland as their country. These use such phrases as: 'I like Ireland because it is

my own country' (3) ; 'I love Ireland because it is my homeland. In any country one will find the inhabitants are naturally patriotic'. (5) ; 'Ireland comprises two different provinces, Northern Ireland and Eire. But this does not make much difference to the people'. (8) ; 'I like Ireland because for one reason it is my native country'. (11) ; 'Ireland works on my feelings. Even the mention of it makes my heart feel warm'. (12). Others in this group reveal their feeling of 'Irishness' by their attitude towards Irish unity (see II below).

The remaining nine of the 'positive' group praise Ireland's scenery, the friendliness of the people, and the peace of the land : 'The people are pretty well civilized and there are not often many brutle mudders' (12). It is a puzzle in this group to decide how far each writer thinks of himself as Irish. On the whole the feeling of the group is probably best expressed in the words of one of its members : 'I am a sort of a way attached to its music its famousnes and its green fields. We should be proud of it. Great generals were born here such as Alexander of Tunis, General Montgomery General Templar and many other famous people. Yeats a famous poet who was born in Ireland gave great feeling in his poems about the Emerald Isle' (16).

Only three of the essays express either dislike of Ireland in general (22, 23) or a specific and exclusive devotion to Ulster (21). In one case, the dislike is fundamental : 'I don't like the sea which separates us from the rest of England' (22). In the other case (23) anti-Irishness is related in some way to the smoke-nuisance in the city of Bêlfast. The partisan of Ulster is embattled : 'I like Ulster or Northern Ireland because of it scenery which is very beautiful and meby because I get some satisfaction of having an enemy in the South of Ireland' (21).

The remaining three express no emotion about Ireland, although one of them admits that he likes to read 'the legends and myths of ancient Ireland' (24).

II. PARTITION

Only three of the essays (13, 22 and 26) ignore partition.

Nine favour the re-unification of the country. All but two of these belong to the groups with a positive feeling towards Ireland. Only two essays however (11 and 12) are at all specific as to the kind of unity which is desirable (see Section IV below). Six of the remaining seven who favour unity content themselves with a simple or qualified expression of regret that the country is divided. One writer expresses a wish that the country were united 'one way or another' (1). One of the 'indeterminate unity' group makes a significant qualification : 'Ireland should be one country and not two. I do not like the way the South of Ireland try to make Ireland one country against our willingness. I also

hate the customs' (23). The most profound opinion expressed in this group is probably : 'Ireland's main disadvantages are that it is partitioned and partly the people themselves' (6).

Only one writer—the same who expressed an exclusive devotion to Ulster (21)—definitely comes out against Irish unity (see Section IV below). The remaining fourteen who mention the partition of Ireland do not reveal whether they desire partition to be ended or not. It is *probably* safe to assume that all those (twenty in number) who express a 'positive feeling' towards Ireland would favour unity *on some terms.* (see Section IV below). However, without going into the field of conjecture at all, we have the following figures :

In favour of unity	9
Against unity	1
Non-committal mention of partition	13
Ignore the subject altogether ...	3
	26

III. CAUSES OF PARTITION

Fourteen writers assign a cause or a defining factor of partition. Of these seven mention religion only as being the cause of, or defining factor in, partition ; five mention religion with other factors, only two mention another factor alone.

(*a*) Religion. In view of the importance and sensitivity of the subject, the references to religion are worth giving in full. The numbers marked with an asterisk are those who also mention causes or defining factors other than religion :

> 'It is a great pity that Ireland is divided into two parts the North known as Ulster is dominated by the Protestants and the South known as Eire is dominated by the Roman Catholicks. There is some bitterness about this division and some violence but this is usually caused by the extremists' (12).
>
> 'The people of Ireland are mostly Roman Catholic. The majority of them are very friendly but there are always a few people who are bad. This is where religion comes in. All stout Roman Catholics obey their priest their aim is to be good but they go about it in a different way from us. This is why there is so much hatred. Now Ireland is divided into two parts, the North and the South. The North is mostly Protestant and the South Roman Catholic' (18).

'This fine little island has one drawback—it is divided in matters of religion. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants are always squabbling over religion. But they unite together when there is a call for help from their neighbours and are slowly but gradually learning to think of each other as friends and not as enemies' (7).

'The religion is mainly the same in Ulster and Eire but mostly Protestant in the North and Catholic in the South. I think this does not really matter, although some people would rather see Ulster and Eire united' (19).

'The partition between N. Ireland and Eire the only real difference the N.I. is inclined to be more Protestant than Catholic and Eire is more inclined to be Catholic than Prestant' (25).

'The religion in Ireland is roughly half in half and there is a lot of feeling between the two. Sometimes there are fights in the streets but these are quickly ended by the police' (20).

One essay deals with Catholic and Protestant antagonism in the course of a suggestion for unification. This is quoted in Section IV below (1).

'Religion is an important thing. Of course you have different kinds of religion but there is one that I think is not right. That is the religion that the Catholics follow. Now I think that because it says in the bible that he (Jesus) would die on the cross and be buried and then on the third day he was to rise again. But the Catholics don't believe that, they believe that Jesus died but did not rise again' (23).

Though it is not specifically stated, it seems to be felt that this article of Catholic belief has an effect on the division of Ireland.

'The North's religion is Protestant with a few Catholics. In the South, Catholics are predominent. Protestantism is definately better, for the Catholic priests get too much money and poverty is common' (24).

'Most of Eire is all Roman Catholic and most of Northern Ireland is all Protestant, but they are divided up into six different sections according to their beliefs' (12).

'South of Dublin the majority of people are Roman Catholics and North of Banbridge most are Protestants especially in Antrim and East Derry. About 1920 there was a civil war between the Catholics and the Protestants because the Catholics wanted all of Ireland to themselves' (4).

'There are two main religions in Ireland. Roman Catholic and Protestant. The Roman Catholics are mainly in Southern Ireland.

I think that Roman Catholics should not be allowed in Northern Ireland and Protestants should not be allowed in Eire. . . . Ireland is a good country in spite of their overcrowed towns and their slums and the Roman Catholic inhabitians (14).

(*b*) NON-RELIGIOUS FACTORS

Of the two essays, which in giving 'defining factors' omit mention of religion, one raises social and political questions :

'The main difficulty in Ireland to-day is the question of the border. I do not like this because it divides the people of Ireland. In the South people are still working for very poor wages although they can get nearly everything they want if they have the money. One reason why I do not like the south is because during the last war although they were supposed to be neutral german soldiers could land at Cork and have dinner while our men could not even cross the border without the fear of being stoned or silently disposed of' (9).

(NOTE : The writer of this essay also states : 'The people of Ireland are a strong hardy race. They have never been conquered although the English tried many times'.)

The second essay plumps for an economic interpretation :

'Ireland is divided into two countries Eire and Ulster. It is divided now for about thirty years and if these two countries would be joined again Dublin the capital of Eire would be the capital of all Ireland. Then Eire would get the biggest and best trade and would be the centre of Ireland's industries' (21).

Of the remaining five, those who give both a religious and another factor, three have recourse to history :

'The people of Eire hate the English and the people of Northern Ireland because of what has happened during Ireland's history' (14).

'The partition of Ireland took place after the first World War. Not wanting to be ruled from Dublin, the Northerners voiced their intentions of staying with Britain. They drilled forces to show that they meant it and defied England and the South' (24).

(NOTE : This essay is the only one that reveals a knowledge of the events which led up to partition or of the recent history of Ireland.)

'The people from the north came from Scotland mainly and speak English but in the South West (*sic*) they still speak Irish and a little English' (4).

In these three essays the historical factors seem, however, to be secondary : the religious factor is felt to be the driving force behind the historical events mentioned in 14 and 24, and the linguistic distinction produced by 4 is later abandoned for a purely religious one (see Section III (*a*) above ; penultimate quotation).

The remaining two essays in the ' non-religious factors ' group give primacy to the constitutional issue :

> ' Ireland is divided into two parts, North and South. In the South the people have no King or queen but have a prime minister to rule over them. While in the North we have the " Queen " to rule over us ' (23).
>
> ' Ireland is divided into two sections, Northern Ireland and Eire. It is divided because Eire will not come under the Queen's rules, and law which Northern Ireland does. . . .' (12).

Unlike the ' historical ' factors the ' constitutional ' one seems to be regarded as an absolute, sufficient in itself. It is remarkable however that this factor is introduced only in two essays.

> (NOTE : No. 24, much the best informed of the 26 essayists, states that ' Northern Ireland is part of the British Commonwealth ' ; his emphasis, however, is not on this, but on northern resistance to Dublin rule, and on the religious question ; he does not mention the Queen.)

IV. THE END OF PARTITION

Although thirteen essays are in favour of Irish unity, only four give any idea of what form this unity might take. Even of these, however, only one is quite explicit :

> ' I feel that if Northern Ireland and Éire were brought together under the Queen's rules, the whole of Ireland would be even more peaceful than any other country in the world. . . .' (12).

Another comes down, but in more ambiguous language, in favour of concession to a ' southern ' viewpoint :

> ' If the North went in with the South and people would forget the seventeenth century, I am sure that it would not make much difference in the management of the country for it is well united as it is ' (11). (NOTE : The writer had mentioned the unity of ecclesiastical organization, sport, etc.)

The remaining two present an '. . . either . . . or . . .' view :

'My feelings are that both sides should come to an agreement. Some people want Ireland united under the Irish Parliament and others under the English Crown' (18).

'I would like Ireland united one way or another: If it were all Roman Catholic it would stop all this hatred and strife between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants. If it were all Protestants and the South allowed itself to be governed by the English Parliament it would be a unition of England and Ireland under the same flag and it would be encluded in Gt. Britain. I think that this would make Gt. Britain a far stronger nation.

If Ireland ever was united I think that their wisest plan would be to have a king of Ireland so that they would be a separate nation and trade with the rest of the world' (1).

The most striking themes and tendencies which emerge from this analysis are probably:

1. The degree to which a sense of 'Irishness' persists (Section I).
2. The tendency to identify political partition with Protestant-Catholic *apartheid* (Section III (*a*), e.g. Nos. 12, 18, 25, 24, 4. Section IV, No. 1).
3. The relative insignificance of the themes of loyalty to the Crown (Sections III (*b*) and IV, 23, 12) and of exclusive loyalty to Ulster (Sections I and III (*b*): 21).
4. The prevalence of a desire for unity, of indeterminate form (Section IV).

This is not the place to develop the implications of these themes. It is necessary, however, to utter two words of warning, especially to readers with nationalist backgrounds. First, the existence of a desire for unity does not necessarily imply, and probably does not imply in most of the cases here involved, a desire to break with Britain. There is evidence in several of the 'pro-unity' essays of a tendency to regard 'Irishness' as not exclusive of Britishness (Section I, 16) or to regard unity as part of Britain as acceptable (Sections I, II, IV, 12, 18, 1) or to dislike 'Southern' pressure (Section II, 23). A less tangible point is that one senses that some of the writers use the word Ireland in a dual sense always in contrast with Britain, but sometimes as including and sometimes excluding the writer. This shift can take place in mid-sentence as I think it does in 14: 'Ireland is a good country (including the writer) in spite of their (excluding the writer) overcrowded towns and their slums and the Roman Catholic inhabitians'. Similar attitudes are discernible in the writer who refers to British soldiers as 'our men', but seems also to take pride in Ireland's resistance to English rule (Section II (*b*) 9).

The second warning is against attaching too much importance to one or two rather strange misconceptions about recent Irish history (Section III (*b*) 9) or Catholic doctrine (Section III (*a*) 23). It should not be taken, without further evidence, that misconceptions of these dimensions are widespread, and it is probable that a similar enquiry in an Irish Catholic school would produce ' howlers ' of a corresponding character.

I should like to thank the teacher whose interest in truth made this little enquiry possible. It is better, however, to leave him anonymous lest, in the grim words of one of his essayists, he be ' silently disposed of '.

The Communist Theory of Law

by JAMES A. HENCHY

TO the faithful Marxist law is a concept with a disreputable past and a limited future. While neither Marx nor Engels attempted to formulate a theory of law, they make it quite clear that they regarded law as an essential part of the apparatus of the bourgeois state which would perish with the bourgeois state. The view of law as part of the fortifications of capitalist society which were to be stormed and razed to the ground may have stiffened the anarchic zeal of the early revolutionaries, but it rendered the victors in the October Revolution singularly unqualified to produce a convincing basis for the continued existence of the Communist state which emerged from the revolution.

The problem has not become any easier in the years that have since elapsed. Up to the end of the Second World War the U.S.S.R. remained the only Communist state in the world. Its primacy in the statement and restatement of the rules of both theoretical and practical Communism was clearly established amongst the Communist parties of the world. During this period the dilemma was primarily an internal one for the U.S.S.R., for the tempo of the world revolution had so slowed down that the U.S.S.R., which was conceived as a temporary expedient, had acquired many of the characteristics of a permanent state. Its emergence at the end of the Second World War as one of the leading world powers, its active membership of the United Nations and kindred organizations, its participation in the administration of international law, these and other factors have produced a condition of things which must force Communist theorists to re-interpret Marx in the light of the altered conditions both within Russia and throughout the world. It is no longer possible to dispose of law as a ' bourgeois fetish '. The rise to power of Communist parties in Yugoslavia, Poland, China and other countries, and the symptoms of dissident nationalism that have developed in some of those countries, dispose of the suggestion that law is to be explained or justified only in so far as it is a factor in the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the bourgeois states. The problems of ' co-existence ' lie in relation to socialist as well as capitalist states. It may well be that such problems, and the fact that they are not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future, may result in a radical re-interpretation by Communists of some of the teachings of Marx and Engels on law and the state, but it is difficult to see how it could result in a convincing Communist theory of law.

The preoccupation of Marx and Engels with the economic interpretation of history and society makes their writings on the nature of law[1] seem like footnotes to their larger thesis of dialectical materialism. Nowhere do they attempt to propound a theory of law ; this, as we shall see, is not very surprising. They postulated a period in history when

[1] Mainly, Marx, *Capital, Critique of the Gotha Programme ;* Engels, *Anti-Dühring, The Origin of Family, Private Property and State.*

there was no state, and put forward as a historical fact the proposition that the state emerged as a mechanism of restraint only when society divided itself into classes. The state became the primary instrument by which the most powerful of the classes, the property owners or capitalists, exploited the workers. The form of the state varied with the progression of history, but whether it be a primitive slave state or a modern bourgeois state, it owed its existence to physical force, because ' whenever there was a state, every society had a group of people who governed—gave orders, exercised domination—and who, in order to retain authority, had in their hands a mechanism of physical constraint, of violence—of weapons appropriate to the technical level of each epoch '.[1] This tension between capital and labour will result in the uprising of the workers against the capitalists and with it the destruction of capitalism and the capitalist state. The new state organization that will result will be the dictatorship of the proletariat which, dictatorship though it be, will work towards its destruction, so that it may be replaced by the classless society or Communism.

Neither Marx nor Engels is very specific as to the extent to which the dictatorship of the proletariat is transitional. Was it to abrogate itself when the state had taken over the means of production, socialized the economy and abolished classes? Or was it to remain in existence until capitalism had been smashed throughout the world? The successful revolutionaries in Russia were ill-prepared in many ways for the ideological problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat which they claimed to have established. The more enthusiastic of them suggested that, because of its novel economic features, it should not be called a ' state ', a term which had a hated capitalist connotation. Lenin, however, made it clear that the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia constituted a state, and its role was laid down by Section 9 of the Constitution of 1918 :

> The principal object of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., a Constitution designed to serve the present period of transition, consists in the establishment, in the form of a strong All-Russian Soviet Authority, of the dictatorship of the urban and rural workers together with the poorest of the peasants, to secure the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the effectuation of socialism under which neither class divisions nor state authority will any longer exist.[2]

Writing immediately before the Revolution, Lenin states that this dictatorship would ' wither away ' to make way for the classless society, whereas the bourgeois state would have to be abolished by revolutionary violence.[3] The proletarian dictatorship would be stigmatized by the

[1] Lenin, *The State*, in *Soviet Legal Philosophy* (Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series, vol. V), p. 7.
[2] 54 *Law Quarterly Review*, p. 404.
[3] *State and Revolution*, passim.

instruments of physical force which had sustained the capitalist state throughout the centuries. As for law, ' law is nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing the observance of law ',[1] and so it would give way upon the disappearance of the state to the classless society to which law would be repugnant.

The Russian state that came into existence as a result of the October Revolution was considered to be merely a necessary re-grouping of forces in the course of the revolution. Since law was an essential feature of the capitalist state, and since the dictatorship of the proletariat was only a means to an end, neither Marx nor Engels saw any need to work out a theory of law : it was more important to work towards the abolition of law. Consequently, upon the founding of the Soviet state, respect for law became a ' bourgeois fetish ' and the distinction between statutory law and administrative decree was condemned as a ' bourgeois fiction '. Legislation took the form of governmental decree and in the absence of specific law judges were to administer the law on the basis of ' socialist consciousness of justice '.[2] Law, therefore, in the limited form in which it existed, was merely an instrument of government policy and unworthy of serious study.

The necessity for the formulation of a Communist theory of law did not arise until it became obvious that, far from the dictatorship of the proletariat progressing to the classless society, the Soviet state was in danger of collapse. A decision to change over to a ' New Economic Policy ' was taken at the Tenth Communist Party Congress in March, 1921. This programme was a compromise between Marxism and capitalism in that a limited amount of private enterprise was permitted under strict state control. It was hoped that by such conciliation of the peasants the recurring crises of production and distribution would be surmounted and the state put on a more secure footing. It became obvious that the suppression of the counter-revolution would have to be followed by a long struggle against the hostile forces within and without the state. The need to formulate and interpret law on a more permanent basis and to reconcile it with the basic tenets of Marxism became one of primary importance. Immediately upon the introduction of the New Economic Policy the first Civil Code was prepared and other codes dealing with criminal law, land law, labour law, etc., were introduced. It became necessary to formulate a theory of law to fit this new stage of Marxism in practice.

The name most prominently associated with Communist legal theory in the era of the New Economic Policy is Pashukanis (1891-1937). He first attracted attention with the publication in 1924 of his *General Theory of Law and Marxism.*[3] That Soviet jurisprudence was still in its infancy is shown by the fact that he called his work *A First Attempt at*

[1] Lenin, *Collected Works,* xxi, p. 228.
[2] Statute of the People's Court, Nov. 30, 1918, Art. 22.
[3] *Soviet Legal Philosophy,* pp. 111-225.

Marxist Criticism of the Basic Juridical Conceptions. It was shortly afterwards translated into German for the purposes of Communist propaganda, and so, from an early stage, Pashukanis caught the attention of the western world. His influence and reputation within the U.S.S.R. grew rapidly. His *General Theory of Law and Marxism* and the papers he subsequently published provided the central legal thought for the series of essays published by a number of Soviet jurists between 1925 and 1930 as *The Encyclopedia of the State and Law*. He became Vice-President of the Communist Academy, Director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law and Editor-in-chief of the Institute's organ, *The Soviet State*. Pashukanis's unquestioned leadership in the formulation of legal doctrine and the approval his writings received in official Soviet reference-books led a number of western writers to look upon his analysis of the origin and nature of law as being a statement of the definitive Soviet viewpoint. Time, however, was to prove that Pashukanis, like many another Soviet theorist, was expendable.

The origins of Pashukanis's theory of law lie on the one hand in the writings of Marx and Lenin and on the other hand in the works of certain German philosophers, notably Laband and Jellinek.[1] This theory became widely known as the ' commodity-exchange theory '. Adapting what he claimed to be the methodology of Marx to jurisprudence, he finds the origin of law in the exchange of commodities. Capitalist society is a society of commodity-owners. The acquisition and alienation of commodities and the problems resulting therefrom cover the whole field of law. The capitalist state is born when the group or clan organization of authority holds within its framework a sufficiently broad market intercourse, but law is an institution quite apart from any regulation of it by the state. Pashukanis accepts the theoretical omnipotence of the state but puts the study of the state outside the scope of jurisprudence since ' as an organisation of class dominance and an organisation for the conduct of external wars, the state neither requires—nor essentially admits of—legal interpretation '.[2] All law above commodity-exchange law—for example, public law—exists only as a reflex of commodity-exchange law and will disappear with the disappearance of private law. Bourgeois law, which was opposed to the socialist revolution, would wither away. In fact, with the complete disappearance of commodity-exchange in the planned production and distribution of a socialist economy, law would cease to have any foundation and disappear.

Pashukanis's theory involves at least one important deviation from classical Marxism : he attempts to explain law as something existing independently of the state. Writing in the era of the New Economic Policy, when a delicate and carefully controlled compromise existed between socialism and capitalism, he conveyed the implication that a completely state-planned economy would result in the elimination of

[1] For an analysis, see Dobrin, 54 *Law Quarterly Review*, p. 402.
[2] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. 183.

law. There would thus be a socialist state but no socialist law. To the orthodox Marxist law will disappear only when the state ceases to exist as a means of compulsion, but Pashukanis visualized the continuance of the state long after the disappearance of law. Moreover, his general theory seems to give more than a hint of the merits of capitalist society.[1] His commodity-exchange theory gives a meaning to law and equality in the bourgeois state which runs counter to the usual Marxist criticism of law and equality as being merely part of the apparatus for concealing the exploitation of the workers. 'Only bourgeois-capitalist society', he says, 'creates all the conditions essential to the attainment of complete definiteness by the juridic element in social relationships.'[2] It is as if he were contrasting the known merits of the *Rechtstaat* with the unknown controls of the socialist state.

To the student of primitive law the inadequacy of the commodity-exchange theory as an explanation of the origin of law will be obvious. The delictual liability in a primitive society is frequently unrelated to the exchange of commodities, e.g., the blood-feud. But the reaction against Pashukanis developed not because his theory of law was based on a misreading of history: his generalization was no more sweeping than that of Marx. The fall from favour of the school of Pashukanis, which had so dominated Soviet jurisprudence for a number of years, was due rather to the fact that it failed to provide a basis for the socialized Soviet state. Marx and Engels had, no doubt, envisaged the abolition of the state as a capitalist institution, but they did not expect it to give way to universal anarchy. 'The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not abolished; it withers away.'[3] To Pashukanis law was something totally antagonistic to this change to socialism. Such elements of law as existed in the Soviet state were but part of the residuum of capitalism, and as soon as private commodity production was abolished law would have withered away. Such a theory was fatal to the claims of the Soviet leaders to have created, or to be in the process of creating, a state with a purely socialist character. But, more important still, Pashukanis and his followers strongly pressed the point that law continued to be necessary only as a result of the exigencies of the New Economic Policy, and that as soon as socialization was complete within the state law would have vanished, as also would the state. It was obviously out of the question for the Soviet government to tolerate a theory which involved the withering away of the Soviet state at a time when it was encircled by enemies. Even within the U.S.S.R. the spread of Pashukanis's theory was having results which ran contrary to the policy of the political leaders.

[1] See Dobrin, 54 *Law Quarterly Review*, p. 423; Schlesinger, 6 *Modern Law Review*, p. 24.
[2] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, pp. 119-120.
[3] Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, in Oakeshott, *Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, p. 131.

The New Economic Policy was reaching its final stages at the end of the 1920's. As a breathing-space it had served its purpose, and the drive towards the complete socialization of the state was again gathering momentum. The limited concession to private ownership which had existed during the New Economic Policy was dropped. The state ownership of all industry had become almost an accomplished fact. The collectivization of agriculture was pressed forward feverishly, often against the stubborn resistance of the *kulaks,* who were eliminated by the most brutal methods. In every field the authority of the state made itself felt. It was an era of ambitious Plans accompanied not alone by affirmations that they would be eventually successful, but also by official declarations that socialism had finally triumphed. The widespread acceptance in educated groups of Pashukanis's theory that it was only the free exchange of commodities that justified the retention of law, coupled with the oft-repeated Marxist dictum that socialism would render government obsolete, produced the result that in many quarters it was believed that the time for the abrogation of law and order, as hitherto known, had come. Some judges closed their courts; law students resolved that the further study of law was unnecessary; there was a movement in some provinces for the closing down of the local soviets, and the Conference of Marxist Publicists in 1930 resolved that the existing categories of crimes and punishments be abolished and be replaced by ' repression based on expediency as the leading principle for the judge in each particular case '.[1] The drift was quickly stopped by official action and in a report to the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress in 1930 Stalin laid down the new line :

> We are for the withering away of the state, while at the same time we stand for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat which represents the most potent and mighty authority of all the state authorities that have existed down to this time. The highest development of state authority to the end of making ready the conditions *for* the withering away of state authority : there you have the Marxist formula.[2]

The denunciation, in all but name, of the Pashukanis school of law marked it out for ridicule and obloquy. In the sorry manner which has become all too familiar in the case of Soviet intellectuals who have departed from the current application of Marxism, Pashukanis denounced many of his earlier views and wrote papers on the basis of his conversion to the opinions of his adversaries. For a time it seemed as if his rehabilitation was complete. During 1935 and 1936 he assisted in the preparation of the new Constitution and in 1936 he became Vice-Commissar of Justice. Suddenly, he was one day in 1937 denounced by *Pravda* as ' an enemy of the people '. It may be that Pashukanis had become involved in political activities which brought about his

[1] Dobrin, 65 *Law Quarterly Review,* pp. 420-1.
[2] *Soviet Legal Philosophy,* p. 235.

downfall.[1] At any rate, this public denunciation of him seems to have been his obituary. No record of his trial or conviction was ever published. He simply disappeared.

The article in *Pravda* denouncing Pashukanis was by P. Yudin and was expanded by the same author in a longer article in the Communist Party's magazine, *Bolshevik*, for September 1, 1937.[2] As there was nobody of the name of Yudin prominent in legal circles, it has been suggested that the Yudin in question may have been merely a *rapporteur* for some influential group.[3]

The importance of Yudin's article is that it makes a complete break, not alone with Pashukanis, but with all previous legal literature, and seeks to give a basis for a completely new Soviet doctrine of law. It begins with the proposition that law is a creation of the state for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the dominant class within the state. Thus, in a bourgeois society, legal institutions merely safeguard the interests of the bourgeoisie against the interests of the worker class. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a new type of state and its law is a new type of law, namely, law which protects the interests of the workers. A doctrine of law independent of a doctrine of state is inconceivable. The essence of the law of the Soviet state is that it is socialist in content, and the fact that it has retained some bourgeois forms should not detract from its essentially socialist character. Theories of law which involve the withering away of the Soviet state must be discarded. The literature of the law must be rewritten.

The reaction against Pashukanis was undoubtedly increased by the course of international affairs as well as by developments within the U.S.S.R. Hitler had risen to power in Germany and had made no secret of his ambition to expand the German state eastwards. The old fear of attack, and possibly of counter-revolution, was felt in Russia again. The Constitution of 1936 had sanctioned private property in certain personal goods and chattels, and such property rights required the protection of law. The Russian dictatorship, moreover, was learning, as dictatorships have discovered since the beginning of history, that government by force is more effective if clothed in the garb of legal forms. It was at any rate unthinkable that a doctrine which envisaged the rapid atrophy of the legal order should be countenanced in a state which might at any moment have to mobilize its resources to fight a war for its very existence.

The dominant figure in Soviet legal theory upon the eclipse of Pashukanis was Vyshinsky. Later to become Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., he had been Professor of Law in Moscow University and achieved a world-wide notoriety as the chief prosecutor in the dramatic

[1] For suggested reasons for his liquidation, see Hazard, *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. xxxii, and Schlesinger, 6 *Modern Law Review*, p. 25.
[2] Reproduced in *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, pp. 281-301.
[3] Hazard, *ibid.*, p. xxix.

treason trials of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Radek and other leading Bolsheviks in 1936, 1937 and 1938. When Pashukanis was liquidated he became head of the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences and editor of its journal, *Soviet State and Law*. In an address entitled 'The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law'[1] and in the textbook, *The Law of the Soviet State*, which he edited,[2] he inaugurated the new philosophy of law with a denigration of the school of Pashukanis couched in language of violent abuse. Having rejected the theory that law was in the process of withering away he re-stated the basis of the legal order by defining law as 'the aggregate of rules of conduct—or norms: yet not of norms alone, but also of customs and rules of community living confirmed by state authority and coercively protected by that authority'.[3] He hastens to point out, quite rightly, that his definition has nothing in common with the normativism of Duguit or Kelsen. 'Our definition,' he says, 'starts from the relationship of dominance and subordination expressed in the law'.[3] The doctrine of 'revolutionary legality' is thus revived and the state is put forward unabashedly as the instrument of coercion in the class warfare. No attempt is made to show that any balance is kept between the classes in the state. The coercive power of the state is expressed to be wielded in the interests of the workers who, in both theory and practice, are identified with the Communist Party.[4] Since the right of the Communist Party to speak or act on behalf of the 'working class' has never been tested by democratic processes, and since the Communist Party does not seem to be liable to account for its conduct, law becomes simply the instrument of coercion by which the Party rules. The justification of such rule is said to lie in the merits of the social system,[5] and the utter ruthlessness with which law is made to serve the state finds excuse in the degree to which law assists the attainment of the aims of the Party.

There is little evidence that the Communist theory of law in Russia has substantially changed since Vyshinsky laid down the new line in 1938. The definition of law formulated by Soviet jurists in 1938 survived the stresses of ten turbulent years and passed the scrutiny of a conference of Soviet jurists in 1948. It is set out in the following terms in the 1949 textbook of *The Theory of the State and Law*, published by the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.:

> Law is a combination of the rules of behaviour (norms), established or sanctioned by state authority, reflecting the will of the ruling class—rules of behaviour, whose application is assured by the coercive power of the state for the purpose of protecting, strengthening and developing relationships and procedures suitable and beneficial to the ruling class.[6]

[1] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, pp. 303-341.
[2] English translation, New York, 1948.
[3] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. 337.
[4] See Jones, *Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law*, p. 273.
[5] Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*, p. 77.
[6] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. xxxvi.

Whether the attitude to law of Vyshinsky and the post-1937 jurists will continue to be acceptable in Russia or in other Communist countries is by no means certain. The idea of ' revolutionary legality ' served the purposes of the Communist movement when it was dominated by Stalin, and ' it is in truth in the subordination of the letter and the machinery of the law to the " revolutionary " spirit of 1918 that the characteristic mark of the Russian theory of law is to be found '.[1] The difficulty for the Communist theorist lies in the fact that the doctrine of ' revolutionary legality ' was conceived for the purposes of a transitional era which has now passed. The ' withering away ' of the Communist state has become largely an academic theory, but it cannot be discarded, since it forms part of the Communist gospel, even though events seem to have belied the forecasts of Engels and Lenin. Engels propounded the theory as follows :

> The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not ' abolished ', *it withers away.*[2]

Lenin, in his *State and Revolution,* written some months prior to the October Revolution, found it necessary to put a gloss on Engels's forecast :

> The state withers away, in so far as there are no longer any capitalists, any classes, and consequently, no *class* can be *suppressed.* But the state has not yet completely withered away, since there still remains the protection of ' bourgeois right ' which sanctifies actual inequality. For the complete withering away of the state, complete Communism is necessary.[3]

It fell to Stalin to explain the doctrine of the ' withering away ' of the state in the light of the experience of the U.S.S.R. An escape from the criticism that Russia had failed to follow the course predicted by Engels and Lenin might have been found in an admission that it had not yet been found possible to achieve a completely socialist state in Russia. But such a ' Trotskyite ' plea was ruled out by the fact that the ruthless collectivization of agriculture and industry and the ' liquidation of the capitalist elements ' were considered to have produced a completely socialist state. Moreover, it became necessary, with the onset of the Second World War, to develop, and give an ideological basis for, Russian nationalism. Thus, when Stalin reported to the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 1939 he disposed of the theory of the ' withering away ' of the state as follows :

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[1] Jones, *ibid.,* p. 278.
[2] Engels, *Anti-Dühring,* in Oakeshott, *ibid.,* p. 131.
[3] Oakeshott, *ibid.,* pp. 144-5.

> Will the state be preserved among us likewise during the period of Communism as well? The answer is 'yes': it will be preserved unless capitalist encirclement shall have been liquidated and the danger of military attacks from without eliminated; of course the forms of our state will change once again in conformity with a change of the internal and external setting. The answer is 'no': the state will not be preserved and will wither away if capitalist encirclement shall have been liquidated and replaced by socialist encirclement.[1]

Such an explanation seems to do violence to the idea that a total and inevitable atrophy is to be the fate of the state consequent upon the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It follows from Stalin's restatement of the theory that the state is to 'wither away' only if and when it is decided that such a course is politic. What was conceived as an inexorable historical consequence has been converted into part of the strategy of world revolution.

It is doubtful if Stalin's pronouncements on this or on other aspects of the Communist theory of state will continue to find acceptance. Soviet legal literature after 1937 developed a tone of servility towards the dicta of Stalin that may earn it its share of the reaction against the era of Stalin. One cannot in any case see any permanence in a doctrine of law which rests entirely on despotism. The justification in theory of the unfettered tyranny of the Communist Party in the interests of the working class may give some explanation of the excesses committed in the name of law in countries where the Communist Party has seized control, but it adds nothing to the science of jurisprudence. The preoccupation of Russian legal theorists with problems of orthodoxy has largely reduced them to the level of glossators on the texts of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Their backwardness is probably nowhere better shown than in their inability to appreciate the fundamental nature of the structure of law in a socialized society. They have failed to define civil law or to appreciate that a great part of what in a purely capitalist state would be private law takes on the character of public law in a socialist state.[2] They accordingly have had very little influence on the development of legal theory in those non-Communist countries in which socialism has taken root, and Communist theorists outside of Russia have shown little independence of thought.[3] The unbridgeable gap between law in a Communist state and elsewhere seems to lie in the fact that the doctrine of Communism requires that law be deprived of its ethical content and that it merely serve as the arbitrary and coercive agent of the Party dictatorship. Consequently, most of the problems that have concerned legal philosophers since Plato and Aristotle have no place in Communist jurisprudence other than as 'bourgeois fictions'. Communism has produced not so much a theory of law as a theory of despotism.

[1] *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. 349.
[2] See Schlesinger, 6 *Modern Law Review*, pp. 21-38.
[3] For an unorthodox but influential Marxist theory of law, see Renner, *Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions*, ed. Kahn-Freund.

Some Recent Trends in Soviet Science and Philosophy

by M. B. CROWE

THE recent advances in Russian science and technology have been dramatically brought to the attention of the world by the successful launching of two artificial earth-satellites. The satellites themselves, in their orbits, are not alone the proofs of an extraordinary technical capacity, with all that this implies, but they have become the symbols of triumphant bolshevist science. It is worth asking, however, whether the undoubted advances are—as Soviet statements would have us believe—the fruits of the communist ideology or whether they have been brought about in spite of it. This raises the question of the relation between dialectical materialism, on the one hand, and science and philosophy on the other. It is a question which has come very much to the fore in Russia in the past ten years. The evidence available points to some interesting changes of policy ; and it will be of interest to attempt to summarize some of it.

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There is no ambiguity about the theoretical position. Dialectical materialism claims to be a universal system of thought, a complete philosophy of the universe and of human existence. No field of human activity, not even that of the scientist or the philosopher (perhaps least of all that of the philosopher), falls outside its purview. One is not surprised, then, at the all-embracing ideological control that Marxist society finds necessary ; nor is it so strange that the Praesidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences should hold that ' science isolated from politics does not exist and cannot exist in the world '.[1]

In the last years of Stalin's life, however, there seemed to be some abatement of the absolute claims of the ideology. At all events there took place a series of much-publicized discussions on various questions of philosophy, physics, biology and linguistics as well as on questions concerning literature, music and the arts. The discussions prove, on inspection, to have been limited. There was never, for example, any calling in question of the bases of dialectical materialism ; and in most cases the discussion was closed by a directive of the Central Committee

[1] Cf. the letter of the Praesidium, accepting the resignation of the American geneticist, E. J. Muller, Dec. 1948, quoted in the collective work *La Filosofia del Communismo* (English translation, *The Philosophy of Communism*, Fordham University Press, 1952, p. 280).

of the Communist Party laying down the party-line. Still, it is noteworthy that discussion took place at all—even if one cannot exclude the possibility that it was officially inspired in order to tempt ideologically unreliable thinkers into the open so that they could be dealt with. Stalin's death, in March 1953, was, in this as in other matters, an event of tremendous importance. It seems to have removed the force best able to ' contain ' the wave of ' criticism and self-criticism '. Some of the discussions went to lengths that he would have hardly tolerated. Moreover, the collapse of the cult of personality (although not publicly avowed for some time) meant the end of Stalin's brand of Marxist orthodoxy, which included an almost pathological distrust of every manifestation of non-communist thought. As a result a more conciliatory attitude towards Western thought became possible.

This situation has been epitomized in what, at first sight, looks like a mere technicality—the rehabilitation of the law of the negation of the negation.[1] This law was part of the classical exposition of the dialectical materialism. Lenin took it from Engels who, in turn, had it from Hegel. According to the dialectic all development takes place by way of the union of opposites. The first stage (thesis) breaks down by reason of its internal contradictions and gives way to the antithesis (the negation of the thesis). This, too, breaks down, and is succeeded by the synthesis, which includes the valid elements in both thesis and antithesis. If the antithesis is the first negation, the synthesis is the negation of the negation. Thus the primitive communism of mankind was succeeded by its negation, the regime of private property ; and this will, in turn, give way to the system of communism (the negation of the negation). The whole dialectical process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis may be likened to the progress of a spiral which, through a series of changes of direction (negations), returns continually, but on a higher level, upon its starting-point. The thesis, which is the starting-point, is not annihilated but rather transcended ; what is valid in it is exalted. This is the celebrated Hegelian *Aufhebung* that Lenin found so attractive despite the ' empty pedantry and mysticism ' with which Hegel had tricked it out.[2]

The ' law of the negation of the negation ' was a commonplace of Soviet philosophy until the publication of Stalin's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* in 1938. This work ranked with—or, rather, above—the classic texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin. One important respect in which Stalin differed from his predecessors was his handling of the dialectic. In place of Engel's three laws (one of which was the law of the negation of the negation) he laid down four ' principles of the Marxist dialectical method ' (which made no special provision for the negation of the

[1] G. A. Wetter, ' Die jüngsten Entwicklungen der Sowjetphilosophie ', paper read at the *Institut International de Hautes Études,* Bolzano, 30 August 1957.

[2] Cf. R. N. Carew-Hunt, *Theory and Practice of Communism,* pp. 19-21.

negation).[1] The new formula, of course, became the new orthodoxy and no more was heard of the negation of the negation until Stalin's death. And, when this law did return to favour, it was clearly capable of being used as the theoretical justification for a more conciliatory attitude towards Western culture than had been possible in Stalin's time. Capitalism cannot be bad in all its works and pomps if something in it is due to be preserved and exalted in the final synthesis of communist society.

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It will be instructive to examine more closely in this light some of the discussions that have taken place in Russia during the last decade. In many ways the most important of them was the great philosophical discussion of 1947. This was occasioned by the publication of G. F. Alexandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy*. Alexandrov, a man of considerable distinction, was professor of philosophy at the Soviet Academy, sometime chief of propaganda for the Party, and winner of the Stalin Prize in 1942 ' for scientific work '. But he is now known chiefly for the controversy his book provoked. The discussion reached its climax when the Academy met to consider the work and to hear Andrei Zhdanov, then Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, give the official view. Zhdanov's speech, ostensibly a summing-up of the discussion, was very critical of Alexandrov's work. The burden of the complaint was that Alexandrov had been too accommodating in his attitude towards Western bourgeois philosophy ; that he did not make clear the *qualitative* difference between the philosophy of Marx and Engels and that of their predecessors ; and that he did not sufficiently stress the dependence of ideas upon material (economic) conditions.[2] Zhdanov went on to find fault with the ' philosophical front ' generally for its apparent inability to produce a genuine bolshevist philosophy. The speech was followed by the abject ' self-criticism ' of Alexandrov and his undertaking to correct his errors in future work.

One of the results of the ' philosophical discussion ' was the decision to found a new periodical, *Voprosy Filosofii* (or *Problems of Philosophy*) with the double aim of popularizing philosophy in the Soviet Union and of intensifying the campaign against bourgeois philosophy. The first editor, however, B. M. Kedrov, seems to have taken too literally his commission of developing Marxist-Leninist philosophy and, within a year, he too had come under attack. One of the chief heads of accusation against him was his responsibility for an article, written by his protégé M. A. Markov, on ' The Nature of Physical Knowledge '. Markov said what no other Marxist dared say, that physical science is independent

[1] Cf. G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus*, pp. 382-4, 386-7.
[2] A. A. Zhdanov, ' Rede in der Diskussion über das Buch Aleksandrovs ', in G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus*, Anhang II, pp. 594-616.

of Marxist-Leninism. And Kedrov opened the pages of *Voprosy Filosofii* to the discussion that followed. After Kedrov's dismissal there was a long delay for reorganization. The third number for 1948 appeared eventually in mid-1949 under the editorship of D. I. Chesnokov ; and the new policy was announced as the further intensification of the struggle against the remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of the people.[1]

It soon became apparent that the Zhdanov intervention in the philosophical discussion was intended to set a headline. Its influence is seen in the other ' discussions ', in the fields of literature, music, art and science, which usually end in an exhortation to thinkers, whatever their speciality, to be militant in the cause of dialectical materialism.[2] Of these ' discussions ' the most notorious is undoubtedly the Lysenko controversy in genetics.

Up to 1948 the theory of heredity that had been widely accepted, in the Soviet Union as elsewhere, was that associated with the names of Gregor Mendel (1822-1884), August Weismann (1834-1914) and T. H. Morgan (1866-1945). In this theory heredity depends upon a ' gene ', located in the chromosome of the cell-nucleus, which transmits the morphological and physiological qualities of parent to offspring. An essential feature of the theory is that characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the parent plant—or animal—organism are not passed on by inheritance. Experience seems to bear this out. And the suggested reason is that such acquired characters do not touch the ' gene '. Another feature of the theory is that it acknowledges the existence of stable biological species. Both of these features were to be rejected in the new genetical theory of Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.

Lysenko, basing his teaching on the practical work of I. V. Michurin (who died in 1935), declared that the whole ' gene ' theory of inheritance was irreconcilable with dialectical materialism and that the continuity of the germplasm was part of an idealistic reactionary biology that must give way to progressive soviet biological science. This declaration was made in a paper, read to the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science, for which the way had been prepared by a long campaign against the traditional theory of heredity.[3] Lysenko's paper ' On the State of Biological Science ' was subjected to a full discussion (31 July—7 August, 1948) in the course of which it became clear that many Soviet biologists preferred the older theory. Lysenko, however, was able to announce that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had examined and approved his paper. Further discussion was unnecessary. It was now the official view that the inheritance of acquired characteristics

[1] Cf. J. and M. Miller, ' *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) ' in *Soviet Studies*, 1 (1950), n. 3, pp. 210-230.

[2] Cf. E. J. Simmons, ' Soviet Literature 1950-1955 ' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan. 1956, pp. 89-103 ; A. Voyce, ' Soviet Art and Architecture : Recent Developments ', *ibid.*, pp. 104-115 ; R. M. Slusser, ' Soviet Music since the Death of Stalin ', *ibid.*, pp. 116-125.

[3] Cf. *The Philosophy of Communism*, (see note 1), pp. 272-6.

was not merely possible but necessary ; that stable species were ' static ' and ' metaphysical ' and inadmissible in dialectical materialism ; that Weismann's conception of a germplasm, as distinct from the bodily environment that shelters it, leads to ' agnosticism ' and ' idealism ' in science (because it admits sudden and unpredictable mutations) ; and that any teaching on biological evolution from which religious conclusions were openly and notoriously drawn must be false. One of the chief exponents of the now discredited Mendel-Weismann-Morgan ' scholasticism ', Professor Zhebrak, sized up the situation in a letter to *Pravda* on 15 August 1948. He said that, as long as two possible views in genetics were recognized by the Party and the differences between them could lead to fruitful discussion, he had held firmly to his opinion. But now that the basic theses of Michurin had been approved by the Central Committee of the Party he found it impossible as a Party-member ' to persevere any longer in views pronounced erroneous by the Central Committee of our Party '.[1]

It is not difficult to see why the new genetical theory attracted the ' social engineers ' of the Soviet Union. It did away with the biological inequality of men and catered for their transformation into ideal Soviet citizens, by the implantation of suitable characteristics, through the appropriate manipulation of the economic environment. It was even suggested that the Lysenko theory had some relevance to the problem of transforming the *kulaks* into obedient industrial workers. In general, the theory stresses man's domination of nature by showing him how to harness the forces of evolution. Had not Marx said, in the *Theses on Feuerbach* : ' Up to now philosophers have done nothing but give various interpretations of the world ; what is needed is to transform it ' ?

The new line was propagated at once. A meeting of the Soviet Academy, on 13 August 1948, passed a hurried resolution calling upon all Soviet philosophers to show themselves diligent in working for the spread of ' revolutionary Michurinism ' in biology. At the same time the editorial board of *Voprosy Filosofii* was censured for having failed lamentably in its duty by publishing an article in favour of Mendel-Morganism in biology.[2]

Since the death of Stalin, however, the controversy has receded into the background. Lysenko is, apparently, still active in the Academy of Agricultural Science, but more as an administrator. His voice is no longer heard in scientific pronouncements.[3] This may be the result of a prudent assessment of the situation by those in authority ; for the scientific basis for Lysenko's theory has always been suspect and Lysenko himself, although a distinguished experimental agronomist, does not seem to have unduly impressed independent biologists. The classical

[1] Text in G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus*, p. 219.
[2] Cf. G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus*, pp. 217-220, 366-374.
[3] J. Turkevich, ' Soviet Science in the Post-Stalin Era ', in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan. 1956, p. 145.

theory of heredity has recovered some ground in recent years and Lysenko's views have come under heavy criticism within the Soviet Union. Still, the Michurin-Lysenko theory has not been officially disowned. And as late as February 1954 Lysenko was able to obtain a doctorate in biological science for an ardent supporter of his, V. S. Dmitriev, in the teeth of the strongest opposition from the commission appointed to examine Dmitriev's dissertation. The case was so scandalous that Khrushchev commented publicly on it and Dmitriev's degree was later withdrawn.[1]

In other fields the issue of a 'Marxist science' has not arisen as critically, nor has it been decided as crudely, as in the Lysenko genetics controversy. In general biology, for example, the origin of life has been much discussed. A. I. Oparin, whose theory was generally received, taught that life could only originate in multi-molecular protein-formations, themselves the result of a long process of evolution.[2] But this view has recently been opposed in the interests of dialectical materialism for, in the theory attributed to Engels, life must have begun in a single protein-molecule. Again, Soviet biologists have been concerned with the problem of determining whether life is necessarily cellular or not, one reason for their interest being the fact that a non-cellular stage of life was considered a *desideratum* in the dialectical materialist doctrine of evolution. Nevertheless the claim of O. B. Lepeshinskaja to have produced non-cellular life experimentally in the laboratory has been generally discredited. Such matters suggest that, even where there has been no official action comparable with the support of Lysenko, ideological preoccupations are never altogether absent from the thinking of Soviet biologists.[3]

One would expect that ideological considerations would be least of all relevant in the field of physical science. Whatever about 'revolutionary genetics' or 'socialist biology', a term like 'bolshevist physics' seems particularly unmeaning and unhelpful. The progress of Soviet science, it is true, has been much the same as that of the rest of the world, the only difference being, perhaps, that lack of foreign contacts and scientific exchange in the last forty years has made the progress much harder than it need have been for Russian scientists. The scientific method, hypothesis to explain the known, prediction and verification of new phenomena and the progressive simplification and extension of theory, is, as one would expect, common to East and West. If the recent launching of space-satellites shows that Russia is in advance of the rest of the world, this better technology differs in degree, not in kind, from that of the other countries. And yet in the domain of physics there has been ideological discussion.

[1] Cf. *Soviet Studies*, 6 (1954), n. 1, pp. 101-6.

[2] Cf. P. H. Yancey, 'The Origin of Life', in *Bios*, 23 (1952), p. 210.

[3] Cf. G. A. Wetter, 'Die jüngsten Entwicklungen der Sowjetphilosophie, (see note 2).

The theory of relativity is, of course, accepted by Soviet physicists ; by explaining and unifying present phenomena and enabling future phenomena to be predicted, it satisfies the requirements of a good scientific hypothesis. But one of its consequences was an unexpected embarassment to dialectical materialism, the convertibility of matter and energy. If matter can disappear, even in the form of energy, then the very foundation of materialism seems to be endangered. One might imagine that, for a consistent and rather naïve materialist, Einstein's convertibility-equation $E = mc^2$ must verge on the blasphemous ! More awkward still is the fact that relativity has led many theorists towards cosmologies and cosmogonies that postulate a beginning of the universe in space and time or that even introduce the notion of creation. These difficulties, however, have not been allowed to develop acutely ; discussion has been damped by the application of a distinction between the physical theories of Einstein and others (which can be accepted) and their cosmological speculations (which must be rejected as products of the capitalist environment of their originators). The approach to the uncertainty-principle of Heisenberg is similar. The principle means, in effect, that the more one knows about the position of an electron the less one knows about its velocity, and vice versa ; one can only speak of the behaviour of the particle in terms of statistical probability. This eccentricity is distasteful for ' it seems to question the essential knowability of nature, the one thing that all Soviet philosophers agree is demanded by dialectical materialism '.[1] Once again the solution has been pragmatic. When, late in 1953, Heisenberg's *Philosophical Problems of Nuclear Science* was published in a Russian translation, the book carried a long introduction warning the reader that, while Heisenberg's contributions to quantum physics are sound and important, his own interpretations of them are ' idealistic ' and to be rejected.[2] The practical conclusion is that Heisenberg does not really upset scientific predictability any more than he proves the existence of human freewill.

These were, at best, partial and provisional solutions of a real problem, that of the place of the laws of physical science in the Marxist *Weltanschauung*. Perhaps no general solution is possible. If in 1948 M. A. Markov, in the article on ' The Nature of Physical Knowledge ' already referred to, held that physical laws are the same in the U.S.S.R. as abroad and was stigmatized as ' cosmopolitan ' for his pains, it seems that now not much more than a perfunctory acceptance of the general scheme of dialectical materialism is demanded of scientists. In 1955 *Voprosy Filosofii* stated editorially that ' the solution of important scientific problems cannot be achieved by administrative action, by the harsh imposition of authoritative points of view on those who think differently,

[1] G. Brown, 'The Discussion of Physics ', in *Soviet Studies*, 6 (1954), n. 2, p. 132.

[2] Cf. G. L. Kline, ' Recent Soviet Philosophy ', in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan. 1956, p. 133.

by the forbidding of a free exchange of views . . .' This, of course, is not as liberal as it sounds. The journal *Kommunist* in the same year warned that ' from time to time an attempt is made, under the flag of the conflict of opinions, to revise the root theses of Marxist-Leninism . . . It cannot be permitted that individuals should use the freedom of conflict of opinions and criticism for the revision of the fundamental principles of Marxism '.[1]

* * *

If far-reaching ideological demands, such as we have seen, are made of the positive sciences, what may be expected in the philosophical and semi-philosophical disciplines? Two controversies may be singled out for the comparison they invite with the scientific ' discussions ' considered above—the linguistics controversy and the controversy about the nature of logic.

Up to 1950 the great figure in Soviet philology and linguistics had been N. Y. Marr (1864-1934), the son of a Scots father and a Georgian mother. His fame, within the U.S.S.R., rested to a considerable extent upon his ' Marxist philology '. The details of his theories need not concern us, beyond noting that some of them were fanciful in the extreme. He is said, for example, to have tried to reduce all language to the four elemental sounds *sal, ber, yon* and *rosh* which were, in addition, the names by which the four Japhetic tribes called themselves. The articulate speech, built up of these elements, had been preceded by ' linear speech ' or sign-language. The passage from one to the other was one of the ' dialectical leaps ' in man's evolution.[2] These theories led to many difficulties. Marr himself, before his death, seems to have withdrawn the four-element theory ; but some of his followers retained it and even developed it to the point of utter absurdity. The situation in linguistics was most confused when *Pravda* opened its columns to a monster discussion that, the editors claim, ' evoked a lively response from the Soviet public, including more than two hundred articles from scientists, mainly philologists '. One contribution, however, was decisive—that of Stalin himself who embarked on his first literary venture for twelve years, ' Regarding Marxism in Linguistics ' (*Pravda,* 20 June 1950). The article was written in answer to four questions put by ' comrades from the youth '. In it Stalin made it clear that he was speaking not as a technical philologist but rather as one concerned with Marxism in linguistics and in the other social sciences. He criticized certain points in the system of Marr, notably the assumption that language is, like law, philosophy, art, etc., part of the ' superstructure ' of society. On the contrary Stalin asserted that language is a function of the whole society,

[1] *Voprosy Filosofii,* 1955, n. 1, p. 138 ; *Kommunist,* 1955, n. 7, p. 119, both cited by G. L. Kline, op. cit., p. 126.

[2] Cf. J. Ellis and R. W. Davies, ' The Crisis in Soviet Linguistics ', in *Soviet Studies,* 2 (1951), n. 3, pp. 209-264.

basis as well as superstructure. This meant a development of the Marxist ' basis-and-superstructure ' concept of society, a development that not alone ended the hegemony of Marr in Soviet linguistics but promised to be fruitful in other fields too. Stalin's article in *Pravda,* together with two further letters written by him to the periodical *Bolshevik,* ranked immediately as ' a new treasure in the storehouse of Marxism '.[1]

Finally, in a more purely philosophical realm, there is the quarrel between the dialectical and the formal logicians. As long ago as 1946 the Central Committee of the Party had issued a directive prescribing the teaching of logic and psychology in secondary schools.[2] This immediately posed a problem, for there were no suitable text-books. Formal logic, in the traditional Aristotelian sense, had long been out of favour ; it was ' static ' and ' metaphysical ' because it professed to deal with objective and unchanging realities notwithstanding the Marxist-Leninist demonstration that the only realities are the passing stages in the eternal process of change and development. Yet the All-Union conferences of teachers, called to debate the questions of the nature and function of a Marxist-Leninist logic, revealed a good deal of confusion. So also did the discussion, in over sixty articles, in the pages of *Voprosy Filosofii* from 1950 until the end of 1951. Three kinds of view emerged. There were those who admitted only one logic, formal logic, and relegated the so-called dialectical logic to the epistemology and methodology of dialectical materialism. Secondly, there were those who wanted a single logic with two ' dimensions ', a formal and a dialectical. Finally, there were those who admitted two distinct logics, but were vague about the relation between them.[3] Such errors, however, got short shrift in an article entitled ' On the Logic of Thinking and the Science of Logic ' by I. I. Osmakov, head of the philosophy department of the U.S.S.R. Ministry for Higher Education.[4] Osmakov finds totally unacceptable the notion that there is a sphere of the real to which the Marxist dialectic does not apply. And this is precisely what bourgeois formal logic, with its illusory unchanging realities, demands. It must give way to a dialectical logic deduced from the principles of Marxist-Leninism.

The real problem, however, that of designing a suitable text-book of the dialectical logic, proved intractable. This was, in a limited sense, a victory for the partisans of formal logic. Perhaps, too, Stalin's intervention in the linguistics controversy slightly favoured the case of the formal logic. But nothing came of these indications. The whole project of logic for schools has been dropped. And, more recently, there has been a stepping-up of the campaign against those who support ' the crudest

[1] Cf. G. A. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus,* pp. 229-233 ; M. Miller, ' Marr, Stalin and the Theory of Language ' in *Soviet Studies,* 2 (1951), n. 4, pp. 364-371.
[2] Decree of 4 December 1946, translated in *Soviet Studies,* 3 (1952), n. 3, pp. 343-4.
[3] Cf. A. Winkelmann, ' Die Stellung der formalen Logik im Sowjetsystem ', in *Scholastik,* 31 (1956), pp. 85-89.
[4] Cf. C. A. Campbell, ' The Soviet Concept of Logic ', in *Soviet Studies,* 3 (1952), n. 3, pp. 278-287.

and most harmful vulgarization of the philosophical foundations of Marxist-Leninism and the politics of the Communist Party by trying to substitute formal for dialectical logic. . . . What might, in the beginning, have been considered, with some straining, as a conflict of opinions within the limits of Marxism, has now quite openly gone beyond those limits. . . . We must put a decisive end to this erroneous tendency '.[1]

* * *

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is hardly novel. It seems clear that, in Soviet society, the ' general line ' of the Communist Party will always favour severe ideological control of philosophy, science and other human activities. There may be tactical relaxations according to time and circumstance. The period after Stalin's death is a case in point ; a momentary breeze from the West seems to have been felt in the stuffy storehouse of Marxist concepts. It is not, perhaps, extravagant to find a political parallel for this stirring of freedom in the consumer-goods policy of the Malenkov regime. The present trend seems to be in the reverse direction, towards a stricter orthodoxy, paralleled by the political rise of Khrushchev. And, if the more abusive interferences with science, as in the Lysenko affair, are now avoided, we need probably look no further for the reason than to the loss of prestige they bring and to the way in which they impair the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda.

[1] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1955, n. 3, pp. 163, 171, cited by G. L. Kline, ' Recent Soviet Philosophy ' in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan. 1956, p. 131.

Tennessee Williams

by DESMOND REID

THOMAS LANIER WILLIAMS was born in Missouri forty-five years ago. As clerk, lift-boy, telephone operator, waiter and cinema worker, he learned to observe people and to write about them. He wrote poetry, short stories and plays. He studied in the Universities of Missouri and Iowa and in Washington University. Now, as Tennessee Williams, he is a playwright of high talent. His own judgment that he is a minor dramatist who has written one or two major plays seems a modest one : he has not been uniformly brilliant but few of his works have failed to reflect glimpses, at least, of sure craftsmanship. He has won the annual New York Drama Critics' Circle Award three times, and twice the coveted Pulitzer Prize.

It is not, however, because of these successes that Tennessee Williams has become a much-discussed man, both inside and outside the theatre world. He has been the centre of enduring controversy ; and each new play, almost indeed each new production of one of his plays, has whipped up that controversy. The main point at issue is the predominance of ' sex ', and sexual aberration, in his work and the manner in which he treats it. His critics condemn him as bold and bawdy, often suggestive, sometimes indecent ; to those who defend him he is a sincere artist impatient of superficiality and convention, a realist who depicts people as they are : with their private hopes and fears and failings and failures.

That is but a broad statement of the opposing points of view. I shall discuss them more fully in the course of this article. Meantime we may note Tennessee Williams's reaction to the strife that surrounds him. He refuses to change his methods ; he writes what he wants to write ; and if theatre-goers do not like it they can stay away from his plays. Here are his own words :

> Of course I know that I have sometimes presumed too much upon corresponding sympathies and interest in those to whom I talk boldly, and this has led to rejections that were painful and costly enough to inspire more prudence. But when I weigh one thing against another, an easy liking against a hard respect, the balance always tips the same way, and whatever the risk of being turned a cold shoulder, I still don't want to talk to people only about the surface aspects of their lives, the sort of things that acquaintances laugh and chatter about on ordinary social occasions.[1]

[1] From the Introduction (*Person-to-Person*) of *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*. Except where otherwise noted, all quotations are from the editions of Tennessee Williams's plays published by Secker and Warburg, London. They are cited here by kind permission of the publishers.

Of this it may be observed in passing that many of his supporters seem to accord him much more than ' a hard respect ', that ' a cold shoulder ' hugely understates the attitude of his opponents and that in their opinion a hard respect or even warm acclaim may be won at too great a price.

I have never seen one of Williams's plays on a stage. It may seem strange, then, to presume to discuss them with any degree of authority. As Williams himself has written : '. . . a play in a book is only a shadow of a play and not even a clear shadow of it. . . . The printed script of a play is hardly more than an architect's blueprint of a house not yet built or built and destroyed.' [1] With that we will all, I think, agree. A play for the stage is what the dramatist writes ; and he may fairly claim that his success or failure be judged from the stage presentation of his plays. But suppose one is interested rather in the content matter of the plays, searching for the author's lines of thought, for an underlying philosophy of life, for community of theme or character. Then the plays must be read and re-read and pondered. A performance on the stage is over in two or three short hours ; one is left with impressions, with, perhaps, half-remembered lines of dialogue. Further, an actor or a director may by a personal interpretation heighten or lessen the force of phrase or situation. He may change or misrepresent the emphasis, and fail to convey what the dramatist intended. Admittedly in modern plays when characters are more sharply drawn there is less scope for individualistic interpretation—Hamlets are few nowadays ; but to avoid anything of a misleading nature it is necessary to go to the sources, to the play in print. There acts and scenes and lines may be considered at leisure ; you can turn back a page ; you can make a note ; you can compare and contrast ; and when all is over you can form a fairer judgment.

* * *

The characters which Tennessee Williams puts before us are people in trouble. Usually they are people in desperate trouble : they are lonely, forgotten, poverty-stricken, misunderstood or despised, without hope of helping themselves and unhelped by others. He is remarkably faithful to this theme. Sometimes he crowds all the trouble on to the shoulders of one unhappy person ; sometimes there are two or three, equally unhappy, whose lives and troubles intermingle ; sometimes he leaves them at the curtain-fall with a dim ray of hope ; more often there is none.

Blanche du Bois in *A Streetcar Named Desire* is perhaps Williams's most forlorn character. She has been a gentlewoman knowing wealth and ease ; now she is destitute, an alcoholic, an ageing nymphomaniac.

[1] *Camino Real* in the Afterword.

She scrabbles frantically for a hold, something with which to lift herself from the depths. She glimpses a breathless break in the clouds when Mitch is attracted to her, likes her and will, she realizes, ask her to marry him. But her tottering hopes crash forever when her brother-in-law, despising her and her airs of gentility and her ceaseless recalling of better days, tells Mitch of her past promiscuity. At the play's end she is taken, screaming, to a mental home.

Alma, in *Summer and Smoke*, is in her middle twenties : '. . . there is something prematurely spinsterish about her. An excessive propriety and self-consciousness is apparent in her nervous laughter ; . . . people of her own age regard her as rather quaintly and humorously affected '. She has a father hopelessly unable to understand and help her, and a mother, ' a spoiled and childish girl who evaded the responsibilities of later life by slipping into a state of perverse childishness '.[1] Alma falls in love with John Buchanan. She insists on marriage, but he will not be tied by any such contract. After a long, disintegrating struggle with herself, unaided and unadvised, Alma can stand the strain no longer ; she offers herself to John on his own terms. But it is too late : time and tragedy, and Alma, have changed John Buchanan. He is in love with and engaged to a younger girl. We leave Alma on the street with a passing stranger. She will almost surely end as another Blanche du Bois.

The Rose Tattoo presents to us Serafina delle Rose, shattered and slatternly after the death of her husband. Her dulled mind is shocked still more at the revelation of her husband's infidelity. Her meeting with another stray, Alvaro, opens the door to hope. Of their initial conversation Williams writes : ' Their fumbling communication has a curious intimacy and sweetness, like the meeting of two lonely children for the first time '.[2] In this play too we have the correlative unhappiness of Serafina's daughter, Rosa : young and wild and immoral, disgusted by her mother, avid for affection, for a man to love and who will love her.

And so the sad list grows : there is triple tragedy in *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*, Big Daddy, a vigorous mountain of a man dying of cancer, Brick, his son, well on the way to being a confirmed dipsomaniac, and Maggie, Brick's wife, desperately trying to reach her husband through his unveiled contempt and indifference and fighting for a share of Big Daddy's fortune ; *The Glass Menagerie* shows us Tom, chained to a nagging mother (du Bois-like in her dreams of earlier gentility and 'gentlemen callers' on Sundays) and a crippled sister, Laura. He deserts them in the end after cruelly raising their hopes of betterment by introducing Laura to a friend of his. A possible husband for the shy, reserved

[1] *Summer and Smoke*, Part I, Scene I.
[2] Act II, Scene I.

girl? But the friend explains honestly that he cannot call again: 'I go out all the time with a girl named Betty. She's a home-girl like you, and Catholic, and Irish, and in a great many ways we—get along fine'. He leaves; and Tom leaves—for good; and the two women face a bleak future alone.

Still the list grows as the one-act plays add their quota of human beings crumbling under strain or loneliness: for example, poor deranged Miss Collins (*Portrait of a Madonna*—traces again of Blanche du Bois), Charlie Colton, the elderly salesman (*The Last of My Solid Gold Watches*) whose world, and business connections, have vanished, the derelict Little Man and his love for a cat, 'She isn't a fair-weather friend . . . She'd be faithful to me' (*The Strangest Kind of Romance*), and the homeless, friendless little orphan girl (she is about thirteen) of *This Property is Condemned.*

There is about all this a terrible singleness of purpose. Always it is the waifs and strays and outcasts and misfits that claim Tennessee Williams's attention. In bringing their distress before us he serves them well. His writing is clear-sighted and remorseless. He is sincere in his belief that what he depicts is representative of the world about us, and, as he himself tells us, he is trying to drive home the screaming need of a world-wide human effort to know ourselves and each other a great deal better. To Williams his hapless characters are not merely the misfits of the world: they are typical human beings. They typify others similarly if not identically cudgelled by misfortune. The little world of a Williams play is a miniature of the great cruel world in which we, all of us, live. The squalid dwellings which are the homes of his characters symbolize the decay and corruption of our world.[1]

Although it is his aim to reflect reality, I wonder if the picture painted by Tennessee Williams is a complete one. That there are tension and trouble and violence in the world is beyond question. It is also true that some of the sufferers suffer and tread the downward path alone, unaided by any human hand. But is that the common lot of people in distress? Is every door shut against them and every head turned away? It is easy, I know, to view the matter through Irish spectacles. We are, taking us by and large, a kindly people; we will help, as a rule, when help is needed and when help we can. But we have not a corner in charity. Charity is a human virtue and sympathy for our fellow men is something ingrained in human nature. In individuals these virtues may be blighted by a rotting selfishness. But they are as old as the world

[1] Here are some of the author's Production Notes. 'The dark, grim rear wall of the Wingfield tenement' (*The Glass Menagerie*); 'spindling pillars, sagging steps and broken rails' (*The Rose Tattoo*); 'the shabby room', 'the furnishings are dishevelled and old' (*The Long Goodbye*); 'There is an effect of sinister antiquity in the setting, even the flowers suggesting the richness of decay' (*Auto-Da-Fé*); 'the sagging porch', 'the loose boards', 'the rusty spout', 'the unkempt lawn' (*Baby Doll*).

itself and they die hard. I cannot feel that they are as yet dead or dying.

I do not, I think, misinterpret Tennessee Williams on this point. He is concerned about widespread decay of understanding and sympathy. The title, *This Property is Condemned,* refers directly to the tumbledown house that is the only home known to Willie the orphan girl. There she lives alone. Clearly, at the play's end, we are intended to apply the phrase to the child herself. What her subsequent life will be is sadly obvious. But Williams would have us apply the phrase also to the world at large : it too is a property that is condemned.

The crazy plaza of *Camino Real* is his scarifying conception of our world. It is peopled by pitiable wrecks and those who can but will not help them : there are sex-ridden men and women, cheats, profiteers, military guards to enforce a mocking law. Only death and removal in the Streetcleaners' barrel awaits those in the Camino Real. It is a condemned property ; and so, too, are those, all of them, who have the unhappiness to dwell within it. Tennessee Williams does not exclude humour from this or other of his plays, but the over-riding effect is one of gloom and despair.

A more accurate likeness is drawn by John Steinbeck in *The Grapes of Wrath* or by Michael Vincente Gazzo in another modern play, *A Hatful of Rain.* Steinbeck's is an angry book. He tells a fearsome story of a dispossessed community, thousands of people hunted and haunted by hunger and cold and dereliction. At the end of his last page he leaves them still homeless, foodless and workless. But all along the way, on endless journeys, through unceasing want and privation, kindness travelled with them. Those who had a little shared with fellow-sufferers who had nothing. When one of the travellers died, all mourned. The troubles of one were the troubles of all. There were instances, too, of fellow-feeling from outside their own shabby ranks—a canteen girl sold for a cent two nickel-apiece candies to two hungry little boys. This spirit lightens the whole book in biting contrast to the greed and cruelty of the landowners and land-grabbers so powerfully indicted by Steinbeck.

A Hatful of Rain makes the same point in a different, more confined, way. Here we have four people : a young man, a drug addict, his wife and his father who are unaware of this, and his brother who has known and has tried to help him from the start. Twice a day now Johnny needs a ' shot ' ; he has no money left ; neither has Polo, the brother. Johnny struggles to keep his secret from his wife and his bouncy, respectable father. Inevitably he collapses under the strain and they learn the ugly truth. At once the family ranks close ; other, lesser troubles are forgotten ; they will all help Johnny.

Tennessee Williams could not have given us either of these stories. When reading *Summer and Smoke* for the first time I reached the scene

where Alma returns to John Buchanan. She can no longer live without him :

> One time I said ' no ' to something. . . . But now I have changed my mind, or the girl who said ' no ', she doesn't exist any more, she died last summer—suffocated in smoke from something on fire inside her. No, she doesn't live now. . . . I said, ' But what about your pride ? '—She said, ' Forget about pride whenever it stands between you and what you must have ! ' And then I said, ' But what if he doesn't want me ? ' I don't know what she said then. I'm not sure whether she said anything or not—her lips stopped moving—yes, I think she stopped breathing.[1]

There I was interrupted, before John gave his answer. But I knew what that answer must be. Tennessee Williams would not countenance a happy ending for Alma. Although John's views on marriage have changed, she must suffer a final blow : John is engaged to another girl.

This consistent refusal to salt the lives of his characters with a little legitimate happiness or a little human aid sounds a false note in Williams's plays. Of his leading characters, too, only Stella and (to a lesser extent) Mitch of *A Streetcar Named Desire* and Jack (*The Rose Tattoo*) seem to be balanced human beings. Stella is a flower in the Williams wilderness : she is normal. She feels deeply for her sister, Blanche ; but, for all his coarseness and for all the roughness of their life together, she loves her husband. She will not allow Blanche to wreck their marriage. There are surely as many Stellas in the world as there are Blanches. Tennessee Williams would have given us a more complete picture had he reflected that fact in his plays.

* * *

It is remarkable that although Williams writes consistently of suffering humanity there is little anger in his writing. Here too he differs from Steinbeck. Clearly, much of the sorrow that surrounds his heroes and heroines is occasioned by the acts or omissions, wilful or unconscious, of their acquaintances. But Williams does not waste time with the culprits. His whole attention is given to the sufferers, and he is himself always gentle and understanding with them. He is pitiless in exposing their weaknesses, but he is compassionate with them. He is on their side. He fights their battles.

This gentle compassion strikes me as the most noteworthy characteristic of Tennessee Williams. It permeates his work. It is rooted in the understanding he has for the fears and motives of his characters. He sees how straitened, almost ensnared, they are by circumstance. Faith-

[1] *Summer and Smoke.* Part II, Scene II.

fully and in detail he puts their plight before his audience or his readers ; and so powerfully does he write that he can hardly fail to communicate to viewers or readers his own sense of immense pity.

It is unnecessary to point to isolated lines that illustrate this compassionate approach. It is the very stuff of which the plays are woven. Williams writes :

> These people on the stage do not return our looks. We do not have to answer their questions nor make any sign of being in company with them, nor do we have to compete with their virtues nor resist their offenses. All at once, for this reason, we are able to see them ! Our hearts are wrung by recognition and pity, so that the dusky shell of the auditorium where we are gathered anonymously together is flooded with an almost liquid warmth of unchecked human sympathies, relieved of self-consciousness, allowed to function. . . .[1]

He is extraordinarily skilful in building up a scene to a point where our sympathy is called forth unrestrainedly. Again and again in *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* he does it. We feel for Big Mama as she reels under Big Daddy's verbal onslaughts, for Brick trying desperately to conceal from Big Daddy the reason for his drinking, for Big Daddy himself hugely exulting in the fact that he has not got cancer—when all the time, we know, he has ; when he learns the truth ' his face crumbles like broken yellow plaster about to fall into dust '. In switching our sympathy from one character to another Williams is a master.

Individuals claim our compassion in most of the other plays : Serafina and Blanche, Laura (*The Glass Menagerie*), The Little Man, The Little Girl, and so on. In *Baby Doll*[2] we feel for Aunt Rose and Archie, even (a tribute to Williams's dexterity) for spoilt Baby Doll and vengeful Silva.

Unhappily, just as Tennessee Williams exaggerates the universality and aloneness of suffering humanity, so too does he push his compassion too far. He is on sure ground when he states that he has never met a person he could not love, provided he understood that person. To understand and to sympathize and to love are right and good things. It is when Williams goes further that we must part company with him : individuals have taken right or wrong paths not by choice but by necessity, driven willy-nilly by themselves, their circumstances and their antecedents. That is a morally indefensible doctrine. It is the most dangerous element in Tennessee Williams's works.

It should be said that he does not expressly approve in the plays of immoral conduct. But I do not, I think, read him incorrectly in

[1] *The Rose Tattoo* in the Introduction, *The Timeless World of a Play*.
[2] The film script was based largely on Williams's one-act play, *27 Wagons Full of Cotton*.

saying that his ' necessity ' doctrine and his avowed disbelief in ' guilt ' must imply condonation of the offences his plays reveal. In addition, he is at such pains to pile agony on agony, cornering his tortured little people, that our sympathy tends to flower into the judgment, ' I don't blame them for what they did '.

In the plays we find the implied suggestion, based on compassion, that Williams's men and women are not responsible for their immoral behaviour. They are unhappy weary people. They fall into two groups : some whose present plight is the result of earlier excesses (mainly of a sexual nature) to which they were driven by circumstances ; they are now to be pitied, but who, understanding the stresses to which they surrendered, will blame them for what they did ? To this group belong, for example, Blanche du Bois and Bertha (*Hello from Bertha*). The second is a larger and more varied group : we see the circumstances working on the characters, the vain search for relief and, finally, the fall. Here we have Serafina and Rosa and Alma and Brick ; Big Daddy belongs to this class too, though his is a somewhat different situation : freed after years from the fear of cancer, he is going to live again, he is a lusty old man bent on celebrating. And Alvaro, lonely for so long, with only love and affection to offer ' on hot days and cold days in this lonely old world ' will sin with Serafina. And Silva (*Baby Doll*), hated as ' a man with foreign blood ', his cotton gin burnt down by Archie Meighan, will talk bitterly of the

> evil spirits that haunt the human heart and take possession of it, and spread from one human heart to another human heart the way that a fire goes spreading from leaf to leaf and branch to branch in a tree till a forest is all aflame with it—the birds take flight—the wild things are suffocated—everything green and beautiful is destroyed.

So Silva will take revenge on stupid old Archie by seducing Archie's stupid but desirable young wife. And again (the implied suggestion is) who, understanding, will blame these people. They crave for and surely they deserve a little release, a little happiness, a little self-assertion.

There is here, obviously, question of moral standards. Williams himself writes that ' The great and only possible dignity of man lies in his power deliberately to choose certain moral values by which to live . . .'[1] But what are these ' certain ' moral values ? Is each man to choose his own ? Or is each man to strive to measure up to the objective norm of the natural law and its precepts ? or the revealed law of God, the Ten Commandments which apart from being God's rules of life enshrine fundamental principles without which men cannot live together ? Not many of the Williams characters seem to profess acceptance of the

[1] *The Rose Tattoo,* in the Introduction.

natural law or the revealed law of God. That may not be the dramatist's fault : he portrays the world as he sees it, and he sees a materialistic, immoral world. So Big Daddy and Maggie and Brick and Alvaro and Stanley Kowalski and others are little, if at all, influenced by moral considerations.

And yet they are responsible for their actions. They are human beings with freedom of choice ; they can choose to do or omit this, to do this or that ; they are not children or sleepwalkers or lunatics ; as human beings they can distinguish between right and wrong. Whatever their troubles, as long as they retain the ability to reason and to choose they are responsible for what they do. Stress of circumstance, environment, antecedents may weaken their defences and lessen their culpability. But they remain free to accept or decline. For pathological cases, clearly, full allowance must be made. Exceptionally, too, repeated offences forming a habit of sinful conduct can so undermine a person's moral fibre that now each individual failure may not be morally imputable. I would say that this applies to Blanche du Bois as Williams depicts her. But even here we ought to remember that the earlier offences, which led to the forming of the habit, may have been imputable and should not be made little of.

This is not a new doctrine. It does not set an impossible standard. Neither does it fail to take account of strain and weaknesses which do in fact lessen without removing imputability.[1] But it would seem that Tennessee Williams does not accept this teaching. I believe that he is sincere in this. He does not parade his characters as models to be imitated. To him they are accusing ghosts—accusing his audiences who, through lack of charity and understanding, have had a share in putting them, or others like them, where they now are.

Mrs Hardwicke-Moore, the central character of *The Lady of Larkspur Lotion,* is another desperate, broken-down woman. Her landlady, Mrs Wire, will no longer be fobbed off with the threadbare excuse that she is expecting money from her Brazilian rubber plantation :

MRS WIRE : You with your Brazilian rubber plantation. That coat-of-arms on the wall that you got from the junk-shop—the woman who sold it *told* me ! One of the Hapsburgs ! Yes ! A titled lady ! . . .

WRITER : Stop badgering this unfortunate little woman ! Is there no mercy left in the world anymore ? What has become of compassion and understanding ? Where have they all gone to ? Where's God ? Where's Christ ? What if there *is* no Brazilian rubber plantation ?

[1] For fuller treatment of this matter, see *Criminal Responsibility and Punishment* by Michael Connolly, S.J., in *Studies,* Autumn, 1957.

MRS HARDWICKE-MOORE : I tell you there is, there *is* !

WRITER : What if there is no rubber king in her life ! There *ought* to be rubber kings in her life ! Is she to be blamed because it is necessary for her to compensate for the cruel deficiencies of reality by the exercise of a little—what shall I say ?—God-given—imagination ?

... ...

MRS WIRE : I'll ask you to please stop spitting me in the face those high-flown speeches. . . .[1]

Mrs Hardwicke-Moore is—any sufferer ? Mrs Wire is—any member of Williams's audience ? The Writer is—surely, Tennessee Williams himself ? This plea for understanding might be inserted into any of his plays, and his query ' Is she to be blamed. . . .' be repeated, changing the compensation seized on by Mrs Hardwicke-Moore to something more serious than the exercise of imagination.

Powerfully, then, Williams evokes our compassion. But he must not blind us to the fact that the sins we see *are* sins—free offences against the divine law, be it revealed or contained in the natural law.

* * *

The elements in Tennessee Williams's plays to which most people take exception are his use of ' strong language ', dialogue about intimate sexual matters, and suggestive situations. It is not at all easy to indicate where the line should be drawn in this connection. Some things unquestionably should not be discussed or done in public on a stage ; others, equally undoubtedly, are allowable. But there is a middle group which will always pose problems : is *this* immoral, or suggestive, or indecent, or obscene ? has the border-line been crossed ?

We may set aside from the present discussion the pornographer. He is a sex pedlar. He may seek to avoid unqualified condemnation and perhaps prosecution by adroit handling of his shabby wares, but his purpose is to sell his cake because of the spice it contains. It is unnecessary to comment on the morality of his writing.

Here we consider a writer with a different aim. A playwright is concerned, as an artist, to present a slice of life or of human experience. He presents for our observation a few or several people. In the little section of their life which we view ' sex ' has a place. They may be married or unmarried ; they talk about sex and their sexual problems ; they giggle or guffaw at sexy jokes and smutty stories ; consistent with the action of the play and with the circumstances in which they find

[1] *The Lady of Larkspur Lotion* in *27 Wagons Full of Cotton and other one-act plays* by Tennessee Williams, published by John Lehmann, London.

themselves, they are drawn towards sexual intimacies ; there are scenes of ' love ' and seduction leading at times to fornication or rape or other crimes to be committed offstage or after the fall of the curtain. All these things happen in real life. People circumstanced as are the characters in the play are so tempted, and many succumb to the temptation. And the dramatist, concerned with reality, depicts these things with fidelity.

What is his purpose in so doing ? It may vary :

(*a*) he may have no purpose beyond the representation of life as he sees it ;

(*b*) primarily or secondarily he may seek by showing forth evil in all its ugliness to develop in his audience an aversion for it ;

(*c*) again primarily or secondarily he may aim at stirring the consciences of his audience : to shock or startle them into realization that in real life, by act or omission, they may have been a contributory cause, partial perhaps or indirect, of others' sinning as do the characters in his play.

If I read him correctly, Tennessee Williams's work combines the first and third of these.

To what extent is all this allowable ? We face here a problem that has long been debated. The matter is governed by moral principles that are old and wise and based on discerning knowledge of human nature. They are as sound today as they were centuries ago ; and they cannot with impunity be disregarded. It should be obvious that it is necessary to avoid two extremes. The first of these would sweep away any restriction on the dramatist's licence. In this ' progressive ' view, sexual matters may be treated in an uninhibited manner as is any other less inflammatory facet of human life. The dramatist as an artist is above morality. To take cognizance of it would cramp his artistic expression. Surely this is false. The dramatist is a man ; as such he is subject to the laws of human nature ; to temper his writing, to respect the laws that govern him and all mankind cannot impair his work as an artist. On the contrary his work must thus be enhanced, completed and rendered more valuable.

The second extreme, with almost equal rashness, would exclude all treatment of so delicate a matter from stage or novel or screen. It would cast, in the name of reverence, a cloak of silence about the whole subject of sex. In so doing it would, unwittingly and ironically, help to perpetuate the misguided impression that over even legitimate lovemaking and marriage relations there hangs a dark and dirty cloud. Marriage and

related topics are sacred things. They are indeed worthy of reverence. But reverence does not demand puritanical silence.

To come back now to the three elements mentioned : ' strong language ', dialogue about intimate sexual matters, and suggestive situations. To attempt an assessment of the allowability or otherwise of individual lines or incidents or scenes in individual plays would be a hopeless task within the confines of a study such as this. I cannot quote extracts, and anyway to filch from their context a number of lines would be unfair. Here, however, are some general observations.

' Strong language ' can vary in quality and strength. The nautical profanities of Long John Silver in *Treasure Island* are scarcely objectionable. The bloody-and-damn type of expletive (as in, say, *The Shadow of a Gunman*) at worst may leave some people uncomfortable. But the use of other words, of anatomical slang and of phrases involving the Holy Name are out of place and objectionable on the stage, as they are in real life. In this connection I would find fault with, for example, *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*. Language of this sort may contain little that incites to positive sin. If used repeatedly and immoderately, however, it can lower the moral tone of a person, a group—or a nation.

' Smutty ' talk and stories and remarks are generally inadmissible. But a qualification must be made. It is accepted that the moral danger involved in such conversation depends on the condition and temperament of the persons who converse. There is an obvious difference between the casual banter of married people and the furtive tale-swapping of adolescents. It is worth noting, too, that those who indulge in this kind of talk are careful, by and large, to do so only in relatively small and private groups. Most people of sane and normal upbringing (even those private offenders) are repelled by such conversation on a stage. There will always be the few who take delight in this more public badinage, just as there will always be the stupid irritating giggle at any reference, however inoffensive and well-intentioned, in theatre or cinema, to marriage or child-bearing or similar subjects. Morality apart, there is something peculiarly distasteful about presenting this kind of thing as part of a theatrical entertainment for large groups of men and women of varying age, upbringing and maturity.

I cannot see that Tennessee Williams's plays would have suffered unduly had he curbed his characters in this matter. His dramatic sense, his power in building up atmosphere and his incisive, repetitive dialogue do not depend on this doubtful assistance. Specifically, by way of example, his Elephant Story in the Broadway version of *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* (Act III) is vulgar and offensive. In fairness it may be said that, for the most part, Williams's ' smutty ' lines are not dragged in ; they *fit* in ; they are in character. But that does not wholly justify them.

More serious discussion of sexual affairs may be less offensive. Here there is no poking fun at matters sacred. There is rather honest exploration of a difficult situation or problem. Presentation and delicacy of touch are of first importance ; and again, ' realists ' and ' art ' advocates notwithstanding, there is room for and need of judicious reticence. A husband and wife may discuss their marital intimacies or difficulties in the privacy of their room. But there may well be serious moral dangers to watchers and listeners when that discussion takes place in a ' private ' room on a public stage. A tremendous amount depends on the content and tone of the conversation, as on the quality of the audience : what is fit food for adults can be poison for younger people.

In *Summer and Smoke* (Part II, Scene VIII) we find Alma Winemiller and John Buchanan discussing love. John delivers a long speech : ' Hold still ! Now listen here to an anatomy lecture. You see this chart . . .' (he is a doctor), and he goes on to discourse of the three birds on the anatomical tree : all hungry, one for truth, one for food, one for love. Alma, he tells her, has fed the first and third birds with ' nothing but hand-me-down notions—attitudes—poses ! ' Here is Alma's answer :

> So that is your high conception of human desires. What you have here is not the anatomy of a beast, but a man. And I—I reject your opinion of where love is, and the kind of truth you believe the brain to be seeking ! There is something not shown on the chart.
>
> JOHN : You mean the part that Alma is Spanish for, do you ?
>
> ALMA : Yes, that's not shown on the anatomy chart ! But it's there just the same, yes, there ! Somewhere, not seen, but there. And it's *that* that I loved you with—that ! Not what you mention ! . . .

This is worth noticing because it is one of the rare instances of a Williams character conceding that there is more to human love than bodily enjoyment. He makes the point finely if briefly here (it arises equally briefly elsewhere in the play) ; he is open but neither vulgar nor indelicate. One might wish, however, that he had chosen a more balanced protagonist than Alma for the spiritual side of the discussion. All through the play her problem is the same : to stick to her principles, certain of their soundness, or to yield to John. Ironically, when she would finally capitulate, John has switched to her way of thinking. Her fall is sadly pointed by the fact that she has helped to spiritualize his outlook—just as in *The Prisoner* Brigid Boland's Cardinal, disgraced beyond recall, has yet rocked the foundations of his interrogator's materialism. *Summer and Smoke* is not one of Williams's best plays, but, taking it in the round, it is a sound handling of a delicate theme.

In his other plays discussion of sex concerns itself all but exclusively with the physical element. Delicacy of treatment apart, this uniform

insistence on only one aspect of human love must impart a false impression. Serafina and Rosa and Alvaro and Stanley and Archie Meighan are types, single-minded in their approach to sex and marriage. Tennessee Williams would, again, more faithfully have mirrored actual life had he given us even a few more normal men and women : more normal in that they recognize the spiritual quality of marriage relations—and are happier for that recognition.

Finally, with regard to suggestive situations this may be said : it can be quite proper to convey that a man and woman are tempted to sin together, or have sinned ; it is morally indefensible to depict their sin on the stage. In between these extremes lies the suggestive situation. A long drawn-out seduction scene, a woman disrobing or scantily clad, simulation of passionate embraces, can be highly inflammatory stage material. Whatever his own views on the matter and whatever his desire to show life as it is, the dramatist must respect the fact that he writes for a flesh-and-blood audience. He may not wantonly dangle morally dangerous material before them.

This is particularly true when the suggestive scene is a purple patch in the play. It is brilliantly depicted, drawn with a wealth of detail. It stands out. It resembles the similar passage in a book which tugs at the reader's imagination drawing him back to re-read it. Such a section, in play or novel, is also aesthetically unsound : it does not merge with the pattern ; it distracts.

Some scenes there are, otherwise indictable, which are saved by a deliberate playing down of the situation, or by the presence of some other element which softens or relegates to a minor place the note of suggestiveness. (The opposite may also happen when the director or the performer betrays the dramatist by overplaying a scene.) In *The Rose Tattoo* there is about slovenly Serafina a curious dignity which tones down some of the suggestive nature of a number of her scenes with Alvaro. Rosa, on the other hand, lacks any such overriding quality. Her extreme youth and unhappiness win sympathy, but she is a wild child, to be restrained on a stage. As other examples, I would rule against Scene X of *A Streetcar Named Desire,* the Esmeralda-Kilroy scene in Block Twelve of *Camino Real* and a number of incidents in *Baby Doll.*

To write a play is difficult. It is harder to write a good play. The dramatist who chooses, as he may legitimately do, to treat of sexual matters shoulders a still heavier burden. His subject requires him to tread warily if he is to preserve the delicate balance between free artistic expression and his moral responsibility as a man. However sincere his intention, he may fail at times to do so. Whatever the cause—lack of ability, unsure artistic touch, cloudy judgment or momentary impatience at restraint—he fails. We should not pass too hard a sentence on him. It is an honest failure.

Can this be said of Tennessee Williams? I do not think so. Repeatedly his work has met with wide disapproval. It may be conceded that many of those who criticize him are swayed by mere hearsay and have little first-hand knowledge of his plays. But most of them are well-informed. They are not cranks; they are men and women of sense and maturity and balance; they judge reasonably, with adult knowledge of human nature and of human responsibility. Their verdict does not impress Tennessee Williams. He writes what he wants to write—not what they want him to write. He goes his own way. Those who like may follow him. Those who do not care for his plays may seek their entertainment elsewhere, at the musicals or the comedies. To suspect his sincerity may be to do him an injustice. Because he believes in his own approach and his own methods, he too may be said to have failed honestly. But, objectively, it is his critics who are right and he who has often been wrong.

* * *

Here is a last quotation. It introduces a further impression, personal perhaps, left by the plays of Tennessee Williams.

ALMA: . . . Have you ever seen, or looked at a picture of, a Gothic Cathedral?

JOHN: Gothic Cathedrals? What about them?

ALMA: How everything reaches up, how everything seems to be straining for something out of the reach of stone—or human—fingers? . . . The immense stained windows, the great arched doors that are five or six times the height of the tallest man—the vaulted ceiling and all the delicate spires—all reaching up to something beyond attainment! To me—well, that is the secret, the principle back of existence—the everlasting struggle and aspiration for more than our human limits have placed in our reach. . . . Who was it that said—oh, so beautiful thing!—'All of us are in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars!'

JOHN: Mr Oscar Wilde.

ALMA: (*somewhat taken aback*) Well, regardless of who said it, it's still true. Some of us are looking at the stars![1]

On looking back over the plays, back over the sadness and sorrow that engulf Tennessee Williams's characters I see them as men and women without God. Most of them allow Him little or no place in their lives. They do not recognize that their desperate grasping at fleeting human happiness reflects the hunger in every human heart for something above

[1] *Summer and Smoke.* Part I, Scene VI.

and beyond and infinitely greater than themselves. It is the desire for ultimate happiness which is to be ours after death with Almighty God. Like Alma's cathedrals, we are straining and reaching up, but not to something beyond attainment.

I wonder if this is more than a personal impression, if it is a somewhat unexpected by-product of Tennessee Williams's work. I wonder, too, if he is at all conscious of conveying that impression. He is too informed a man to be unaware of that human desire for God. And he is, I judge, too sincere to ignore it should he recognize the place it occupies in men's lives. If or when that recognition comes, he may well write one of the great plays of the twentieth century.

The Lost 'Hamlet'

by B. T. CLEEVE

OF all great plays, *Hamlet* must be the worst constructed. No other masterpiece is so full of loose ends, discrepancies, problems whose apparent answer involves a still worse problem. How old is Hamlet? Why is he passed over for the throne? How innocent is his mother? Why does the gravedigger fail to recognize him? Why does Hamlet warn the king of his return? And having done so, why does he hide from him in the graveyard? In that same scene, why does Horatio not recognize Laertes for himself? Why does Hamlet quarrel with Laertes?

One can go on almost indefinitely with these questions. Why has the outlaw Fortinbras 'rights of memory' to the throne of Denmark? And what was the exact position regarding the throne of Norway? Where was Horatio during Act II? And why is Hamlet so much more friendly to him in Act III than in Act I? And so on and so on. On a first reading of *Hamlet* one feels that all these questions can be simply answered by taking a little thought. Hamlet is 18. Or perhaps 30. Or perhaps . . . . ? Hamlet warns the king because he is too nobly-minded to take him unawares. But what about taking Rosencrantz and Guildenstern unawares? Well then, perhaps . . . . ? If you care to examine them you will find that all the hundreds of similar problems in *Hamlet* are equally baffling. One leads in to another, like a maze. And after several years of close study of the play, I am convinced that like a maze these questions have one common centre or cause.

The cause is simply stated. Shakespeare was revising an old play to bring it in line with contemporary popular taste. His terms of reference required him to stick fairly closely to his source, or at least more closely than he would have done if he had been using less well-known material. But his own view of the subject took him further and further away from the *tone* of the old play. The foundation is one kind of story. The working out is quite another. Accordingly, the logic of the play suffered, and discrepancies arose which are irreconcilable as *Hamlet* now stands, and would only become intelligible if we could refer to the older play. But that, of course, seems impossible, because, as everyone knows, the older play, usually referred to as Kyd's *Hamlet*, or Ur-Hamlet, is lost.

But is it really impossible? I think not. After all, we have a good deal of relevant information, and all we need for our purpose is to reconstruct the plot. If the few previous attempts seem unsatisfactory, it

is because they have not made use of all the information available, or have had a different purpose to ours.

First, what do we know of Kyd's *Hamlet*? That it had a ghost who cried 'Hamlet, revenge', as we learn from many references in Elizabethan and Jacobean literature. That it was Senecan in style (this from Nashe's sneer in his preface to Greene's *Menaphon*). That it was highly popular. That it appeared in or about 1587 and must have paralleled Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* in some respects. That it was based on the story of the Danish Prince Amleth, first written down by Saxo Grammaticus in Latin about 1208 A.D. and paraphrased into French by Belleforest about 1570. And finally we have the derivatives: the 'Good' or 2nd Quarto, which is more or less Shakespeare's own text; the 'Bad' or 1st Quarto, which is mainly a botched-up piracy of Shakespeare's play; and *Der Bestrafte Brudermord,* a German play extant in an 18th century MS, which seems to derive from several versions of the Hamlet story, including Kyd's. This is a good deal of information to possess, if we use it properly.

* * *

The best previous attempt to reconstruct Kyd's play, that of the American scholar H. D. Gray, practically ignored half of this evidence, and contented itself with working back to Kyd from the derivatives. My method has been to compare the derivatives to the source, and to note the differences. If one lays Belleforest's plot beside Shakespeare's, certain major differences, of tone, character and incident immediately appear. These must be due either to Shakespeare's alterations to the story or to Kyd's, and I believe that in most cases it is possible to decide one way or the other. Having done so, one has a list of features which, added to Kyd's source, provides the material for a reconstruction of at least the outline of Kyd's plot. In a short article it is unfortunately impossible to show the full working-out of this method. Except in some few instances I can only give the results. But anyone who is sufficiently interested may apply the method for himself, and it is in the hope that some will do so more effectively than I have been able to do that I am writing this article.

Here, then, are the major differences between Belleforest and Shakespeare which I think can be attributed to Kyd's play. First, the ghost. We know Kyd had a ghost, and there is a clear source for it outside the story of Amleth. Kyd was an imitator of Seneca, and Seneca's *Agamemnon* has a ghost who commands his son to 'Think on thy mother'. This in turn may have prompted Kyd to look to the story of Agamemnon's

family for additional material to fill out his French source. The two stories have points in common, as Kyd must have noted if he read them. In both a father is murdered by his wife's lover, leaving his son to revenge him. Both sons are touched with madness, real or assumed. Both face the terrible problem of a mother's guilt and punishment.

But the parallels between Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and the Greek plays which tell the story of Agamemnon and Orestes are much more detailed than that, and have puzzled generations of students. The improbability of Shakespeare having been responsible for them has led some scholars to deny their existence, and others to turn to quirks of psychology or a common folklore origin to explain their existence. But if we attribute them to Kyd's play, from which Shakespeare need merely have adopted them, the difficulty dissolves.

A list of these parallels is then at the same time a list of further features in Kyd's play—the castle battlements at the play's beginning, the watchman speaking of war and of evil to come, all from Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* ; the callous advice to Hamlet from his mother and Claudius that 'Thou know'st 'tis common, all that lives must die' and 'But you must know your father lost a father', paralleling Sophocles' *Electra*, lines 288 and 1173 ; Hamlet's horror at his father's unshriven death, paralleling Orestes' horror at his father's lack of burial rites ; Hamlet's doubts that the ghost may be a devil paralleling Orestes' doubt in the *Electra*, line 979, 'spake a fiend in likeness of the God?' ; Hamlet's extravagant friendship for Horatio paralleling that of Orestes for Pylades ; the graveyard scene in which Hamlet and Horatio hide from the king and court, just as in a similar scene Orestes and Pylades hide from Electra and her attendants at the beginning of the *Choephorae ;* Horatio's wish to die with Hamlet, and Hamlet's request to him to live on and tell his story, paralleling Pylades' wish to die with Orestes in the *Iphiginia in Tauris*, and Orestes' insistence that Pylades live on to tell his story. 'Ah, speak not so! . . . . if thou be saved . . . . then should my name live . . . .' (line 687).

I have noticed 28 parallels of speech or incident which to my mind cannot be ascribed to accident or common origin, or anything except borrowing ; and for three reasons I think that the borrower must have been Kyd. Kyd was a translator and Latinist—Shakespeare was not ; if it was necessary to add material to Belleforest's story to make a play, Kyd would have encountered that necessity first ; and finally, the material does not fit in to Shakespeare's play as well as one would expect if he were the borrower.

For example, Hamlet has no real reason for his extreme affection for Horatio. I suggest that this is because the reason, which was included in Kyd's play, has been dropped by Shakespeare, leaving only its effect.

And the graveyard scene, placed as it is, near the play's end, creates numerous difficulties. Why does Hamlet hide from the king at such a point in the story? Why does the gravedigger fail to recognize Hamlet, when he must have known him for years? Why does Horatio fail to recognize Laertes, when he must have seen him at the king's marriage feast, referred to at the beginning of the play?

These difficulties vanish if we imagine this graveyard scene coming at the commencement of Kyd's play, or near it. Hamlet will then not be so sure of the king's attitude to him as our Hamlet must be. And the return will have been from a long absence at 'school' in Wittenberg, and not a short one on the way to England. During this long absence he may well have altered so much that the gravedigger can justifiably fail to recognize him. (I should say here that there are strong arguments against Hamlet being disguised in this scene. In brief, Horatio treats him with a respect which is inconsonant with any real disguise.) Horatio need never have been at the court at all, or not when Laertes was there, thus justifying Hamlet's remark that that is 'Laertes, a very noble youth'.

If the scene came towards the beginning of Kyd's *Hamlet*, as its parallel does in the *Choephorae*, one might make a further inference: that the concern is not to bury Ophelia, but in some way to honour the hero's dead father, as it is in the Greek play. If we assume this, the quarrel with Laertes at once becomes intelligible. No one can ever have been really satisfied about Hamlet's quarrel with the brother of the dead Ophelia. As it stands it is outrageous, and only fine writing carries it off. But if the quarrel was over some blatantly hypocritical words of mourning for the dead king, Hamlet's behaviour would be entirely praiseworthy.

From this long digression, we can return to the question of features not present in Belleforest, but present in *Hamlet* or other derivatives, which can be ascribed to Kyd. One of these is a change in the character of the queen. If we trace her character through the several extant versions of the Hamlet-story, we see a steady change for the worse. In Saxo she is more sinned against than sinning. She repents of her submission to her first husband's murderer, promises to amend, and ends by helping her son to his revenge. In Belleforest, 'some people' accuse her of knowing of the murder in advance. She denies this, and helps her son as she does in Saxo. Still, the breath of suspicion is there. In Shakespeare's play, her own son accuses her of the murder; 'As kill a king', and again 'Ay, lady, it was my word'. And she no longer denies the charge. She merely professes ignorance of his meaning. Nor does she offer or give any help beyond silence and neutrality. I think it fair to suppose that Kyd's Gertrude occupied an intermediate position

between Belleforest's and Shakespeare's queen : less innocent than the former ; more helpful than the latter.

Next we come to the Norwegian war, the embassies, Fortinbras and his rights of memory, his passage across Denmark with his army, and the preparations for war described in Act I, Scene i, by Horatio and the watchmen. And here we touch on H. D. Gray's reconstruction of Kyd's play.

Dr Gray pointed out that none of these elements plays any real structural part in our *Hamlet*, and that they are all obviously survivals from the earlier play. He pointed out too, in his article in the *Philological Quarterly*, vol. vii, 1928, that there is a very sudden change of tone in Shakespeare's Act I, between the first scene and the fourth. In Scene i, the ghost is warlike. 'Thus frowned he in an angry parle', says Horatio. But in Scene iv Horatio describes him to Hamlet as seeming 'more in sorrow than in anger', and this change is paralleled by the virtual dismissal of all questions of warfare from the play. From the end of Scene i, during which it looks as if the threatened war will dominate the play, the wars are no more than noises off. But in the *Brudermord,* which seems to contain survivals from Kyd's play, there is evidence that in the earlier play the wars really were dominant throughout. Night, the symbolical opening figure which speaks the prologue of the *Brudermord,* is almost certainly taken from Kyd's *Hamlet.* So is the closing scene. And both these passages speak of wars and factions, fires of revenge sweeping the kingdom. Horatio is made to say at the end of the *Brudermord,* 'Alas ! what has not this kingdom suffered for ever so long from hard wars ? Scarcely is there peace but internal disturbance, ambition, faction, and murder fill the land anew'.

Working back from the *Brudermord,* Dr Gray reaches certain detailed conclusions which I have no space to discuss here. It must be sufficient to say that I agree with him in general, that Kyd's play was one of war and faction, while I disagree with much else in his article.

But this question of faction is a fundamental one. If Kyd told his story as one of competing factions, a great deal becomes clear. Gertrude would finally have joined her son's faction. Horatio would be a leading figure in that faction, thus justifying Hamlet's expressions of friendship, together with the curious little scene in the 'Bad' Quarto in which Gertrude asks Horatio to tell Hamlet to be careful, a scene which does not occur in the 'Good' Quarto. Osric and Laertes would have been leading members of the opposing king's faction, and this in turn would justify the king's otherwise curious choice of Osric to carry out the extremely delicate mission of getting Hamlet to fight Laertes. As it stands in *Hamlet* this choice seems absurd. Moreover, there is a sharp contrast between Osric's 'waterfly' behaviour in Act V Scene i, when

Hamlet mocks him, and his shrewdness as a judge of the fencing bout in the following scene. Was his ' waterfly ' behaviour originally a mask, like Hamlet's madness ?

Which brings us to the problem of that madness. In the original story, Amleth was a child when the story opens and probably unknown except by name to his father's murderer. He had been out at fosterage. His assumption of madness was a satisfactory disguise because his new stepfather had never seen him behaving sanely, and his foster parents and relatives were his good friends, who would not reveal the deception. But Hamlet's sharp transition from a well-known, if melancholy, sanity to sudden madness cannot possibly allay suspicion. It must, and immediately does, arouse it. And I suggest that in Kyd's play, Kyd followed his source, Belleforest, and made the madness a logical disguise. Hamlet will have been absent in Wittenberg and comparatively unknown to his uncle or the court. He will have returned at the play's beginning and have assumed the disguise of madness almost immediately. His violent quarrel with Laertes at the graveside may either have prompted him to the deception or been an illustration of a decision already taken.

Finally, and again I must plead lack of space as an excuse for not dealing with a multitude of other features, let us examine Horatio and Fortinbras. In *Hamlet* both present problems. Horatio's have been glanced at. As for Fortinbras, the terms of the conflict between Hamlet's father and his would lead one to expect the crown of Norway to pass to the king of Denmark. But it passes instead to the dead king of Norway's brother. Why ? And if not to the victor, why not to the son of the vanquished rather than the brother ? And what ' rights of memory ' can the young Fortinbras possibly have in Denmark ? I think Horatio supplies part of the answer. In the *Brudermord*, Claudius offers Hamlet the throne of Norway. This obviously points to a version of the story in which the King of Denmark occupies both thrones after the elder Hamlet's conquest. There would then be no elder, Norwegian king, and Fortinbras would be what he appears to be in Hamlet, Act I, Scene i, a dispossessed outlaw with a claim to his father's throne, sharking up his ' lawless resolutes ' for an attempt to regain his birthright.

I suggest that in Kyd's play Claudius offers the throne of Norway to Hamlet in the hope that he will be killed in trying to secure it. Instead, Hamlet despatches Horatio as his ambassador to Fortinbras. This explains Horatio's absence in Shakespeare's Act II. The terms of his unofficial ' embassy ' would have been to offer an alliance between the two dispossessed princes, each to obtain his own. This would explain the otherwise meaningless expedition of Fortinbras's army across Denmark and the arrival of Fortinbras at the play's end. If we add a codicil to the alliance that the survivor take all, we explain the ' rights of

memory'. We also explain Hamlet's increased affection for Horatio in Act III. He has done well for his friend and prince in the interval since Act I.

* * *

We can now make an attempt to sketch the outline of Kyd's plot. Some of this outline has been at least briefly argued in the preceding pages. I have dealt with the rest at length elsewhere, and must ask the reader's pardon for merely stating the result of those arguments here.

Kyd's play, then, will have been one of action rather than character. It will have opened with a Prologue spoken by Night as *Der Bestrafte Brudermord* does, perhaps with the ghost of the Elder Hamlet accompanying Night, as the ghost of Andrea accompanies Revenge at the opening of *The Spanish Tragedy*. This prologue would have promised a general conflagration of faction and revenge, and would parallel the soliloquy of the lone watchman who opens the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus. This scene would take place on the 'balcony' or upper stage of the Elizabethan theatre. The next would take place below it, on the inner stage, and would show the newly-crowned Claudius and his court, as *The Spanish Tragedy* shows the Spanish king and *his* court. Claudius would be receiving a letter from Hamlet almost identical to the one which Shakespeare makes him receive in Act IV when Hamlet reports his return from the voyage to England. He would also be despatching emissaries to pacify or browbeat young Fortinbras.

On the outer stage Hamlet and Horatio would then return to Elsinore from Wittenberg to find a sexton tending the late king's grave. Since Hamlet has been absent for years, the sexton's failure to recognize him would be logical. On seeing a procession approaching, the pair of youths would hide. Although Hamlet had written to Claudius of his return, he is not sure, as Shakespeare's Hamlet is, that Claudius is an enemy to be feared. He wishes to have more information before revealing himself.

The procession is connected with Hamlet's dead father, perhaps dedicating his monument. Laertes's grief offends Hamlet, who thinks him or knows him to be an enemy and hypocrite. They quarrel. The next scene, between Ophelia and her family, would show her being warned against Hamlet as a consequence of this quarrel. As Shakespeare offers the scene, it is irrational. Shakespeare's Queen Gertrude 'thought to see' Hamlet marry Ophelia. Why was Polonius so anxious to prevent their courtship, when the marriage must have been a brilliant one for his daughter? Why did he assume it to be impossible? But as I reconstruct Kyd's plot, the Polonius family belongs to Claudius's faction, in opposition to Hamlet, and the quarrel with Laertes deepens the rift.

The next scene would return to Hamlet and Horatio. They would be seeking information from the watch. The apparition would confirm Hamlet's suspicions. He would approach the likeliest members of the watch to join his faction, and swear them to their new allegiance in the oath-scene. (It is not often recognized that Shakespeare's Marcellus is committing high treason in swearing the oath. Shakespeare never follows this up, but I think that Kyd would have shown Marcellus as a follower of Hamlet later in the play. Being an officer of Claudius's Guard he would have been invaluable.) Finally, Hamlet would assume his disguise of madness. All that Claudius has seen of him so far is his violent attack on Laertes, and he might be willing to think him mad, and therefore harmless.

To take Kyd's second Act more briefly, it would have shown Polonius's despatch of a messenger to spy on his son ; Claudius offering the throne of Norway to Hamlet ; Hamlet's despatch of Horatio to Fortinbras ; Hamlet's practice of his feigned madness ; Rosencrantz and Guildenstern spying on Hamlet ; the royal embassy returning from Norway, not to say that peace has been secured but to warn Claudius that it has not, and that young Fortinbras is in arms against the nominal Danish rule ; Polonius spying on Hamlet by means of Ophelia ; and finally Hamlet's determination to test both his mother and Claudius with the play-within-the-play.

Kyd's third Act will have continued the king's attempt to probe Hamlet. It will have shown Hamlet meeting Ophelia and preparing the play-within-the-play ; Horatio's return from Norway bringing news of a successful alliance with young Fortinbras ; the play-within-the-play whose outcome would suggest Gertrude's innocence of the murder of Hamlet's father and Claudius's guilt, confirming the ghost's revelations ; and lastly the closet-scene, with a final test of Gertrude, and her offer to help Hamlet, after the killing of Polonius. Having joined her to his faction Hamlet would tell her of his counterplots, as he does in Shakespeare's play, but now they would result in action and not be left baffingly in the air as Shakespeare leaves them. (For although he speaks to his mother of delving below their mines, etc., Hamlet behaves subsequently as if he had no plans at all and was acting always on the spur of the moment.)

Act IV would show the discovery of Polonius's body and the preparations for Hamlet's despatch to England. These preparations would interfere with a prearranged plan for Fortinbras to attack Elsinore. At a meeting which survives in Shakespeare's play as the mere passage of Fortinbras's army across the stage, Hamlet would tell Fortinbras that the attack must be postponed, to allow Hamlet to dispose of his escort and return to the castle.

The mob, already stirred up by Hamlet's agents would give some evidence of distraction, giving point to Claudius's decision to send Hamlet away, rather than murder him on the spot. There would be a scene between Hamlet and Horatio, laying plans for Hamlet's escape from his escort and their own future meeting. Ophelia would be shown mad, and Laertes would return to avenge his father Polonius, making use of the already inflamed mob for his own ends. Horatio would discuss Hamlet's affairs with the queen, as he does in the 'Bad' Quarto; he would be overheard by Claudius who would hatch a counter-plot with the tamed Laertes, although this would not involve a fencing match. Osric would be briefed as the instrument of the plot. Ophelia would unequivocally commit suicide, as Belimperia does in similar circumstances in *The Spanish Tragedy*.

The last Act will have begun with Hamlet's and Horatio's prearranged meeting, and their entering the castle, as Orestes and Pylades do in the *Oresteia*. There they would be joined by Hamlet's faction, including Marcellus. There would be a general slaughter, ending with the death of Hamlet and the victorious arrival of Fortinbras to inherit both kingdoms, Denmark and Norway, in accordance with his agreement with Hamlet.

This, then, if I am right, is what Shakespeare undertook to revise. A complex revenge-play of the late 1580's. Commencing his task with no thought of altering its fundamental tone and story, Shakespeare wrote the first scene as a preparation for a play in which the dominant note would be warfare. But almost immediately he must have been absorbed by the problem of Hamlet's situation: that of a prince urged to revenge his father on his uncle; compelled to suspect his mother of murder and despise her for adultery and incest. How would a thoughtful man react to such a situation? How Kyd's young warrior acted is plain enough, but uninteresting compared to how a sensitive, cultivated man would have reacted. And accordingly I think Shakespeare tossed Kyd's hero out of the window and substituted his own: an intelligent, morbid, melancholy courtier of thirty; a mature mind which might be explored. But Scene i read and acted too well to throw away, so Shakespeare retained it. After all, no one was going to pore over the text and compare notes. By Act V the audience would have forgotten the minutiae of Act I. And so the 'revision' continued, diverging further and further from Kyd's play in tone and detail. The warfare and faction disappeared. Hamlet must stand alone so that nothing should distract the audience from his problem and his character. Accordingly his mother, his most obvious helper, is left in a shadowed, suspect neutrality. Horatio is left as nothing but an echo: 'Yes, my lord'; 'Indeed, my lord'. Marcellus disappears after his treason in Act I. A

hundred other discrepancies are ignored or never noticed in the heat of composition. And what do they matter compared to the fire and sweep of the play and language ? The play's the thing !

Indeed it is. But nothing about Shakespeare or his method of working can be uninteresting. And however much the reader may disagree with me on points of detail, I hope I have demonstrated that some such outline as I have ascribed to Kyd's lost play must underlie the problems and contradictions contained in *Hamlet.**

*The foregoing is an abstract of some parts of an essay recently submitted as a doctoral thesis to the National University of Ireland. Having dealt with Kyd's Ur-Hamlet along the lines of this article, but naturally in far greater detail, the essay examines Shakespeare's additions to the plot and their possible sources, and ends with an attempt to discover passages of Kyd's text in Shakespeare's play.

The Native Christian Minority in Egypt

by J. J. W. MURPHY

ABOUT ten years ago a Catholic priest of an Oriental rite was talking to me, at his own house in an Egyptian town, about the position of Christians in Middle-Eastern countries. I was surprised then at what he told me of Muslim hostility to Christianity and of the probability that persecution would break out. Now I know that his pessimism was well-founded.

I may not mention his name nor that of the rite to which he belonged. He is an Egyptian national. It is not safe for Egyptian Christians to say anything to foreigners that might indicate discontent with the prevailing conditions or distrust of the government. Egypt may seem far away, but the modern world is small. A couple of clues, reported to those who know the background, could betray an identity.

According to my friend the native Christian communities, such as his, who are in union with Rome, were in a stronger position than other Arab Christians ; the Arab governments, especially the Egyptian, feared the moral influence of the Pope who would not allow attacks on his own flock to pass unchallenged, but who could not intervene with the same authority to protect Christian bodies that did not accept his position in the Church of Christ. Modern Arab governments like to be thought progressive in the western sense of that strange word. If U.N.O. has done little else, it has at all events helped to make such people sensitive to world-opinion on their progressive qualities. Papal reproof for old-fashioned failings like religious fanaticism and intolerance would upset them quite a lot. But the influence on governments of such papal utterances depends on the measure with which they are made. The procedure is well known : first, admonition in general terms ; if that fails, pointed reproof. Only in the last resort is there downright condemnation. A government which fears the pointed reproof usually avoids it by some amendment after the general admonition.

At Christmas 1954 the Pope denounced political nationalism in principle. The recent papal encyclical on African missions, *Fidei Donum*, warns of the dangers of rising African nationalism, which is being exploited by Communists and Muslims in different ways against the Church.[1] On the next level to the Pope, an article in the *Osservatore Romano* of 9 May 1957 by Cardinal Costantini, formerly secretary of Propaganda, commented on the encyclical with some particulars of those dangers. Soon after, on the lower level of the popular Catholic Press, facts were given and names of persons and places were mentioned

[1] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* XLVII, 22 and XLVIII, 40.

in proof of specific accusations that Islam was waging a cold war against the Church, especially in Egypt.

All this had been known, long before it appeared in the newspapers, to those who had lived in Arab countries during the rise of Arab nationalism and had kept up their contacts there. But to me, at least, it revealed something which I did not know, but which I was expecting to hear. It was that some Christian Arabs were at last tiring of telling the world how happy they were under the new nationalist regimes which had replaced the colonial and imperial exploiters (whom they had aided their Muslim fellow-countrymen to expel), and how confident they felt that any disabilities imposed on them for religious reasons would soon disappear, along with other evils of the bad old days when imperialists could divide and conquer the Arabs. Most of them had for long been leaning over backwards to show their detachment from European Christians, British especially, and their loyalty to their Muslim rulers. The Catholics were generally more reserved than the others ; but they too joined in the nationalist outcries and deplored the crimes of Christian imperialists, such as the Crusades and the bombardment of Alexandria, in much the same way as Englishmen apologize to Irishmen for Cromwell and the Black-and-Tans, without knowing much of the truth in either case. But all the time they were keeping the Holy See informed. Gradually the information showed a pattern. It became evident that the conciliation of Arab Christians by Muslim governments was a political move to obtain a united nationalist front against the British and French, and that once these had left the Middle-East, the united front would have lost its use and the Christians their chief bargaining counter.

The most important Christian newspaper in Egypt, *Le Rayon d'Egypte*, in its issue of 18 November 1951, a month after the Egyptian government repudiated the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, has the following account of the government's first moves towards this united front :

> Des démarches ont été discrètement entreprises auprès de certaines communautés. Des déclarations apaisantes et des proclamations de solidarité ont été successivement obtenues de différents chefs religieux, en premier lieu du Patriarche Copte Youssab. A Port Said, à l'Eglise grecque-orthodoxe, une réunion fut tenue ou un Cheikh musulman fut photographié debout devant l'iconostase aux côtés du prêtre en habits, et priant avec lui pour la libération du sol de la patrie. Au Caire, à l'Eglise grecque des Saints Anges une cérémonie de prières publiques était également photographiée et publiée. Les journaux de choc eurent pour mot d'ordre d'apaiser les apprehensions et des articles parurent appelant a l'Union et declarant que Coptes et Musulmansfurent de tout temps unis- leurs dissensions ne datent que de l'arrivée des Anglais, dont le levier politique fut de " diviser pour vaincre".

About two years later, under the new regime of Mohammed Naguib who had shown some exceptional marks of good-will towards the Chris-

tian communities, and even towards the Jews, the same paper wrote :

> Ces manifestations de bienveillance très touchantes pour les Chrétiens n'ont pas manqué de provoquer une détente et d'établir un climat de bonne entente dans le sein de la population. Une mystique de la Libération avait été creée, et cette mystique demandait la bonne harmonie entre tous les éléments de la population. Il ne fallait plus que l'étranger impérialiste puisse jouer de la corde de la division intérieure et de la defense des minorités. Des minorités c'est bien simple, il n'y en avait plus et la censure même avait reçu ordre de supprimer impitoyablement tout ce qui faisait allusion à cette division classique dans le peuple. Les regards méprisants ou haineux qui suivaient le prêtre dans la rue, ont presque disparu et à peine de-ci de-la quelques timides " Assis, Assis " acueillaient le passage de la soutane. Jusqu'aux Frères Musulmans, forteresse de la réaction islamique, qui proclamait dans leurs discours à qui voulait entendre, que l'essence de l'Islam était la tolérance et que les Chrétiens n'avaient jamais été aussi heureux et libres que sous la domination de l'Islam.' *Rayon d'Egypte* 17 Janvier 1954.

Three years later the government of Gamal Nasser, who had supplanted Naguib, suppressed the *Rayon d'Egypte*. The immediate reason was an article entitled *Le grand peur des Chrétiens d'Egypte* in its issue of 3 February 1957. In this article it was alleged that measures of discrimination against Christians were reducing them to poverty and to the status of second-class citizens, so that all who could leave Egypt were planning to leave ; and the rest were in constant fear of losing their jobs to Muslims and of failing to get employment because of their religion. They were now a long way from ' la mystique de la Libération ', of which the *Rayon* had written so beautifully, in 1954, that it demanded the harmony of all elements and that minorities were no more. ' Des minorités, c'est bien simple : il n'y en avait plus . . .'

In a different and sinister sense this rhetoric had become truth during 1956. Under the Turkish empire which had ruled the Arab world from the early 16th century to the 20th, religious minorities ruled themselves internally and dealt with the State through their religious leaders in all matters of ' personal status '. This was known as the *millet*[1] system. It meant in practice that an Arab Christian would have to apply to the ecclesiastical court of his own denomination, instead of to the civil court, in disputes about such things as marriage, inheritance, adoption. The case would be decided by an ecclesiastical judge according to canon law. The State would enforce that decision, and there could be no appeal to the civil courts. It was fair and it worked well ; but it had an inherent weakness. A Christian who did not want to obey the ecclesiastical court could evade it by changing his religion to Islam. The Turks certainly did not want such converts and made rules to stop

[1] The word means ' nation '. The practically-minded Turks could see no explanation of the numerous religious differences which they found among Christians, except in the fiction that religion went with race.

them, but the enforcement of such rules depended very much, as did all Turkish government, on the local governors. The Turks had, on the whole, a rather detached attitude to religion. They became Muslims when they took over the Arab empire in the 16th century, but few of them were fanatics for Islam at any stage of their history, and in our own time they have been the first Muslim country to disestablish it as the State religion.

The *millet* system of ecclesiastical courts survived the break-up of the Turkish empire, except in Turkey itself. In the Arab states that developed from the empire, under French and British tutelage after the defeat of Turkey in the first world-war, the problem of bogus conversions became serious as foreign Christian influence on their native governments grew less. In March 1954 the heads of the Coptic Christians in Egypt issued a list of complaints against the abuse of conversions from Christianity to Islam. They alleged that the rules for receiving converts were evaded in favour of Islam, that Christian partners were getting divorces in Muslim courts which would be refused in their own, that custody of children, irrespective of their wishes or welfare, was regularly awarded to the divorced party who became a Muslim.

In addition, minors, even mere children, who quarrelled with parents, were accepted as Muslim converts and put under police protection against their own families ; Christian apostates who repented and wished to return to their Church were penalized as apostates from Islam, and if they repented at death, they could leave nothing to their Christian heirs—their property went to the State. The Copts were speaking for themselves as the largest and oldest Christian community in Egypt ; but every other Christian community had the same grievances.

Such a protest from the small Greek Catholic community would not have carried much weight. They were a minority of a minority. Many of them were foreigners, although the Greek Christian community had been in Egypt from the beginning of Christianity, six centuries before the Muslims. Rome was indeed behind them but that was a handicap as well as a support ; it made them suspect of allegiance to a foreign power—the ancient accusation that follows Catholic minorities everywhere. They certainly were not looking for trouble with the government, but trouble came. It came from the same source against which the Copts were protesting, the Muslim Sharia courts, who were favouring bogus converts.

A Greek Catholic, Gabriel Hallaq, became a Muslim in order to get a divorce from his Catholic wife and custody of his only child, a girl of eight. The Sharia court awarded him both. Its award of custody of the child was expressed as follows : 'The child has reached the age when she can understand religious instruction, and if she remains with her Christian mother, she runs the risk of learning infidelity from her.' By 'infidelity' here is meant any non-Muslim religion. The

Arabic word is *Kofr*, and it is a fighting-word when applied to an Arab Christian, for its proper application is to idolaters, not to 'people of the Book'.

Archbishop Zoghbi, the Patriarchal Vicar of Alexandria, then held an ecclesiastical court, as he was competent to do under the *millet* system in such a case, and the custody of the child was awarded by this court to the mother. The Sharia court confirmed its first award to the father; police were sent to take away the child, but she was not to be found. The police summoned the Archbishop, who admitted that he knew where the child was and denied the legal competence of the Sharia court. He was sentenced to imprisonment, if within eight days the child was not produced in court. He still refused to obey and declared that it was his duty to uphold the judgment of his own court, which was a recognized and properly constituted tribunal not only in Church law but in Egyptian law.

Last year when most people read the report that cases of personal status were in future to be decided by the Egyptian civil courts alone and that this was a blow at Christianity, they wondered why, and passed on to some other piece of news. Others may have known a little more and thought that here was the end of another relic of bygone days that had outlasted its usefulness: if special tribunals for religious minorities led only to evasions and conflicts of jurisdiction, as typified by the Hallaq case, they had no place in a modern state. To such troubles they had sometimes led, but their very existence stood for the rights of minorities and the claims of conscience. Guarantees written into paper constitutions are poor substitutes for facts of history, twelve centuries old, like the tribunals of the *millet* system. If Egypt were a modern western state with the acceptable by-product of religious tolerance resulting from the evil of widespread religious indifference, then religious minorities might expect at least such equality before the law as they generally get in the United States and in the British Commonwealth. Special tribunals would not be needed to ensure it.

The Muslim religion in Egypt has lost ground to the same western scepticism and materialism as attacked Christianity in Europe; probably it has lost more because its intellectual defences are weaker. But the same religious indifference has not resulted from this loss, because nationalism has grown strong enough to fill the emotional gap left by religious belief. In some Christian countries the accidents of history have caused nationalism to impart an emotional super-charge to religion which compensates for the intellectual weakness of its local defences. The same has happened in Egypt, but not by accident. Islam is totalitarian in principle; it knows no distinction between religion and politics, unless as a temporary expedient.

Egypt had learned religious scepticism and political nationalism from 19th-century Europe. In Europe, political nationalism gradually

took the place of religion, arrogating to itself the absolute values and claims of religion. As Pope Pius XI pointed out in his condemnation of Nazism, it even borrowed from religious language 'to enrich the vocabulary of unbelief from the heritage of Christian ideas'[1]; it perverted to a merely human sense the accepted Christian meaning of such words as faith, redemption, inspiration, martyrdom, and so on. Some centuries before Nazism, this modern aberration had been anticipated by Islam. The Greek word for a witness, consecrated by six centuries of Christians to those who had borne witness to Christ in their blood, was taken over to honour all Muslims who died in battle against infidels. They are the martyrs of Islam. In fairness it must be said that their claim to the title is better than that of most European nationalist heroes. Death for the Faith and death for the State are the same thing for a Muslim, for the State is, or ought to be, the Muslim Church.

So, political nationalism, which became a substitute for religion in the west, fitted into the totalitarian frame-work of Islam to reinforce religion with its emotional content and to produce a characteristic form of religious intolerance of which political passions are the driving force. I call it characteristic, because, as I have mentioned, the accidents of history have produced it also in Christian countries, Catholic and Protestant, including our own.

People ask: are the Arabs anti-Christian, or just anti-British? Such a question ignores the totalitarian nature of Islam; and it assumes that Christians in Arab countries are like Christians in China, a few converts made by foreign missionaries from the west, who must share the odium caused by western imperialism. These two mistakes are so fundamental as to make the question almost meaningless.

* * *

I have tried to give some idea of Islamic totalitarianism in Egypt; this is essentially the same in all Muslim countries because it is of the essence of Islam. But the position of Christians in Arab countries varies according to their history. That is a long story whose main point is that the first Christians were natives of Palestine because Christ was born, lived and died there, six hundred years before its conquest by the Arabs. The Christian religion has never died out in the land of its birth nor in any land on its borders in the Middle-East. On its southern border is Egypt, whither in infancy the Founder of Christianity came, as one of many refugees who have come and gone, before and since, on the Sinai desert road. There are perhaps four million Christians in Egypt to-day, about the same number as in Ireland. The great majority of them are natives whose roots are deeper in the soil of Egypt than are those of the Arabs who came as conquerors in the 7th century and became the ruling class of Egypt and of the Middle East. The Arabs imposed

[1] Mit Brennender Sorge (C.T.S. trans.)

their religion on Egypt as the religion of the state, but it was a very long time before Islam became the religion of the Egyptian people.

Egypt had become Christian, and fervently Christian, within the first century A.D. The Patriarchate of Alexandria claims to have been founded by St Mark the Evangelist. The early history of Egyptian Christians reminds an Irishman of his own national apostle's praise : ' They who never had the knowledge of God, but until now worshipped idols and abominations—how hath there lately been prepared here a people of the Lord ! Now are they called the children of God. Sons and daughters of chieftains are seen to become monks and virgins of Christ '. Like the Irish, the Egyptians were best when they aimed very high ; not so successful when they lowered their aim to levels below perfection. Like the Irish monks, who opposed to the corruption caused by barbarism in 6th-century Europe a primitive rigorism that knew no compromise and made few concessions to human weakness, so the Egyptian monks of the Thebaid reacted to the corruption of their day. They saw nothing but sin and temptation in the decadence of the eastern Roman empire of the 3rd and 4th centuries, and no hope of salvation but by flight into the desert, away from a sick civilization. Perhaps they were right : perhaps there was no cure for it. They saved their own souls, no doubt ; they laid the foundations of monasticism firmly, but they did not save Egypt as the Irish monks saved Europe, even though the Irish monastic system did not survive Europe's need of it.

Humanly speaking, the heroic age of Christianity may be said to have ended with the 3rd century and the persecutions, when the Roman empire became officially Christian. After that, men had time to think at leisure about the tremendous belief to which Christianity had committed their minds, the fact that God had become Man. St Paul terrified Felix, the Roman governor, ' when he spoke of justice and continence and of the judgment that is to come ' (Acts 24, 25). Justice and continence are no easy things, but they are within the scope of the human will : a good pagan need not be terrified. God reduced to human shape and form was something the human mind unaided could not accept ; the best minds of paganism had examined it already as presented to them in the glories of Greek sculpture and literature, by the greatest artists in representation of the human form, corporeal and spiritual, that the world has ever seen. They had firmly rejected it. Justice and continence they knew and valued, as befitting human dignity. God in human form was an unworthy idea, good enough perhaps for those who knew no better, but not the truth, not the truth about God. Yet there was the historical fact of Christ : ' the thing that couldn't, had occurred', and they were too intelligent to think that it might be explained away, not being Science graduates in red brick universities of the 20th century A.D.

So there were tremendous debates and determined attempts to explain the fact of the Incarnation, not intentionally to explain it away ; but the Incarnation being what it is, a mystery, all explanations tended to end by explaining it away. It is the duty of the teaching Church to see that Christian mysteries are not explained away, so there followed condemnations and anathemas. It was unfortunate that all this debate took place when first-class minds were scarce in the Church and in the world, but second-class and third-class abounded. It was said that every cobbler in Alexandria had his views on the mystery of the Trinity. As there were no Sunday newspapers to write to, he threw stones and beat-up rival theologians, amateur and professional, and occasionally took an afternoon off with a like-minded mob to raid a monastery or loot a church whose clergy held other views from his. ' The Alexandrian rabble on the slightest pretexts took to stones and cudgels. In street-uproar, says an authority, himself Alexandrian, the Egyptians are before all others ; the smallest spark suffices here to kindle a tumult '.[1] Thus Mommsen, the German historian of the Roman empire. Sa'ad Zaghlul knew what he was doing when, in the 20th century, he brought ' the street ' into politics in order to make British rule impossible in Egypt. Somebody else will have to take it out of politics before any rule can last.

Politics came into theology as the Roman Emperors, now Christian and orientalized, took sides sometimes with heresy, sometimes with orthodoxy. When finally, in the year 452–3, the authority of Pope and Emperor combined in decisive action against heresy, the Church in Egypt split on political lines over the religious issue. The great majority of native Egyptians went Monophysite in order to spite the foreigner ; the imperialist Greeks of Egypt accepted the Pope's ruling because it came by way of Constantinople with the Emperor's support.[2] At a later date the Greeks were to show that they were as ready as the Egyptians to put politics before religion, for in the subsequent disputes between Rome and Constantinople they went into schism, in which they have since remained, as the Egyptian Christians remain in heresy.

The Arabs invaded Egypt in 639. The country, divided by religious and political factions, was an easy prey. The native Egyptian Christians turned against their Greek fellow-Christians and sided with the Muslim invader. For a short time they had the unchristian satisfaction of helping the Arabs to oppress the Greeks, but their own turn soon came and they have paid the penalty for that short-sighted and selfish

[1] Mommsen : *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, vol. 2, p. 205.

[2] Hence the name ' Melkites ' by which the Greek Orthodox Christians were known from the Syriac word for king, *malka*, referring to the Emperor of Byzantium, Marcian, who organized the Council of Chalcedon (451) with the rather reluctant assent of the Pope. By a curious chance of history the term is now applied generally to those Greeks who have returned to the Roman obedience, not to the schismatical Orthodox. See Fortescue *The Uniate Eastern Churches*, p. 185-6.

policy by thirteen centuries of Muslim oppression which passed periodically into persecution.

From their Arab masters they got the rather barbarous name which they still bear, Copts. It is a corruption of the Greek word for Egyptians, *Αἰγύπτιοι*. Egyptians they certainly were and are. The city Copt may be indistinguishable from his Arab or Turkish fellow-citizen, but in the villages of Egypt there are hundreds of thousands of peasants whose features and frames surprisingly resemble the sculptured figures of the men who built the Pyramids and fought in the armies of the Pharaohs. They speak Arabic like others but the language of their liturgy is still the language of an Egypt older than Arab, Roman and Greek empires, and whose civilization was ancient when described with wonder and awe by Herodotus in the early days of Greece's golden age.

From the Arab conquest down to our own time the condition of the Copts in Egypt was comparable to that of the Jews in Europe, always despised, often persecuted, intermittently massacred, yet somehow managing to survive, and not only to survive. Many of them attained positions of wealth and influence, which were lost at the next outburst of Muslim fanaticism. In the older part of Cairo there is still a Coptic quarter like a Jewish ghetto in an old European city. Many of the inhabitants still wear a bluish-green cross tattooed on the hand, a relic of the days when every Christian monk had his hand branded with his name, and every male Christian had to wear around his neck a large cross of not less than ten pounds' weight. At a later date the law was that all Jews had to wear yellow turbans ; all Christians, blue. The penalty of disobedience to this rule was, for Jew and Christian, death and confiscation of property. This was not religious persecution with a view to inducing a change of religion. The Arab ruling-class had no interest in making their Christian and Jewish subjects into Muslims, for that would have put them on a level too near to themselves to be comfortable, or safe, for the Arab ascendancy. It was temptation rather than persecution which gradually caused many of the native Christians of Egypt to lose their religious faith, the temptation to rise out of their hard condition as second-class citizens in their own country, at the price of their religious and traditional way of life. To-day in Egypt there are between three and four million Coptic Christians, the vast majority of Christians in Egypt, but a small minority among twenty million Egyptian Muslims.

The truth of history has obliged me to use the word 'heresy' about their faith. But the term *Monophysite* is very much a theologian's word, something like *Transubstantiation*, only more so. From what I have been able to understand of the ordinary Copt's faith, I would say that he firmly believes in Christ as God made Man, while he rejects, without fully understanding, those technical terms which the Catholic Church

has declared necessary for the correct theological expression of that belief. There is no doubt about the validity of the Coptic clergy's priesthood or of their sacraments. When a Copt becomes a Catholic, he does not have to change his native liturgy ; and only a few of his beliefs must be changed. There are now about 60,000 Catholic Copts in Egypt, under their own Catholic Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria.

The course of Egyptian nationalism has been marked by attempts at political alliances between native Christian and Muslim. A great advocate of these was Gommos Sergios, a Coptic priest and vicar of the Coptic Patriarch. His emblem for his organization was the united Cross and Crescent. It is the sort of delusion that takes most of a life-time to see through. Gommos Sergios came in due course, which means after many years and disappointments, to see through it, and being an honest man he said so. But, as might be expected, his experience does not seem to have helped younger people to avoid his mistake.

In the great anti-British demonstrations of November 1951 native Christians joined Muslims in processions through Cairo and Alexandria, carrying banners with slogans as extreme as any nationalist could devise. The Muslim newspapers wrote eloquent tributes to the patriotism of the Copts and their devotion to the national cause. The Copts thought that perhaps the time was ripe to suggest that some of their grievances might be remedied. The Egyptian government regretted that the time was not opportune and took no action. Others did. Within a few weeks, on 4 January 1952, the Coptic church in Suez was burned out, the caretaker murdered and his dead body dragged through the streets and burned by an Egyptian mob. The governor of Suez sent a loudspeaker van around Suez, blaming the British for the outrage. No doubt his accusation was repeated by those English newspapers which dutifully print every anti-British hand-out.

The British have gone from Egypt, and many of the native Christians, who cheered louder than any Muslim when they went, are thinking of going too. But these are a minority ; they are mostly city-folk whose quick wits and aptitude for education of the exam-passing sort made them strong competitors for white-collar jobs. On paper all Egyptians are equal ; in practice no Christian need apply. But most of the Copts are not interested in white-collar jobs. They are peasants living in the remote villages of Upper Egypt, at peace with their Muslim neighbours whose hard life they share. They hardly knew that the British were still on the Canal after they had ceased to govern Egypt twenty years before. Nor would they have cared had they known. For good or ill the British have gone, as the Turks have gone, as the Greeks and Romans went. If the worst comes to the worst, the Coptic peasant will do what his ancestors did for over thirteen hundred years : he will bow before the storm and hope that some of his people will survive it, if not himself. He will not leave Egypt.

Punishment for Crime

by MICHAEL CONNOLLY

PHILOSOPHERS have traditionally taught that civil punishment for crime is lawful for one or more of three purposes : retribution, deterrence, reform. Retribution : the infliction of a penalty gives the condemned criminal his deserts and thus ' restores the balance of justice ' ; the social order against which he has risen by his misdeeds recoils upon him, through its ministers, afflicting him by deprivation of life, liberty, property or by otherwise hurting him. Deterrence : the penalty dissuades the culprit from repeating his offence, and others from imitating him. Reform : punishment serves to re-educate the delinquent, inducing repentance for past misdeeds and amendment for the future.

Of these purposes or justifications of State punishment, the first has long been under heavy fire. Retribution or pure punishment is denounced as being sheer revenge and the heaping of injury upon injury. The criminal injures society and society retaliates by injuring the criminal.

Social anthropologists, tracing the evolution of punitive customs and laws, have endeavoured to explain the origin of the common persuasion that the delinquent merits retributive penalty, irrespective of whether this is necessary as a deterrent to others or useful as a means of reforming the criminal himself. The State's alleged right to punish, we are told, is traceable to the desire of revenge and the supposed need to placate the tribal gods for a breach of the tribal code. Primitive communities believed that their customs and *mores* were established by their gods. Violation of these displeased the gods and would bring misfortune on the community if the delinquent were not forced to make expiation by enduring punishment. Moreover, when a member of a group was injured, his kinsfolk sought revenge by violent action, not merely against the aggressor but against his kindred as well. This gave rise to the disastrous practice of blood-feuds. These were a serious disturbance of the public order and security which the State, on its emergence, sought to maintain.

The civil organization, therefore, took over the task of wreaking vengeance on the wrongdoer. Purely retributive punishment is thus nothing else than revenge, albeit regularized revenge, and quite unjustifiable. The conclusion is that penal action by the State is justified solely for its deterrent and re-educative value ; to inflict a penalty on a criminal merely for the purpose of punishing him is a relic of barbarism.

It has been a common fallacy of materialist evolutionists to suppose that when they have given an account of the development of an idea or belief from cruder to purer forms they have explained it away. Rationalist anthropologists reconstruct, with a wealth of detail, the historical development of mankind's ideas about God and religion, about the soul and immortality, about the State and monogamous marriage as moral institutions, and imagine that by so doing they have exploded these ideas. It does not seem to occur to them that those cruder and more naïve theories of an earlier time may have been mankind's tentative gropings towards truths, vaguely and inaccurately glimpsed, but really there. So too with the evolution of the *rationale* of punishment. Its cruder forms may have been discredited while itself remains. May not a hint of the truth be contained in Bacon's oft-quoted aphorism : ' Revenge is a wild sort of justice ' ?

* * *

Denial of a punitive or retributive function in civil penalties has not been confined to non-Catholic or rationalist penologists. Certain leading Catholic sociologists have been repelled by the traditional notion and name of *poena vindicativa* and have denied that retribution is a right of any human authority. One of the best-known living Catholic ethicians, Canon Jacques Leclercq, Professor at the University of Louvain, writes : *La notion de justice vindicative est irréductiblement obscure.*[1] And, earlier in the present century, others have written in the same strain.

Though it must be admitted that there is at present some lack of agreement amongst Catholic philosophers on the purposes of State penalties, still the view that one of those purposes, indeed the fundamental one, is retribution has a venerable tradition. The Canon Law of the Church contains *poenae vindicativae*, of which the purpose is not the amendment of the culprit, but the expiration of his crime. (See canon 2286.) The doctrine of Aquinas is debated, but a modern Irish Thomist thus summarizes the teaching of his master : ' It (the juridical, retributive theory of punishment) is the theory that seems most in keeping with the teaching of S. Thomas. . . .'[2] The words of the present Pope, in some of the addresses to which allusion has been made,[3] endorse the traditional view. For example, in his address on the Function of Punishment (5 December 1954) the Holy Father said :

[1] *Leçons de Droit Naturel*, IV, i, p. 85.

[2] *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 1952, p. 366, in an article by Fr J. Collins, O.P.

[3] Criminal Responsibility and Punishment. *Studies*, Autumn 1957, pp. 303—11.

> In our discourse of 3 October 1953 . . . . we called attention to the fact that many, perhaps the majority, of civil jurists reject vindictive punishment ; we noted, however, that perhaps the considerations and arguments adduced as proof were being given greater importance and force than they have in fact. We also pointed out that the Church in her theory and practice has maintained this double type of penalty (medicinal and vindictive), and that this is more in agreement with what the sources of revelation and traditional doctrine teach regarding the coercive power of legitimate human authority . . . . Whatever the attitude of positive human law on this problem, it is sufficient for our present purpose to make clear that in any total or partial remission of punishment, the vindictive penalties (no less than the medicinal) can, and even should, be taken into consideration.

Still, the idea of retributive punishment is a scandal to modern humanitarians. The very term *poena vindicativa* seems self-condemnatory. *Vi vocis* it seems to mean ' vengeance-penalty '. How can vengeance be good ? How can it be Christian ? Is it not odd to attribute the justification of ' vengeance-penalty ' to the doctrinal tradition of Him Who bade His followers forgive seventy times seven times ' that they might be children of their Heavenly Father ' ? To call it ' expiatory ' does not entirely remove the scandal. If this word implies that the criminal repents of his crime, is anxious to make amends, willingly undertakes to compensate his victim and to pay a fine to the State in token of his return to obedience to the laws, then the idea is one which our moral sense commends. Such expiation is reasonable ; it is a true restoration of the order violated by the crime. But if the criminal remains obdurate and unrepentant, if he merely endures perforce the pain or disability inflicted upon him, is not his penalty merely the adding of physical evil to moral and juridical guilt ? And how can that be justified, apart from its deterrent usefulness ?

On the other hand, when taken in conjunction with the other aims of penalty, retribution does not strike us as unreasonable. Civil authority is willed by God and is equipped with all rights necessary for furtherance of the common good. These include the right to make laws and to fortify them with threats of penalties against those who are convicted of breaking the law. If these threats are to be effective, they must be carried out when the law is broken. Modern penologists say that the only purposes of State penalties are the protection of society and the reform of the criminal. But if protection of the State is the sole and adequate justification for fining, imprisoning or even hanging the criminal, is not the human person made a mere means to the purposes of the community, a course which is reprehensible by the standards of both Christian and Kantian ethics ? Nor is the added justification of reform or re-education of the culprit sufficient. For, to begin with, reform in the case of seasoned offenders is often quite unlikely ; indeed, given the resources in suitable

personnel and money at the disposal of many States, it is morally impossible. Besides, the duty of educating or re-educating the individual is not one which rests immediately on the State.

It is considered right to penalize the guilty, ' to make an example of them ' for the protection of the community. It is equally considered wrong to deprive an innocent person of life, liberty or other personal rights, however much this might be judged useful for the common good. Why ? Simply because the criminal deserves punishment, while the innocent man does not. Penal action is not only a protection for society ; it is the criminal's ' due '. But this is precisely the retributive element. No doubt, it is conjoined with the deterrent and even reformative ends of punishment. But it, too, is indispensable ; and without it the other aims are unjust.

When the retributive purpose of penal action is conjoined with the deterrent and emendatory, we have little difficulty in accepting it. But when we consider retribution in isolation from the other purposes, when we ask ourselves if it is right to punish the wrongdoer just because he has done wrong, even though no other good result is aimed at or even possible, then we experience the difficulties which have made the *poena vindicativa* so distasteful to modern jurists. Yet many ethicians in the past and not a few to the present day have held that retribution is the intrinsic and adequately justifying purpose of civil penalties.

Fr J. Collins, O.P., in his article on the teaching of Aquinas on State penalties, writes : ' Juridical retribution alone would justify the infliction of punishment by the State even though emendation of the criminal and deterring of others from a similar crime were ruled out '. The Report of the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment has this passage (p. 18) : ' We think it must be recognised that there is a strong and widespread demand for retribution in the sense of reprobation—not always unmixed in the popular mind with that of atonement and expiation '. As Lord Justice Denning put it :

> The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else . . . . The ultimate justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime ; and from this point of view, there are some murders which, in the present state of public opinion, demand the most emphatic denunciation of all, namely the death penalty.

The last quotation suggests a practical utility in considering the aim of retribution alone on its merits. For the question might seem otiose or of purely speculative interest, seeing that in practice civil pun-

ishment is always deterrent and thus able to lean on the purpose of social defence for part of its ethical justification. But the discussions on capital punishment show that the enquiry is not superfluous.

The main argument of those who advocate the retention of the death penalty is that it is an irreplaceable deterrent against murder and certain other graver crimes. But statistical evidence has weakened that argument considerably and indeed, in the opinion of abolitionists, invalidated it. The figures seem to show that in very many cases the abolition of the death penalty has not caused an increase in the homicide rate. Even in certain neighbouring states, *e.g.*, of U.S.A. and Australia, whose populations are economically, culturally and socially homogeneous, there is little difference in the homicide rate between those which have retained and those which have abolished the death penalty.[1]

It is true that the argument from statistics is often misleading. The British Royal Commission was wary and rather negative in its inferences from statistical evidence. But more and more people are coming to believe, or at least suspect, that in modern civilized countries (with their highly efficient police and prison systems) capital punishment is no longer an indispensably necessary deterrent from murder. Should this view gain universal acceptance (as it well may), then the main argument in favour of retaining the death penalty (viz., its necessity as a deterrent) is gone. And the ethician who sees in the deterrent value of the death penalty its sole justification must forthwith pronounce it unethical. If, however, there is also a retributive justification, the moral question is not yet closed.

Most people have an instinctive persuasion that it is right to visit punishment on crime, that the wrongdoer deserves to be penalized irrespective of any social utility resulting therefrom. Perhaps it is wasted effort to seek a more reasoned ground of this persuasion. May it not be that here we have one of those moral intuitions, self-evident principles of right and wrong, which St Thomas and, I believe, most ethicians regard as the basis of all our reasoning on moral matters? They are axioms and therefore cannot be strictly demonstrated save perhaps by a *reductio ad absurdum*. This may explain the difficulty we experience in framing a syllogistic-type argument to prove them. Perhaps this proposition (' that crime deserves penalty ') cannot strictly be proved any more than it can reasonably be denied. Its truth must simply be seen and acknowledged.

There are eminent ethicians who take this view. For Sir David Ross it is a *prima facie* obligation that happiness be proportioned to merit. The same is true of Kant. A recent commentator on the Lords' Debate on Hanging, July 1956, writes :

[1] cf. Royal Commission Report (1953) par. 64 and Appendix 6. (Cmd 8932)

> The Draconian standpoint (viz., ' that appropriate punishment for legal offences is a moral right possessed by society ') . . . . retains an enormously powerful semi-conscious backing not only from the mass of people but from the most sophisticated of us when caught off our rationalist or humanitarian guards . . . . To most Draconians their standpoint is axiomatic—something not to be questioned, something without which their characteristic thinking (or judging) on criminal matters could not proceed at all. That some (otherwise sane and perhaps even virtuous) people do question their tenets is for the Draconian, therefore, just one of those dreadful things—a dreadful incapacity to see the obvious truth.[1]

The late Archbishop Temple in the first Clark Hall lecture at Gray's Inn, London, March 1934, declared :

> Defenders of retribution as the essence of punishment rely upon an intuition which assures them that it is good that the wicked should suffer. If one has no such intuition—as I have none—it is difficult to be impressed by its alleged occurrence in others. That there is satisfaction in the infliction of pain on those who have aroused our indignation is undeniable ; and this may masquerade as an intuitional assurance that their suffering is itself good. But in fact to proceed from one of those to the other with no further justification is to commit a manifest fallacy.

I fear, therefore, that we cannot excuse ourselves from some attempt to prove that the State has a right to punish which justifies it in exacting retributive penalties, which governing authorities may and do use for deterrent and reformatory purposes.

We are encouraged to think that there must be an answer by the teaching of Our Lord who though commending forgiveness of injuries by His example and precept, nevertheless also taught in a score of passages in the Gospels that the punishment of Hell is eternal. Eternal punishment has no emendatory purpose and, after the Day of Judgment, will have no deterrent purpose either. It is a purely retributive penalty and, if we are to justify the ways of God to men, must be ethically reasonable.

* * *

The main difficulty urged against retributive penalty is that it is sheer revenge and therefore wrong. It is admitted that the criminal has incurred moral or juridical guilt. But how does it mend matters to hurt or fine or kill him, supposing he has ceased from wrongdoing, and prescinding from any deterrent or emendatory effects of punishment ? That is the objection. And to it we may reply that if the infliction of retributive penalty had no other purpose than to hurt the wrongdoer and so, perhaps, satisfy somewhat the angry and vindictive instincts of those whom he has wronged, then it would be impossible to justify.

[1] *Philosophy*, April 1957, p. 134.

Unfortunately, the very name *poena vindicativa*, ' vengeance-penalty ', seems to suggest that this is the case. But it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to the etymology of the word. Historically, the aspect of revenge may have loomed large in the minds of those who were concerned to exact retribution. But it does not follow that retribution is necessarily revenge. The upholders of *poena vindicativa* maintain that its essence and meaning, its intrinsic purpose (*finis operis*) is the restoration of the order of justice, the repairing of the *juridical order*, and that this is a good purpose and one which justifies the pain and physical evil by which that purpose is realized. What does this restoration of justice, of the juridical order mean ?

Every *order* is a unity in multiplicity. A juridical order is a unified system of rights, with their co-relative obligations, binding in mutual relationship the members of a group. The concept of right is a social one. It connotes each one's allotted portion of a limited amount of ' externality ' (*i.e.*, of the means of bodily life and development, of living space and opportunity for movement and action) which is shared by the group as a whole.

Man is a social animal. Being an animal, he has a material body which needs ' externality ', *lebensraum*, understood in a very broad sense, so as to include not merely room and liberty in which to move around, but possessions or the facilities for acquiring them, liberty of action, liberty of association with his fellows. A man's right *objectively* is the portion of ' externality ' due to him ; *subjectively* it is his moral claim to that share of externality. Man's bodily condition necessitates this externality. But man is social, too. He must live in society with his fellows. These, too, all need their portion of externality, their rights *objectively*. And the amount available for all is not unlimited. Hence arises the necessity that each one's rights, his portion of externality, his due, be allotted to him in accordance with some uniform arrangement which distributes equitably the amount available. This is done by law (*jus*) which sets up an *order of justice* (*jus-titia*) assigning to each his due share of externality in such manner as to harmonize the claims of all persons in the group to an adequate allowance of ' living space '. Thus comes into existence a juridical order, a unified system of rights (*jura*), an equilibrium of the competing needs and claims of the members of society, allowing to each as large a share of externality as is compatible with the requirements of all the others.

The Natural Law sets up its own ' juridical order ' and this receives further determination when men form civil societies as they are bound to do. The State or civil society whose purpose, ' the common good ', is obligatory on its members, also sets up through its law, a juridical order, the civil or positive juridical order. Civil law assigns to each citizen the portion of externality available to him. It is right and good

that each observe the limits of his portion and respect those of others. This kind of goodness is called *justice;* its object is the rendering to everyone his due, his portion of externality. Justice presides over the civil juridical order. The ruler, by an act of distributive justice determines and safeguards the limits of each one's portion ; the subjects observe commutative justice when they respect the limits of their neighbour's portion, and legal justice when they observe the juridical order as a whole, respecting its requirements and refraining from disturbing it. Thus is set up the ' order of justice ' whose maintenance unimpaired, or restoration if violated, is the purpose of threatening and inflicting punishment.

When the wrongdoer injures a fellow-member of the community or the community itself as such, he disturbs the juridical order. By upsetting its equilibrium he lowers the level of social well-being in the community. Thus he harms the community as well as the individual who is, as the case may be, the immediate victim of his transgression. The civil authority is charged with the maintenance of justice, *i.e.*, with the safeguarding of the equilibrium of rights constituting the civil, juridical order. Its duty is to repair the crime committed by exacting repayment or compensation, if possible, of the individual victim, but also by punishing the transgressor so as to undo the injury done to the community by the violation of the juridical order.

How can punishment effect this ? Evil or harm is the absence of the due amount of goodness which anything should have. The evil which the crime has injected into the order of the social community consists in a lowering of the social well-being of the community. That diminution has been freely caused by the criminal ; he is responsible for it ; it is imputable to him ; it is *his*. Justice demands that each be given what is his. In the present instance, the ruler whose duty is the maintenance of justice, has the obligation or at least the right to give the criminal what is his, *i.e.*, to cause to flow back upon him that evil which he has injected into the social organism. That evil, in this case, is a diminution of the enjoyment of those rights which it is the purpose of the social community to order and safeguard. This will mean that the culprit shall suffer a curtailment of liberty, property, even of life itself. But that is punishment. In essence, then, penalty is the ' fructification of evil ',[1] though this does not take place automatically or mechanically, but through the intervention of human authorities requiting demerit.

In his discourse on International Penal Law (3 October, 1953) Pope Pius XII said :

> One may ask if the modern conception (viz., that defence of the community is the essence of punishment) is fully adequate to explain punishment. The protection of the community against crimes and criminals

[1] Cf. J. Maritain : *Neuf Leçons sur les Notions Premières de la Philosophie Morale.* Paris : Tequi. 1951. p. 183.

must be ensured, but the final purpose of punishment must be sought on a higher plane. The essence of the culpable act is the freely-chosen opposition to a law recognized as binding ; it is the rupture and deliberate violation of just order. Once done, it is impossible to recall. Nevertheless in so far as it is possible to make satisfaction for the order violated, that should be done. For it is a fundamental demand of ' justice ' whose role in morality is to maintain the existing equilibrium when it is just, and to restore the balance when upset. It demands that by punishment the person responsible be forcibly brought to order ; and the fulfilment of this demand proclaims the absolute supremacy of good over evil ; right triumphs sovereignly over wrong.

Punishment is a consequence of freewill, of freedom abused. If actions are not free, they merit no punishment. Freedom, responsibility, imputability, merit or demerit—that is the order of concepts. We have little difficulty in seeing the reasonableness of merit—that the citizen who observes the order of justice should enjoy the rights and liberties guaranteed by society ; that he who renders distinguished service should in justice receive special reward from the community whose well-being he has notably enhanced. Why then should we reject the notion of punishment as a result of merit-in-reverse or demerit ? All this implies is that the harm, the diminution of ' externality ' which the criminal has freely caused, which truly is *his*, should accrue to *him* as much as possible, by retrenchment of the benefits of social order.

Some people prefer to say that punishment is the repudiation of the crime by the community and, therefore, is retrospective or retributive as well as forward-looking (deterrence and re-education). If past crime went unpunished, if the authorities were content to prevent its repetition in the future and considered it impossible or unimportant to undo the harm it had done in the past, then the community would seem either to regard the criminal as irresponsible or to connive at or condone his crime. But by inflicting penalty, through which the self-will of the criminal (over-indulged in his wrongdoing) is painfully curbed and thwarted, the community re-affirms, re-asserts the juridical order. The sanctity and importance of that order are emphatically proclaimed, its reality made palpable. In his remarkable lecture (already quoted) on ' The Ethics of Penal Action ', the late Archbishop Temple says :

> It is, as I believe, the first moral duty of the community, or of the State on its behalf, to reassert the broken moral law against the offender who has broken it. For this reason it must affirm his guilt and deal with him in accordance with it (p. 28).
>
> The moral approbation which we give to a penal action, when carefully distinguished from all satisfaction in it as an act of venegance, is due, as I believe, to its expression of the repudiation by the community of

> the crime. To forgive may be right ; to condone (as the word is ordinarily understood) is always wrong. The first duty of the State is to dissociate itself from the act of its own member ; to do this it must act, not only upon, but against that member. Just because he is a member his act implicates the community unless the community repudiates it. The community must exhibit an antagonism in its will against the will of the offending member (p. 30).
>
> The essential element in so-called Retributive Punishment is not the infliction of pain or loss on the evil doer, as though that by itself were good, but the assertion of the good will of the community against his evil will, whereby in one act it condemns that evil will and reminds him that the good will of the community is also his own, or at least that his duty and welfare consist in making it so. But this action of the community must be painful, because its essential quality is antagonism to the criminal so far as he is criminal (p. 31).

A person does not defy with impunity the physical order of the universe, for instance by stepping out of a fifth-floor window. Neither should he be permitted to disrespect the moral or juridical order. There is analogy, if not absolute similarity, between the two orders ; the one ' punishes ' its violators mechanically, the other through the instrumentality of its officials. But both are instances of the recoil of order upon its violators.

In that part of the *Summa* where St Thomas speaks of the penalty for sin,[1] he alludes to civil society as to one of the three ordered systems to which human life and activity are subordinate. These ordered systems are represented as having a unity, a being and life of their own. Just as a single organism resists and represses forcibly attack upon its life and integrity, so civil society resists forcibly those who violate its order. And this repression is penalty. As the State and its natural purpose are necessary for man, he is subject to the juridical, civil order which the State sets up. Civil crime is a free and external violation of this order of justice and is rightly called injustice or injury. The criminal rebels against the order to which he is subject and expresses his rebellion in external act. Justice remains violated, civil order is upset, things are awry and out of place if the violator remains immune and unpunished. Punishment gives him his due, replaces him in his proper position of subordination and inferiority, of willy-nilly acknowledgment of his subjection to social order. Therefore it is right. Order requires it. And to preserve order is good.

Is this ' re-action of order ' just a delusive metaphor by which we seek to rationalize our revenge and make it respectable ? No. The order of civil society is a reality, a social reality, a reality of organized co-operation to which every citizen is obliged to contribute and which he is forbidden to disturb. Crime is a voluntary and culpable attack

[1] I. II, q. 87, a. 1.

upon that organized unity which is the life of the state. Every living thing resists attack—understandably, because it is meant to live and function and develop itself. That resistance, that recoil of the civil organism upon the rebellious member is punishment. True, its infliction is not an automatic reflex action but a decision of human beings who are the instrumental organs of the social body. Its purpose is not revenge—which is in itself vicious and evil—but order, whose integrity requires that disorder be repressed and penalized.

But when all is said, it must be admitted that it is not easy to justify civil punishment on purely retributive grounds. We feel more assurance when we can call in the assistance of the deterrent and reformatory purposes as well. And in actual fact the three purposes are combined in State penalties. If we have insisted at some length on the validity of the retributive element, this does not mean that we deplore the modern tendency to emphasize the re-educative purpose in the measurement of State penalties. On the contrary, is not the remote purpose of civil society the good life of all its members? Besides, sociological and criminological research have shown what a large part in delinquency is due to general social, economic and cultural conditions. It is only fitting that the State, the supreme secular organization of society should feel obliged to undo as much as it can the perversion of character which bad social conditions have caused.

* * *

Pope Pius XII, while endorsing the retributive purpose of State punishment, does not neglect or underrate its possibilities as an instrument of reform. On the contrary, the interest and indeed originality of his teaching are that it encloses all three purposes of punishment within a single, comprehensive aim. This the Holy Father describes as the ransoming of the delinquent, through expiation, from his enslavement to guilt and penalty.

The person who, by his crime, has freely injured the juridical order has incurred *reatus culpae et poenae;* he is in a condition in which his will is de-orientated from its due and proper goal and in which he is liable to penalty. Punishment's inherent purpose is expiation, i.e., that the delinquent shall make amends by repairing as far as possible the order he has violated. He does this by bearing physical evil—imprisonment, fine, etc. He must perforce endure this evil, whether resignedly or in revolt. But since the full purpose of penalty is the criminal's liberation, the ideal of penal law and punishment is only achieved if the victim accepts his pain with willingness, in testimony of his recognition that he is subordinate to a certain order and goal, and of his genuine desire to return to the observance of that

goal. In this way, the retributive purpose merges into the reformative. But, be it noted, the retributive purpose is not so dependent on the reformative that whenever this latter cannot be obtained the penalty becomes useless. Retribution has its own validating purpose irrespective of amendment, viz., the upholding of the juridical order. Part of the criminal's amendment is the reparation of this order.

The ideal of penalty being this redemption of the delinquent, it is desirable that all who have to do with him should keep this purpose in mind. This applies particularly to judges, lawyers, prison authorities and chaplains, welfare workers and probation officers. And, of course, it applies to the delinquent himself. This purpose of helping the condemned person voluntarily to make expiation is too little recognized by civil, penal law. Some procedures of modern penology, such as putting the criminal on a period of probation, contribute towards it. But its more explicit recognition and pursuit are greatly to be desired.

It would seem, then, that the main purpose of punishment is the restoration of order through expiation by which the criminal is set free from his state of guilt and liability to punishment. That restoration includes (as a rule) the bearing of physical evil. Ideally the criminal will bear this willingly, thus giving serious proof of his re-submission to order. But should he be recalcitrant, nevertheless the restoration of order will, at least partially and imperfectly, be secured by his willy-nilly subjection to penalty.

The Pope outlines the ideal purpose of punishment. But he well recognizes that often the ideal cannot be achieved. This is no reason for omitting those of its constituent elements which can be realized. And one of those elements is retribution—a purpose of punishment which the Holy Father refuses to discard or minimize.

Reviews

IRISH FAMILIES

IRISH FAMILIES, THEIR NAMES, ARMS AND ORIGINS. By Edward MacLysaght. Dublin : Hodges & Figgis. 1957. Pp. 365. Plates 27. £5 5s.

Surnames in Ireland go back to the tenth century. The practice had begun before the year 1000 and continued into the eleventh century. Brian Boruma is sometimes given credit for the innovation, on what grounds it is not easy to discover. He was known himself as Brian, son of Cennédig, and his son, who died in 1064, was known as Donnchad, son of Brian. The first O Brien was Toirdelbach, King of Munster and, in his own estimation, King of Ireland, who died in 1086. Had Brian introduced surnames he would presumably have taken one himself and this would be (according to the fashion then finding universal acceptance) O Larkin, after his grandfather, Lorcán, King of Dál Chais. Brian was a man of great intellectual power and inexhaustible energy but, so far as our evidence goes, he showed no interest whatever in this matter. It is a nice question whether the process was affected by any influence from outside. Camden, the antiquarian, reports that in France surnames were coming into use at the beginning of the eleventh century and that the custom tended to spread to England, where, however, its progress was slow, for the villagers and the countrypeople still regarded the baptismal name, strengthened often by a nickname, as a sufficient means of identification. Even later, when surnames had almost become a necessity in towns and cities owing to the enormous growth in population, a man who changed his place of residence frequently changed his surname also. The exceptions were the aristocrats and the merchant-princes whose names were an asset which their descendants were loath to lose. In Spain stability had not been reached as late as the sixteenth century : the five sons of a distinguished father might bear five different surnames, an indifference to convenience which must have proved awkward for all concerned.

The practice, once adopted, took deep root in Ireland. Surnames appeared in every quarter of the land. Most were patronymics, based on the name of the grandfather ; preceded, therefore, by *Ua* (*Ó*) or *Mac mic* ' grandson ', with the *Mac mic* soon reduced to the simple *Mac*. On rare occasions the ancestral name chosen was a generation or two further back. Many of the baptismal names which now became stereotyped in the new forms were themselves extremely ancient. The Niall in O Neill, the Amolngid in McAuley, the Conchobar in O Connor go back to a period centuries before the introduction of Christianity. Colour had an extraordinary place in the Irish system of nomenclature. Thus Duff, Devine, Devane, Dwane, Duggan are but modifications of the one word dubh, ' black '. Two colours may unite, e.g. dubh and flann (O Doolin) ; or a colour be modified by a noun, e.g. dubh and Sláinghe, ' the river Slaney ' (O Delaney). The qualifying noun very often denotes a physical characteristic, e.g. dubh-ceann, ' black head '

(O Deegan, O Duigenan); in reverse order, ceann-dubh (Canniffe, Canavan); or with the obsolete adjective loch, ' black ', for dubh, ceann-loch, Ceallach (O Kelly, O Callaghan). Sometimes the name expresses a moral quality, e.g. caomh, ' gentle ' (O Keeffe); less flatteringly, ifreanna, from ifreann, ' hell ' (O Heffernan). Animals and birds make their contribution, e.g. each, ' a horse ', in each-tighearna (Ahearn); bran, ' a raven ', in O Brain, O Byrne. Names compounded with cú, ' a hound ', are very numerous, e.g. Mac Conmara, Mac ConUladh, Mac ConMidhe (MacNamara, MacCullough, MacNamee). From mac, ' a lad ', come such forms as Mac (mic) Uidhir (Maguire), Mac (mic) Ráith (McGrath). The professions are not overlooked, e.g. Mac an Bháird (Ward), Mac an Airchinnigh (MacInerney, Nerney), Mac an tSaoir (MacIntyre, MacInteer). Maol in pagan times, and both Maol and Gilla under the Christian dispensation, can have a religious connotation, e.g. maol-anfadha, ' devotee of the storm ' (O Molampy), Maol Ciarain (Mulhern), MacGiolla Pádraig, (Kilpatrick, Fitzpatrick). Social relationships appear in aitheach, 'a person who pays rent' (O Fahy); and in compounds of flaith, ' a lord ', and céile, 'a follower, client' (O Flavin, O Flaherty, O Kelleher, O Quigley). Finally, there are names of foreign origin, Norse (O Higgins, MacKettrick, MacCaffrey, MacAuliffe), Welsh (Rice, Merrick), Norman, (Roche, Redmond, Dalton, Barry, Burke), English (Blake, White, Preston, Stritch, Wadding).

From these many sources the number of surnames evolved was very great. Father Woulfe, in his *Sloinnte Gaedheal is Gall* gives more than 3,000. That his list is not exhaustive is obvious from the genealogical collections in such Books as Ballymote and Lecan, from the quite short tract called *Críchad an Chaoilli*, edited by Canon Power and published by the Cork University Press, and from the study of the Cenél Binnig by Dr Séumas O Ceallaigh, published by the same Press under the title *Gleanings from Ulster History*. Caoille was an area, roughly the present baronies of Fermoy and Condons, which covered about a tenth of County Cork. Notwithstanding its small size, it contained more than a hundred distinct surnames. In Cenél Binnig, a strip along the left bank of the Bann from Lough Neagh to the sea, the number of surnames met with was sixty. Thus a list for the whole country, even with full allowance made for the recurrence of the same name in several districts, would be expected to reach, and perhaps surpass, ten thousand.

Dr MacLysaght's approach to the subject is from a very interesting angle, that of mediaeval heraldry. This form of symbolism seems to have developed in western Europe shortly before the year 1200. It spread with surprising rapidity. During the thirteenth century most of the great families of Europe came to display armorial bearings on their shields and also on their long coats, which thus became ' coats of arms '. Bearings would likewise appear on the knight's banner or pennon and on his horse's trappings. The custom was of particular value on the field of battle, where friend could be distinguished easily from foe. Irish families did not lag behind the knightly families of the rest of Europe in enthusiasm for the invention. In due course, officers of arms—kings, heralds, pursuivants—became attached to the princely and noble houses. These officers were made into a corporation in England by Richard III. There was nothing similar in Ireland until the office of Ulster King of Arms was instituted by Edward VI in 1553. It came to an end in

Dublin Castle only in 1943 and even then, by a process akin to the transmigration of souls, re-appeared in a new and youthful body as the Genealogical Office. Dr MacLysaght served for many years as its courteous and scholarly head.

The present book, as an example of the printer's and publisher's art, must rank amongst the finest ever produced in Ireland. The paper, described as ' Irishmade Woodfree Antique ', is a delight to handle, the print a delight to read, the twenty-seven plates, with their 243 coats of arms, a prolonged delight to contemplate. Great praise is obviously due to Miss Myra Maguire, Heraldic Artist to the Office. Can any consolation be offered to the *profanum vulgus,* the multitude of families outside the charmed circle of the 243 ? This much, perhaps, that some of the names included have no resplendent role in Irish history and might readily be replaced by names with a better claim to fame. Why, for instance, do four of the ' Seven Septs of Leix ' bear arms, while the remaining three do not ? And where are the O Maelseachlainns, who were Kings of Meath at the Norman Invasion, whose ancestors were Kings of Ireland back to 743, and whose more remote ancestors were Kings of Ireland before the coming of St Patrick ?

The biographical notes are abundant. They could, of course, be expanded to almost any length. Some of the sketches show signs of hasty composition ; and there are slips of the pen which unaccountably were not corrected in the proof-sheets. Dr Croke was surely not Archbishop of Tuam and Charles Kickham was not born in Mullinavat. MacCann derives from cana, ' a wolf-cub ', just as Collins and Culhane derive from coileán, ' a pup '. Maelsuthain O Carroll and Maelsuthain, the *anmchara* or confessor of Brian Boruma, who on Brian's behalf made the famous entry in the Book of Armagh, are different persons. Both, indeed, were scholars ; but O Carroll, who in his day had been King of the Eoganachta round Killarney and later had joined the monastic community on Inisfallen, died in 1010 and was buried at Aghadoe, while Maelsuthain, the confessor of Brian, died in 1031. The inference (not drawn by Dr MacLysaght but drawn by many others) that Brian Boruma was educated at Inisfallen is thus unsubstantiated. The O Concannons, chiefs of Uí Diarmada, were a branch of the Uí Briúin, not of the Uí Maine. In dealing with the O Donoghues it should, perhaps, be mentioned that the most aristocratic family of the name lived in the Co. Tipperary. It was descended from the King of Munster who died in 957, a few years before the kingship of Munster was usurped by the Dalcassian king, Mathgamain. O Fedagáin (Fegan, Fagan) should not be regarded as a corrupt form of the northern O hÓgáin (O Hagan), or even of O hAedagáin. The name is found in eastern Airgialla in 1095 and has a satisfactory etymology of its own. The chief point of interest about the O Friels is that they are nearest in blood to St Colmcille, for they alone are in the direct line of descent from his brother. The mention of the O Heffernans is not in the Book of Rights but in O hUidhrin's topographical poem, composed about the year 1400. The family was intruded into Uaithne Cliach by the O Briens in the period of their great expansion and was driven out, when the O Briens were no longer strong enough to maintain them, by the older inhabitants. Not only are the MacCatháins (Keanes) of West Clare distinct from the O Catháins (Kanes) of Derry, but the Hogans of Clare are distinct from the Hogans of north Tipperary. These had their chief seat at Ardcroney

and were of the Múscraighe, not of Dál Chais. To say that 'the O Keeffes not only originated in Cork but always stayed there' is to invite dissent. The ancestors of the family gave kings to Cashel or Munster down to the beginning of the ninth century. They were the dynasty of the Eoganachta Glennamnach, a branch of the Eoganachta settled in south Tipperary. A day came when they crossed the border into Cork (as did their distant relatives of the royal line of Cashel, the MacCarthys and the O Callaghans) and established themselves as overlords in the territory of the Feara Muighe Féne (Fermoy). This migration can hardly be dated before the eleventh century, for the native chiefs of the Feara Muighe had already adopted a surname, O Dubhagáin, O Duggan, before the O Keeffes arrived to exercise political authority over them. The O Maoileóin (Malone) genealogy, which gives the family eminence by connecting it closely with the illustrious O Connors of Connacht, is a bare-faced forgery ; nor is it meet to attach the O Daly family to the southern Uí Néill, except in a geographical sense. They are found first in Corcu Roída, a small tributary state, and bring honour to that ancient people, from whom they almost certainly derive, by the wealth through the centuries of their literary talent.

One last concession to the demon of criticism ! If the folder-map of family locations, neatly placed at the end of the book, is admirable in size and clarity, that of the counties and baronies, facing page 284, seems designed only for lynx-eyed readers. However, the rest will not complain too loudly. This is a work destined to give hour upon hour of pleasure to countless Irish families at home and abroad.

JOHN RYAN

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE FAR EAST IN THE MODERN WORLD. By F. H. Michael & G. E. Taylor. London : Methuen & Co. Ltd. Pp. 724. 50s.

THE changes that have taken place in Far Eastern countries in modern times are enough in themselves to make our age an epoch. The West is largely responsible for them ; fittingly, they have vital consequences for the West. Nobody would deny now the global importance of what has happened in Japan during the past 90 years and in China during the past half-century. It is less commonly realized that the smaller countries of the Far East have also moved into the main stream of world affairs.

The history of the Far East in the past 150 years is crowded and complicated as well as important. Messrs Michael and Taylor of the University of Washington were daring in their attempt to write it in one volume. Happily their ability matched their daring to a remarkable extent. In 688 pages of text they give a comprehensive and readable general history, distinguished by a high degree of accuracy on facts and balance in judgment.

The countries included are those of South-East Asia, China, Japan, Korea and Siberia. In the first part of the book the backgrounds of these countries are described with emphasis on religious, social and economic aspects. Part II narrates the history of the colonial and economic penetration of the Far East by Western powers in the 19th century and up to the end of the first World

War. The starting-point of Part III, the longest section, is the Russian Revolution and the Comintern ' swing to the East '. The book brings us up to 1955.

Many of the authors' judgments, by their clarity and soundness, merit quotation. On China, for instance, they say :

> All efforts to adjust the Confucian world view to modern conditions were defeated by the advocates of Western rationalism and pragmatism which did not themselves provide any adequate substitute (p. 4).
>
> For those Chinese, few at the time [early 1920s] who wanted a formula both for taking over the power of the state and for managing it, Communism provided a pseudo-scientific body of doctrine which exploited the high prestige of the West and of Western science (p. 331).
>
> Owing to their ignorance of the history and nature of international Communism some of these [U.S.] diplomatic reporters completely misjudged the character and policies of the Chinese Communists (p. 649).

Ten years ago the academic world produced little, if any, writing like this about China. Even today the following truths, familiar to those who were inside China, will come as a revelation to many students :

> The National Government was not overthrown by a " popular revolution " or by the defection of the Chinese " people " as has been so often stated. The National Government had alienated important sections of the politically articulate minority—the intellectuals, students, professional classes, businessmen, and even officials—but very few of these turned to Communism. Many of them lost confidence in the ability of the government to handle the situation after the war and in their despondency and bitterness became indifferent to the outcome of the civil strife. Their neutralism was cultivated by the Communists. . . . The peasants were tired of war, of conscription and taxes, and had no reason to feel that the government was vitally interested in their welfare. But there were no peasant uprisings against the government although there were some against the Communists. . . . The victory of the Chinese Communists was a victory of military organization and strategy (pp. 446-7).

For a work like this it is sometimes hard to decide what should form part of the main outline and what may be treated as secondary detail or omitted. It seems to me that the massive exodus of the Vietnamese refugees from the Communist Vietminh zone, in 1954-55, deserves more than a passing reference. The extreme measures taken by the Communists to prevent them, in spite of the agreement signed in Geneva, and the lamentable inadequacy of the International Supervisory Commission are not recorded. The Geneva ' settlement ' on Indo-China calls for more precision. The armistic agreement, signed by the French and Vietminh high commands, included the provision for free movement of refugees but did not prescribe general elections. It was the unsigned Final Declaration that called for elections in 1956. As the authors note, the State (now Republic) of Vietnam was a party to no agreement in Geneva.

The influence of Buddhism on Burma's nationalist leaders, especially the devout and upright U Nu, is rightly noted. Another influence, however, that of British and Indian Socialism, from Fabian to Marxist, also prevails in high political circles in Burma.

The significant fact that about 72 per cent of the Chinese prisoners of war, former Communist soldiers, taken in Korea refused to return to China is stated. It should be added that 32 per cent of the North Korean prisoners of war—a smaller percentage because they were in their own country and more exposed to Communist reprisals—refused to return to the Communist-ruled north.

The authors stress the ' major part ' played by the Catholic Church in the development of the Philippines and mention Christian missions elsewhere from time to time. But Christianity in the Far East has greater importance than would appear from the space given to it in this book. For the numbers of its Asian members and clergy and for its influence, direct and indirect (which the Communists certainly recognize), it deserves more attention.

Apart from the passing mention that the Chinese Communists imprisoned ' many foreigners, especially foreign missionaries ', the authors ignore the Communist campaign against religion in China, North Korea and Vietnam. This is a curious omission, since the book includes sections on the Communists' social revolution, their ideological campaign, mass organization and Communist culture in China.

The omission is a real defect ; Communism anywhere cannot be fully comprehended without a knowledge of the anti-religious programme that is of its very essence. It should be stressed that Asian Christians, clergy and laity, have suffered far more and in much greater numbers than the foreign missionaries, from the Communist persecution of religion in the Far East.

Soviet Russia's activities and American Far Eastern policy are subjects of informative chapters.

Errors are bound to slip into a book of this scope. For future editions, the following should be noted : José Rizal, the Philippine patriot, was executed in Manila, not Spain (p. 293) ; Nguyen Ai Quoc was only one of Ho Chi Minh's former names (p. 585) ; Tongking proper did not have 2½ million Catholics (p. 590) : at most it had one million. Ngo Dinh Diem is from central Vietnam, not Tongking (p. 592) ; the Binh Xuyen (not ' the Xuan ') armed organization in southern Vietnam was not a sect ; its leader was General Le Van Vien or Bay Vien, not General Nguyen Van Xuan (pp. 590-92). The Communists did not exactly ' give up their invasion ' of Laos after the Geneva agreement (p. 592) ; using the Pathet-Lao, they held on to two provinces, forcing the Laotian government to agree to a coalition compromise that makes Laos one of the danger spots of S.E. Asia.

On the fateful preludes to Japan's surrender in 1945, the narrative (p. 538) might be amplified. The U.S. knew independently in June that Tokyo was trying to get Soviet Russia to mediate for better terms than unconditional surrender. This was learned through intercepted radio messages, as the U.S. had broken the Japanese code. It can hardly be said (p. 538) that Moscow was not ' consulted ' before the Potsdam Declaration was issued on 26 July, 1945. The Russians were informed and they asked, in vain, to have it delayed

—possibly fearing that the Japanese might surrender before Soviet armies could enter the war against them with full profit.

It is not generally realized that Chinese Communist forces had gone into action in Korea before their large-scale attack of 26 November, 1950 (p. 675). On 1 November they had attacked a battalion of the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment in strength inflicting heavy losses.

The leftist party, P.A.P., in Singapore is the People's Action Party, not Political Action Party (p. 614).

These are imperfections in a book that is, in the main, a solid achievement. As a general manual of history, it is a very useful addition to current serious literature on the Far East. Maps and a bibliography—admittedly not exhaustive—enhance the value of the well-produced volume.

PATRICK O'CONNOR

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945. By Alexander Dallin. London : MacMillan. 1957. 60s.

MR DALLIN'S book is a dispassionate, well-documented, survey of German occupation policy in Russia during the war. It is unlikely that the picture he paints will be much altered by later writers. If there are still any people who see Hitler's invasion of Russia as a pure-minded crusade to save Europe from Bolshevism they should read this book. The special place accorded to Russia in Nazi ideology was known to any reader of *Mein Kampf* or the works of the Nazi ' Philosopher ', Alfred Rosenberg, who was minister in charge of the occupied territories in the East. Official German policy in Russia was dominated by the crude racial principles and economic exploitation that formed the basis of the Nazi attitude. The spaces of Russia were to provide *lebensraum* for the German people and be colonized as if they were the empty prairies of North America and not the home of millions of slavonic peoples. The Russians were regarded as subhuman beasts unfit to rule themselves and destined to be serfs of the German *Herrenvolk*. Hitler himself stated that the Nazi goal was to ' deprive (the Eastern peoples) of any form of state organization and consequently keep them on as low a cultured level as possible. Our guiding principle must be that these people have but one justification for existence—to be of use to us economically '. Rosenberg himself was not prepared to treat the whole east as inferiors and endeavoured to foster separatism in the Ukraine and elsewhere. This difference was to lead him to constant clashes with more ruthless Nazis, and he finally had to give way in face of Hitler's support for the former.

In practice the exigencies of war and the differences between Rosenberg, the S.S. and other agencies prevented the full implementation of the Nazi policy. Nevertheless enough was done to alienate the vast bulk of the population which seems to have been ready enough to welcome the Germans. Resentment and fear were aroused by the treatment of prisoners of war (who were callously left to starve or freeze to death in their hundreds of thousands), the forced labour programmes (which dragged off 2.8 million men and women to Germany), and the excesses of individuals like the brutal Eric Koch, the Reichskommissar of the Ukraine. Opportunities to influence the populations in favour of the Germans were initially neglected. It was frequently urged

for instance by army leaders (if only in the interests of military expediency) and Russian experts that the redistribution of the collective farms into private hands would gain much needed support from the local population and increase production. When an agrarian reform law was finally introduced in February of 1942, much of the potentially beneficial results in this field were negatived by the inadequacy of the law and procrastination in its application. The crudity and bankruptcy of Nazi ideology was nicely epitomized by its educational policy of reducing the Russians to illiterate tools in contrast with the traditional myth of the Germans as the bearers of culture to the East. Hitler pontificated ' At the most, one must let them learn not more than the meaning of road signs . . . mathematics and such like are quite unnecessary '— and this was for the people who were to produce the first earth satellite ! As a consequence of this policy the school system tended to be grossly neglected, especially in the Ukraine.

The opening of the churches which the Germans permitted did gain them some small popularity. Hitler himself regarded Christianity as ' the heaviest blow that ever struck humanity ' but recognized that it was inexpedient to try to crush the churches. Nazi policy was directed, however, towards keeping the various Orthodox churches divided and promoting further divisions. Catholic Uniats, representing a supra-national church, received no encouragement.

The intensity of German exploitation varied from area to area. The Baltic states tended to fare better as candidates for germanization, and the Caucasians, being outside the area of potential German colonization and being non-Slavs, were given a large measure of autonomy. But the Ukrainians, despite Rosenberg's objections, were subjected to the ruthlessness of his nominal subordinate Koch, who had Hitler's support.

Mr Dallin's study serves to emphasize at least two points among others. First, the blindness that Nazi presuppositions inflicted on Hitler and others despite the practical disadvantages they involved. Compromises when they came were always ' too little and too late '. Secondly, the inefficiency that permeated the whole Nazi political structure, rent as it was by quarrels between the various agencies concerned with the East. The German failure was not only military but also political and economic.

BRIAN J. O'CONNOR

LITERATURE

ON POETRY AND POETS. By T. S. Eliot. London : Faber and Faber Limited. 1957. 21s.

MR ELIOT is notoriously fastidious about the writing and publication of his work. It is no surprise then that these critical essays contain nothing that is not of the highest standard. It is not merely a book that must be read by anyone seriously interested in literature. It is one that richly repays reading. Here we have mature Eliot, and it is pleasant to find that he has not repudiated the younger writer of the *Selected Essays* but has advanced to positions that are at once new and yet logical developments of his first thoughts.

Mr Eliot's charm comes from his combining unpretentiousness with great critical powers. As well as that he is readable because, writing at a time when it can hardly be said that ' society has achieved a moment of order and stability, of equilibrium and harmony ', his own prose has those qualities which he demands of a classical ' common style '. He repudiates all title to scholarship and claims only the right of a practitioner to speak about his craft. Thus he tells again how the notes to *The Waste Land*, in their present form, are the result of having to make the book a little longer to suit the printers. Now, to his alarm and perhaps secret delight, he finds that these notes, ' the remarkable exposition of bogus scholarship ', can never be ' unstuck '. If the poem were to be sold without the notes people would want their money back. When this sort of thing can happen it is no wonder he writes : ' I have been somewhat bewildered to find, from time to time, that I am regarded as one of the ancestors of modern criticism, if too old to be a modern critic myself '. He is constantly surprised to find, although for him they still have validity, that some of his ideas (dissociation of sensibility, objective correlative—' notorious ideas ') have had ' a truly embarrassing success in the world '.

But there is more than persuasive charm. These direct and disarmingly simple essays are certainly among the best instruments modern man has for appreciating poetry. They inevitably stimulate the ordinary reader or teacher and they are a happy hunting-ground for those who set examination papers or write M.A. theses : ' I therefore suggest considering Byron as a Scottish poet . . .'; ' *Paradise Lost*, like *Finnegans Wake* (for I can think of no work which provides a more interesting parallel : two books by great blind musicians, each writing a language of his own based on English) . . .' The essays are full of things like that : the shrewd mature judgment enlivened by a boyish vigour of thought which joyously makes molehills out of critical mountains.

Among the essays on poetry there are many old friends : *The Social Function of Poetry, The Music of Poetry, What is a Classic ?, Poetry and Drama, The Frontiers of Criticism.* On poets, we have the essay on Virgil, two studies of Milton, one each on Byron, Rudyard Kipling and Yeats. Most of the essays were written between 1940 and 1956 but *Milton I* dates from 1936 and there is an early essay (1926) on Sir John Davies.

Of the two ' new ' essays the Ballard Matthews Lecture, *Goethe as the Sage* (1955), discusses the nature of the ' great European ' poet as we find him in Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe. He must, Mr Eliot says, possess the attributes of abundance, amplitude, unity, permanence and universality. The second essay, hitherto unpublished, is *Johnson as Critic and Poet* (1944). It is, I think, as perfect an example as could be desired of Mr Eliot's main qualification to be a great critic. I mean his tolerance.

Mr Eliot, who ' combines a Catholic cast of mind, a Calvinist heritage, and a Puritanical temperament ', dislikes certain things, in life and in literature, intensely. But he does not allow his prejudices, his idea of what poetry should be like for instance (which naturally determined the character of his own poetry), from interfering with his fairness. It will be remembered that in 1928, in the introduction to Ezra Pound's *Selected Poems,* Mr Eliot wrote of the epigrams with such sympathy that it came as a surprise to find him say, ' I am not prepared to say that I appreciate epigrams : my taste is possibly too romantic '. In the present volume we have the introduction to *A Choice of*

Kipling's Verse which, by means of the same generous critical tolerance (not a tolerance of bad writing but of genre and unsympathetic ideas), has set many people free to enjoy publicly the *Barrack Room Ballads* or the *Seven Seas* who enjoyed them before in a shamed privacy. But the Essay on Johnson is magisterial in showing how this tolerance is achieved. It should be read not merely as an example of how to criticize but as a lesson in how to live.

JOHN C. KELLY

THE LION AND THE HONEYCOMB. By R. P. Blackmur. London : Methuen. 1957. Pp. 309. 25s.

THE Common Reader—let us continue to posit, fondly, his existence—is unlikely to read Mr Blackmur's Essays in Critique and Solicitude. This is unfortunate, because there are insights in these essays which are important in any understanding of contemporary society. Reading Mr Blackmur one feels yet again, and poignantly, the breakdown in communication which is the burden of Yeats, Joyce and Eliot, and which is so much a part of our own thoughts and fears. There is no question of blaming Mr Blackmur (for scorning the mob) or the Common Reader (for laziness and ill-will) : the causes are much more complex. It is enough, at this point and within the limits of a short review, to say that the level of Mr Blackmur's discourse is very ' high ' : most readers will find the book very difficult indeed.

Could Mr Blackmur have made it easier, less dense ? I doubt it. Of course he could have written other essays on the same subjects (Henry James, Melville, The Cultural Crisis, Henry Adams, T. E. Lawrence, Irving Babbitt, T. S. Eliot, Dante) but they would not have represented the insights which he, R. P. Blackmur, has been ' fated ' to acquire. Admittedly, in a BBC Third Programme broadcast last year Mr Blackmur succeeded in speaking generously and ' easily ' about a poem by Wallace Stevens ; and sometimes his writing is quite transparent. But more frequently he finds that the level of critical enquiry which interests him compels him to bear hard down on the language, nagging it to yield up his meaning. He can do very little with the single sentence. Usually such a sentence is merely a tentative and ' dark ' parade of a few key words which thereafter, forced, gradually illumine and justify one another. That is why it is so easy to quote a few lines and make Mr Blackmur seem a fraud : the syntactical unit of his discourse is the paragraph, not the sentence. In the paragraph he finds room to make his own persuasive gestures, taking the risk that his meaning will be private, unsupported by any communal patterns of idea or commitment.

This being so, one wonders who Mr Blackmur's readers are, or what audience he is likely to secure. As Professor of English at Princeton University he is read, I assume, by his own best students ; thereafter by fellow critics, graduate students of modern literature, and the keenest undergraduates. Conceivably one could write for this audience alone, choosing to ignore the millions. And indeed it is unlikely that Mr Blackmur will be invited to write for the *New York Times Book Review* or even for the *New Yorker*. But the trouble about *The Lion and the Honeycomb* is that Mr Blackmur does not seem to be in touch with any audience, even the one he has clearly secured for himself over

the past twenty years : he seems unable to act on any assumptions, even the most tentative, about his readers. Or else, as Cleanth Brooks has recently suggested, Mr Blackmur persists in the notion that others are as intelligent as himself. In this he errs.

Whatever the reasons (and I do not claim to have unearthed them) Mr Blackmur is dependent to an unusual extent on his own resources of insight and intelligence. Unlike Mr Trilling (see page 32 of *The Lion and the Honeycomb*) Mr Blackmur has no society whose code he can use as a pattern : the only mind he can use is his own. Hence, perhaps, the ruthlessness with which he trusts his own ' feel ', his own response to the work. Hence also his beautiful confidence in the heuristic power of words. What one values in Mr Trilling is the consistency with which he confronts literature from a point of view (even if not one's own) palpable and serious. We can trust him to exhibit, with his own solicitude, the virtues and the defects of one kind of public mind. Mr Blackmur lacks this relation and this consistency. He is well aware of this, and perhaps his new and deeper concern for the cultural dilemma is urging him to find for himself a relation to society, even if only that of the ironical observer.

We need this scrutiny, not only for what it reveals of our own condition, but as an example of flexible and daring intelligence. It is my understanding that *The Lion and the Honeycomb* is as fine an achievement, in its own way, as Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis,* Kenneth Burke's *Permanence and Change,* Wallace Stevens's *The Necessary Angel,* Francis Fergusson's *The Idea of a Theater,* and William Carlos Williams's *Selected Essays.* These works, so different in many respects, share an unusually high degree of intelligence and an unusually deep devotion. *The Lion and the Honeycomb* is a book which would inspire any student of literature who has the following gifts and commitments : keen intelligence ; good will ; a preoccupation with the role of the Word in human relations, and with that of Literature as an image of the human condition.

Denis Donoghue

GEORGE MOORE. Letters 1895-1933 to Lady Cunard. Edited by Rupert Hart-Davis. London : Hart-Davis. 1957. 27s. 6d.

Some writers live as much by their personality as their works. Byron is a good example of this class, a class to which many Irish writers belong. Swift comes at once in mind. So does Wilde, even without the scandal ; and Shaw was at great pains to impress himself on the world as ' a character '. He tried too hard. It is difficult for the Irish to avoid being ' characters '. (Joyce was *sui generis*—an Irish writer who put all he had into his work.)

In the future, when the wave of contemporary taste recedes and the wrecks of reputations lie like skeletons on the critical sands, one little vessel will be seen bobbing up and down in the water; on its bow will be written George Moore. Moore is Ireland's Boswell, but whereas Boswell's masterpiece was begotten by extraordinary reverence, Moore's owes its peculiar distinction to an almost alarming irreverence. In one respect the authors were not unlike. An absence of shame raised both to heights to which self-respect forbids

other writers to aspire. Boswell was a pious, lecherous drunkard ; Moore was an impious, frugal epicure. Boswell was a genius by accident, Moore by an infinite capacity for taking pains.

Mr Rupert Hart-Davis has recently edited and published some of the many thousand letters which Moore wrote to Lady Cunard. Understandably she had destroyed many of them in his lifetime ; what is more difficult to understand is why Moore destroyed all her letters to him. Did they tell too much by telling there was little to tell ? The publication of the Campbell letters was Shaw's amorous Waterloo ; perhaps the Cunard letters would have been Moore's Titanic.

These letters are not so much love letters as after-love letters. They reveal an affectionate, unexpected Moore. Whatever the original nature of his feelings may have been, he nourished all his life tender memories of the excitement the future Lady Cunard aroused in his self-centred, unimpassioned nature. She stimulated his imagination, stirred his heart and solaced the wound Mrs Craigie (John Oliver Hobbes) had given to his erotic vanity.

The publication of these letters has been something of an event in London, but Dublin (one critic excepted) has not been impressed by them. The plethora of literary genius in Ireland has made us forget ' the likes of George Moore '. Their effect on this reviewer was to send him back to the Moore shelf and, in particular, to Susan Mitchell's brilliant book, written at the height of the Georgian period.

Browsing on the Moores, I found certain very definite impressions forming in my mind. There had been various aspects of Moore—Moore the failed painter—the Manet-sided Moore, Moore the scandalmaker, Moore the Zolaist, Moore the gospel writer, Moore the cad, Moore the buffoon, Moore the Don Juan, Moore who wrote *Hail and Farewell.*

Most of these Moores have not worn well. *Tess of the d'Urbevilles,* surrounded though she be by cardboard figures, is as fresh as the day Hardy invented her ; Esther Waters might be a character in a Church Magazine serial. Helen Waddell's *Peter Abelard* makes Moore's story on that theme seem pretentious and dull. No biblical scholar, I should still prefer the Gospels from the four saints with whom they are usually associated than cross the Brook Kerith with St George. Moore the Blue Beard, Moore the Don Juan and Moore the buffoon have tended to merge into the one character ever since Susan Mitchell defied the notice BEWARE OF THE BULL and peeped over the hedge, only to see an ugly, innocent-looking, old gentleman asleep in a chair, a cigar in one hand, *The Sunday Times* in the other.

But the Moore who wrote *Hail and Farewell* was, I believe, a genius. By this book Moore ensured his immortality as a writer and as a literary character. On that particular shelf in English Literature on which Boswell's masterpiece takes first place, Moore's book takes, I believe, the second. His lack of reverence, which the moralist must deplore, combined with his sharp sense of character, his inspired buffoonery, his malice, his treachery and his highly-developed literary sense combined to produce this incorrigible but indisputable work of art. And for that reason everything about this odd man should be of interest to those who care for the craft of letters. This volume is an important addition to Moore's work and Mr Hart-Davis has written an introduction which is a model of tact, understanding and unobtrusive skill.

The letters are not exciting if one comes to them without any previous knowledge of the writer : but Mr Hart-Davis has been optimistic enough to assume the existence of an informed public. He deserves to find it. He will hardly do so in Dublin. For good measure he has added to the volume a passage out of *Héloïse and Abélard* (published twenty-seven years after Moore met Lady Cunard) which is obviously a reference to their own love affair. Moore urged his beloved to marry because ' if I wed thee thou wilt hate me in six months '. If they did not marry he believed ' our love shall last to the end of our lives '.

It may console those who are shocked by this to learn that the prophecy was disproved (as Moore knew when he wrote the passage). From 1909 Lady Cunard was to find more in the world of music than she had ever experienced with her middle-aged man of letters.

But he was faithful in his fashion, and wept over his pot of basil tears that were too literary and nostalgic to have caused him more agony than it was comfortable to bear. But who can measure feeling ? It is sufficient that in these letters the man whom we knew as a farceur in love appears in a more sympathetic character—affectionate, wistful, patient, humble and, at last, pathetic.

TERENCE DE VERE WHITE

MASTERY AND MERCY : A STUDY OF TWO RELIGIOUS POEMS. By Philip M. Martin. London : Oxford University Press. 1957. 15s. net.

HOPKINS's *Wreck of the Deutschland* and T. S. Eliot's *Ash Wednesday* are admittedly difficult poems which repel most well-intentioned readers and yield only a scanty return to even a sustained and serious study. Hence there is a real danger that such poems should join the list of those books which are praised but not read. It would indeed be a pity if these two great spiritual poems were relegated to that bleak limbo. Canon Martin has seen to it in *Mastery and Mercy* that they are made available for all who would like to get their spiritual message. Hence his book is primarily an exposition of the content of the poems and only incidentally a literary study.

In the *Wreck* Hopkins aims at showing the role of Christ the Redeemer in the tragedies and ills of human life : that it is only by a fellowship with His sufferings that the ills of life can find their explanation and antidote. In *Ash Wednesday* Eliot traces the way of a penitent soul from the first effective resolve, ' Because I do not hope to turn again ' through stages of doubt, temptation, discouragement up to a stage that may be taken as a kind of confirmation in righteousness. Both poems are obscure and for different reasons of style and genius. That of Hopkins comes from a certain concentration by which he fuses words and knots up images in a violent effort to convey the full value of his thought and emotion. Eliot is obscure partly because his thought is quick-darting and because he is extraordinarily allusive. He is essentially a learned poet and at least in this poem he is inspired rather by what he has read than by his own personal experience. In every stanza of *Ash Wednesday* the influence of Dante is strongly felt ; and the opening line of the ode of Dante's friend Cavilcanti, ' Because I do not hope to turn again ' sounds like a refrain throughout the poem.

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On one reader at least the impression left by a study of the two poems would be this: whereas the message of Hopkins is the utterance of a heart full of the love of Christ, and drawn from a powerful spiritual experience and as a result full of inspiration, the musings and meditations of Eliot seem strangely cold and unmoving ; they seem to be inspired mainly by the symbolized Christ of Dante's *Purgatorio,* and convey only faintly the notion of heartful contrition and love which should be the chief influences in a conversion.

Canon Martin has made a thorough study of the poems ; he has entered with sympathy and insight into the thought and mind of the writers ; he has given the commentary and explanation required for an understanding of their message. One might question here and there his interpretation. Does his exposition of ' a melting a madrigal start ' represent Hopkins's idea exactly? Is his attempt to show the influence of love of Christ in the poem of Eliot somewhat forced ? He certainly has rendered a genuine service to poetry and religious thought by making these two poems generally available in so satisfactory a manner.

HUGH KELLY

ROMANTIC IMAGE. By Frank Kermode. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1957. 18s.

IT may be, when all is said, that the primary function of the critic of poetry is to make people read poetry. If so Mr Kermode's book must be considered a success. It is provocative and likely to drive the reader to look again at some poems of the nineteenth century romantics (Arnold in particular), and, as well, at a great deal of Yeats with a quickened awareness and a slightly different point of view. For this we are grateful. The book had a mixed reception from the Sunday reviewers (perhaps the adverse criticism was influenced by the infuriating number of misprints) but it was noticed, which is after all the main thing. The book was worth notice because Mr Kermode, in spite of a detestable denseness and opacity of style, is very familiar not merely with the poets he writes about but with what the critics have said.

Romantic Image is informative and interesting. For instance, the development of the symbolist aesthetic in English (from Coleridge and Blake through Pater, Symons, Bergson to T. E. Hulme and T. S. Eliot) is dealt with in a clear and satisfying synthetic way. The explicitation of what is meant by ' image ' is helpful. In the plastic arts the image is frozen and static. In literature there is dynamism. In a drama, for instance, the image may well be the whole developed situation containing within itself many verbal and visual sub-images.

Mr Kermode, following Arthur Symons, is quite well aware of the pitfall, the enormous gulf of obscurity, into which a symbolist poetry can fall. Especially in a long poem, like Pound's *Cantos*, the search for concreteness in imagist writing may result in long passages of incredible unintelligibility : '. . . The difficulties are enormous, in terms of precision and the complexity of the symbolic relationships ; and the finished product . . . may be nothing but a confused heap of words, with only the isolated perfect details to show (how) dreadfully the artist has squandered his power '. (p. 118). Besides, if the whole

poem is image then, perhaps, not merely the whole work of one poet but the whole of literature is one gigantic image. This is not metaphysically absurd but it is still very difficult to demonstrate.

But these things are incidental to Mr Kermode's main theme which is the problem of the artist's isolation, the apparently inevitable and unbridgeable rift between life and art. For all the romantic poets (that is for all the major poets of the last fifty years except Hopkins) life is a threat to art and the artist. Once the poet became involved with living men and their problems

> '. . . his piping took a troubled sound
> of storms that rage outside our happy ground. . . .'

Yeats took an original position in looking on art as a threat to life and on death as the only solution of the dilemma. For this reason he and many others very often chose the image of the Dancer as the vehicle of their thought : life in his feet, and his face, as it were, a mask of death.

These poets made a false problem for themselves. The poet is by nature contemplative, but if he confine himself to the contemplation of limited beauty he can hope for no peace or satisfactory solution. It is a pity that more poets have not followed Mr Eliot's lead in reading St John of the Cross. The Uncreated is the only adequate object of contemplation. God is the ' still centre of the turning world '. Realizing that made it impossible for Hopkins to be a romantic. As Dr Leavis wrote in *The Common Pursuit* (p. 49), ' The Victorian-romantic addicts of beauty and transience cherish the pang as a kind of religiose-poetic sanction for defeatism in the face of an alien actual world—a defeatism offering itself as a spiritual superiority. Hopkins embraces transience as a necessary condition of any grasp of the real '.

JOHN C. KELLY

FURTHER PAPERS ON DANTE. By Dorothy L. Sayers. London : Methuen. 1957. Pp. 221. 25s.

THERE must be many people who remain in Miss Sayers's debt for their first introduction to *The Divine Comedy* through the medium of her spirited translation. To them this collection of papers may serve as a commentary and expansion of the principles behind Miss Sayers's work. The essays (or rather lectures, as most of them originally were) do not claim to be in any sense scholarly ; rather are they contributions to original critical appreciation of Dante and we must be grateful for such a rare commodity, even if Miss Sayers's views provoke disagreement.

Both the strength and the weakness of the book lie in this personal approach. Miss Sayers is in love with Dante and succeeds in communicating her enthusiasm to her readers. She goes far, for example, towards persuading us that Dante was a great comic writer '—with a range extending from Swift on the one hand to Jane Austen on the other ' (p. 21), though not everyone would be able to see this in the somewhat grim humour of the poem. The most helpful essay

in the book is ' Dante's Virgil ' (pp. 53-77) in which Miss Sayers throws a great deal of common-sense light on the role played not only by Virgil but also by the other great symbolical personages of the poem.

The danger of Miss Sayers's idiosyncratic though brilliant treatment is that she almost completely ignores previous scholarly studies of Dante. This is a pity, for it leads her into some controvertible assertions, particularly in the realm of the history of philosophy, a study vital for the understanding of Dante's matter, if not of his art. It is certainly not good enough after the work of Bruno Nardi, Etienne Gilson and others to persist in treating the Divine Comedy as ' Thomism set to music ' ; yet Miss Sayers comes perilously near to giving that impression. It is true that she makes a fleeting and vague genuflection to other views (p. 38), presumably to show that she is aware of them, but she makes little effort to take account of their findings and suggestions.

The paper on ' The Divine Poet and the Angelic Doctor ' (pp. 38-52) reads more like a piece of high-grade popular apologetic for Miss Sayers's own brand of High Anglican medievalism than a serious discussion of its official subject. The same must be said of ' Dante's Cosmos ' (pp. 78-101), which contains an excellent short explanation of Dante's cosmology ; but why does Miss Sayers feel it necessary to sharpen her claws once again on her favourite dislike, ' modern science', in the person of the late Sir Arthur Eddington (who was by no means as stupid as Miss Sayers represents him here) ?

The same unbalanced partisanship appears in ' Dante and Milton ' (pp. 148-181), a comparative study of the two poets reminiscent of the anti-Miltonic criticism which Mr T. S. Eliot made fashionable in the 1920s and repudiated in the 1940s. Much of Miss Sayers's treatment of both poets is based on speculation which she would be annoyed to hear described as psycho-analytical. Yet what other name can be applied to Miss Sayers's long drawn-out comparison (always of course to Milton's disadvantage) of the influence of the respective sexual experiences of the two poets on their literary productions ? Such influence undoubtedly existed, but would it not be safer to admit that we shall never in the nature of things be able to assess it ? How on earth, for instance, can Miss Sayers know that ' —Dante was sexually centralised, as Milton and Dickens were not ' (p. 162), whatever " sexually centralised " may mean ?

Another comparison, this time between Dante and the late Charles Williams (pp. 183-204) has the presumably undesired effect of convincing one that Williams's extravaganzas hardly gain much from the juxtaposition.

JOHN B. MORRALL

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

INSIGHT. By Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1957. Pp. xxx and 785. 63s.

THIS work will probably rank as one of the great philosophical treatises of the century. The subtitle is *A Study of Human Understanding,* which inevitably perhaps reminds one of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* or Hume's *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.* Like Locke's Essay and Hume's Inquiry, this is the kind of work which will undoubtedly be the subject of commentaries, interpretations, disputes (and postgraduate theses) for generations

to come. It is a work which would have delighted St Thomas, since it is a genuine attempt at *vetera novis augere et perficere.*

The first part of the work, running to more than three hundred pages, is a valuable introduction to philosophy, though it is of course a great deal more than this. It is a most important contribution to satisfying the growing demand from scientists for something to read in which the philosopher's knowledge of scientific thought is at least comparable to the level of his philosophical insight. The sheer breadth of Father Lonergan's intellect is exciting and, in the most literal meaning of the word, astonishing. Mathematics, mathematical physics, physics, psychology, neurology, bio-chemistry, logic, he takes in his stride. But the work is not a treatise *de omni scibili* (*et de aliquibus aliis rebus*). For he is not concerned as such with what is known, but with the structure of the knowing : the aim is ' a development that can begin in any sufficiently cultured consciousness, that expands in virtue of the dynamic tendencies of that consciousness itself, and that leads through an understanding of all understanding to a basic understanding of all that can be understood '. The author modestly says : ' This is not an erudite work '. While admiring his humility, one must of course enter the direct negative.

One of the great merits of the first part is the inductive approach to the presentation of philosophical problems. Step by step, the reader is led on to see the problem, and once the problem is seen the answer emerges. It would be impossible to give in a short notice any intelligible summary of the argument. Suffice it to say that the first half of the work is a leading on of the reader through the kind of knowledge acquired in the empirical sciences, through logic, psychology and cosmology, to the point where metaphysics becomes possible. Each individual reader will probably find some chapter or section of outstanding value. For the logician, this is certainly the chapter on the ' Canons of Empirical Method '. This is as good a treatment of scientific methodology as one is likely to meet. Mill's ' Methods ', long outmoded and never taken seriously by scientists, will appear even puerile by comparison. To the physicist and cosmologist, probably chapter V on ' Space and Time ' will make the greatest appeal.

There are no concessions to a mythical ' general reader '. The ' sufficiently cultured consciousness ' which the author writes for assumes a mature mind which is abreast of the intellectual world on many fronts at once. Such a mind will have little difficulty in following the argument through part I. But when the author in part II moves explicitly into metaphysics and epistemology, it will require all the resources at one's command to keep up the pace. Part II will be the subject of controversy for years to come. For this is not traditional metaphysics. It is not a re-statement but a re-thinking of the Aristotelian-Thomistic line of thought and, as the author very rightly claims, any criticism of his positions must be made in the light of his other, more historical, studies of St Thomas. This re-thinking has been done in the light of the great metaphysical systems since St Thomas. One can discern particularly a Hegelian strand, introduced perhaps through the author's familiarity with Kierkegaard and later existentialism. Father Lonergan quite rightly points out (page 594) how he differs from Hegel, but one cannot help picturing future students getting him out of context and arguing, as scholars do, about particular phrases. If ' Being is the objective of the pure desire to know '

(page 348) and ' The objective of the pure desire is the content of knowing . . .' (page 349), will not a future commentator be tempted to say ' Therefore Being is the content of Knowing '. One knows what Father Lonergan means, of course, but there is a problem about the phrase ' content of knowing '. It is well that we should be stimulated and excited by Father Lonergan to reflect on our own principles and terminology. The problem of terminology is one which each philosopher must solve for himself. Father Lonergan's, while difficult and sometimes new, is an indispensable instrument in his pursuit of insight. It must be mastered as one proceeds, otherwise whole sentences will be unintelligible. Consider : ' Inasmuch as one accepts the counter-positions, one thinks of the real as a subdivision in the " already out there now ", of objectivity as extroversion, and of knowing as taking a good look ; similarly, on the counter-positions, the good is identified with objects of desire while the intelligible good of order and the rational good of value are regarded as so much ideological superstructure. . . .' (page 624).

The book is full of good things. One foresees philosophers and theologians for generations to come arguing, criticizing, re-stating the treatment of the existence and nature of God : ' If the real is completely intelligible, then God exists '. A new and great work of philosophy is a rare and welcome event. One must congratulate and humbly thank Father Lonergan for his achievement. One must also admire and thank Messrs Longmans and Company, particularly for their courage in bringing out this full-scale metaphysical treatise in a philosophical world and climate of thought which is so tragically anti-metaphysical.

E. F. O'DOHERTY

RE-APPRAISAL OF ORIGEN. Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène. By Henri Crouzel. Paris : F. Aubier. 1956. Pp. 287.

ORIGEN, the great scholar, exegete and spiritual writer of Alexandria, died seventeen hundred years ago, probably in 254. His death was hastened by the imprisonment and tortures which he suffered for the faith under the persecution of Decius. He left behind him so many works that even antiquity soon lost count of them : St Epiphanius said 6,000, St Jerome, who translated many of them, 2,000. He left a reputation so high that Jerome in a moment of enthusiasm said of him : ' In his other books he surpassed everybody. In the commentary on the Canticle of Canticles, he surpassed himself '. St Gregory of Neo-Caesarea wrote his panegyric ; the great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and Gregory, made an anthology of his works. Yet his recent centenary, as Fr Crouzel remarks, passed unnoticed, though he was one of the earliest and most influential of the great theologians.

There is no mystery about his fate. Within fifty years of Origen's death, parts of his doctrine were being censured. A hundred years later, St Jerome found that his unstinted praise of Origen might compromise his own orthodoxy, and uttered cautions which ended a famous friendship when Rufinus refused to join in the palinode. It was this Rufinus, ' a man who never changed his opinion or betrayed his teacher ', whose loyalty to Origen provoked St Jerome into that unworthy stream of invective which left us this classic pen-picture of a professor :

> Waddling like a tortoise, old pig-faced Grunter (i.e., Rufinus) came into class. It was all he could do to get out a few words at a time, so that you would think he was sobbing, not speaking. All the same, when his desk was ready, with a heap of books on exhibition, he would knit his brows, pinch his nose, wrinkle his forehead, and snap his fingers to call his class to attention. Then came a spate of sheer nonsense, and a string of adversaries to be denounced one by one. You would think he was an arbiter of elegance like Longinus, and the guardian of Roman eloquence, to hear him branding his dislikes and banishing them from the ranks of the academy. He had plenty of money, so he made a much better impression at the dinner-table. And no wonder, because he dined and wined his friends in droves. And this provided him with a wedge of noisy chattering supporters when he appeared in public : a Nero at heart, a Cato to look at, a dubious character from any point of view. You would have had to call him a monster made up of strange and incongruous parts, or a new sort of beast built on the lines of ' The head of a lion, the rump of a dragon, a chimaera in between '.

This tirade is typical of the storms that were gathering about the memory of Origen, and which were to issue in the thunderbolts of anathema at the fifth General Council, Constantinople, 553.

The picture of the monster which Jerome applied to the innocent Rufinus would fit much better the writings of the Alexandrine : parts of these are sublime and forceful, parts might be labelled poison, and parts dismissed as fantasy. Fr Crouzel, in the good company of Basil, Gregory, and Jerome unprovoked, tries in his summary of Origen's theology to show its strength at its best, its limitations when applied to problems of which the solution was not yet ripe, its roots in the impossible speculations which make so much of Origen tiresomely far-fetched. As the central issue round which he builds the unsystematic and somewhat inconsistent Origen into some sort of organic whole, he takes the notion of ' the image of God ', that is, the exemplarism which operates in the Word, divine and incarnate, in the world of spirits and in man, each in their own nature and degree. He shows that though Origen based himself on Scriptural themes, and of course held steadfastly to the common faith of the Church, the course of his speculation was directed by the Platonic theory of subsistent, separate, Idea-forms, and that this wedding of Christian revelation and Hellenic thought was not always happy and fruitful theologically, though often heart-warming in the moral and mystical sphere.

The inner drive of the derivative image towards its original perfection became in the theology of Origen a valuable link between doctrine and practice. But the notion of image tended to blur the distinction between natural and supernatural in created things and, in the Trinity, tended to represent the Word as an inferior reproduction. Hence the charges levelled against Origen, that he was the father of the Pelagian, Arian and other heresies. Fr Crouzel, writing one of the most balanced apologies which have appeared on behalf of Origen, absolves him from the guilt of conclusions which he never firmly drew, and which were excluded by his deepest convictions. But he does not

re-write Origen in terms of a more developed dogma, which was the fault for which Jerome fell out with Rufinus. Thus the book clarifies and advances the history of theology.

It also offers a short but comprehensive picture of the development of philosophical schools up to neo-Platonism. The clarity and firmness of Origen's thought shows up most strongly when compared with the emanationism of his contemporary, Plotinus, who sat with Origen at the feet of Ammonius Saccas. One interesting point is that Origen ranked Aristotle as an atheist, along with Epicurus. That means that Aristotle's denial of God's particular providence towards men made a bad impression on antiquity. And this suggests that if it is the general impression that counts, not the abstruse precisions and reservations of an author, the centuries have not in fact been unjust to Origen himself. He was using an unworkable philosophy, the Platonism that fascinated the many followers of Plato, but which the philosopher himself seems to have abandoned in his latest works.

KEVIN SMYTH

PUBLIC WORSHIP. By J. A. Jungmann, S. J. Translated by Clifford Howell, S.J. Challoner Publications : 21s.

' C'EST LE PREMIÈRE PAS QUI COUT ' is a shrewd adage. The first move in a cultural, educational, social or spiritual reform movement is decisive. Most reform movements within the Church have originated in a leader, who combined the qualities of a thinker and a doer. The modern socio-liturgical movement stirring the Church began with St Pius X. Pope Leo XIII clarified social teaching but his famous encyclicals caused hardly a ripple outside a limited circle. The Pope of the Eucharist and the Liturgy called for action, formed a plan, fixed its objective and decided on the means to attain it. The basis of his plan for 'the restoration of all things in Christ' was 'active participation of the faithful in the Sacred Mysteries and in the solemn public prayer of the Church '. From that programme the liturgical reform movement has never departed, although at times it seemed to wander off into bypaths. There were periods when it got lost in musical labyrinths, ritualist extravagances and ceremonial intricacies. Happily it has returned in recent years to the path marked out for it by ' The Parish Priest of the world '. The pastoral aspects of liturgical reform now receive pride of place in conferences and study circles devoted to the progress of social and spiritual reform within the Mystical Body of Christ. This return to simplicity and sanity is due in large measure to the study of intellectual giants like Fr Jungmann, S.J., who is a professor of theology in the University of Innsbruck. His popular writings on the Mass and the Liturgy, and his books on education have had a strong impact not only on professors and teachers but also on the average alert and educated Catholic. His latest work, now made available to English readers in a flowing translation by Fr Clifford Howell, S.J., ought to exercise great influence. Should it become a standard text book for seminaries and teaching centres generally, the liturgical movement will not be lacking in leaders properly indoctrinated and equipped to lead the faithful to the ' fountains of living water ' provided by the liturgy.

The book is a masterly survey of the beginning and development of liturgical worship, its decline in the post-Reformation period, and the measures now being taken by the Holy See to restore communal or corporate worship. Fr Jungmann refrains from pressing his own point of view on the reader or indulging in controversial side issues. He keeps to the facts of history and lets them speak for themselves. That method is more convincing than any special pleading or devotional exhortation.

Every Catholic realizes the importance of the Mass in his spiritual life. Often he does not know how to make the best use of it. This work of only 300 pages will enable any teacher to give a thorough grasp of ' the summit or centre of the Christian religion ' to adult pupils. Understanding is bound to lead to appreciation and, perhaps, to the re-establishment of the Mass as the central formative influence in the life of a Catholic community.

J. S. Fennelly

THE SACRIFICE OF THE CHURCH. By J. A. Jungmann, S.J. Translated by Clifford Howell, S.J. Challoner Publications : 5s. and 7s. 6d.

Some books are merely read. Others arouse interest and perhaps a spirit of enquiry. Others succeed in setting the mind revolving furiously in a new direction. Fr Jungmann's little classic on the Mass is of the disturbing variety : one can hardly read it through without receiving a mental and spiritual jolt. This matter-of-fact story of the Mass and its vicissitudes is more impressive than any devotional treatise. Here, one feels, is the perennial Sacrifice in perspective. One might call it a compendium or summa of all that has been said or written about the Eucharist by theologians, spiritual writers and historians.

It comes from the pen of an all-round scholar of international fame. His views have breadth, depth and the reasonableness that derives from expert knowledge combined with wide teaching experience. Professor, pastor and people will find this book on religion to their liking. For any teacher it is indispensable.

Fr Jungmann holds strongly that a purely catechetical approach to the Mass is wholly inadequate. It is not enough to know the anwers found in the catechism and to be able to take the sacred rite assunder. It is more important to put the Mass together and make it glow with life. Synthesis yields more beneficial results than analysis. The liturgy uses the synthetic method. He writes : ' indeed what the catechism tells us about the Mass is all perfectly true : here are the very thoughts and concepts we find in any treatise on dogmatic theology. But that is not an unmixed advantage : it implies also a weakness. The advantage is that we have a warrant for the basic thoughts and concepts in which the essence of the sacred mystery is, to some extent, expressible. The weakness is that these thoughts and concepts are only the basis : we cling to ideas crystallised out by controversies which arose in the eleventh century. Of all the heritage of previous years (that which chiefly finds expression in the liturgy) there remains very much of great importance which is ignored '.

Fr Jungmann regrets the decline of liturgical prayer and practice in favour of private devotions and pleads eloquently for a return to corporate worship. Modern legislation aims at such a revival. ' From the time of the Apostles until to-day the Eucharist has ever been acknowledged as the most precious of all the treasures entrusted by Christ to His Church. The altar is the focal point of the Church : the Sunday Mass is the greatest event of the week : so it has ever been. But it is another question altogether whether at all times, including the present, this treasure has been fully used and rendered as fruitful as possible for the spiritual life of God's people '.

The author uses a striking simile to illustrate this point : ' the liturgy of the Mass appears to have suffered a fate very like that of many an ancient building, which, in the course of centuries, has been enlarged and adapted to make it suitable for new purposes. In such a case it may well happen that, with changed conditions and style of living, people hardly know what to do with certain parts of the building. They may end up by dwelling in only a small part of the whole complex structure, while the remaining parts become unused. Something like this has happened to the Mass . . . It would be a great pity if we, with a kind of bourgeois modesty, were content to live in a mere corner of this sublime castle of the liturgy. Here are vast halls in which the people of God, including the people of our day, can be assembled and brought closely together '.

Chapter II on the teaching efficacy of the forepart of the Mass, and its use as medium of religious education and spiritual training, is worthy of serious consideration. We cannot afford to overlook the old method of teaching used by the Church herself for many centuries.

Chapter III, dealing with the causes of the decline of corporate worship and making suggestions for a revival, is penetrating and practical. Here is a book that can give the ordinary reader a proper view of the Mass as it was, as it is, and as it would be if the liturgical teaching of the last four Popes were taken seriously. The translation by Fr Clifford Howell reads like an original.

J. S. FENNELLY

THE MASS IN TRANSITION. By Gerald Ellard, S.J. Milwaukee : The Bruce Publishing Co. 1956. Pp. 387. 6 dollars.

THE dust-wrapper of Fr Ellard's book carries beneath the title the pictures of four Popes : St Pius X, Benedict XV, Pius XI and Pius XII ; and this may be regarded as a kind of completion of the title : for the book deals with the transition through which the liturgy of the Mass has been going during these four pontificates. Or, perhaps, it would be more correct to say that it treats of the general liturgical transition that has been taking place during this time, with special reference to the Mass.

In manuals of liturgical history the period following the establishment of the Congregation of Rites (1588) is usually referred to as one of liturgical ' stability ' or ' fixity ' or ' changelessness ' : the formulae and ceremonies of the liturgy were regarded as something quite settled and immutable and the Congregation endeavoured to secure uniformity of practice everywhere as far as possible. Moreover, the liturgy had come to be looked on very much as

a strict clerical preserve and the laity's part was merely to be present at its performance. Only in the second half of the last century did a change in this attitude begin to make itself felt. The first stirrings took place quietly, almost imperceptibly, in the re-established or newly-founded Benedictine monasteries on the Continent : Solesmes, Beuron, Maredsous, Maria Laach. Then in 1903, just after his accession, Pope St Pius X issued his *Motu proprio* on Sacred Music and Chant and enunciated what was a rather startling principle for those days : that ' active participation' in the public worship of the Church was the ' foremost and indispensable fount ' of the true Christian spirit. Gradually what we now call the ' liturgical movement ' or ' liturgical revival ' took shape, to receive finally its great pontifical charter in the present Holy Father's encyclical on the liturgy, *Mediator Dei,* in 1947. During the last fifty years, we may say, interest in the liturgy has been developing in ever-increasing measure, together with a realization of the pastoral importance of the liturgy, a consciousness of the need for liturgical reforms and a desire for greater participation by the laity in the liturgical ceremonies. Once again, after centuries of pretty rigid stability, the liturgy is in a state of transition.

Fr Ellard in the present book studies the developments that have taken place with regard to the Mass during this last half-century and very wisely considers them always in this wider context of general liturgical change and reform. Among subjects to which a chapter each is devoted are : Simpler Rubrics, Church Architecture, Ecclesiastical Art, Vernacular Missals, the Dialogue Mass, Sacred Music and Congregational Singing, the question of the rearrangement of the Sunday Epistles and Gospels (much discussed at recent International Liturgical Congresses), the concept of Sacrifice, Holy Communion and the Mass, the Constitution *Christus Dominus* of 1953 (by which many concessions were made in the Eucharistic fast), Evening Masses (allowed in certain circumstances by this same Constitution), the restored Holy Week order (introduced last year). Finally, at the end, there is a chronological list of all the chief liturgical events of the last fifty years.

The Mass in Transition contains a vast amount of information, clearly put and well documented, by a liturgist of expert knowledge (he is Professor of Liturgy in the Jesuit Theologate in Kansas, U.S.A.) and wide reading. But Fr Ellard is no dry-as-dust purveyor of facts ; he loves the liturgy and is enthusiastic about it ; and his love and enthusiasm appear all through the book and communicate themselves to the reader too. Some might prefer a more strictly chronological and less diffuse treatment of the matter dealt with ; and it might be better too if some of the longer documents were just briefly quoted or summarized in the text and given in full later in an appendix (e.g. the present Holy Father's encyclical on Sacred Music is cited in full *within* a chapter and long sections from *Mediator Dei* are sometimes similarly quoted). But this is a matter of opinion. We can earnestly recommend Fr Ellard's most interesting and very readable book to all who want to be up-to-date in their knowledge of the great liturgical revival that is going on in the Church in our time, particularly with regard to the Mass.

P. C. Barry

MASTER ALCUIN, LITURGIST. By Gerald Ellard, S.J. Chicago : Loyola University Press. 1956. Pp. 226. 4.00 dollars.

Alcuin of York, the Englishman who was such an important figure at the court of Charlemagne at the end of the eighth century : we are familiar with him as a scholar and an educator. But perhaps we seldom think of him as a liturgist. And yet a liturgist he also was, in fact ' lord high liturgist ' of the realm, as Fr Ellard styles him, and the principal agent in the considerable liturgical reform accomplished by Charlemagne. Liturgical reform was, indeed, needed in the eighth-century Frankish kingdom. The old native Gallican liturgy had by this time become rather decadent and many abuses had arisen. The low standard of clerical training caused many difficulties ; liturgical books were scarce and often badly transcribed ; and there was a formidable lack of uniformity in practice, from diocese to diocese and even sometimes from parish to parish. Charlemagne's problem was to restore dignity and unity to the liturgy, and for help to do this he naturally turned to Rome. His general aim was to introduce into his kingdom the Roman liturgy and make it obligatory for his clergy to follow the liturgical usage of the capital of Christendom. And in doing this Alcuin was his chief helper.

Fr Ellard's book begins with two chapters which set the scene : one, entitled ' Liturgical Anarchy ', giving a general picture of the liturgical situation in the Carolingian Empire, and another, ' Alcuin at Court ', on Alcuin's early life and his coming to the court of Charlemagne. The rest of the book studies in detail Alcuin's part in the development and unification of the liturgy under Charlemagne. The Roman Sacramentary which the Emperor obtained from Pope Hadrian about 785 A.D. was, as Fr Ellard says, ' the heart and soul of the entire Carolingian programme for liturgical uniformity ', and consequently the story of its adaptation by Alcuin and of the Supplement he added to it is fully told. An interesting chapter deals with the collection of Votive Masses put together by Alcuin, ' partly by adaptation but mostly by composition '. Very many of them survive in our present-day Missal ; they are ' Alcuin's personal monument in the liturgy, his lasting impression on Western piety '. Other matters treated are : Alcuin's interest in liturgical chant, the *Comes* or Lectionary which he prepared, his defence of the triple immersion in the Baptismal rite, his revision of the Bible, his influence in having the Creed inserted into the Mass. Finally there is a short account of Alcuin's last years as Abbot of St Martin's, Tours, and in the concluding chapter on ' The Roman Rite after Alcuin ' his permanent influence on the Roman liturgy is briefly assessed.

The book is excellently produced, extremely well documented and, while keeping always on a high scholarly level, is simply written and does not presuppose any specialized liturgical knowledge on the reader's part.

P. C. Barry

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